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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 77 Records
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2013 (7) TMI 1121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . 10. Mr. Ganguly, learned senior counsel appearing for the Appellant has not contended that the Government Orders mentioned above are ultra vires the Disabilities Act or that they are devoid of being functional. This is also the dialectic favoured by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the impugned judgment, which we affirm. 11. In this analysis we cannot but conclude that the Appellant has failed to disclose any Legislation or Rules or Orders that would facilitate, support or legitimise his claim for being conferred with the advantage of age relaxation, which is presently available only to SC/ST/OBC candidates. It is for these reasons that regretfully we are unable to locate any merit in the present appeal. Interim orders are accordingly recalled and the appeal is dismissed. Keeping in view the fact that the Appellant has not succeeded before the Single Bench as well as the Division Bench, as also before us, he shall be liable to pay costs to Respondent No. 1.
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2013 (7) TMI 1115 - SUPREME COURT
Termination of service - temporary government servant - removed without holding any inquiry - advertisement published for the 250 posts of Constables - appointment by misrepresentation - involved in a criminal case - concealment of fact while giving information in regard to clause 4 and clause 7 of Proforma of Affidavit - HELD THAT:- We do not find any force in the submission made by Ms. Nanita Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, that the clause 4 and 7 have to be read together and such information was required to be furnished only and only if the person faced the trial and not otherwise.
It is a settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an office by misrepresenting the facts or by playing fraud upon the competent authority, such an order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. “Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.”
In the instant case, the High Court has placed reliance on the Govt. Order, relating to verification of the character of a Government servant, upon first appointment, wherein the individual is required to furnish information about criminal antecedents of the new appointees and if the incumbent is found to have made a false statement in this regard, he is liable to be discharged forthwith without prejudice to any other action as may be considered necessary by the competent authority.
The purpose of seeking such information is not to find out the nature or gravity of the offence or the ultimate result of a criminal case, rather such information is sought with a view to judge the character and antecedents of the job seeker or suitability to continue in service. Withholding such material information or making false representation itself amounts to moral turpitude and is a separate and distinct matter altogether than what is involved in the criminal case.
The persons violating the law cannot be permitted to urge that their offence cannot be subjected to inquiry, trial or investigation. (Vide: Union of India v. Maj. Gen. Madan Lal Yadav [1996 (3) TMI 472 - SUPREME COURT] and Lily Thomas v. Union of India & Ors.,[2000 (5) TMI 1045 - SUPREME COURT].
The courts below have recorded a finding of fact that the appellant suppressed material information sought by the employer as to whether he had ever been involved in a criminal case. Suppression of material information sought by the employer or furnishing false information itself amounts to moral turpitude and is separate and distinct from the involvement in a criminal case.
Thus, the appeal is devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1114 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in his cross-examination five years earlier. The question of, therefore, any fresh cause of action arising at the time of pronouncement of the judgment does not arise. The limitation for the present suit should be held to have begun on the date when the statement was made during cross-examination, particularly since there was no other witness examined on behalf of the Ministry of Railways. The suit is therefore barred by limitation as it has been filed more than five years after the alleged defamatory statements were made. 24. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court concludes that the plaint fails to disclose any cause of action to support the present suit for libel and defamation against the Defendant. The plaint is accordingly rejected. The Defendant's application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is allowed with costs of ₹ 5,000 which will be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant within four weeks. Consequently, the suit and all pending applications are dismissed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1113 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as in charge of the business of the Company, as every Director need not be and is not in charge of the business of the Company. 36. In the instant case on hand also, the respondent, who is the complainant in the above said cases has not stated as to how the complaints have been filed against the petitioners. In the absence of appropriate answer on the part of the respondent, this Court, without any hesitation, can exercise the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., and quash the criminal proceedings of the case in S.T.C.Nos.1290, 1292 and 1293 of 2007, on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Madurai, in respect of the petitioners alone. 37. In the result, these criminal original petitions are allowed and the criminal proceedings in S.T.C.Nos.1290, 1292 and 1293 of 2007, on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Madurai are quashed in respect of the petitioners alone. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1098 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aint under Section 190(a) read with Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. will not lie under Section 372 of the Cr.P.C. before the Sessions Court' but lie before the High Court with Special Leave under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C. only. Thus, in the instant case, I find that the appeal against acquittal of the accused in a complaint filed under Section 190(a) read with Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. alleging an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, would not lie before the Sessions Court under Section 372 of the Cr.P.C. and the same will lie before this Court with the Special Leave under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C. Thus, there is no illegality or impropriety in the impugned judgment dismissing the appeal by the learned Sessions Judge on the ground of the lack of jurisdiction. Needless to say, this order will not stand in the way of seeking proper remedy, before this Court. In the result, the judgment under challenge is confirmed and this revision petition is dismissed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1092 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ermine the duty to be assigned to her. In view of her reinstatement, now the Respondent authority may get opinion of the doctor for assigning her duty. In case the Appellant is not in a position to perform the normal duty because of her mental condition, the competent authority will apply Proviso to Section 47(1) of the said Act. 24. Having regard to the fact that we have upheld the order passed by the Commissioner, we direct the authorities to reinstate the Appellant in service immediately and to pay her regular salary every month. The Appellant shall be entitled to arrears of salary w.e.f. 1.2.2008 which the Respondent shall pay within three months, else the Appellant shall become entitled to interest at the rate of 6 per annum with effect from 1.2.2008 till the actual payment. 25. The appeal is allowed in the manner indicated above and the orders passed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2013 (7) TMI 1086 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dent to fortify its contentions. In a proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. if it is established that the substratum of the prosecution case is found to be shaky, then certainly the court has jurisdiction to interfere to prevent a vexatious litigation. It has been repeatedly held that the vicarious criminal liability has to be construed strictly. In the absence of a foundation on which the prosecution can build its edifice, this Court finds that the prosecution against the petitioners is nothing but an abuse of the process of court. In the result, i. All Criminal Miscellaneous Cases are allowed. ii. Annexure-A complaint in each case, in so far as it relates to the petitioners, is hereby quashed. It is made clear that the complainant/2nd respondent can proceed with the complaint in respect of other accused named in the complaint. All Criminal Miscellaneous applications to accept documents will stand allowed. All other Criminal Miscellaneous applications will stand disposed of.
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2013 (7) TMI 1081 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... draw present petition without prejudice to right to file appropriate fresh proceedings for same claim. 2. Learned advocate for the respondent does not have any objection if such liberty is granted to the petitioner. 3. Therefore, at this stage present petition is disposed of in view of the aforesaid aspects, however with the clarification that it will open to the petitioner to take out appropriate proceedings in appropriate Court, including petition seeking winding up in accordance with the provisions under the Act, Company Court Rules and prescribed form in accordance with law. With the aforesaid clarifications, the petition stands disposed of as withdrawn. Notice is discharged.
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2013 (7) TMI 1075 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e minister acted out of extraneous considerations. Suspicion, however, strong cannot be proof of the charge of mafafide. It is only on clear proof of high degree that the court could strike down an action on the ground of malafide which standard of proof was not, in our opinion, satisfied in the instant case. To the extent the High Court held the action of the minister to be malafide, the impugned order would require correction and Civil Appeals No. 2856 and 2857 of 2002 allowed. 47. In the result we dismiss Civil Appeals No. 2853/2002, 2854/2002 and 2855/2002 with cost assessed at ₹ 5,00,000/- to be paid by Appellant No. 1-Mutha Associates to the beneficiary of the acquisition-APMC, Pune. We, however, allow Civil Appeals No. 2856 and 2857 of 2002 filed by Shri Narayan Rane to the extent that the finding recorded by the High Court regarding malafides against the Appellant in that case is reversed and the judgment and order passed by the High Court accordingly modified.
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2013 (7) TMI 1074 - SUPREME COURT
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act) - After 37 years of initiation of the acquisition proceedings - Petition for hand over vacant possession of the land - The High Court directed respondent No.5 to hand over a portion of the developed area to the appellant free of cost. - HELD THAT:- the writ petition filled after almost three decades of pronouncement of the award by respondent No.2 and there was no tangible explanation for the delay. We have no doubt that if the appellant had pressed its prayer for issue of a mandamus to the official respondents to deliver possession of the acquired land after evicting the slum dwellers, the High Court would have non-suited it on the ground of laches by taking cognizance of total inaction between 23.6.1998, i.e., the date on which Deputy General Manager (Planning) had written letter to respondent No.2 to hand over vacant possession of the acquired land or refund the compensation, and January, 2006, when exchange of correspondence again started. The High Court would have also taken note of the fact that while the appellant was sleeping over its rights, the Municipal Corporation had sanctioned Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, the Cooperative Society formed by the slum dwellers had entered into development agreement with respondent No.5 and the latter had constructed buildings and handed over 600 units to the slum dwellers for permanent residence and dismissed the writ petition by applying the ratio of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai 1964 (1) TMI 33 - Supreme Court
Hence, Apex court do not find any justification for entertaining the prayer for issue of a mandamus at this belated stage by ignoring the developments which have taken place in the intervening period.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed as barred by time and also on merits.
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2013 (7) TMI 1065 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... appoint the appellants in the revised merit list placing them at the bottom of the said list. The candidates who have crossed the minimum statutory age for appointment shall be accommodated with suitable age relaxation. 28. We clarify that their appointment shall for all intents and purpose be fresh appointment which would not entitle the appellants to any back wages, seniority or any other benefit based on their earlier appointment. 29. The order passed by the High Court shall stand modified to the above extent. Appeals disposed of. 30. There shall be no order as to costs. Contempt Petition No. 433 of 2011 in Civil Appeal No.5320 of 2013 ( S.L.P. (C) No. 26349 of 2011) In view of the orders passed in Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 26341-26342 of 2011 and Special Leave Petition (C) No. 26349 of 2011, nothing survives in this Contempt Petition for our consideration and decision. The Contempt Petition is accordingly dismissed as having become infructuous. Ordered accordingly.
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2013 (7) TMI 1050 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ase, the Department will deny even that relief. 2 However, it has now been clarified that in terms of the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court, the Petitioner would be permitted to bring his Lawyer when he is attending in pursuance of the summons issued by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence. However, the Lawyer should be within the hearing distance as stipulated in the judgments. 3 Since the clarification as above has been given, nothing survives in this Writ Petition and it is disposed of.
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2013 (7) TMI 1049 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rned officers of the Union of India dealt with the serious issue involving challenge to the validity of law enacted by Parliament and the rules framed thereunder. The non -appearance of the counsel engaged by the Union of India on the dates appointed for hearing the case is quite intriguing. Prima facie, it gives an impression that the counsel engaged by the Union of India had some other idea and, therefore, he refrained from representing the cause not only of its client but the people of India. We are sure that the Government of India will take remedial measure and ensure that only those advocates are engaged by it who are serious and sincere in representing the cause of public before the Courts. We also make it clear that as a sequel to setting aside of the interim order passed by the High Court, the Central Government and the Governments of all the States shall be bound to rigorously implement the provisions of the 2003 Act and the 2004 Rules as amended from time to time.
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2013 (7) TMI 1044 - SUPREME COURT
Amendment introduced to Sections 2, 4, 9 and 17, as well as insertion of Sections 31-A, 31-B, 31-C, 37-A, 37-B to the Maharshi Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1995 (Act No.37 of 1995) - The amendment was by way of Amendment Act No.5 of 2000, hereinafter called the “Amendment Act” - Held that:- Amended Section 4(1) under Act 5 of 2000 inclusive of the introduction of proviso to the said Section is ultra-vires of the Constitution and the same is liable to be set aside.
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2013 (7) TMI 1024 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the owners of jenmom lands in the Malabar area 1 are the proprietors of the soil and the minerals underneath the soil - In Present case, a `jenmi '2 holds jenmom 3 lands as absolute owner and has proprietary rights over both the soil and subsoil. The ryotwari settlement made by the British Government in the Malabar area of the erstwhile Madras Province only obligated the jenmis to pay revenue to the State but did not in any way affect their proprietary rights in the lands. Nor did the ryotwari settlement have the effect of transferring and vesting the ownership either of the land or the subsoil (minerals) to the State. In support of this submission, the appellants heavily relied on a judgment of this Court in BALMADIES PLANTATIONS LTD. & ANR. VERSUS STATE OF TAMIL NADU [1972 (4) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT] and also a standing order of the Board of Revenue of the erstwhile Madras
HELD THAT:- there is nothing in the law which declares that all mineral wealth sub- soil rights vest in the State, on the other hand, the ownership of sub- soil / mineral wealth should normally follow the ownership of the land, unless the owner of the land is deprived of the same by some valid process. In the instant appeals, no such deprivation is brought to our notice and therefore we hold that the appellants are the proprietors of the minerals obtaining in their lands. We make it clear that we are not making any declaration regarding their liability to pay royalty to the State as that issue stands referred to a larger Bench.
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2013 (7) TMI 1018 - SUPREME COURT
Rules for Licensing and Controlling Places of Public Amusement (other than Cinemas) and Performances for Public Amusement including Melas & Tamashas - dance bars - High Court declared that Sections 33A and 33B of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 are ultra vires Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India - held by the High Court that dance performed by the bar dancers can not fall within the term “freedom of speech and expression” as the activities of the dancers are mainly to earn their livelihood by engaging in a trade or occupation -
Held that:- We do not agree with the submission of Mr. Subramanium that the impugned enactment is a form of additional regulation, as it was felt that the existing system of licence and permits were insufficient to deal with problem of ever increasing dance bars. We also do not agree with the submissions that whereas exempted establishments are held to standards higher than those prescribed; the eating houses, permit rooms and dance bars operate beyond/below the control of the regulations. Another justification given is that though it may be possible to regulate these permit rooms and dance bars which are located within Mumbai, it would not be possible to regulate such establishments in the semi-urban and rural parts of the Maharashtra. If that is so, it is a sad reflection on the efficiency of the Licensing/Regulatory Authorities in implementing the legislation. 120. The end result of the prohibition of any form of dancing in the establishments covered under Section 33A leads to the only conclusion that these establishments have to shut down. This is evident from the fact that since 2005, most if not all the dance bar establishments have literally closed down. This has led to the unemployment of over 75,000 women workers. It has been brought on the record that many of them have been compelled to take up prostitution out of necessity for maintenance of their families.
In our opinion, the impugned legislation has proved to be totally counter productive and cannot be sustained being ultra vires Article 19(1)(g).
We are also not able to agree with the submission of Mr. Subramanium that the impugned legislation can still be protected by reading down the provision. Undoubtedly, this Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Vs. P. Laxmi Devi (Smt.) (2008 (2) TMI 850 - SUPREME COURT) upon taking notice of the previous precedents has held that the legislature must be given freedom to do experimentations in exercising its powers, provided it does not clearly and flagrantly violate its constitutional limits, these observations are of no avail to the appellants in view of the opinion expressed by us earlier. It is not possible to read down the expression “any kind or type” of dance by any person to mean dances which are obscene and derogatory to the dignity of women. Such reading down cannot be permitted so long as any kind of dance is permitted in establishments covered under Section 33B.
We are also unable to accept the submission of Mr. Subramanium that the provisions contained in Section 33A can be declared constitutional by applying the doctrine of severability. Even if Section 33B is declared unconstitutional, it would still retain the provision contained in Section 33A which prohibits any kind of dance by any person in the establishments covered under Section 33A.
In the present case, the restrictions in the nature of prohibition cannot be said to be reasonable, inasmuch as there could be several lesser alternatives available which would have been adequate to ensure safety of women than to completely prohibit dance. In fact, a large number of imaginative alternative steps could be taken instead of completely prohibiting dancing, if the real concern of the State is the safety of women.
Keeping in view the aforesaid circumstances, we are not inclined to interfere with the conclusions reached by the High Court.
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2013 (7) TMI 1010 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... orders of the Supreme Court in Review Petition (C) No. 2309/2012 in Writ Petition (C) No. 210/2012, titled as Union of India v. Namit Sharma, wherein interim orders have been passed on 16th April, 2013, the respondent has initiated the process of appointment of the Information Commissioners at the Central Information Commission. He further states that in case the said Special Leave Petition comes to be dismissed, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court shall be implemented in full, subject, of course, to such further or other orders or judgment that may be passed by the Supreme Court either in the aforesaid Special Leave Petition or in any other matter pertaining to the subject matter of these proceedings. 2. The statement of counsel for the respondent is accepted by this Court. 3. Counsel for the petitioner states that under the circumstances, he does not wish to press this contempt petition any further. 4. The petition is disposed of as not pressed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1007 - CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
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... ... ..... he relevant time and that it was impossible for him to attend to all the RTI applications simultaneously and respond to them in the prescribed time frame, cannot be disregarded. Overload of work does partly explain the delay on the part of CPIO in giving inspection of leave records of President, CESTAT. 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in my view, the ends of justice will be met if a penalty of ₹ 5,000/ is imposed on Shri Victor James the then CPIO. The Commissioner, East Delhi Municipal Corporation is hereby directed to recover an amount of ₹ 5,000/ from the salary of Shri Victor James, Director (Vigilance) and have a Demand Draft made in favour of ‘PAO CAT’. This Demand Draft should be sent to Shri Pankaj K.P. Shreyaskar, Director, Central Information Commission, August Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaji Cama Place, New Delhi 110 066. The Demand Draft should reach the Commission in 5 weeks’ time from the receipt of this order.
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2013 (7) TMI 1005 - SUPREME COURT
Appeal or revision the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Section 151 C.P.C. - Held that:-
In the instant case as noticed above, when the complainant’s application under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. was rejected for the second time, he moved the High Court challenging the said order under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. on the ground that the Sessions Court had not correctly appreciated the facts of the case and the evidence brought on record. The complainant wanted the High Court to set aside the order after holding that the evidence brought on record is sufficient for coming to the conclusion that the appellants were also involved in the commission of the offence.
In our considered opinion, the complainant ought to have challenged the order before the High Court in revision under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. and not by invoking inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Maybe, in order to circumvent the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 397 or Section 401, the complainant moved the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. In the event a criminal revision had been filed against the order of the Sessions Judge passed under Section 319 of Cr.P.C., the High Court before passing the order would have given notice and opportunity of hearing to the appellants.
So far as the inherent power of the High Court as contained in Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is concerned, the law in this regard is set at rest by this Court in a catena of decisions. However, we would like to reiterate that when an order, not interlocutory in nature, can be assailed in the High Court in revisional jurisdiction, then there should be a bar in invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. In other words, inherent power of the Court can be exercised when there is no remedy provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure for redressal of the grievance. It is well settled that inherent power of the court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision in the Code under which order impugned can be challenged.
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The intention of the Legislature enacting the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Civil Procedure vis-à-vis the law laid down by this Court it can safely be concluded that when there is a specific remedy provided by way of appeal or revision the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Section 151 C.P.C. cannot and should not be resorted to.
Whether the High Court exercising its revisional jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., while considering the legality and propriety of the order passed under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. - Held that:- Indisputably, a valuable right accrued to the appellants by reason of the order passed by the Sessions Court refusing to issue summons on the ground that no prima facie case has been made out on the basis of evidence brought on record. As discussed hereinabove, when the Sessions Court order has been challenged, then it was incumbent upon the revisional court to give notice and opportunity of hearing as contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 401 of Cr.P.C. In our considered opinion, there is no reason why the same principle should not be applied in a case where such orders are challenged in the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.After giving our anxious consideration in the matter, we conclude by holding that the High Court has committed a grave error in passing the impugned order for the reasons given hereinbefore. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and remand the matter back to the High Court to consider the matter afresh after giving an opportunity of hearing to the present appellants.
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2013 (7) TMI 988 - SUPREME COURT
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Entitlement for payment of gratuity or GPF or any of his retiral benefits of Government Servant - The appellant joined Health Department, of the respondent State, as Medical Officer and took voluntary retirement. Appellant claimed that he had not been paid all his retiral benefits, and penal rent for the said period had also been deducted from his dues of retiral benefits without giving any show cause notice to him. Appellant made various representations, however, he was not granted any relief by the State authorities. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred a complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum.
Whether government servant fall under the definition of a “consumer” as defined under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act - HELD THAT:- it is evident that by no stretch of imagination a government servant can raise any dispute regarding his service conditions or for payment of gratuity or GPF or any of his retiral benefits before any of the Forum under the Act. The government servant does not fall under the definition of a “consumer” as defined under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act. Such government servant is entitled to claim his retiral benefits strictly in accordance with his service conditions and regulations or statutory rules framed for that purpose. The appropriate forum, for redressal of any his grievance, may be the State Administrative Tribunal, if any, or Civil Court but certainly not a Forum under the Act.
Therefore, Shri Narendra Hooda, learned Senior AAG, Haryana has made a statement that All the dues for which the appellant had been entitled to had already been paid and the penal rent has also been dispensed with and the State is not going to charge any penal rent. If the State has already charged the penal rent, it will be refunded to the appellant within a period of two months.
The Appeal stands disposed of.
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