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Showing 181 to 200 of 233 Records
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1987 (10) TMI 53 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Countervailing duty - Valuation ... ... ... ... ..... ms Tariff Act, and even if it is so stated the Section cannot be struck down merely because the petitioner is unable to carry on his business because of his inability to pay the duty. The petitioner is not compelled to import the goods in case the petitioner is not able to pay the duty and the validity of the Section does not depend upon the ability of the petitioner to pay taxes. In our judgment, there is no merit whatsoever in the challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 3(2) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. 10. Though the petition raises several other issues, Dr. Kantawala stated that the petitioner is not desirous of pressing any other contention, including the complaint about packing charges being loaded on c.i.f. value while determining the assessable value of the imported goods. As all the contentions raised by the petitioner are turned down, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 11. Accordingly, petition fails and the rule is discharged with costs.
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1987 (10) TMI 52 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Presecution - Refund claimed for amount already refunded ... ... ... ... ..... ed the refund amount in respect of eight claims and that in respect of other eight claims he had made claims for the same amounts in the earlier petitions but submits that the same was done inadvertantly. The Respondents have also shown to Mr. Kumar Prabhulal Shah two refund orders bearing Nos. 1206 to 1291 of 3rd June, 1987 and Bearing Nos. 1162 to 1205, dated 1st June, 1987. Mr. Kumar Prabhulal Shah also voluntarily accepts that the signatures on the refund orders are his. All the petitions are also adjourned to 23rd November, 1987. 9. One last thing which must be mentioned is that Mr. Kantawala s for the Petitioners applies for a discharge. At this stage, in view of the fact that two of the earlier petitions have been filed through his Office, I do not permit Mr. Kantawala to take a discharge until the show cause notice is disposed off. Mr. Kantawala is also directed to produce his office copies of those earlier petitions filed through his office along with all annexures.
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1987 (10) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
Whether yarn obtained and further processed within the factory for the manufacture of fabrics could not be subjected to duty of excise?
Held that:- In the instant, case, the appellants are liable to pay Excise duty on the yarn which is obtained at an intermediate stage and, thereafter, further processed in an integrated process for weaving the same into fabrics. Although it has been alleged that the yarn is obtained at an intermediate stage of an integrated process of manufacture of fabrics, it appears to be not so. After the yarn is produced it is sized and, thereafter, subjected to a process of weaving the same into fabrics. Be that as it may, as we have held that the commodity which is obtained at an intermediate stage of an integrated process of manufacture of another commodity, is liable to the payment of Excise duty, the yarn that is produced by the appellants is also liable to payment of Excise duty. In our view, the High Court by the impugned judgment has rightly held that the appellants are not liable to pay any Excise duty on the yarn after it is sized for the purpose of weaving the same into fabrics. No distinction can be made between unsized yarn and sized yarn, for the unsized yarn when converted into sized yarn does not lose its character as yarn. Appeal dismissed.
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1987 (10) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the establishment of the respondent was covered by the notification dated 20th September, 1975 and came within the mischief of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 ?
Held that:- Whether in a particular case manufacture has resulted by a process or not would depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. There is no doubt that the process must bring into existence a new item or a new commodity known differently in the market as such by people who use or deal with that good. In that process the ironing of clothes as has been found to be an essential part and for that power is used. These are facts found and are not disputed. If that is the position, then in our opinion, it comes clearly within the purview of the Act in view of the other facts noted before and the employees are covered by the Act.
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1987 (10) TMI 49 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... band can constitute a Hindu undivided family. That rule cannot apply after the extinction of the Hindu undivided family itself by the Act, when the joint family has been wiped off, the joint family character has been effaced and the absolute right of the individual members had been declared under the statute. Thus, by operation of law, the property held by an individual member on and after December 1, 1976, has lost its character of ancestral property and that character cannot be revived as no undivided family could come into existence or revive within the State where the system has been statutorily put an end to. We, therefore, hold the view that the Tribunal has rightly rejected the contention of the assessee. We accordingly answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of the judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1987 (10) TMI 48 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eassessment in respect of the income earned by the Hindu undivided family up to December 1, 1976, by issuing notice to the quondam karta in the name of the joint family. The income accruing, therefore, can only be assessed in the hands of the members of the family in proportion to their share as the income of the individual members and not as that of the Hindu undivided family. In this view, the proportionate share of the income that accrued to the partner as on March 31, 1977, is properly assessable in the hands of the assessee in the individual status. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that the share income of Shantilal C. Shah is properly assessable in the individual status. The question is accordingly answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of the judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1987 (10) TMI 47 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Liability To Tax ... ... ... ... ..... , we leave the matter for verification by the concerned Income-tax Officer. He shall verify whether, at the time of transfer, the land was being used for agricultural purposes. If it was so used, the income arising from the transfer of such land would be agricultural income and not exigible to capital gains tax. Otherwise, the levy would be proper. The expression agricultural purposes has to be understood in its ordinary connotation. It includes the activities of the nature mentioned in paras (ii) and (iii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (1) of section 2 (definition of agricultural income ). Writ Petitions Nos. 9605 of 1981, 5641 of 1980, 1605 of 1986, 2211 of 1986, 2123 of 1986 and 7167 of 1982 are disposed of with the above directions. There shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. We wish to place on record the valuable assistance rendered ably by Sarvasri Y. Ratnakar and S. R. Ashok for the petitioners, and Sri M. Suryanarayana Murthy, for the Revenue.
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1987 (10) TMI 46 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Income, Income From Other Sources ... ... ... ... ..... the construction of the assessee, it would not reduce the cost of construction of the assessee. In my view, therefore, the interest received would constitute income of the assessee assessable in terms of section 56 of the Act. For the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the fourth question referred to us for our opinion in regard to interest income from bank deposits must constitute income of the assessee. That question, therefore, must be answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The other questions, either at the instance of the assessee or of the Revenue, must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The references are disposed of accordingly. Since most of the questions have been decided in favour of the assessee, there shall be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, in terms of section 260 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. S. B. SANYAL-I agree.
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1987 (10) TMI 45 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Interest On Deferred Dividends, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... to discounting requires, for the reasons stated by us, reconsideration by the Tribunal. We now come to question No. 3. We have already stated that the first instalment of interest became due and payable only at the end of two years as provided under section 5A of the Act No. 28 of 1975. Likewise, the second instalment of interest became due and payable at the end of three years. It was not only the Payment of interest that was deferred to the date on which the respective period expired, but the accrual of interest itself was deferred. That was the legislative intent when the section states shall become due and payable . Accordingly, question No. 3 is answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in these tax referred cases. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1987 (10) TMI 44 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... eason stated by us, we are of the view that the tax deducted at source under section 194 of the Income-tax Act did not form part of the net wealth of the assessee for the purpose of assessment under the Wealth-tax Act. However, we modify the second question to read as follows Was the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal right in holding that the gross dividend and not the net dividend, i.e., interim dividend declared less tax deducted at source, is to be included as the value of the asset in the net wealth of the assessee for the assessment year 1975-76 ? We answer this question in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In the light of our answer to the second question, we decline to answer the first question. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in this tax referred case. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1987 (10) TMI 43 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ax Officer would have reached a different conclusion had he passed a detailed order. So, the conclusion of the Commissioner that the orders of the Income-tax Officer are erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue are based merely on suspicion and surmises in the absence of any enquiry having been made by him. In the income-tax assessments, all questions boil down to this, whether income has been properly determined and whether the correct rate of tax has been applied. The Commissioner does not say that the income was higher or that it was assessed on a wrong entity or at a low rate or that any exemption was wrongly allowed. In the absence of such a finding, the assessment orders cannot be said to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. For the above reasons, we are not inclined to direct the Tribunal to state the case on any question proposed by the Revenue. The applications are, therefore, dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.
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1987 (10) TMI 42 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Addition To Income, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... ust have furnished the complete address of the purchaser to the assessing officer and must have taken full steps to summon him. Instead of doing that, the assessee requested the assessing officer to locate the purchaser first. On these facts, it cannot be said that the assessing officer failed to issue summons illegally. Had the assessing officer failed to issue summons to the purchaser, after the complete address of the purchaser having been furnished to him and full steps having been taken by the assessee in this regard, then only the assessee could have urged that the assessing officer had abdicated his jurisdiction illegally and that gave rise to a question of law. But on the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no duty on the assessing officer to issue summons, inasmuch as the assessee failed to furnish the address of the purchaser to the assessing officer. Therefore, the questions proposed by the assessee do not arise. The application is accordingly rejected.
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1987 (10) TMI 41 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust, Religious Purpose, Religious Trust ... ... ... ... ..... at page 90 Thus, the classification made by the aforesaid sub-clause (a) for purposes of exemption is not unreal or unknown. It conforms to a well recognised pattern. It is based on intelligible differentia. The object of this differentiation between income accruing or received from a source in the specified areas and the income accruing or received from a source outside such areas, is to benefit not only the members of the Scheduled Tribes residing in the specified areas but also to benefit economically such areas. The object of section 4(1)(b) of the Agricultural Income-tax Act confining the exemption to agricultural income spent within the State is to benefit not only the concerned religious or charitable trust but also for the economic benefit of the utilisation of such income within the State. Section 4(1)(b) of the Agricultural Income-tax Act is perfectly valid and is not opposed to article 14 of the Constitution. The original petition fails and is dismissed. No costs.
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1987 (10) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that could not render the claim false. Same applies to stock discrepancy. In any case, if the assessee had furnished all details and had not concealed anything, then it cannot be said that he was not acting bona fide only because its explanation was not accepted. The proviso to the Explanation to section 271(1)(c) was, therefore, squarely applicable and the Tribunal was justified in the circumstances in cancelling the penalty. Question No. (1), as such, raised by the Department does not arise. As regards questions Nos. (2) to (4), it again does not raise any question of law as the order cannot be said to be perverse only because the Tribunal did not levy penalty on the finding recorded in the assessment proceedings. Question No. (5), no doubt, is worded as a question of law. But it cannot be taken in isolation. Since, on facts, penalty was not leviable, the question does not arise. In the result, the application fails and is rejected. But there shall be no order as to costs.
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1987 (10) TMI 39 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... itself offered this amount for being added, the addition was made. Regarding the remaining two other additions, the assessee gave an explanation which was rejected by the Income-tax Officer but was accepted by the appellate authority. Normally, the question whether there is concealment or not is a question of fact unless there are some other grave errors of law. The submission of learned counsel for the Revenue is that in the instant case, Explanation 1 to section 271(1) (c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is applicable, but the Tribunal erroneously found otherwise. The assessee furnished an explanation with regard to the additions made and the appellate authorities held the same to be a bona fide one. The question, whether the explanation offered by the assessee is bona fide or not, is question of fact and no question of law arises therefrom. On these facts, we do not see that the questions proposed by the Revenue are questions of law. The application is, therefore, rejected.
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1987 (10) TMI 38 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Object Of General Public Utility... ... ... ... ... ..... d on in such a manner that it does not result in any profit . It would indeed be difficult for persons in charge of trust or institution to so carry on the activity that the expenditure balances the income and there is no resulting profit. That would not only be difficult of practical realisation, but would also reflect an unsound principle of management. The principle laid down in the aforesaid case was applied by the Supreme Court in the following three later decisions (i) CIT v. Bar Council of Maharashtra 1981 130 ITR 28 (ii) CIT v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce 1981 130 ITR 184 and (iii) CIT v. Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 1981 130 ITR 186. In view of the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal and the law laid down by the Supreme Court as stated above, our answer to the three questions referred to us is in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1987 (10) TMI 37 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Loss ... ... ... ... ..... f the assessee. The mill, when the crushing season approached, sold the bonds but at loss of Rs. 11,839 and it is this loss of which the deduction has been claimed. The finding of the Tribunal that the investment in the bonds at the instance of the district authorities related to the business and hence the loss on their transfer is a business loss is a finding of fact and that cannot be disturbed by us in advisory jurisdiction. On similar facts, in Patnaik and Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1986 161 ITR 365, the Supreme Court held that the loss on sale of such bonds was a revenue loss. Following the said authority, we hold that the opposite party is entitled to claim deduction of Rs. 11,839 as a revenue loss and that was rightly allowed by the Tribunal. In the result, the question referred to us is decided in favour of the opposite party and against the Revenue. Let the record be sent to the Tribunal to pass an order conformably to this order under section, 260 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
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1987 (10) TMI 36 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the plots indispute. The Tribunal thus did not ignore any relevant material. Similarly, question No. 3 does not raise any question of law. It purports to refer to the claims of the petitioner in land acquisition proceedings and before the Wealth-tax Officer. But the valuation under section 7 of the Wealth-tax Act has to be determined of the price which it would fetch in the open market. Therefore, what had to be determined was the price the land would fetch if sold as agricultural land. For that the assessee claimed that it would fetch not more than Rs. 12,000 per bigha. In land acquisition proceedings, the compensation on the other hand was claimed on its potential value as a building site. Since the basis in the two proceedings was not the same, the assessee rightly claimed different rates. Question No. 4 again does not raise any question of law for the reasons mentioned while discussing questions Nos. 2 and 3. In the result, all the applications fail and are rejected.
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1987 (10) TMI 35 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ajor dealers of the assessee and their annual sales turnover runs into several lakhs of rupees. Again, the assessee has pointed out that during the year of appeal, it had huge surplus funds and that it has earned interest of over Rs. 20 lakhs on its bank deposits whereas it has paid only a sum of Rs. 13,020 on its overdraft account with the bank. The Commissioner further observes Again, it was submitted that had the assessee not allowed credit facilities to the three dealers, either its turnover would have been lower or the price realisation would have been less or both. Relying on these findings, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Income-tax Officer was not right in estimating the interest income notionally. These are purely findings of fact and no question of law arises therefrom. For the above reasons, we do not agree with the Revenue that question No. 2 is a question of law. The application is, therefore, rejected and the same is dismissed.
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1987 (10) TMI 34 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in the instant case would, therefore, be an order disposing of the appeal under section 250 of the Act and, consequently, the appeal preferred by the assessee before the Tribunal was maintainable. In so far as the second question is concerned, suffice it to point out that once it has been found that the appeal before the Tribunal was maintainable, no exception can be taken to the proposition of law that keeping in view the scope of an appeal before the Tribunal, it was open to the Tribunal not only to reverse the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) but also to exercise such jurisdiction as would be exercised by the Commissioner of Income-tax under the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 249 of the Act. It is for these reasons that we are of the opinion that there is no merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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