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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 221 to 240 of 27625 Records
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2025 (1) TMI 260
Relevant time for filing an application - whether the time for filing a Section 17 application commences when the party seeking to challenge the award receives a formal notice (18.11.2022) of the making of the award, or from the date such party is aware of the existence of the award? - HELD THAT:- The respondents had notice of filing of the award due to the order dated 21.09.2022, wherein the District Court had directed the respondents to hand over the balance fee to the arbitrators, following which the award shall be furnished. The respondents were completely aware of this direction, which sufficiently states that clearing the fees will result in the court notifying the filing of award. The limitation for filing objections to the award is 30 days, and is governed by Article 119(b) of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The trigger for the limitation to start running specified therein is the date of service of notice of the filing of the award. Section 14(2) of the 1940 Act requires that the court of relevant jurisdiction should give notice to the concerned parties when an award is filed.
While Art. 119(b) of the Limitation Act requires that there be a ‘service of notice’ for the limitation to start running, Section 14(2) of the 1940 Act merely states that court ‘give notice’ to the parties. The precise form of what constitutes as a ‘notice’ of filing the award is unspecified. However, interpreted reasonably, what must be required is that the parties come to know about the existence of the award so that any objections to it may be filed. What appears from the usage of the word ‘notice’ is that the parties merely reach a state of awareness about the award and plan their next steps accordingly, and not the imposition of another procedural step.
The District Court and the High Court fell into error that the limitation for filing objections was still running when the appellant filed an application under Section 17 of the Act on 10.11.2022. The formal date of notice of filing of the award on the respondents, that is, 18.11.2022 holds no significance as they were made sufficiently aware of the award ’s filing on 21.09.2022 itself. The court directing the respondents to clear the fees was a clear intimation about its filing. Holding otherwise would not only be departing from precedents of this Court, but also allowing the respondents to take advantage of their own inaction. Hence, the limitation is to be treated as expired on 20.10.2022, and the appellant’s application seeking pronouncement of judgment in terms of the award was valid and well beyond the period for filing objections to the award.
Conclusion - The parties have to take steps to scrutinise the award themselves as soon as it becomes accessible and they are aware of its accessibility. The limitation period was deemed to have started on 21.09.2022, making the appellant's application under Section 17 timely and valid.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 259
Principles of natural justice - whether the High Court has correctly exercised its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in granting the respondent/claimant one more opportunity to crossexamine appellant/respondent’s witness, despite the Arbitral Tribunal rejecting such a prayer? - HELD THAT:- Section 11 application was allowed by the High Court on 08.05.2023 leading to the constitution of the Tribunal which held the first hearing on 19.05.2023. It is evident that the cross-examination of the appellant/respondent’s witness RW-1 commenced on 09.12.2023 when the respondent/claimant’s counsel asked 9 questions on that very day and the cross was adjourned for 10.02.2024. On 10.02.2024, the record shows that the crossexamination commenced at 11 am and concluded by 7 pm during which time the respondent/claimant’s counsel asked as many as 104 questions to the said witness. After a long lapse of almost 8 months, during which period the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal was exhausted, the cross-examination commenced on 01.10.2024. Even on that day the cross-examination was commenced at 5.35 pm and concluded at 7.40 pm, which is more than two hours.
The Arbitral Tribunal seems to have given full opportunity to all parties, which is amply evident from the record. On the other hand, the unrestrained cross-examination of RW-1 by the respondent/claimant has already exceeded 12 hours, but the respondent/claimant does not seem to be satisfied with it.
Even as per the quote hereinabove interference under Article 226/227 is ‘permissible only if the order is completely perverse i.e. that the perversity must stare in the face.’ Condition (vi) to (x) underscores the reason why High Courts ought not to interfere with orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunals for more than one reason.
Conclusion - There are no justification in the order passed by the High Court in interfering with the directions of the Arbitral Tribunal holding that full and sufficient opportunity to cross-examine RW-1 has already been given and no further extension of time is warranted.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 216
Dishonour of Cheque - acquittal of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - rebuttal of presumptions raised u/s 139 and 118 of the NI Act - HELD THAT:- It is trite law that a Court while considering the challenge to an order of acquittal ought to only interfere if the Court finds that the appreciation of evidence is perverse.
The present case, however, relates to acquittal of an accused in a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. The restriction on the power of Appellate Court in regard to other offence does not apply with same vigor in the offence under NI Act which entails presumption against the accused. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of ROHITBHAI JIVANLAL PATEL VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. [2019 (3) TMI 769 - SUPREME COURT] had observed 'However, such restrictions need to be visualised in the context of the particular matter before the appellate court and the nature of inquiry therein. The same rule with same rigour cannot be applied in a matter relating to the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, particularly where a presumption is drawn that the holder has received the cheque for the discharge, wholly or in part, of any debt or liability. Of course, the accused is entitled to bring on record the relevant material to rebut such presumption and to show that preponderance of probabilities are in favour of his defence but while examining if the accused has brought about a probable defence so as to rebut the presumption, the appellate court is certainly entitled to examine the evidence on record in order to find if preponderance indeed leans in favour of the accused.'.
It is also well settled that once the execution of the cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that the holder of the cheque/ respondent received the cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability are raised against the accused.
On a perusal of the record, it is seen that right from the time of framing of notice, the statement of the respondent under Section 313 of the CrPC, and during the course of the trial, the respondent denied taking any loan from the appellant. The respondent, however, did not dispute the issuance of the cheque in question, or his signatures on the cheque. He consistently maintained that it was in fact the respondent who had advanced the loan to the appellant - It is pertinent to note that the presumptions under Section 118 and 139 of the NI Act are not absolute, and may be controverted by the accused.
From a perusal of the record, it is apparent that the respondent was acquitted of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act chiefly on the premise that on a juxtaposition of the financial status of both the parties, the respondent appeared to be more financially sound that the appellant.
In the present case, except for the averments made by the respondent, no material is led to demonstrate that the appellant did not possess the financial wherewithal to advance the said loan in question. Even at the stage of cross-examination, no question is put to the appellant to indicate that she did not possess the financial means to advance the loan in question. For this reason, in the opinion of this Court, the burden never shifted upon the appellant to demonstrate that she possessed the means to advance the said loan.
Conclusion - The respondent failed to rebut the presumptions raised against him under Sections 139 and 118 of the NI Act.
The impugned judgment dated 24.07.2019, acquitting the respondent of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is accordingly set aside - List on 16.01.2025 for further directions.
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2025 (1) TMI 133
Acceptance of an illegal gratification from the original complainant - whether CBI had power to register the FIRs and investigate offences qua respondent No.1 in the appeals? - whether the FIR for offences under the PC Act could be registered in Hyderabad in the State of Telangana when the offences alleged to have been committed at places within the State of Andhra Pradesh and for that reason whether the CBI Court in the State of Telangana got jurisdiction to try the offence under the PC Act in respect of offences allegedly committed at places falling within the State of Andhra Pradesh?
HELD THAT:- The term ‘law’ was defined in para 2(f) of the Circular Memo dated 26.05.2014. The said definition, as extracted above, would reveal that it would take in any order, bye-law, scheme, notification, or any other instrument having immediately before the appointed day viz., 02.06.2014, the force of law in the whole or in any part of the existing State of Andhra Pradesh. Thus, the cumulative effect of para 2(f), clauses (i) to (iii) of para 6 of the said Circular dated 26.05.2014 as also other notifications issued prior to 02.06.2014 or in modification of the then existing law(s), as it is to be understood in terms of the definition in para 2 (f), especially, in the absence of repeal or alteration or amendment in the State of Telangana also have to be looked into while considering the question(s) involved in the cases on hand.
In the contextual situation it is also relevant to refer to Resolution No.4-31-61-T dated 01.04.1963 of Ministry of Home Affairs establishing the Central Bureau of Investigation. Going by the said resolution dated 01.04.1963, it provides the function of the CBI in cases where public servants under the control of the Central Government are involved either themselves or with the State Government servants and/or other person - it is difficult to accede to the contentions of the first respondent in the captioned appeals made in a bid to support and sustain the impugned judgment. In such circumstances, considering the questions from such different angles, the impugned judgment whereunder subject FIRs and further proceedings in pursuance thereof, were quashed cannot be sustained.
Conclusion - The laws which were applicable to the undivided State of Andhra Pradesh would continue to apply to the new States created by the Act and that the laws that operated would continue to operate notwithstanding the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh. CBI retains jurisdiction to investigate offences within the newly formed states without requiring fresh consent.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 132
Dishonour of Cheque - cognizance of offences - whether the complaint filed by the appellant herein under Section 138 of the NI Act is in accordance with the requirement under Section 142 of the NI Act? - Power of attorney holder - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the complaint (Annexure P-18) would reveal that Complaint No. 701 of 2021 has been filed in the name of M/s Naresh Potteries through Neeraj Kumar (Manager and Authority-letter holder). Further, a perusal of the cheque which is the subject-matter of the complaint would reveal that it has been issued in the name of Naresh Potteries. As aforementioned, Section 142 of the NI Act contemplates that the complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act should be in writing and should be filed by the payee or the holder of the cheque. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the complaint in the present matter satisfies the requirements of Section 142 of the NI Act.
Since the High Court has quashed the summoning order on a categorical finding that the power of attorney holder did not have personal knowledge of the facts giving rise to the criminal proceedings as there was no specific pleading to that effect in the letter of authority and the affidavit of the power of attorney holder under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C., we find it apposite to reproduce the relevant portions of the aforesaid documents which contain averments regarding authorisation in favour of and knowledge on the part of Sh. Neeraj Kumar.
This Court in M/S TRL KROSAKI REFRACTORIES LTD. VERSUS M/S SMS ASIA PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. [2022 (2) TMI 1112 - SUPREME COURT] had come to a categorical finding that what can be treated as an explicit averment, cannot be put in a straightjacket but will have to be gathered from the circumstance and manner in which it has been averred and conveyed, based on the facts of each case. The relevant portion of the said decision has already been extracted above. In the instant matter, the averments made in the documents referred to above, make it wholly clear that Sh. Neeraj Kumar possessed personal knowledge of the facts of the matter at hand and was well-equipped and duly authorised to initiate criminal proceedings against Respondent No.1. That beside the fact that it would always be open for the trial court to call upon the complainant for examination and crossexamination, if and when necessary, during the course of the trial. As such, a peremptory quashing of the complaint case by the High Court is completely unwarranted and that too on an incorrect factual basis.
Conclusion - The complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act must be filed by the payee or holder in due course, and a power of attorney holder must have personal knowledge and authorization to file the complaint.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 131
Dishonour of Cheque - violation of cardinal ingredient of Section 138 (b) of the NI Act - discharge of burden to prove - presumption under Sections 139 and 118 of the NI Act - non-production of bank statement / IT return by the complainant would vitiate the complaint itself.
Whether the complainant violated the cardinal principle laid down under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act? - HELD THAT:- In Suman Sethi case [2000 (2) TMI 822 - SUPREME COURT] the Hon’ble Supreme Court held 'If in a notice while giving the break up of the claim the cheque amount, interest, damages etc. are separately specified, other such claims for interest, cost etc. would be superfluous and these additional claims would he severable- and will not invalidate the notice. If, however, in the notice an omnibus demand is made without specifying what was due under the dishonored cheque, notice might well fail to meet the legal requirement and may be regarded as bad.'
Thus, to make a valid demand notice as per the proviso of Section 138(b) of the Act, 1881, the due amount of bounced cheque, and other additionally claimed amounts should be mentioned in a separate portion. In the demand notice, if other amount is mentioned with the cheque amount in a separate portion in detail, the said notice cannot be faulted. In the case on hand, the complainant demanded the cheque amount of Rs.9.00 lakhs and he additionally demanded Rs.5,000/- towards charges for issuance of the legal notice. Therefore, Ex.P.11 is a valid one.
Whether the non-production of bank statements or Income Tax returns by the complainant would vitiate the complaint itself? - HELD THAT:- In the light of the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ragini Gupta vs. Piyush Dutt Sharma [2019 (4) TMI 114 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT], the finding of the learned trial Court that as the complainant failed to disclose Rs.42.00 lakhs alleged to have invested for the production of the film in his income tax returns is not correct because if the complainant did not disclose his income in the Income Tax Return, then the Income Tax Department is well within its rights to reopen the assessment of income of the assessee and to take action as per the provisions of Income Tax Act.
Whether the complainant had discharged the onus, and whether the accused failed to discharge the onus on his part? - HELD THAT:- As far as the aspect of existence of basic ingredients for drawing of presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act is concerned, the accused did not deny his signature on the cheque in question that had been drawn in favour of the complainant on a bank account maintained by the accused. The said cheque was presented to the bank concerned within the period of its validity and was returned unpaid for the reason funds insufficient. So all the basic ingredients of Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act are apparent on the face of the record. The trial Court had failed to take note of all these facts and failed to draw the requisite presumption. Therefore, it is required to be presumed that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the holder of the cheque i.e. the complainant received the same in discharge of an existing debt. The onus, therefore, shifts on the accused to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a presumption, which he failed to do so.
With regard to the preponderance of probabilities, the accused has to bring on record such facts and circumstances which may lead the Court to conclude either that the consideration did not exist or that its non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that the consideration did not exist. Mere denial would not fulfil the requirements of rebuttal as envisaged under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act.
Conclusion - i) In the demand notice, if other amount is mentioned with the cheque amount in a separate portion in detail, the said notice cannot be faulted. ii) Complainant correctly disclosed Rs.42.00 lakhs alleged to have invested for the production of the film in his income tax returns. iii) It is required to be presumed that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the holder of the cheque i.e. the complainant received the same in discharge of an existing debt. The onus, therefore, shifts on the accused to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a presumption, which he failed to do so.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 130
Dishonour of Cheque - conviction of the petitioner-accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - compounding of offences - compromise arrived between the parties - HELD THAT:- Having taken note of the fact that the petitioneraccused and the complainant-respondent have settled the matter and the complainant has no objection in compounding the offence, therefore, this Court sees no impediment in accepting the prayer made on behalf of the accusedpetitioner for compounding of offence while exercising power under Section 147 of the Act as well as in terms of guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Damodar S. Prabhu V. Sayed Babalal H. [2010 (5) TMI 380 - SUPREME COURT], wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held 'A bare reading of this provision would lead us to the inference that offences punishable under laws other than the Indian Penal Code also cannot be compounded. However, since Section 147 was inserted by way of an amendment to a special law, the same will override the effect of Section 320(9) of the CrPC, especially keeping in mind that Section 147 carries a non obstante clause.'
In K. Subramanian Vs. R. Rajathi [2009 (11) TMI 1013 - SUPREME COURT], it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that in view of the provisions contained in Section 147 of the Act read with Section 320 of Cr.P.C., compromise arrived at can be accepted even after recording of the judgment of conviction.
Conclusion - Since, in the instant case, the petitioner-accused after being convicted under Section 138 of the Act, has compromised the matter with the complainant, prayer for compounding the offence can be accepted.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 129
Dishonour of Cheque - Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) can be considered an "association of individuals" under Section 141 of the NI Act - Applicant is actively participating into the affairs of the Accused No. 1. or not - vicarious liability of members of HUF - HELD THAT:- The discussion of the Supreme Court in the said Ramanlal Patel [2008 (2) TMI 859 - SUPREME COURT] is with reference to the definition of “joint family” and “person” as defined under the Gujarat Ceiling Act. The said discussion will not apply to the explanation of the term “Company” as given in Section 141 of the NI Act - the Supreme Court was considering the scope of Section 3 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, which classifies the assessee under the heads “individuals”, “Hindu Undivided Families”, “Companies”, “Local Authorities”, “Firms” and “Other Associations of Persons”. The Supreme Court has observed that if Hindu undivided family is to be considered as an association of persons, there was no point in making separate provision for the assessment of “Hindu Undivided Family”. Thus, the said decision of the Supreme Court interpreting Section 3 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 will have no application to Section 141 of the NI Act.
It is well-settled that the decision of a High Court will have the force of binding precedent only in the State or territories on which the court has jurisdiction. In other States or outside the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court it may, at best, have only persuasive effect. By no amount of stretching of the doctrine of stare decisis, can judgment of one High Court be given the status of a binding precedent so far as other High Courts or Courts or Tribunals within their territorial jurisdiction are concerned.
Conclusion - The term 'association of individuals' will include Hindu Undivided Family of which the business is said to be a joint concern.
The Criminal Application is dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 60
Condonation of delay of 5 years, 10 months, and 16 days in filing the appeal by the appellant/State - The court dismissed the application for condonation of delay, finding that the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the extensive delay.
HELD THAT:- This Special Leave Petition is dismissed with costs of Rs.1,00,000/- to be deposited by the State within a period of two weeks from today with the Supreme Court Mediation Centre and file proof thereof, in terms of the signed Reportable Order.
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2025 (1) TMI 59
Suit for Recovery - Direction to deposit 75% of the decretal amount during the pendency of the present Appeals - separate pre-institution mediation was not initiated for the Counter-Claim - HELD THAT:- The Commercial Courts (Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement) Rules, 2018 [hereinafter referred to as “Pre-Institution Mediation Rules”] provides that a party to a commercial dispute is required to initiate mediation prior to the filing of a suit. Sub-rule (8) of Rule 3 of Pre-Institution Mediation Rules provides that the mediation process should be completed within a period of three months - A commercial dispute is defined as a dispute referred to in Section 2 (1) (c) of Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Section 2 (1) (xviii) of the CC Act includes “agreements for sale of goods or provision of services”. Concededly, the dispute between the parties is commercial in nature and is subject to the Pre-Institution Mediation Rules.
The Supreme Court in the judgment of Yamini Manohar vs. T.K.D Keerthi [2023 (10) TMI 1375 - SC ORDER], relying on the M/s. Patil Automation case, has held that pre-litigation mediation is mandatory unless the suit contemplates urgent relief. It was further held that a plaintiff should not be permitted to file an application for interim relief as a subterfuge to wriggle out of the requirement of mandatory pre-institution mediation. The Court held that in order that the provision is not bypassed, the learned Commercial Court has a role, although a limited one, to examine whether the suit contemplates an urgent relief so as to keep a check that legislative intent behind the enactment of Section 12A of the CC Act is not defeated.
In the present case, pre-litigation mediation was initiated by Molmek prior to instituting the suit. Molmek has relied upon the copy of the Non-Starter Report of the authority appointed for pre-institution mediation, South-West, DLSA, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, dated 15.03.2022 to submit NAPL did not attend the Mediation proceedings as these were closed as a "non-starter". NAPL filed its combined Written Statement and Counter-Claim on 31.08.2022 raising a Counter-Claim of Rs. 7,62,930/- against Molmek before the learned Commercial Court.
The object of the CC Act is to ensure speedy resolution of commercial disputes to accelerate economic growth and improve the international image of the Indian Justice System and to restore the faith of the investors. Once a party has taken steps to exhaust the remedy of pre-institution mediation to then ask the opposite party in a case where the subject matter of dispute is entirely the same, to once again undertake pre-institution mediation, prior to filing its counter-claim would defeat the very purpose of the CC Act and delay adjudication of the commercial dispute between the parties.
The Supreme Court in AMBALAL SARABHAI ENTERPRISES LTD. VERSUS K.S. INFRASPACE LLP & ANR. [2019 (10) TMI 1601 - SUPREME COURT] case has held that the statement of object and reasons for the enactment of the CC Act was the early and speed resolution of the commercial disputes and thus, there was an amendment made and fast track procedure set in place by the CC Act - The Supreme Court analysed the provisions of the CC Act and based on such analysis held that statutory provisions of the CC Act and the language therein should be interpreted purposefully to facilitate the swift resolution of commercial disputes, thereby benefiting litigants involved in trade and commerce and contributing to the country's economic growth.
NAPL has placed evidence before the learned Trial Court which remains uncontroverted with respect to the supplies of goods by it to Molmek to show a total number of 46 deliveries between the period 26.10.2018 and 08.01.2021. NAPL has given invoice numbers, “e-way bill” numbers and all filed requisite evidence. The 5 disputed invoices also form part of its GST returns that were filed. The learned Trial Court has conducted a detailed examination and found that NAPL has proved its delivery.
Conclusion - Molmek failed to prove its claim for recovery due to insufficient evidence. The separate pre-institution mediation for the counter-claim was not necessary, as it would undermine the objective of the Commercial Courts Act.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 58
Dishonour of cheque - Company has not been impleaded, as accused, in this case - whether the proceedings cannot be initiated and allowed to be continued against the company?
HELD THAT:- Admittedly, the said Company has neither been impleaded, as, accused in the complaint, under Section 138 of the NI Act, nor in the legal notice issued against the Company, before filing the complaint.
Even otherwise, the Company cannot now be impleaded as accused, in this case, as before filing the complaint under Section 138 NI Act, certain legal formalities have to be completed by the complainant, i.e., issuance of legal notice, demanding the money, within the stipulated period.
The nonprosecution of the company, from whose account the cheque was issued and dishonored, is fatal, noncurable illegality and shall lead to the dismissal of the complaint, being legally defective and not properly constituted.
Conclusion - The prosecution for cheque dishonor under Section 138 of the NI Act requires the company to be named as an accused. Directors and officers can only be held vicariously liable if the company is prosecuted.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 57
Dishonour of cheque - competence of power of attorney holder to file a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, without any averment in the complaint about the power of attorney holder's knowledge of the facts of the case - HELD THAT:- It needs to be borne in mind that a power of attorney holder is a competent person to file a complaint under section 138 of the NI Act. The aforesaid proposition has already been settled by various judgments. A Magistrate is entitled to issue process to the accused on the basis of the contents of the complaint, documents in support thereof and the affidavit submitted in support of the complaint. If an affidavit is filed in support of the complaint, before issuance of the process under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C, the Magistrate has a discretion and is not bound to call upon the complainant to be examined to decide whether or not to issue process on the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. The Magistrate can rely upon the affidavit filed in support of the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act.
In the instant case, the petition to quash the complaint was filed immediately after the summons was served on the accused. Neither the complainant nor the power of attorney holder has been examined. Summons have been issued based on the complaint, the documents, and the affidavit filed in support of the same.
The circumstances of the instant case has to be appreciated, bearing in mind the above decisions. The stage of giving evidence on oath has not yet been reached. Summons was issued to the accused after verifying the affidavit of the power of attorney holder, which contains a specific averment that the power of attorney holder is conversant with the facts of the case. In view of the decision in MITA INDIA PVT. LTD. VERSUS MAHENDRA JAIN [2023 (2) TMI 824 - SUPREME COURT], the said statement in the affidavit is sufficient. Thus, a power of attorney holder, who is aware of the facts of the case and has made such an averment in the affidavit, is certainly competent to lodge a private complaint, even if such an averment is absent in the complaint.
Conclusion - A power of attorney holder, who is aware of the facts of the case and has made such an averment in the affidavit, is certainly competent to lodge a private complaint, even if such an averment is absent in the complaint.
This petition to quash the complaint is dismissed, leaving open the question regarding the maintainability of a second petition under section 482 Cr.P.C.
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2025 (1) TMI 56
Maintainability of complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, filed against the petitioner - High Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the complaint and subsequent proceedings or not - HELD THAT:- It is no longer res integra, that this Court, while exercising the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot assume the role of trial Court and the defence, if any, of the accused cannot be taken into consideration, at this stage, as it is for the accused to prove his defence by leading the cogent evidence before the trial Court.
Scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C., has elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the year 1992, in the lead case reported as 1992 CrLJ, 527, titled as State of Haryana Vs. Chaudhary Bhajan Lal & Others [1990 (11) TMI 386 - SUPREME COURT], in which, the Hon’ble Apex Court has formulated the guidelines for exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., where it was held that 'In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.'
Now, if the facts and circumstances of this case are seen in the light of the the above decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that all the grounds, which have been taken in the petition, are based upon the defence of the accused, which will only to be considered by the learned trial Court - The petition is totally silent as to how the complaint filed by the complainant before the learned trial Court lacks ingredients of Section 138 of the NI Act.
Conclusion - This Court, while exercising the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot assume the role of trial Court and the defense, if any, of the accused cannot be taken into consideration, at this stage, as it is for the accused to prove his defense by leading the cogent evidence before the trial Court.
Petition dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 3
Locus of Respondent organization to approach the National Commission - jurisdiction of National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission to interfere with banking operations, which is the exclusive statutory domain of the Reserve Bank of India - jurisdiction to fix a maximum ceiling rate of interest to be charged by banks from their credit card holders for their failure to make full payment on the due date - interference with the contract executed between the parties or not - charging rate of interests by banks in the manner as advised by Reserve Bank of India vide its master circulars & notifications being independent of a standard ceiling rate prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India, is unfair trade practice or not.
Whether the Respondent organization has the locus to approach the National Commission? - HELD THAT:- Section 12(1)(b) also permits a “any recognised consumer association whether the consumer to whom the goods sold or delivered or agreed to be sold or delivered or service provided or agreed to be provided is a member of such association or not” to file a complaint, in terms of the procedure prescribed under section 13 of the Act. The Respondent nos. 1 and 2 herein, have taken refuge under this provision claiming themselves to be a voluntary consumer association, to approach the National Commission.
Since, this Court has held that the requirement of Order I Rule 8, prescribed in Section 13(6) is to be read into section 12(1) of the 1986 Act RAMESHWAR PRASAD SHRIVASTAVA ORS. AND AVINASH GAUR AND ORS. VERSUS DWARKADHIS PROJECTS PVT. LTD. AND ORS. [2018 (12) TMI 2007 - SUPREME COURT], the requirement of obtaining prior permission from the Commission, for any consumer to act in a representative capacity, can in no way be dispensed with.
The consumer Complainant fails to disclose any deficiency in service or violation and is in fact a public interest litigation in guise of a purported consumer dispute. We also agree with the contention of the Appellants, that the Respondents had approached the National Commission at the behest of the Respondent no. 3, a credit card holder with Citibank, purportedly claiming an amount of Rs. 90,000/- against excess interest charged by the bank, which is barred by the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Commission.
A direction by the National Commission or any other Court, must be based on material or evidence and not on surmises, and bald averments made by complainants. Any such directions issued otherwise is unsustainable. It is unable to subscribe to the view adopted by the National Commission, that ‘any complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to curb unfair trade practice(s) adopted by the banks is maintainable’.
Whether the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, has the jurisdiction to interfere with banking operations, which is the exclusive statutory domain of the Reserve Bank of India? - Whether the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission had the jurisdiction to fix a maximum ceiling rate of interest to be charged by banks from their credit card holders for their failure to make full payment on the due date, at the behest of the Reserve Bank of India & unilaterally direct banks/non-banking financial institutions to charge rates of interest not beyond the 30% p.a., in absence of an instruction/directive of the Reserve Bank of India? - HELD THAT:- The National Commission has assumed jurisdiction and expertise over the Reserve Bank of India, whilst observing that a ceiling on the rates of interest, is the purported solution to the alleged exploitation of credit card holders. It has made observations, that are contrary to the legislative intent of Section 21A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 that provides for a statutory bar on any court/tribunal to re-open transactions, that the rate of interest charged by the banking company in respect of such transaction is excessive - The decision of the National Commission to unilaterally hold that any interest above 30% p.a. is usurious, is in contrary to the legislative intent of section 21A and is an encroachment upon the domain of the Reserve Bank of India.
In the case of Central Bank of India Vs Ravindra & Ors. [2001 (10) TMI 1065 - SUPREME COURT], this Hon’ble Court had decided on the issue, when banks in India were not following a uniform practice, and other banks charged interest with monthly or quarterly rests while others charged with yearly or six-monthly rests. It was held by this Hon’ble Court, that a distinction was drawn between the court’s power to interfere on the promise that the interest charged is excessive under the general law, and the court’s interference on the premise that the interest charged is in contravention of the circulars and directions issued by the Reserve Bank of India. In the former case, it would not be permissible in view of the bar enacted by Section 21A of the Banking Regulation Act, while in the latter case, it would be permissible because of the Reserve Bank of India’s circulars and directions having statutory force under section 21/35A of the Act, having been violated.
The RBI is the prime regulator and the decision-making authority for the economic/financial decisions of the Indian economy, any endeavor by the National Commission or any other Court/Tribunal to decide at the behest of the RBI cannot be termed to be just, fair and equitable - There is also merit in the submission made by the Appellants, that a direction cannot be issued to the Reserve Bank of India, to enact a particular legislation. It is a settled cannon of law that “when an executive authority, exercises a legislative power by way of subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a legislature, such executive authority, cannot be asked to enact a law, which he has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority.
Whether the Impugned Judgment interferes with the contract executed between the parties? - Whether charging rate of interests by banks in the manner as advised by Reserve Bank of India vide its master circulars & notifications being independent of a standard ceiling rate prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India, constitute an unfair trade practice? - HELD THAT:- It is a well-settled principle that the terms of a contract executed between two parties, are not open to judicial scrutiny unless the same is arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or actuated by bias. The courts cannot strike down the terms of a contract, because it feels that some other terms would have been fair, wiser or logical.
In the present context, the pre-conditions of ‘deceptive practice’ and unfair method’ are manifestly absent. The Banks have in no manner made any misrepresentation, to deceive the credit card holders. Upon availing the facility of the credit cards, the customers, are made aware of ‘the most important terms and conditions’, including the rate of interest, that shall be charged by the Banks. Even on merits, the Reserve Bank of India, has made it clear that there exists no material on record, to establish that any bank has acted contrary to the policy directives issued by the RBI - The mere inflation in the rates of interest cannot be construed as a practice, intended to cause loss or injury.
It is correct to say that the National Commission has been duly empowered under the statute to set aside unfair contracts, which may symbolise a single will or are unilaterally dominant or incorporate terms which are unfair and unconscionable. However, the rate of interest, charged by the banks, determined by the financial wisdom & directives issued by the Reserve Bank of India, and is duly communicated to the credit card holders from time to time, cannot be in any manner unconscionable or unilateral. The credit card holders are duly educated and made aware of their privileges and obligations, including timely payment & levying of penalty on delay - the question of directing the RBI to act against any bank does not arise, in the facts and circumstances of the present case and that there is no question of the RBI being directed to impose any cap on the rate of interest, either on the banking sector as a whole, or in respect of any one particular bank, contrary to the provisions contained in the Banking Regulation Act, and the circulars/directions issued thereunder.
Conclusion - The Court emphasized that the RBI is the primary regulator of banking practices, and the National Commission overstepped its jurisdiction by interfering with banking operations and contractual terms. The decision reinforced the RBI's authority in regulating interest rates and banking policies - the National Commission's judgment was set aside - appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 2
Seeking quashing of Criminal Complaint - Dishonour of Cheque - continuation of legal proceedings commenced by the company in its former name by its new name - inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing the proceedings.
Continuation of legal proceedings commenced by the company in its former name by its new name - HELD THAT:- It is relevant to note that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 of the CrPC ought to be exercised sparingly especially when the matter is at the stage of issuance of summons as the same has the effect of scuttling the proceedings without the parties having an opportunity to adduce the relevant evidence. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2022 (4) TMI 1434 - SUPREME COURT], adverting to a catena of judgments, had underscored the parameters for exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceedings at the stage of the summoning order.
In the present case, apart from raising an argument in relation to the cheques in dispute being given as security, the petitioners have sought to challenge the complaints essentially on the ground that the same are not maintainable by virtue of the same being filed in the old name of the complainant company - It is argued that even though the name of the complainant company was changed on 28.05.2018, however, the complaints were subsequently filed in the erstwhile name in June, 2018.
In the case of MUNISH KUMAR GUPTA VERSUS M/S MITTAL TRADING COMPANY [2024 (4) TMI 1212 - SC ORDER], the Hon’ble Apex Court had set aside the order whereby the concerned High Court had permitted the complainant to amend the date in the complaint by observing that if such amendment was not permitted, the same will be fatal to the case of the complainant. In the said case, the complainant therein had claimed that the error in the date of the cheque in dispute in the evidence as well as the complaint was merely typographical in nature. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the date of the cheque is a relevant aspect as the same was instrumental in determining whether the issue of notice was within the time frame as provided under the NI Act and as to whether there was sufficient balance in the account of the issuer on the date. In view of the same, it was held that the amendment as sought for was not justified.
While a bald averment is made that grave prejudice would be caused to the petitioners if the substitution of the new name of the complainant company is allowed, however, in the opinion of this Court, mere use of the old name of the complainant company is not a relevant aspect as the same is not likely to have any effect on the merits of the case. No cogent argument is made in relation to how the change in name will affect the case against the petitioners or as to how their defence would be hampered by such a change - It is also relevant to note that the mere change in name does not alter or affect the rights of the company. Furthermore, the agreement between the complainant company and the accused company is not disputed. The change of the name of the complainant company is merely formal in nature and the same can be easily cured. The same also has no effect on the original nature of the complaint.
Application of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing the proceedings - HELD THAT:- It is incumbent on this Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to ensure substantial justice. In light of the same, considering that the petitioners have failed to show as to how they will be gravely prejudiced by a mere correction in the name of the company, quashing of the criminal proceedings merely on account of a technical error at this junction, when the signatures on the cheques in dispute have not been disputed and the claim of the complainant company has not been adjudicated on merits, would be unmerited and it will frustrate the ends of justice - considering that the complaints have been pending since the year 2018, this Court considers it apposite to request the learned Trial Court to expedite the proceedings.
The present petitions are dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1
Dishonour of Cheque - compounding of offence after the judgment of conviction and order of sentence have been passed - petitioner compromised the matter with the respondent (complainant) - HELD THAT:- Having taken note of the fact that the petitioner - accused and the complainant-respondent have settled the matter and the complainant has no objection in compounding the offence, therefore, this Court sees no impediment in accepting the prayer made on behalf of the accusedpetitioner for compounding of offence while exercising power under Section 147 of the Act as well as in terms of guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Damodar S. Prabhu V. Sayed Babalal H. [2010 (5) TMI 380 - SUPREME COURT], wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held 'since Section 147 was inserted by way of an amendment to a special law, the same will override the effect of Section 320(9) of the CrPC, especially keeping in mind that Section 147 carries a non obstante clause.'
In K. Subramanian Vs. R. Rajathi [2009 (11) TMI 1013 - SUPREME COURT], it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that in view of the provisions contained in Section 147 of the Act read with Section 320 of Cr.P.C., compromise arrived at can be accepted even after recording of the judgment of conviction.
Since, in the instant case, the petitioner-accused after being convicted under Section 138 of the Act, has compromised the matter with the complainant, prayer for compounding the offence can be accepted in terms of the aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court.
Conclusion - In view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, the petitioner should be permitted to compound the offence committed by him under Section 138 of the Code.
The present matter is ordered to be compounded and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P, which was affirmed in appeal by learned Additional Sessions Judge (CBI Court), Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., are quashed and set-aside and the petitioner-accused is acquitted of the charge framed against him under Section 138 of the Act - Undisputedly, the total amount of the cheques is Rs.15,000/-, however, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is a poor person and the imposition of compounding fee may be reduced.
Petition disposed off.
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2024 (12) TMI 1558
Recovery of possession of the Petitioner's premises - superstructure constructed on the leased plot stood yielded to the Respondent No. 1-Society - whether the lease-deed executed by the Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 was in respect of land i.e. Plot No. 57 or was a lease of plot along with the proposed construction on the said land? - HELD THAT:- The settled legal position is that under Section 108(h) of the TP Act, a right is given to the lessee to remove the structures erected by him on the leased land subject to a contract to the contrary. The ownership in the superstructure continues in the lessee during the subsistence of the lease under the well recognised concept of dual ownership and in event the contract restricts the lessee from exercising the right granted by Section 108(h) of TOPA, the ownership will pass to the lessors.
Clause 2(20) sets out that the agreement between the parties was to deliver the demised plot and premises to the Lessors with all improvements at the determination of the term. The above term constitute an agreement which restricts the lessee from exercising the right granted under Section 108(h) of TP Act - Despite the term of the contract providing for the superstructure to be yielded and delivered to the lessor upon termination, the obstacle in the way of the Respondent No. 1 to obtain recovery of possession of the Petitioner's premises are the findings of the Trial Court and Appellate Court which hold that the Respondent No. 1 is not entitled to terminate the lease on account of violation by the Petitioner.
Plain reading of Section 91 of the MCS Act would indicate that Sub-Section (1) of Section 91 is prefaced with non obstante clause and provides that a specified class of disputes arising between specified class of parties can only be referred by any of the parties to the dispute to Co-operative Court. What is therefore necessary is that the subject matter of lis and the parties to the lis must fall within the enumerated class under Section 91 of the MCS Act. As far as the parties to the lis is concerned, the bye-laws of Respondent No. 1 makes it clear that for lease to be executed in respect of the plot owned by the Society, the person is required to be member of the Society and the Petitioner claims through the member. The parties to the lis are therefore of the class enumerated in Section 91 of MCS Act.
It is well settled that the Co-operative Court established under the MCS Act is a substitute for Civil Court and the jurisdiction of the Co- operative Court will not go beyond the jurisdiction vested in the Civil Court. The Respondent No. 1 has come with a case of violation by a member of the bye-laws adopted by the Society by virtue of which lease was granted to the member. The scheme of bye laws does not set out relationship of landlord and tenant. The entire agreement is between a Society and its member. It is the business of the Society to ensure compliance with the regulations and bye-laws framed by it. A claim by the Society for recovering possession of the premises from its member upon determination of lease by reason of violation of its bye- laws is a dispute falling within the purview of Section 91 of MCS Act and the Co-operative Court would have the jurisdiction to decide the dispute.
Conclusion - The grant of mandatory injunction qua the Petitioner's premises would be the consequence of the termination of lease in view of Clause 2(20) of the Lease Deed dated 25th February, 1958. In view of the specific finding of the Trial Court that the violation of condition by the Petitioner would not give right to the Respondent No. 1 to terminate the lease and the resultant decline of relief of recovery of Plot No. 57, the well recognised doctrine of dual ownership would prohibit the grant of mandatory injunction qua the Petitioner's premises. The Respondent No. 1 was thus not entitled to recovery of possession of the Petitioner's premises.
The impugned Judgment and Orders passed by the Co-operative Court and judgment and order passed by the Maharashtra State Co-operative Appellate Court are hereby quashed and set aside - petiton allowed.
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2024 (12) TMI 1551
Suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession - decreeing the suit in favor of the Plaintiffs despite the Defendants seeking protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act - HELD THAT:- No error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned judgment and order.
Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was inserted partly to set at rest the conflict of views in this country, but principally for the protection of ignorant transferees who take possession or spend money in improvements relying on documents which are ineffective as transfers or on contracts which cannot be proved for want of registration. The effect of this section, is to relax the strict provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act in favour of transferees in order to allow the defence of part performance to be established - Section 53-A is an exception to the provisions which require a contract to be in writing and registered and which bar proof of such contract by any other evidence. Consequently, the exception must be strictly construed.
Conclusion - Section 53A requires strict compliance with its conditions for protection to be granted. The absence of a proven contract and lawful possession by the Defendants meant they could not invoke this protection.
SLP dismissed.
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2024 (12) TMI 1529
Rejection of application preferred by the appellants seeking discharge from the charges punishable under Sections 306 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 - instigation or abetment of suicide - proximate cause linking their actions to the deceased's decision to commit suicide - whether the appellants were guilty of abetting the suicide of the deceased under Sections 306 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)?
HELD THAT:- The law on abetment has been crystallised by a plethora of decisions of this Court. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to do a particular thing. To bring a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, the act of abetment would require the positive act of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to commit suicide. Without such mens rea on the part of the accused person being apparent from the face of the record, a charge under the aforesaid Section cannot be sustained. Abetment also requires an active act, direct or indirect, on the part of the accused person which left the deceased with no other option but to commit suicide.
This Court in the case of S.S. CHHEENA VERSUS VIJAY KUMAR MAHAJAN AND ORS. [2010 (8) TMI 1189 - SUPREME COURT], had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 306 of the IPC and the ingredients which are essential for abetment, as set out in Section 107 of the IPC. This Court held that abetment involves the mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Therefore, without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid a person in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. This Court further observed that the intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 of IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence.
More recently, in the case of Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda and Others v. State of Gujarat [2024 (12) TMI 1527 - SUPREME COURT], this Court has relied on S.S. Chheena to hold that the element of mens rea cannot simply be presumed or inferred, instead it must be evident and explicitly discernible. Without this, the foundational requirement for establishing abetment under the law, that is deliberate and conspicuous intention to provoke or contribute to the act of suicide, would remain unfulfilled.
This Court has consistently taken the view that instigation or incitement on the part of the accused person is the gravamen of the offence of abetment to suicide. However, it has been clarified on many occasions that in order to link the act of instigation to the act of suicide, the two occurrences must be in close proximity to each other so as to form a nexus or a chain, with the act of suicide by the deceased being a direct result of the act of instigation by the accused person.
The High Court observed that there is no allegation about any harassment or cruelty meted out by the appellants to the deceased in the Accidental Death Report, however, held that the allegations in the FIR could not be overlooked and the Accidental Death Report and the statements made in the Accidental Death enquiry would be a matter of trial. The High Court also took note of the disputed date of the mahalokadalat but held that incorrect mentioning of the date of the mahalokadalat in the FIR would not be a ground to discharge the appellants, considering the state of mind of the complainant, the deceased’s mother.
The prosecution has failed to prima facie establish that the appellants had any intention to instigate or aid or abet the deceased to commit suicide. No doubt that a young woman of 25 years has lost her life in an unfortunate incident. However, in the absence of sufficient material to show that the appellants had intended by their words to push the deceased into such a position that she was left with no other option but to commit suicide, continuation of criminal proceedings against the appellants would result in an abuse of process of law and as such, it is required to allow the appeal.
Conclusion - Mere harassment or a time gap between alleged instigation and suicide weakens the prosecution's case. Mens rea and a direct or indirect act of instigation are crucial for sustaining charges of abetment to suicide. The necessity of a direct link and proximity between the accused's actions and the suicide for a charge under Section 306 IPC reiterated.
Appeal allowed.
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2024 (12) TMI 1528
Maintainability of second petition - Dishonour of Cheque - imposition of a condition to deposit 20% of compensation by the Sessions Court - dismissal of petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - rule of audi alterem partem - whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the subsequent petition under section 482, Cr. PC for the reason that it assigned? - HELD THAT:- The High Court was unjustified in dismissing the subsequent petition on the ground that the appellants had withdrawn the earlier petition without obtaining leave to file afresh and, therefore, the petition under consideration was not maintainable.
The procedural laws governing criminal proceedings and civil proceedings in our country are quite dissimilar, though the rule of audi alteram partem and a procedure that is both fair and reasonable to both/all parties for rendering justice are at the heart of both the Cr. PC and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - A close reading of Sections 482, Cr. PC and 115, CPC would also reflect that the purposes sought to be achieved by exercising the high courts’ inherent powers, which the respective procedural laws save, are also at variance. Prudence and propriety in the decision making process, thus, make it imperative for the high courts to not confuse the procedural laws governing criminal and civil proceedings.
The legal position as to whether a second petition under Section 482, Cr. PC would be maintainable or not is no longer res integra - In S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla [2007 (2) TMI 311 - SUPREME COURT], a decision arising out of the N.I. Act, the relevant high court had given the party the liberty to avail any remedy in law, if available, at the time of withdrawing her petition under section 482, Cr. PC. This Court, observed that the high court would have the inherent power to decide any successive petition under section 482 and that it is not denuded of that power by the principle of res judicata.
This Court in Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P. [2023 (10) TMI 1342 - SUPREME COURT], has again held that there is no blanket rule against filing of successive petition under section 482, Cr. PC before the high court. It was also held that if such a petition is filed, it must be seen whether there was any change in facts or circumstances, necessitating the filing of such petition - Change of law can legitimately be regarded as a vital change in circumstance clothing the high court with the power, competence and jurisdiction to entertain the subsequent petition notwithstanding the fact that the earlier petition was withdrawn without obtaining any leave, subject to the satisfaction recorded by the high court that the order prayed for in the subsequent petition ought to be made, inter alia, either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice.
While there can be no gainsaying that normally the discretion of the Appellate Court should lean towards requiring a deposit to be made with the quantum of such deposit depending upon the factual situation in every individual case, more so because an order under challenge does not bear the mark of invalidity on its forehead, retention of the power of such court not to order any deposit in a given case (which in its view and for the recorded reasons is exceptional) and calling for exercise of the discretion to not order deposit, has to be conceded - Reading and understanding the words used by the legislature in the literal sense does not also result in manifest absurdity and hence tinkering with the same ought to be avoided at all costs. The word ‘may’ shall be read as ‘may’ and ‘shall’ as ‘shall’, wherever they are used in Section 148. This is because, the words mean what they say.
Conclusion - The successive petitions under Section 482, Cr. PC, are maintainable if there is a change in circumstances, such as a change in law. It emphasized the discretion appellate courts have under Section 148 of the N.I. Act regarding deposit conditions.
The impugned order of the High Court dated 18th May, 2024 and the Sessions Court’s order dated 17th October, 2022, stand set aside. The matter is remitted to the Sessions Court to re-examine the issue of ordering deposit - Appeal allowed by way of remand.
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