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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 181 to 200 of 27622 Records
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2025 (2) TMI 135
Dishonour of Cheque - conviction of the petitioners for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - discharge of the liability of the first accused Firm - compromise arrived between the parties - compounding of offences - HELD THAT:- The petitioners and respondent are present in person and confirm the compromise arrived at between them. In support of the same, today, both the learned counsel for petitioners as well as respondent had filed a Memorandum of Criminal Miscellaneous Petition under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for compounding the offence, as per the settlement entered between the petitioners and the respondent, which have been signed by the petitioners and the respondent and also by their respective counsel.
Conclusion - In view of the compromise arrived at between the parties and considering the petition under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is compounded.
The conviction and sentence imposed upon the petitioners confirming the judgment is set aside and the revision petitioners are acquitted of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - Criminal Revision Case is allowed.
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2025 (2) TMI 72
Challenge to Arbitral Award - reduction in the compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to the appellants for the death of their parents in a motor vehicle accident - assessment of income of the deceased parents - HELD THAT:- The Court finds that the Award rendered by the Tribunal is well-considered. Though the claimed compensation was Rs.1,00,00,000/- each with regard to the father and the mother, the Tribunal granted Rs. 58,24,000/- re the father and Rs.93,61,000/- the mother. The documents produced by the appellants and the reasoning given by the Tribunal as well as the Karnataka High Court’s Division Bench judgment in B Parimala [2000 (7) TMI 1016 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] indicate, and, rightly so, that merely because the appellants stepped into the shoes of the deceased, by such factum itself, the appellants would not be capable of running the Mill. It would be of relevance as to whether due to their lack of experience and maturity, real/expected downfall in the profitability of the firm or the business would ensue. Such factor, while considering a claim pertaining to loss of future income/earnings, would have to be dealt with.
In the present cases, even the monthly incomes of the parents as claimed by the appellants i.e.. income of the father being Rs.25,00,000/- per year and the mother’s being Rs.20,00,000/- per year, the notional income fixed by the Tribunal of Rs.60,000/- each per month, is much more reasonable. It is no longer res integra that Income Tax Returns are reliable evidence to assess the income of a deceased, reference whereof can be made to Amrit Bhanu Shali v National Insurance Co. Ltd. [2012 (4) TMI 839 - SUPREME COURT]; KALPANARAJ AND ORS. VERSUS TAMIL NADU STATE TRANSPORT CORPN. [2014 (4) TMI 1332 - SUPREME COURT], and K. RAMYA AND ORS. VERSUS NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ORS. [2022 (9) TMI 1654 - SUPREME COURT].
It is satisfying that between the formula applied by the Tribunal vis-a-vis the approach adopted by the High Court, the view of the Tribunal rendered in the form of the Award satisfies judicial conscience. The High Court’s reasoning militates against settled law - the Impugned Judgment of the High Court deserves to be interfered with.
Appeal disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 1536
Reversal of acquittal of the appellants - conviction u/s 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC - sufficient evidence to establish a common intention among the appellants and accused No.1-Jagdish Singh to commit the crime - HELD THAT:- It is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.
In the instant case, the learned trial judge on the basis of ocular testimony of the eyewitnesses has held that the accused No.1-Jagdish Singh is guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC as well as under Section 27(1) of the Arms Act. Since the appeal of the said accused No.1-Jadgish Singh is disposed of as abated, we did not go into the findings against the said accused.
Upon consideration of these factors, the learned trial judge came to a conclusion that even if it was assumed that the remaining three accused had accompanied accused No.1- Jagdish Singh, there was no evidence to come to a conclusion that accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 (the appellants herein) who were in car with accused No.1-Jagdish Singh had shared a common intention with him to fire upon or to kill the deceased - The learned trial judge, therefore, found that the prosecution had failed to prove the mental involvement of accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 (the appellants herein) with accused No.1-Jagdish Singh beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.
Conclusion - In the present case, as observed by the learned trial judge, the prosecution has failed to place on record any evidence to show that the accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4 (the appellants herein) had common intention with accused No.1-Jagdish Singh prior to the accused No.1-Jagdish Singh’s shooting at the deceased resulting in her death.
The judgment and order of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Government Appeal No. 100 of 2008 is quashed and aside - appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1535
Challenge to conviction and the sentence of death imposed on the Appellant by the Court of Sessions for Greater Bombay - admissibility and reliability of electronic evidence, specifically CCTV footage, without a Section 65-B(4) certificate - circumstantial evidence - failure of prosecution to follow the mandate Under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, and the failure to produce the Section 65-B(4) certificate - HELD THAT:- In Shafhi Mohammad v. The State of Himachal Pradesh [2018 (1) TMI 1402 - SUPREME COURT], a two Judge Bench of this Court after noticing Anvar P.V. [2014 (9) TMI 1007 - SUPREME COURT] held that a party who is not in possession of device from which the document is produced cannot be required to produce the certificate Under Section 65-B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act. It also held that applicability of requirement of certificate being procedural can be relaxed by the Court wherever interest of justice so justifies.
A court of law in this scenario cannot be technical about the manner of objections that are raised. Even though objection has not been raised specifically when the CCTV footage was exhibited by PW- 1, when PW-38 was in the witness box a specific question was put to him and subsequent to evidence, he deposed that he was aware of the necessity of furnishing 65-B certificate while collecting electronic evidence. On the facts of the present case, we are inclined to treat it as an objection taken at the earliest point in time. Thus, when the prosecution was aware of the need for the 65-B(4) certificate and they themselves collected it for the CDRs there was no reason as to why they did not collect the same for the CCTV footage - no reliance can be placed on the CCTV footage, insofar as an attempt is made by the prosecution to attribute that the Appellant and the deceased EA were last seen together based on the CCTV footage.
There are gaping holes in the prosecution story leading to the irresistible conclusion that there is something more than what meets the eye in this case. While the old adage, witness may lie but not the circumstances, may be correct, however, the circumstances adduced, as held by this Court, should be fully established. There is a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as held by this Court. The circumstances relied upon when stitched together do not lead to the sole hypothesis of the guilt of the Accused and it is not found that the chain is so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the Accused.
On the available evidence, it is opined that it will be extremely unsafe to sustain a conviction against the Appellant. The prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, it is constrained to come to the sole irresistible conclusion that the Appellant is not guilty of the offences for which he has been charged.
Conclusion - The prosecution failed to establish the Appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily due to the inadequacies in the circumstantial evidence presented. There is a necessity of a Section 65-B(4) certificate for the admissibility of electronic evidence.
The Court acquitted the Appellant, setting aside the High Court's judgment and the death sentence, due to the prosecution's failure to meet the required legal standards - Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1525
Seeking review of an order - HELD THAT:- What is recorded in the order dated 26th April, 2024 is the oral consent of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents herein. All the Constitutional Courts in our country accept the oral statements made on behalf of the parties by their respective learned counsel. The order impugned proceeds on a footing that there is no consent given in writing. As the oral consent of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has been expressly recorded, the order dated 26th April, 2024 could not have been reviewed on the ground that there was no written consent.
The impugned order is hereby set aside and the order dated 26th April, 2024 is hereby restored - Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1524
Condonation of delay of approximately 2200 days in filing an application for recall - Order 43 Rule 1(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - HELD THAT:- The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the Respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
Conclusion - The question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The Rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1432
Dishonour of cheque - petitioner arraigned as an accused in a proceeding initiated u/s 138 read with section 141 of the Negotiable Instrument Act - petitioner resigned from the company before the issuance of the cheque - complaint lacked specific allegations - HELD THAT:- In NARENDER KUMAR SURI AND OTHERS VERSUS M/S NARENDRA POLYMERS PVT. LTD. [2014 (10) TMI 1084 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT], a Single Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the Director of Public Limited Company or Private Ltd. Company can tender his resignation unilaterally and without filing in Form 32 and without sending a notice to Registrar of Companies. Filing in of said Form and giving of due intimation and information to Registrar of Companies is duty of company secretary and not of an individual director. it is for the company secretary to fill in forms as prescribed and to give due information and intimation to the ROC, as the law requires and thereafter, to be so mentioned in all the prescribed registers of company, accounts and balance sheet of company and thereafter the said fact is to be brought to the notice of the members of the company as early as possible and at the latest in annual general meeting.
Section 168 (2) of the Companies Act, 2013 also provides that the resignation of a director shall take effect from the date on which the notice is received by the company or the date if any specified by the director in the notice, whichever is later. In the present case from the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner it further discloses that the letter of resignation was sent through speed post on 14.03.2020 and it was delivered to the accused company on 16.03.2020 - Proviso to section 168 (1) states that a director may also forward a copy of his resignation along with detailed reasons for the resignation to the Registrar within 30 days of resignation but this proviso is not mandatory. A resignation cannot be treated as not accepted by the Company simply because Director had not sent the copy of resignation to the Registrar within 30 days. Similarly, even after tendering resignation and the company even after receiving the same, if does not call meeting for its acceptance that also beyond the control of the petitioner and the petitioner cannot be held responsible for the same.
It is settled law that putting the criminal law into motion is not a matter of course or to settle the scores between the parties. Courts cannot be a mere spectator to it. Before a magistrate taking cognizance of an offence under section 138/141 of the N.I. Act, making a person vicariously liable has to ensure strict compliance with the statutory requirement. In the aforesaid factual backdrop and the legal position as stated above, continuation of the proceeding quo the petitioner will clearly be an abuse of process of the court.
Conclusion - The petitioner was not liable under Section 138/141 of the N.I. Act due to his resignation prior to the cheque issuance and the lack of specific allegations in the complaint.
Application allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1431
Dishonour of cheque - petitioner resigned as a director prior to the issuance of the dishonored cheque - Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - HELD THAT:- In NARENDER KUMAR SURI AND OTHERS VERSUS M/S NARENDRA POLYMERS PVT. LTD. [2014 (10) TMI 1084 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT], a Single Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the Director of Public Limited Company or Private Ltd. Company can tender his resignation unilaterally and without filing in Form 32 and without sending a notice to Registrar of Companies. Filing in of said Form and giving of due intimation and information to Registrar of Companies is duty of company secretary and not of an individual director. it is for the company secretary to fill in forms as prescribed and to give due information and intimation to the ROC, as the law requires and thereafter, to be so mentioned in all the prescribed registers of company, accounts and balance sheet of company and thereafter the said fact is to be brought to the notice of the members of the company as early as possible and at the latest in annual general meeting.
Section 168 (2) of the Companies Act, 2013 also provides that the resignation of a director shall take effect from the date on which the notice is received by the company or the date if any specified by the director in the notice, whichever is later. In the present case from the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner it further discloses that the letter of resignation was sent through speed post on 14.03.2020 and it was delivered to the accused company on 16.03.2020 - Proviso to section 168 (1) states that a director may also forward a copy of his resignation along with detailed reasons for the resignation to the Registrar within 30 days of resignation but this proviso is not mandatory. A resignation cannot be treated as not accepted by the Company simply because Director had not sent the copy of resignation to the Registrar within 30 days. Similarly, even after tendering resignation and the company even after receiving the same, if does not call meeting for its acceptance that also beyond the control of the petitioner and the petitioner cannot be held responsible for the same.
It is settled law that putting the criminal law into motion is not a matter of course or to settle the scores between the parties. Courts cannot be a mere spectator to it. Before a magistrate taking cognizance of an offence under section 138/141 of the N.I. Act, making a person vicariously liable has to ensure strict compliance with the statutory requirement. In the aforesaid factual backdrop and the legal position as stated above, continuation of the proceeding quo the petitioner will clearly be an abuse of process of the court.
Conclusion - The petitioner was not liable under Section 138/141 of the N.I. Act due to his resignation prior to the cheque issuance and the lack of specific allegations in the complaint.
Application allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1430
Dishonour of Cheque - whether the amended provision contained under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 would apply on the complaint filed prior to enactment and enforcement of this provision? - HELD THAT:- Bare perusal of Section 143A of the Act of 1881 indicates that the Court trying an offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881, may direct the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant i.e. amount not exceeding 20% of the cheque amount. The sub-section (4) of Section 143A of the Act of 1881 provides that in case the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay the same amount to the drawer - This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that, prior to insertion of the new provision, i.e., Section 143A in the Act of 1881, there was no provision in the Act for issuing directions to the drawer of cheque to pay interim compensation of 20% of the cheque amount to the complainant prior to the commission of the offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881.
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Surinder Singh Deswal [2019 (5) TMI 1626 - SUPREME COURT] has held that the new provisions contained under Section 148 of the Act of 1881 as amended on 01.09.2018 shall be applicable to the appeals against the order of conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881, even in the cases where the criminal complaints for the offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 were filed prior to the amending Act No. 20/2018 i.e. prior to 01.09.2018.
It is not worthy to mention here that the Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with the applicability of Section 148 of the Act of 1881, even on the complaints filed prior to 01.09.2018 but the issue of applicability of Section 143A of the Act of 1881 was not under challenge in the case of Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S. Deswal [2019 (5) TMI 1626 - SUPREME COURT] before the Hon’ble Apex Court.
The issue of applicability of the new provision of Section 143A of the Act of 1881 on the complaints filed prior to 01.09.2018 came up before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana [2019 (8) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT] and it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that prior to insertion of Section 143A of the Act of 1881, there was no provision under the Act of 1881 to direct the accused to pay interim compensation to the complainant prior to his conviction for the offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881. It was held that provisions of Section 143A of the Act of 1881 would apply with its prospective effect and the provisions of Section 148 of the Act of 1881 would not apply with its prospective effect after conviction of the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881.
Conclusion - Section 143A of the Act of 1881 has its prospective effect and the same is applicable upon the complaints filed under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 after introduction/insertion of Section 143A of the Act of 1881 i.e. after 01.09.2018. This provision cannot have its retrospective effect upon the complaints filed prior to 01.09.2018.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1367
Dismissal of application filed by NHAI under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal - execution of a contract awarded by NHAI to the appellant regarding the work of four laning and strengthening of the existing two lane section - HELD THAT:- Division Bench of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the 1996 Act acknowledged that primarily it was for the Arbitral Tribunal to interpret the contractual terms and if the interpretation given by the Arbitral Tribunal is a plausible one, then the court would not interfere with the award merely because according to the court, another interpretation is preferable. Having said that, Division Bench examined Clauses 51 and 52 of the contract. Instead of interpreting the aforesaid clauses in the contractual context, Division Bench went into the dictionary meaning of the expression ‘variation’ and opined that variation would mean the difference between what is provided for or contemplated in relation to the work under the contract and what is the final effect or outcome. Such variation or outcome may be or may not be the result of an instruction given by the Engineer.
Division Bench disagreed with the observations of the Arbitral Tribunal as upheld by the learned Single Judge that even if there was error in estimating the quantity of geogrid while preparing the BOQ, that by itself would not lead to the conclusion that NHAI cannot seek renegotiation of the rates even if the actual quantity exceeds by over 300 percent. The contract does not provide that NHAI should suffer on account of the estimated quantities mentioned in the BOQ turning out to be way off the mark when the contract is executed - Division Bench held that there is no reason as to why variation in quantity beyond the limits set out in the contract, whether instructed or not instructed, should not lead to renegotiation of the rates at the instance of either party. That would be the only fair, reasonable and equitable way to work the contract.
In so far Clause 51.1 is concerned, the variation contemplated thereunder relates to the form, quality or quantity of the works which in the opinion of the Engineer is necessary. In the present case, there is a clear finding of fact by two authorities i.e. DRB and the Arbitral Tribunal, both comprised of technical experts, that there is no variation either in the form or quality or quantity of the works. What actually happened is that at the time of execution of the contract pertaining to the RE wall, the geogrid required turned out to be much more than the estimated figure given in item No. 7.7 of the contract. It is in this backdrop that both the fact finding authorities held that there was no variation in terms of Clause 51.1 and that the Engineer did not have the competence to renegotiate the price or rate of the geogrid for the excess quantity of geogrid required.
It is the correct interpretation of Clause 51 made by the DRB and the Arbitral Tribunal. As such, learned Single Judge rightly declined to interfere with the award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. If that be the position, there was no justification at all for the Division Bench of the High Court to set aside the award under Section 37 of the 1996 Act.
In Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. [2023 (5) TMI 1319 - SUPREME COURT], this Court referring to one of its earlier decisions in UHL Power Company Ltd. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh [2022 (1) TMI 307 - SUPREME COURT], held that scope of interference under Section 37 is all the more circumscribed keeping in view the limited scope of interference with an arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is fairly narrow. Therefore, when it comes to scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act, jurisdiction of the appellate court in examining an order passed under Section 34, either setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award, is all the more circumscribed.
Again in M/s Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company [2023 (8) TMI 985 - SUPREME COURT], this Court reiterated the position that Section 37 of the 1996 Act grants narrower scope to the appellate court to review the findings in an arbitral award if it has been upheld or substantially upheld under Section 34.
Conclusion - The Arbitral Tribunal had interpreted Clause 51 in a reasonable manner based on the evidence on record. This interpretation was affirmed by the learned Single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Therefore, Division Bench of the High Court was not at all justified in setting aside the arbitral award exercising extremely limited jurisdiction under Section 37 of the 1996 Act by merely using expressions like ‘opposed to the public policy of India’, ‘patent illegality’ and ‘shocking the conscience of the court’. As reiterated by this Court in Reliance Infrastructure Ltd, it is necessary to remind the courts that a great deal of restraint is required to be shown while examining the validity of an arbitral award when such an award has been upheld, wholly or substantially, under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Frequent interference with arbitral awards would defeat the very purpose of the 1996 Act.
The impugned order cannot be sustained. Accordingly, judgment and order dated 17.11.2009 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is hereby set aside and the arbitral award dated 03.06.2005 is restored - Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1366
Seeking grant of regular bail - reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence - Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in connection with charges under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - HELD THAT:- During the investigation conducted by CBI, based on information received from Interpol, the Applicant was apprehended while attempting to collect parcels containing psychotropic substances. The Applicant’s contention that he was not in possession of the parcels and had no knowledge of their contents is, prima facie, unsustainable. The Applicant’s conduct, as revealed during investigation, establishes prima facie evidence of conscious possession. The Applicant went to the Post Office in person, enquired about the parcels and attempted to collect them. Despite not being the consignee, he attempted to claim parcels under names that were not his own — one addressed to Rohit Yadev and the other to his driver, Anil Kumar. Moreover, the Applicant’s act of concealing his identity while going to collect the parcels, by covering his face, inquiring about the parcels beforehand, and attempting to flee on sensing the presence of the CBI team, indicates that he was aware of the illicit nature of the parcels.
In the case of MOHAN LAL VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN [2015 (4) TMI 688 - SUPREME COURT] the Supreme Court has clarified that conscious possession does not require physical custody alone but also an awareness of the presence of the contraband and control over it. In this case, the Applicant’s actions and admissions establish a strong prima facie case of knowledge and intent, sufficient to satisfy the threshold of conscious possession under the Act.
On a prima facie assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case, in the opinion of this Court, the Applicant has not met the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act for grant of bail. The allegations against him are grave and serious in nature and there is prima facie credible evidence which links him to a larger conspiracy. Thus, the Court does not deem it fit to grant bail to the Applicant at the present stage.
Conclusion - i) There were no reasonable grounds to believe that the Applicant was not guilty of the alleged offenses under the NDPS Act. ii) The Applicant's conduct indicated a likelihood of committing further offenses if released on bail, given his involvement in an international drug trafficking network.
Application dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1315
Autonomous Body - EPC (Export Promotion Council) exercises public functions or not - to be treated as "State" or not - Seeking grant of childcare leave - challenge to Human Resource Policy implemented by CHEMEXCIL with effect from 08.01.2024 - HELD THAT:- The Division Bench of this Court in DR JITARANI UDGATA VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [2022 (10) TMI 1272 - DELHI HIGH COURT] has held that 'The function performed by the Gjepc cannot be termed as “public duty” and any administrative or financial hold that the Central Government is deemed to have over Gjepc is far from pervasive. The Gjepc retains its autonomous character and it is the CoA which not only looks after the affairs of the Gjepc, but is also empowered to make rules and regulations with regard to conditions of service, appointment, elections, etc. Gjepc does not satisfy any of the requirements or tests laid down by various judgments of the Supreme Court for establishing whether or not an authority can be deemed to be a “State” under Article 12.'
Conclusion - The functions of CHEMEXCIL are admittedly analogous to the functions of GJEPC, albeit in a different industry.
The writ petitions are therefore dismissed, with liberty to the petitioner to take recourse to alternative remedies available to her in law.
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2025 (1) TMI 1314
Seeking of grant of regular bail - smuggling - recovery of 99.876 grams of Etizolam salt which is a commercial quantity - offences punishable under Sections 22, 61 & 85 of the NDPS Act - HELD THAT:- The petitioner was arrested on 15.04.2022 whereinafter investigation was carried out and challan stands presented on 10.10.2022. Charges in the trial in question were framed on 23.11.2022. Total 10 prosecution witnesses have been cited, out of which only 03 have been examined till date. The rival contention of learned counsel for the parties; as to whether the petitioner has been falsely implicated into the FIR in question, whether mandatory provisions of Section 42 and Section 50 of the NDPS Act of 1985 have been complied with or not & the weightage/veracity of the evidence brought by the prosecution alongwith challan (final report); are issues of contentious nature which are essentially required to be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial.
Long back, in HUSSAINARA KHATOON VERSUS HOME SECRETARY STATE OF BIHAR PATNA [1979 (2) TMI 194 - SUPREME COURT], the Hon’ble Supreme Court had declared that the right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court”.
The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights - The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a threefold purpose.
The unequivocal inference is that where the trial has failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985.
Reverting to the facts of the case in hand; as per the custody certificate dated 08.01.2025 filed by the learned State counsel in Court today, the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more than 02 years and 08 months. A perusal of the zimni orders dated 27.02.2023, 10.04.2023, 05.02.2024, 02.08.2024, 03.09.2024, 16.10.2024, 19.11.2024 & 27.11.2024 indicates that the trial is procrastinating, conclusion thereof is not visible in near future and the delay in culmination thereof cannot be attributed to the petitioner. In fact, a perusal of the zimni orders passed by the trial Court indicate that repeatedly summons as also bailable warrants have been issued against the Police officials who have not turned up to have their testimonies recorded as prosecution witnesses. The long inordinate custody of the petitioner as an undertrial, without him being responsible for procrastination of the trial, entitles him to grant of regular bail in the factual matrix of the case in hand.
Conclusion - The right to a speedy trial is integral to Article 21, and prolonged pre-trial detention without justifiable cause violates this right. The statutory conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act must be balanced against the accused's fundamental rights, especially in cases of undue trial delay.
Petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate and subject to fulfilment of conditions imposed - petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1250
Challenge to summoning order - Dishonour of Cheque - determination of criminal liability of a Director, on the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed - HELD THAT:- From the entire averments made in the Petition, what emerges is that the Petitioner herein was admittedly the Director in the year 1998 at the time when the parties started negotiating initially - There is not an iota of averment made against the Petitioner that he continued to be the Director or was responsible for day-to-day conduct of business at the time in 2017, when the impugned Cheque was issued.
Section 141 of the N.I. Act mandates that those Directors/Officials who are responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the Company are responsible for any dishonour of the Cheque issued for and on behalf of the Company.
In the present case, there is not a single averment to show that the Petitioner was in any way responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the Company on the date of issuance of Cheque and cannot be summoned in a Complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act, on the basis of his personal liability. Moreover, the Legal Notice dated 06.09.2017 is addressed only to the Respondent No. 2/Company/M/s Selco International Ltd. and Respondent No. 3/Dr. Venkata Rama Krishna Govindraju a.k.a. Dr. G.V. Rama Krishna; it is not addressed to the Petitioner - He is neither a signatory to the Cheque nor is a Director in the accused-Company and there is no Legal Notice served upon him; therefore, he is entitled to be discharged.
Conclusion - i) Only directors responsible for the company's day-to-day affairs at the time of the offense can be held liable under Section 141 of the N.I. Act. ii) A guarantor's liability is civil and does not extend to criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. iii) The absence of a legal notice to the petitioner and lack of evidence of his involvement warranted setting aside the summoning order.
The impugned Order dated 18.05.2018 summoning the Petitioner Sh. N. Vijaya Kumar, is hereby set aside - Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 1146
Dismissal of appeals on the grounds of delay without considering the merits of the case - HELD THAT:- Although multiple submissions were raised from both sides touching upon the merits of the case, it is not deemed necessary to refer to them as the present appeals can be allowed on a short ground, which is, that the order impugned before the High Court was of refusal to condone the delay in preferring the appeals before the Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai. Once the High Court opined that in normal circumstances the delay ought to have been condoned, it ought not to have commented upon the merits of the orders dated 23.07.2019 and 16.10.2019, particularly, when the Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai had not dealt with the correctness of those orders. In such circumstances, the High Court should have set aside the order rejecting the delay condonation application, condoned the delay and restored the appeals on the file of the Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai for consideration on merits.
The scope of the appeal before the High Court was limited to examining the correctness of the order of the Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai declining condonation of delay. Only when the delay is condoned, the merits of the order could be examined by the Appellate Court.
Conclusion - The delay should be condoned when sufficient cause is shown, and that merits should not be commented upon unless the delay is condoned. The order dated 01.12.2022 passed by the Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeals by the appellants herein against the orders dated 23.07.2019 and 16.10.2019, is set aside.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1090
Maintainability of petition - whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would be maintainable against an order passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) in exercise of power under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006? - interplay between the MSMED Act and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act), especially regarding the roles of conciliation and arbitration.
HELD THAT:- This is a case of statutory arbitration that is mandatory. It is possible to argue that it bars a party from moving the court of law under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 18 also overrides the principle of party autonomy when they enter into an arbitration agreement which prescribes the procedure for the appointment of an arbitrator and conduct of arbitral proceedings. The statute further prescribes an undoubtedly high rate of interest – three times the Reserve Bank rate of interest – presently 6.5 per cent i.e. 19.5 per cent. The interest is compounded with monthly rests - Pre-deposit is a condition for hearing a decision on the objections to the award. The issue therefore which arises and needs consideration is whether there would be an absolute and complete bar to invoke writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution even in exceptional and rare cases where fairness, equity and justice may warrant the exercise of writ jurisdiction.
The access to High Courts by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not just a constitutional right but also a part of the basic structure. It is available to every citizen whenever there is a violation of their constitutional rights or even statutory rights. This is an inalienable right and the rule of availability of alternative remedy is not an omnibus rule of exclusion of the writ jurisdiction, but a principle applied by the High Courts as a form of judicial restraint and refrain in exercising the jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and the same is not limited by any provision of the Constitution and cannot be restricted or circumscribed by a statute.
It is deemed appropriate to refer the following questions raised in the present appeal to a larger Bench of five Judges, namely:
(i) Whether the ratio in M/s India Glycols Limited (supra) that a writ petition could never be entertained against any order/award of the MSEFC, completely bars or prohibits maintainability of the writ petition before the High Court?
(ii) If the bar/prohibition is not absolute, when and under what circumstances will the principle/restriction of adequate alternative remedy not apply?
(iii) Whether the members of MSEFC who undertake conciliation proceedings, upon failure, can themselves act as arbitrators of the arbitral tribunal in terms of Section 18 of the MSMED Act read with Section 80 of the A&C Act?
The first and second question will subsume the question of when and in what situation a writ petition can be entertained against an order/award passed by MSEFC acting as an arbitral tribunal or conciliator - The Registry is directed to place the papers before the Chief Justice so that an appropriate decision can be taken on the administrative side for the constitution of a larger Bench in the present case.
Conclusion - The writ jurisdiction is discretionary and not barred by the existence of alternative statutory remedies. A final determination is not provided but instead the significant questions are raised to a larger bench for comprehensive resolution.
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2025 (1) TMI 1089
Dishonour of Cheque - power of the trial Court to proceed with the trial for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in absence of the accused - when neither accused nor his advocate appeared during evidence recording stage, whether trial Court can a) proceed further, b) dispense statement under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code and c) convict the accused?
HELD THAT:- It is very well true that this view does not fit into the traditional view of ‘mandatory recording of the statement and even giving the benefit to the accused about certain lacunaes in recording Section 313 statement’.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. MOHANRAJ & ORS. VERSUS M/S. SHAH BROTHERS ISPAT PVT. LTD. [2021 (3) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT] has dealt with nature of cases under Section 138 being quasi-criminal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed “Section 138 proceeding can be said to be a “civil sheep” in a ‘criminal wolf’s’ clothing” - The issue involved in that case was whether the proceeding under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are covered by the moratorium provisions under Sections 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. That is why there was an occasion for the Hon’ble Supreme Court to consider the nature of proceeding under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The ingredients of Section 138, 141, 142, 143-A, 148 were considered.
If the proceeding under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are quasi-criminal in nature, there is reason to believe that one of attribute of criminal trial about mandatory recording of statement under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not applicable. So in given set of facts narrated hereinabove, the accused cannot make complaint about causing prejudice if evidence is adduced in his absence and he cannot make complaint of non recording of the statement under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code if they have remained absent without justification. In a given case and after ascertaining certain factors, the Magistrate is justified in proceeding further in absence of accused and even dispense his statement.
It cannot be said that there is illegality in the findings recorded by the trial magistrate and confirmed by the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge. There is no merit in both these revisions applications.
The order of conviction and the sentence passed by the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is confirmed - Both the revision applications are dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1088
Enhancement of the rent/licence fee from Rs. 20/- to Rs. 50/- per day for the petitioner, a fruit vendor - enhancement is discriminatory compared to other vendors in the locality or not - HELD THAT:- This court is not in agreement with the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents for the reasons that when the petitioner obtained the permission for selling of fruit vend at the space in question, the rent was being charged at Rs. 20/- per day, since January, 2016. The same has been enhanced to Rs. 50/- per day within a span of one year and it is this enhancement which the petitioner’s claim to be discriminatory as the same amounts to the petitioner’s paying an amount of Rs. 1500/- per month whereas others are being levied lesser rent/licence fee.
The fact that the petitioner is a fruit vendor is not a relevant consideration to subject the petitioner to such discriminatory treatment. All other vendors in the same locality, as per the public notice dated 27.03.2017 are vendors of similar consumable items with reference to whom he is claiming discriminatory treatment - The Court finds the levy to be shockingly disproportionate and discriminatory. Such arbitrary demand is thus found to be unsustainable. The levy of Rs. 50/- per day is clearly unsustainable since other vendors have been charged much less than Rs. 1500/- per month, i.e. Rs. 1000/- per month or Rs. 800/- per month.
In view of the shocking disparity as evident from the public notice dated 27.03.2017, this Court finds that the determination of rent for the petitioner at Rs. 50/- per day is clearly unsustainable. This Court directs the respondent no.2 to take a final decision on the petitioner’s claim as contained in annexure P-7 to the writ petition taking into consideration the observations made.
Conclusion - The rent enhancement was discriminatory and arbitrary. The municipal authority is directed to reconsider the petitioner's claim for parity and determine rent based on relevant parameters.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 1029
Right to levy royalty - Suits against the appellants for a permanent injunction restraining them from assessing, levying or recovering any amount as royalty from the respondents on account of the use of earth by the respondents for making bricks - Legality of appellants' action of assessing royalty and sending notices for recovery - Jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain the suit in view of Rule 54F of the Mineral Rules, which provides a remedy of appeal against orders of assessment of royalty.
HELD THAT:- The High Court, in the impugned judgment, held that the presumption under sub-Section (2) of Section 42 of the Land Revenue Act would not apply. The reason is that at the relevant time, brick earth was not declared as a minor mineral - the High Court has missed the real issue. As far as the ownership of the said lands is concerned, admittedly, respondents were not the owners. The respondents claimed that they had taken the said lands on lease from the real owners. The persons claiming to be the real owners were not parties to the suit. Most importantly, the Trial Court did not frame any issue on the ownership of the land in question. The District Court did not frame the point for determination on this aspect.
Even if a person owns the land, he cannot undertake quarrying or mining operations therein unless he holds a certificate of approval in Form “B”. A person to whom the certificate is issued is required to file returns showing the production and disposal of mines or minerals. The royalty is determined as provided in sub-Rule (1) of Rule 54C - once it is accepted that brick earth was a minor mineral under the Mineral Rules, the first appellant – the State Government, gets the right to levy royalty on the production and disposal of minor minerals. An appeal is provided under Rule 54F of the Mineral Rules against an order of the assessment of royalty. This remedy is an efficacious remedy available to challenge the levy of royalty.
The three Courts have unnecessarily gone into the issue of ownership of the said lands or minerals therein. The issue was about the right of the first appellant – the State Government to levy royalty. Once it is shown that under the Mineral Rules, the first appellant – State Government was entitled to levy royalty on the activity of mining of brick earth, the issue of ownership of the said lands becomes irrelevant. The reason is that the owners of the said lands in which the excavation is made are not in the exempted category specified in Rule 3 of the Mineral Rules. Though, for different reasons, the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court were right in dismissing the suits.
Conclsuion - i) The State Government has the right to levy royalty on brick earth as a minor mineral. ii) The Civil Court lacks jurisdiction due to the appellate remedy under the Mineral Rules. iii) Land ownership is irrelevant to the royalty issue, and the nonjoinder of landowners does not affect the outcome. iv) The respondents did not make out a case for the grant of a decree of permanent injunction restraining the appellants from recovering royalty from the respondents. However, on the quantum of royalty, an appeal under Rule 54F is always available.
The impugned judgment dated 19th September 2007 of the High Court is hereby quashed and set aside, and the decrees of the dismissal of suits passed by the Trial Court are restored - Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1028
Violation of principles of natural justice - challenge to disciplinary inquiry against the respondent (Bank Branch Manager) - abuse of position by making fictitious debits to crop insurance account narrating the credit to various Syndicate Kisan Credit Cards (SKCC) accounts - fair inquiry conducted or not - no documentary evidence to arrive at a correct decision - Penalty of dismissal.
HELD THAT:- It is well settled that an acquittal in a criminal case is no ground to exonerate a delinquent in disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof differs in these proceedings. It is well settled that the adequacy of the evidence adduced during disciplinary inquiry cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. In the case of BC. CHATURVEDI VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [1995 (11) TMI 379 - SUPREME COURT], this court held 'The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal.'
It is well settled that the Bank officers are expected to maintain a higher standard of honesty, integrity, and conduct.
In view of the respondent's admissions and the fact that documentary evidence was on record, it cannot be said that it was a case of no evidence. The principles of natural justice were followed during the disciplinary inquiry. The respondent thoroughly cross-examined the officer examined as a witness. The respondent did not apply for leading any evidence. Therefore, the finding that the disciplinary inquiry was not fair or was in breach of the principles of natural justice cannot be accepted as correct. The entire premise on which the High Court had interfered is without basis - It is well settled that the exercise of powers by the disciplinary authority is always subject to principles of proportionality and fair play. In the facts of the case, the financial loss caused to the appellant was reimbursed. The respondent, at every stage, fairly accepted his mistakes.
Penalty of dismissal - HELD THAT:- The penalty of dismissal was disproportionate to the misconduct established against the respondent and his unblemished career for a long time. However, fact remains that the misconduct alleged and proved against the respondent was of a serious nature considering the fact that a very high standard of conduct is expected from a branch manager of a Bank. Considering the facts of the case, we are of the view that a minor penalty, as provided in Regulation 4(e) of the Disciplinary Regulations, would be appropriate. The penalty will be of reducing the respondent to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a period of one year, without cumulative effect and not adversely affecting his pension.
Conclusion - i) The disciplinary inquiry was fair. ii) The findings of misconduct were supported by evidence. iii) The penalty was modified to a minor one. iv) The criminal acquittal was irrelevant to the disciplinary proceedings.
Appeal allowed in part.
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