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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 61 to 77 of 77 Records
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2013 (7) TMI 932 - SUPREME COURT
Whether after the death of the original lessee, Rajendra Nath Bhaskar, all rights come to an end and the first respondent or any other legal heir(s) were neither entitled to continue with the lease nor entitled for renewal of lease?
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2013 (7) TMI 878 - SUPREME COURT
Constitutional validity of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 - Disqualifications for persons being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament as well as a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of the State - Held that:- The result of our aforesaid discussion is that the affirmative words used in Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) confer power on Parliament to make one law laying down the same disqualifications for a person who is to be chosen as member of either House of Parliament or as a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State and for a person who is a sitting member of a House of Parliament or a House of the State Legislature and the words in Articles 101(3)(a) and 190(3)(a) of the Constitution put express limitations on such powers of the Parliament to defer the date on which the disqualifications would have effect. Accordingly, sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act which carves out a saving in the case of sitting members of Parliament or State Legislature from the disqualifications under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act or which defers the date on which the disqualification will take effect in the case of a sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature is beyond the powers conferred on Parliament by the Constitution.
Looking at the affirmative terms of Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) of the Constitution, we hold that Parliament has been vested with the powers to make law laying down the same disqualifications for person to be chosen as a member of Parliament or a State Legislature and for a sitting member of a House of Parliament or a House of a State Legislature. We also hold that the provisions of Article 101(3)(a) and 190(3)(a) of the Constitution expressly prohibit Parliament to defer the date from which the disqualification will come into effect in case of a sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature. Parliament, therefore, has exceeded its powers conferred by the Constitution in enacting sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act and accordingly sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution.
We do not also find merit in the submission of Mr. Luthra and Mr. Kuhad that if a sitting member of Parliament or the State Legislature suffers from a frivolous conviction by the trial court for an offence given under sub-section (1), (2) or (3) of Section 8 of the Act, he will be remediless and he will suffer immense hardship as he would stand disqualified on account of such conviction in the absence of sub- section (4) of Section 8 of the Act. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang & Ors. [1995 (1) TMI 268 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] has held that when an appeal is preferred under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [for short ‘the Code’] the appeal is against both the conviction and sentence and, therefore, the Appellate Court in exercise of its power under Section 389(1) of the Code can also stay the order of conviction and the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code can also stay the conviction if the power was not to be found in Section 389(1) of the Code.
As we have held that Parliament had no power to enact sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act and accordingly sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution, it is not necessary for us to go into the other issue raised in these writ petitions that sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It would have been necessary for us to go into this question only if sub- section (4) of Section 8 of the Act was held to be within the powers of the Parliament. In other words, as we can declare sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act as ultra vires the Constitution without going into the question as to whether sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, we do not think it is necessary to decide the question as to whether sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Sitting members of Parliament and State Legislature who have already been convicted for any of the offences mentioned in sub-section (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act and who have filed appeals or revisions which are pending and are accordingly saved from the disqualifications by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act should not, in our considered opinion, be affected by the declaration now made by us in this judgment. This is because the knowledge that sitting members of Parliament or State Legislatures will no longer be protected by sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act will be acquired by all concerned only on the date this judgment is pronounced by this Court. Refer Judgement in case of Harla v. State of Rajasthan [1951 (9) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT]. - Decided in favour of appellants.
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2013 (7) TMI 858 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Compounding of an offence under Section 74 of U.P. Excise Act, 1910 – Petitioner was granted licence for retail sale of country liquor in accordance with the provisions of U.P. Excise (Settlement of Licenses for Retail Sale of Country Liquor) Rules, 2002 for the execise year 2010-2011 - Petitioner in fact was selling country liquor, which was issued for sale for the previous excise year i.e. 2009-2010. Under the provisions of Rules, 2002, it is mandatory that the outgoing licencee at the end of the excise year shall surrender all the stocks pertaining to that year and is not entitled to sale the liquor of the previous year, under the licence for current year - Petitioner more or less admitted sale of liquor of the previous year and on that basis the Collector proceeded to cancel the licence of the petitioner – Held that:- Court finds that absolutely no application was made by the petitioner at any point of time under Section 74 of U.P. Excise Act, 1910 for the offence being compounded. Compounding of an offence under Section 74 of Act, 1910 is at the discretion of the licencing authority. If the petitioner has failed to avail the remedy so provided and has contested the proceedings on merit, he cannot now be permitted to turn around and contended that the offence should have been compounded instead of cancelling his licence – Decided against the Petitioner.
Forfeiture of security money of licence – Held that:- No such plea had been raised before the State Government. Order of statutory authority cannot be challenged on a ground not raised/pressed before the authority concerned – Decided against the Petitioner
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2013 (7) TMI 815 - CHATTISGARH HIGH COURT
Refund of licence fee along with interest for the period of cancellation of licence of Hotel-Bar Licence - The Licencing Authority considered the representation of the residents and without affording any opportunity of being heard to the petitioner, cancelled the aforesaid licence granted to the petitioner on 22.6.2003 - Section 31 of the C.G. Excise Act, 1915 shows that the power given to the Licencing Authority for cancellation of the licence to be exercised on certain conditions which are enumerated in Clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (1) of section 31of the C.G. Excise Act, 1915. If any of the above conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 31 appears to be there, the Licencing Authority entitled to cancel the licence of the concerned licencee after giving due opportunity of hearing to him/her and if a licence is cancelled on the above breach, then only, under sub-section (3) of Section 31, the holder of a licence, permit or pass shall not be entitled to any compensation for its cancellation or suspension nor to the refund of any fee paid or deposit made in respect thereof - The Licencing Authority has taken a view that the cancellation of the licence was not u/S 31 (1), therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to any refund as per sub-section (3) of Section 31.
Section 32 of the Act, 1915 – The section provides power to the Licencing Authority to withdraw licences. It provides that whenever the authority which granted any licence under this Act considers that such licence should be withdrawn for any cause other than those specified in Sec.31, it shall remit a sum equal to the amount of the fees payable in respect thereof for fifteen days, and may withdraw the licence either- (a) on the expiration of fifteen days’ notice in writing of its intention so to do, or (b) forthwith without notice. Sub-Section (3) of Section 32 further provides that when a licence is withdrawn under sub-section (1), any fee paid in advance or deposit made by the licencee in respect thereof shall be refunded to him, after deducting the amount (if any) due to the Government.
Held that:- The petitioner had deposited Rs.2,50,000/- as the licence fee for the period commencing from 30.4.2003 to 31.3.2004 - She was entitled to refund of the licence fee for the period of closure i.e. from 22.6.2003 to 31.8.2003 as would be determined on the basis of the total fee of Rs.2,50,000/- for the above period - Argument relating to refund of fee of one month, i.e. for the period in between 1.4.2003 to 29.4.2003, is concerned, the petitioner cannot make a claim for the same, because, for grant of the licence to the petitioner, she had paid the licence fee only on 26.4.2003. Thus, the grant itself became due in her favour on 26.4.2003 or immediately thereafter and not prior to it – Thus, refund allowed along with simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 31.8.2003 till realization – Decided in favor of Assessee.
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2013 (7) TMI 715 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Cancellation of licence of liquor shop - Transaction or carrying of illicit liquor recovered from Petitioner’s vehicle – Such transportation is within his knowledge - One of the accused arrested from the spot had clearly stated that the petitioner who is the owner of the vehicle, carries business of transportation of illicit liquor through this vehicle and that he had been working for him. He had further stated that the petitioner had allowed the use of the vehicle for transportation of the illicit liquor and whatever profits are earned are shared with the petitioner – Held that:- The aforesaid statement of one of the accused clearly proves the tacit consent of the petitioner and that he had knowledge of such illegal activity. The said statement has not been controverted by any material, evidence or is proved to be false otherwise - The recovery of illicit liquor from the petitioner's vehicle though he may not be present or using the vehicle at the relevant time, would amount to recovery from his possession as the vehicle continues to be in his persuasive possession – Decided against the Petitioner.
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2013 (7) TMI 680 - SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction to entertain the petition for offence punishable u/s 138 - whether the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to try the accused for an offence punishable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act where a cheque is deposited for collection or would it be only the Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over the drawee bank or the bank on which the cheque is drawn - Held that:- The Mumbai Court has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint – court relied upon the judgement of K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Another (1999 (9) TMI 941 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) - if the five different acts were done in five different localities - any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence u/s 138 - the complainant can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done - the amplitude stands so widened and so expansive it is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question regarding the offence u/s138.
whether the sending of notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action in taking cognizance under the N.I. Act – Held that:- The place where the cheque was presented and dishonoured has jurisdiction to try the complaint - issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action but communication of the notice - Section 178 of the Code has widened the scope of jurisdiction of a criminal court and Section 179 of the Code has stretched it to still a wider horizon – appeal decided against the appellant.
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2013 (7) TMI 605 - SUPREME COURT
Recovery - Liability for pay order - Whether Defendant proved that the pay order was issued by Plaintiffs on behalf of CMF – Held that:- the plaintiff had proved that it had bought the securities through the broker - It is the specific case of defendant that the broker informed it that the plaintiff has made payment - defendant had not been able to prove that payment was made by the plaintiff - the natural corollary thereof was that the payment was made by the plaintiff to defendant to purchase the bonds - it had delivered the bonds to the plaintiff - the payment had been made with a clear understanding and arrangement that the bonds would be delivered by Canbank Mutual Fund to the plaintiff on account of the money having been paid by the plaintiff to said defendant.
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2013 (7) TMI 602 - CHATTISGARH HIGH COURT
Sale of contry liquor - Circular asking for affixing of hologram is supported by any statutory provision - The Appellant could not sell country liquor unless the bottles had holograms affixed upon them. It is a compulsory exaction of money and amounts to tax - Article 265 of the Constitution prohibits any taxation without there being any law. No tax or fee can be imposed without being supported by any statutory provision. There is no statutory provision for issuing the Circular. It is violative of article 265 of the Constitution – Held that:- The affixation of holograms is merely a regulatory measure. This decision was taken by the State Government and direction in the form of the Circular was issued by the Commissioner to stop smuggling and evasion of excise duty under rule 4(12) of the Rules framed under the power conferred on the State Government under section 62 of the Chhattisgarh Excise Act, 1915. It is supported by a statutory provision – Decided against the Assessee.
Damages, Return/Refund of price cannot be claimed - Circular was issued by the Commissioner on 23.05.2001 during continuance of the 2000-Tender. After issuance of the Circular, ten months period was still left. The Appellant continued during this period without raising any objection; it never claimed relief on this account: it was only after completion of this 2000-Tender and expiry of six months of the 2002-Tender that the Appellant started objecting to the price of the holograms – Held that:- There cannot be estoppel and acquiescence against constitutional and statutory provisions - The claim of the Petitioner cannot be denied on the ground of estopple – However, Circular is supported by a statutory provision and has statutory force – Therefore, no refund/return can be claimed – Decided against the Assessee.
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2013 (7) TMI 601 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Liquor license - Rule 62 under Section 85 of the Act as well as Rule 9 of the 2003 Rules - A foreign liquor ‘ON’ shop licence - Objections raised by the local people, which included number of Councillors of the local municipality - It does not appear that the Collector had conducted any enquiry to find out the creditworthiness of the complaint(s) – Held that:- Among other things, enquiry must be directed to ascertain the veracity of the allegations levelled by the petitioner in this writ petition regarding vested interests of a group of people, who are standing in the way of a licence being granted in his favour. Copies of the report of enquiry shall be made available to the petitioner as well as the respondent no. 6 (who appears to be the primary objector to grant of licence in favour of the petitioner) as well as the Councillor of the ward in which the site proposed is located. No other Councillor of the local municipality shall be entitled to participate in the proceedings, unless he is a resident of that ward and objects to grant of licence as a resident and not on the authority of the office he holds. A Councillor, even though not resident of the concerned ward, may be allowed to participate in the proceedings if he satisfies the Collector of his right to object - Report of enquiry is furnished and an appropriate reasoned decision shall be taken on the petitioner’s application keeping in mind the relevant factors including location of other nearby liquor shops and the likelihood of loss of State revenue, should the petitioner be unable to offer any alternative site.
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2013 (7) TMI 588 - SUPREME COURT
Inherent power of High Court - Whether the High Court while entertaining the petition under Section 482 of the Code has exceeded its jurisdiction. The powers under Section 482 are inherent which are to be exercised in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances - jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Cr.PC has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection - It has been held that at an initial stage a court should not embark upon an inquiry as to whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not – extraordinary or inherent powers did not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice - the power being extraordinary has to be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional circumstances – court relied upon the judgement of State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan (1988 (10) TMI 260 - SUPREME COURT).
What amounts to conspiracy – difference between conspiracy and negligence - Professional misconduct - Whether the respondent was liable for abusing their official position as public servants and for having conspired with private individuals u/s 120-B, 419, 420, 467, 468 471 r.w. Section 109 of the IPC and Section 13(2) r.w. Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Held that:- He cannot be charged for the offence under Sections 420 and 109 of IPC along with other conspirators without proper and acceptable link between them Lawyer owes an “unremitting loyalty” to the interests of the client and it is the lawyer’s responsibility to act in a manner that would best advance the interest of the client - merely because his opinion may not be acceptable - he cannot be mulcted with the criminal prosecution – particularly - in the absence of tangible evidence that he associated with other conspirators – court followed the judgement of Pandurang Dattatraya Khandekar vs. Bar Council of Maharashtra & Ors. (1983 (10) TMI 225 - SUPREME COURT) - At the most he may be liable for gross negligence or professional misconduct if it is established by acceptable evidence - the liability against an opining advocate arises only when the lawyer was an active participant in a plan to defraud - there was no evidence to prove that respondent was abetting or aiding the original conspirators – decided against the CBI.
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2013 (7) TMI 587 - SUPREME COURT
Sealed cover process – eligibility for promotion - Whether the respondent was eligible for promotion – gross misconduct in the matter of checking and passing the bills of various firms involved in manufacturing and supplying of cast iron sleeper plates was alleged - tribunal dismissed the application – High court decided in favour of respondent - On the relevant date the respondent’s batch mates were promoted - on that date the respondent was not under suspension - no charge sheet was served upon him nor he was facing any criminal prosecution – Held that:- Disciplinary proceedings commence only when a charge-sheet is issued to the delinquent employee – the recommendation of the DPC has to be honored and there is no question of applying ‘sealed cover process’ as decided in Union of India and Others vs. K.V. Jankiraman and Others(1991 (8) TMI 292 - SUPREME COURT) - the findings of his entitlement to the benefit are kept in a sealed cover to be opened after the proceedings in question are over - disciplinary proceedings commence only when a charge sheet is issued - Departmental proceeding is normally said to be initiated only when a charge sheet is issued – court agreed with the decision of the High Court – decided against the appellant.
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2013 (7) TMI 551 - SUPREME COURT
Damages for detention - whether the appellant was entitled for any damage for having detained for around two months u/s 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act - Held that:- respondents have failed to bring on record the evidence to show that the appellant was engaged or was making preparations for engaging in any of his activities as a 'Goonda' which may affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order - there was nothing on record to suggest that the appellant by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually committed or attempted to commit or abetted the commission of offence - there was no sufficient cause for detention of the appellant- there was nothing on the record to suggest that the appellant while in service took part in pro-police association activities or formed any association - there was nothing on the record to suggest that he formed another association after retirement - the respondents had failed to bring on record any evidence to suggest that the appellant incited the police personnel of Tamil Nadu to form an association to fight their rights against the Government - the respondents had also failed to bring on record that the appellant toured to various Districts and incited serving police personnel over forming an association in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order.
Personal liberty - Personal liberty is of the widest amplitude covering variety of rights - Its deprivation shall be only as per procedure prescribed in the Code and the Evidence Act conformable to the mandate of the Supreme Law, the Constitution - the investigator must be alive to the mandate of Constitution and is not empowered to trample upon the personal liberty of a person when he had acted by malafides – as decided in State of Bihar and another vs. P.P. Sharma, IAS(1991 (4) TMI 365 - SUPREME COURT).
Intention to form Association - whether the intention of the appellant was to form Association of Police force amounts to causing disaffection towards the Government established by law to attract Section 3 of Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922 – Held that:- Respondent grossly abused legal power to punish the appellant to destroy his reputation in a manner non-oriented by law by detaining him under the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 in lodging a Criminal Case No.11/98 under Section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1992 and under Section 505(1)(b) of the IPC based on the wrong statements which were fully unwarranted - Nothing had been brought to the notice of the Court to prove that the appellant with intent to cause fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public or to induce to commit an offence against the S/G or against the public tranquility issued the press statement - for attracting the penalty under Section 3 for causing disaffection - it needs to be proved that the person concerned intentionally caused or attempted to cause or done any act which is likely to be disaffection towards the Government established by law in this country among the members of the Police force or induces or attempts to induce or does any act which he knows likely to induce any member of the Police force to withhold his service or committed breach of discipline.
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2013 (7) TMI 550 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Forfeiture of Property - detention under the provisions of COFEPOSA, 1974 - Unexplained investment - Tainted money - Petitioner's husband detained under Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 - More than 50% value of construction cost unexplained - Construction cost of property determined at current rate by valuation officer - Held that:- It is seen that the petitioner's mother had gifted the property by way of registered gift deed. As such, the landed property which is nil encumbered property cannot be considered as bought through illegally acquired funds derived from her husband's income. Therefore, the landed property could not be forfeited, as the subsequent matter of the present dispute is only regarding the superstructure. Therefore, the forfeiture of land, which had been gifted to the petitioner by her mother through a gift deed cannot come under the purview of the "Act". The property had not been purchased by her and the petitioner had only succeeded it through her mother.
The Income Tax Returns particulars furnished showed taxes paid on legal source of income and no case has been made out by the respondents to show that the Income Tax Authorities collect income tax for illegally earned money also and hence, this point is not sustainable under law.
The writ petitioner has failed to give detailed explanation regarding a portion of amount which had been utilized for the construction of the said building. It is imperative that the petitioner should give explanation regarding the source of income for the construction of the building, but she has failed to do so. The second respondent, being the competent authority is equally liable to give an explanation regarding the charge of "illegal money" received by the petitioner from her husband, by way of documentary evidence, but the second respondent has failed to establish their case that the writ petitioner had acquired illegal tainted money from her husband. Therefore, the impugned order of the competent authority has not been supported through documentary evidence. Therefore, the original impugned order passed by the second respondent /competent authority is not maintainable. As such, the subsequent order passed by the first respondent is also not sustainable under law.
This Court is of the further view that the second respondent had initiated the show cause proceedings in the year 1976. After the final order of the second respondent, the writ petitioner filed an appeal before the first respondent. So, the matter is pending on the file of both the respondents for about 20 years, which is an inordinate delay for deciding the issue regarding forfeiture of property. This delay has caused injustice to the petitioner.
The petitioner has been enjoying the interim order passed in W.M.P.No.819 of 1998, dated 21.02.1998. As such, she is enjoying the said property for a period of more than 14 years without any interference. Under the circumstances, the property cannot be forfeited after such a long period since the other expenses for maintenance of building has also been incurred by the petitioner including further investments. The interim order shows that there is a prima facie case on the side of the petitioner. - Decided in favour of petitioner.
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2013 (7) TMI 525 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Qualified audit report - Disciplinary proceedings against Chartered Accountant (CA) - Discrepancies in the audited balance sheet and profits and loss accounts - Respondent pleaded guilty before disciplinary committee - Held that:- balance sheet and profits and loss accounts of the assessee were incorrect - Whether the mistake was bonafide or not is not very material - Even if the computer typist took the last year's closing stock figure and adjusted the cane payment dues account to tally the balance sheet, the respondent was required to compare the closing figure with the closing balance in the books of accounts and the trial balance thereof - no evidence that the respondent cared to obtain confirmation from third parties regarding the amount due to them, which would have demonstrated that the cane dues as mentioned in the balance sheet are incorrect - He simply signed the balance sheet, profits and loss account prepared by the computer operator without verifying the correctness and authenticity of the facts and figures appearing therein - He failed to exercise the professional skill which he possessed by acting in a totally perfunctory manner - Respondent acted in a grossly negligent manner and failed to obtain sufficient information to warrant the expression of opinion in the balance sheet and profits and loss accounts - Following decision of In Re: Shri ´M´, An Advocate of The Supreme Court of India [1956 (10) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT] - Decided in favour of Council.
Quantum of punishment - Held that:- No malafide intention has been found on part of the respondent in furnishing incorrect audit report and financial statements - Respondent is in profession for more than 20 years with no history of any such misconduct in the past - Interest of justice will be served if respondent is severely reprimanded for his misconduct - Decided in favour of Council.
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2013 (7) TMI 326 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Communication of objection - Petitioner not informed of objection raised on trademark application - Authority treated application abandoned - Held that:- respondent was bound to communicate any objection or proposal in writing to the applicant. The respondent admittedly did not do so. Placing the notice of the website does not constitute compliance with that Rule 38(4) - Rule 38(4) by itself does not require an applicant for registration to inspect the respondents' website. The petitioner therefore cannot be imputed with the knowledge of the said letter - Mere posting of the letter on the website does not constitute communication of the objection or proposal in writing - Letter can be said to have been communicated to the petitioner only on the date on which the petitioner noticed it on the website - Petitioner's application for registration cannot therefore, be deemed to have been abandoned - Decided in favour of Petitioner.
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2013 (7) TMI 294 - CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
Non furnishment of information - Defence taken under RTI ACT - Held that:- CPIO has not complied with the directions of the FAA and his contention that the appellant has not approached him, establishes his casual approach towards RTI matters. The CPIO is supposed to take cognizance of the FAA’s directions. He is cautioned to be more careful in future while dealing with RTI matters - CPIO directed to allow inspection of the files within prescribed time limit - Decided in favour of petitioner.
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2013 (7) TMI 177 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Extension of time - Repair work not completed - construction of a world class Museum - Held that:- State Government would not chase the applicant; nor would forcibly evict him from his present residence at 6, Bailey Road, Patna. However, keeping in view the fund available to the applicant and the machinery available to him, the applicant ought to have adhered to the time-frame decided by the Court with consensus - applicant will make sincere efforts to complete the necessary repairs and renovations and will hand over the vacant possession of the residential bungalow at 6, Bailey Road in his occupation latest by 30th April 2013.
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