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Showing 221 to 240 of 2844 Records
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2015 (10) TMI 2631 - ITAT NAGPUR
Disallowance of deduction u/s 80IB(10) - no approval from the local authority for the housing project seeked - whether the Gram Panchayat is “local authority” or not - Held that:- There was a discussion of Bombay Village Panchayat Act, 1958 and as per section 52, sanction of construction of building within the limit of village has to be granted by the Panchayat. On the said basis it was held that the village Panchayat is a “local authority”.
As far as the issue whether the Gram Panchayat is “local authority” or not, the decision of ITAT, Pune Bench has been cited before us n the case of Hiraman Nivrutti Bhujal [2014 (5) TMI 1137 - ITAT PUNE] wherein other decisions were discussed and finally came to the conclusion that the concerned Gram Panchayat was a competent local authority for the purpose of issuing approval and completion certificate for claiming deduction u/s 80IB(10) of I.T. Act. Moreover, the respondent-assessee has also placed reliance on a decision of CIT vs. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1992 (4) TMI 3 - SUPREME Court ] for the legal proposition that the provisions for deductions and exemptions should be construed reasonably and in favour of the assessee. In our considered opinion since all the issues in hand have been covered either by the orders of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case or by respected coordinate Benches, therefore, we find no fallacy in the view taken by the learned CIT(Appeals). - Decided against revenue
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2015 (10) TMI 2630 - SUPREME COURT
Peaceful functioning of fair price shop in Gram Sabha Ardauna, Tehsil Sadar, District Mau - Held that:- In the instant case, shop no.2 had become vacant. The appellant was allotted the shop, may be in the handicapped quota but such allotment is the resultant factor of the said shop falling vacant. The original allottee, that is the respondent, assailed his cancellation and ultimately succeeded in appeal. We are not concerned with the fact that the appellant herein was allowed to put her stand in the appeal. She was neither a necessary nor a proper party. The appellate authority permitted her to participate but that neither changes the situation nor does it confer any legal status on her. She would have continued to hold the shop had the original allottee lost the appeal. She cannot assail the said order in a writ petition because she is not a necessary party.
It is the State or its functionaries, who could have challenged the same in appeal. They have maintained sphinx like silence in that regard. Be that as it may, that would not confer any locus on the subsequent allottee to challenge the order passed in favour of the former allottee. She is a third party to the lis in this context.
The land of which possession is given and the landless persons who have received the Pattas and have remained in possession, they have a right to retain their possession. It will be an anarchical situation, if they are not impleaded as parties, whereas in a case which relates to a post or position or a vacancy, if he or she who holds the post because of the vacancy having arisen is allowed to be treated as a necessary party or allowed to assail the order, whereby the earlier post holder or allottee succeeds, it will only usher in the reverse situation – an anarchy in law.
The question to be posed is whether there is curtailment or extinction of a legal right of the appellant. The writ petitioner before the High Court was trying to establish her right in an independent manner, that is, she has an independent legal right. It is extremely difficult to hold that she has an independent legal right. It was the first allottee who could have continued in law, if his licence would not have been cancelled. He was entitled in law to prosecute his cause of action and restore his legal right. Restoration of the legal right is pivotal and the prime mover. The eclipse being over, he has to come back to the same position. His right gets revived and that revival of the right cannot be dented by the third party. In view of the aforesaid premises, we do not perceive any merit in this appeal and, accordingly, the same stands dismissed
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2015 (10) TMI 2629 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Whether ‘spent grain’, generated in a brewery in the manufacture of 'beer', is an article that would fall within the Entry at Serial No.3 in the First Schedule of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003, which relates to exempted goods; or whether, it is assessable to tax, by treating them as not goods falling under clause (a) or (c) of section 6(1) of that Act?
Held that: - In the larger expanding horizon of commerce and scientific attempts to utilise all leftovers of different processes of production, we see that there are efforts being made, and suggestions extended; in the international scientific domain; to utilise ‘spent grain’, primarily as fodder, and even as food substitutes even for humans, particularly in exceptionally marginalised and economically challenged social groups in certain parts of the world. But, in the contextual content of a taxing statute in a land like India; particularly in the State of Kerala; with the judicial prudence that we are expected to have, we are unable to visualise that 'spent grain' would be reckoned as an edible substitute for human beings; here and now. In this view of the matter, we cannot but repel the suggestion on behalf of the Revenue as to the probable varied utility of ‘spent grain’ and to hold that the Revenue had established that the said substance is excluded from Sl. No.3 (three) in the First Schedule of the Act - the decisions rendered by the Appellate Tribunal are liable to be reversed holding that ‘spent grain’ does not fall either under clause (a) or (c) of section 6(1) of the Act. - Decided in favor of petitioner.
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2015 (10) TMI 2628 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Condonation of delay - interpretation of Section 260A (2) (a) - Held that:- Today in two other appeals Pr CIT v. Gulbarga Associates Pvt. Ltd.(2017 (3) TMI 1266 - DELHI HIGH COURT)questions concerning the interpretation of Section 260A (2) (a) have been referred to a larger Bench. The Court is of the view that many of those questions would arise in the present appeal as well.
Consequently, this appeal is also directed to be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for being placed before the larger Bench to be re- heard.
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2015 (10) TMI 2627 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
Refund claim - claim on the ground that finished goods removed to its Madras Depot on payment of duty were found substandard, and as such, the same were returned to the factory and upon re-packing, the same were cleared on payment of Central Excise Duty - Held that: - no security to the satisfaction of this Tribunal has been furnished by the appellant, entitling it to get the refund from the Original Authority - for the purpose of meeting the ends of justice, the appellant should be given an opportunity to furnish the bond for the refund amount - appeal disposed off - decided partly in favor of appellant.
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2015 (10) TMI 2626 - DELHI HIGH COURT
TPA - exclusion of two companies Cosmic Global Limited (‘CGL’) and Accentia Technologies Limited (‘ATL’) from the list of comparables for the purposes of determining the arm’s length price (‘ALP’) of the international transaction of ‘provision of ITES’ involving the Respondent Assessee - Held that:- One reason for exclusion of CGL was that it had outsourced its major activities whereas the Assessee was doing the business in-house. As far as ATL is concerned, it was noticed that there was merger of some other entity with it and, therefore, the said company could not be considered as a comparable.
The submission of learned counsel for the Revenue is that both these companies were included in the Assessee’s own list of selected entities and the demand for the exclusion was made only before the ITAT. Be that as it may, the Court is of the view that the order of the ITAT in so far as it concerns the exclusion of the above entities from the list of comparables does not give rise to any substantial question of law which requires consideration by the Court.
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2015 (10) TMI 2625 - ITAT PUNE
TPA - selection of comparable - Assessee does not outsource the work rather it receives outsourced work - Abnormal profit in the F.Y. of company is a major constraint to be selected as comparable - Held that:- Cepha Imaging Pvt. Ltd. should be considered as a comparable, if the RPT to sales is less than 25%.
So far as Allsec Technologies Ltd.- the functions carried out by Allsec Technologies Ltd. are different from that of the functions carried on by the assessee. Further, this company has incurred loss in the current year as well as in the preceding year. Apart from the general argument the Ld. Counsel for the assessee could not rebut the findings/observations given by the AO as well as the DRP as to how Allsec Technologies Ltd. should be included in the list of comparables. The various decisions relied on by Ld. Counsel for the assessee are not applicable to the facts of the present case. We, therefore, reject the arguments of the Ld. Counsel for the asessee on this issue and uphold the action of the AO/DRP in rejecting this company from the list of comparables.
R Systems International Ltd. - the company is product development and product seller. Accordingly, the DRP considered the same as not comparable with that of the assessee company. We do not find any infirmity in the order of the AO as well as the DRP on this issue. We find the Ld. Counsel for the assessee while arguing the case for exclusion of Cosmic Global Ltd. has argued that the same company had to be excluded since it had paid translation charges to third parties indicting outsourcing of work. For the above proposition, she also relied on various decisions. Therefore, once it has been found by the DRP from the director’s report that R Systems International Ltd. is leading provider of outsource product development services, business process, outsource service and also own product suites in BFSI, manufacturing and logistics verticals etc., therefore, in the own arguments of the Ld. Counsel for the assessee this company is functionally dissimilar and therefore the same cannot be accepted as comparable. In this view of the matter, we uphold the order of the AO/DRP on this issue.
Risk adjustment - Held that:- The different benches of the Tribunal are taking the view that an assessee who is a captive service provider and does not assume any risk or takes lesser risk as compared to comparable company which undertakes higher risks, then it is entitled to some risk adjustment. However, since the assessee has not produced complete analysis and complete spectrum of risk faced by business entity and in absence of risk analysis of each comparable, we restore this issue to the file of the AO with a direction to give an opportunity to the assessee to work out and justify to the satisfaction of the AO regarding the risk adjustment it is entitled to. We hold and direct accordingly. Ground of appeal by the assessee is accordingly allowed for statistical purposes.
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2015 (10) TMI 2624 - ITAT MUMBAI
Notional interest addition on the business advances given by an appellant to its Associated Enterprises (AE) - Held that:- There is no dispute on the nature of loans as "international transactions‟ in view of retrospective amendment by the Finance Act 2012 to section 92B of the Act relating to the “definition of international transactions”.
Regarding the charging of interest on such interest free loans given to the subsidiaries, it is now decided issue, by virtue of the case of CIT vs. Tata Autocomp Systems Ltd [2015 (4) TMI 681 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT ] that the said loan amounts are required to be bechmarked considering the LIBOR of the Singapore and Hong Kong, as the case may be. Now the question is what is the rate of interest which constitutes ALP in this case. It is the decision of the coordinate Bench in the case of Melstar Information Technologies Ltd (2015 (5) TMI 70 - ITAT MUMBAI) that LIBOR + 2% is followed by the Tribunal of Bombay Benches. No contrary decision of Bombay Benches of the Tribunal is brought to our notice by the Ld AR. Therefore, we are of the opinion that AO / TPO is directed to benchmark the impugned transaction by applying the arm‟s length rate of interest at LIBOR + 2% and the LIBOR of the respective countries should be considered. Accordingly, this part of the ground is partly allowed.
Considering rate of notional interest as 12 months average Libor + 300 basis - Held that:- On perusal of the loans given by the assessee and the date of return of the loans, we find no loan given by the assessee has exceeded one year. Minimum period of loan returned by the AEs is one month. Further, when the period of loans consumed by the AEs is not uniform for applying the uniform average of 12 months LIBOR on all these loans of that countries is prima facie not valid and appropriate. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion, considering the average of 6 months LIBOR of those countries, where loans are consumed, would meet the ends of justice. In any case, this issue was not addressed by the lower authorities during the relevant proceedings. As such, no judicial precedent is brought to our notice on this issue. Therefore, in our opinion, AO / TPO should verify the facts and give an opportunity to the assessee and decide the issue afresh.
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2015 (10) TMI 2623 - CESTAT MUMBAI
Club membership - Levy of service tax - charges received by the Club from their members for providing services - Held that: - matter is no longer res integra and stands decided in the case of Matunga Gymkhana v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai [2015 (1) TMI 1146 - CESTAT MUMBAI], where it was held that in view of the decision in Ranchi Club Limited (2012 (6) TMI 636 - Jharkhand High Court), on application of the principle of mutuality, services provided by the appellants to their respective members would not fall within the ambit of the taxable "club or association" service nor the consideration whether by way of subscription/ fee or otherwise received therefor be exigible to service tax - appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2015 (10) TMI 2622 - ITAT PUNE
Revision u/s 263 - Validity of assessment u/s 144C - Held that:- Where an order is passed by the Assessing Officer, which is contrary to the mandatory provisions of section 144C of the Act, then the same is to be declared one without jurisdiction, null and void and unenforceable in law. Accordingly, we hold so.
Commissioner on its own motion issued show cause notice on 17.12.2013 and had exercised the jurisdiction under section 263 of the Act and on the premise that the assessment order passed was without jurisdiction and without following procedure of law and hence, was erroneous. In the first instance, the assessee had already agitated the issue in appeal, which was pending. Further, where the order has been passed by the Assessing Officer, which is both null and void and is not sustainable in law, then in such circumstances, we find no merit in the exercise of jurisdiction by the Commissioner since for such exercise a valid order should be in existence and when no such valid order is in existence, the Revenue authorities cannot take the shelter of initiating the proceedings under section 263 of the Act in order to correct null and void order passed by the Assessing Officer. We find no merit in the exercise of jurisdiction by the Commissioner under section 263 of the Act.
Non-following of the conditions laid down in section 144C of the Act, we hold that the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer was both null and void and has to be quashed. - Decied in favour of assessee
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2015 (10) TMI 2621 - ITAT DELHI
Determining the arm’s length price of the international transaction of advertising, marketing and promotion (AMP) spent and royalty payment - Held that:- So far as determination of arm’s length price of AMP expenses is concerned the Hon’ble Court in Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications India Pvt. Ltd. (Now known as Sony India Limited) & others [2015 (3) TMI 580 - DELHI HIGH COURT ] has held that if suitable comparable engaged in both distribution and advertising, marketing and promotion (AMP) functions are found, than, arm’s length price of the transaction should be determined on aggregate basis. If, however, there is some difference in the function of distribution or advertising, marketing and promotion performed by the assessee as compared to the comparables, then attempt should be made to bridge the difference by making a suitable adjustment to the profit margin of the comparables. The Hon’ble Court has gone on to hold that if such adjustment is not possible, then, the chosen comparable should be eliminated and if in the process of comparing, no comparables are left who are engaged in performing such distribution and advertising, marketing and promotion functions, then the International transaction of AMP should be segregated and its arm’s length price should be determined applying a suitable method, however, in determining so, a proper set off, if any available from the distribution activity should be allowed. We find that in the present case details of the advertising, marketing and promotion function performed by the assessee are not available on record. Further advertising, marketing and promotion functions of the comparables have also not analyzed by the TPO as he applied the bright line test for determining the value of International transaction of advertising, marketing and promotion expenses which approach has not been approved of by the Hon’ble High Court. Thus since the Ld. A.R fairly stated that facts need to be addressed afresh as at this stage without a detailed discussion on facts, agreements, conduct etc. of the assessee it was not possible to address the advertising, marketing and promotion function of the assessee as well as comparables, thus request for remitting the matter back to the AO on facts and circumstances of the case is found to be justified.
As far as determination of arm’s length of royalty payment is concerned, it is seen that the Hon’ble High Court has held that payment of royalty is a relevant consideration while determining the arm’s length price of international transaction of distribution and marketing, however the tax treatment of royalty being different, the Royalty transaction, may be bench marked separately. Since the determination of arm’s length price of royalty payment is inter connected with advertising, marketing and promotion expenses as held by the Hon’ble High Court we are of the view that determination of arm’s length price of royalty also cannot be done at this stage and needs to be remitted back.- Decided in favour of assessee for statistical purpose.
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2015 (10) TMI 2620 - SUPREME COURT
Substitute arbitrator appointment - Interpretation of Section 15(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Held that:- Bombay High Court applied its mind to the consent terms as a whole and appointed Mrs. Justice Sujata Manohar as arbitrator for the disputes that were left to be resolved by the parties. The said appointing authority has been approached by the respondent for appointment of a substitute arbitrator, which was then done by the impugned judgment. This would therefore be "according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced" in accordance with Section 15(2) of the Act. We, therefore, find that the High Court correctly appointed another independent retired Judge as substitute arbitrator in terms of Section 15(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
Whenever parties agree for mediation, and even name a specific arbitrator with no specific provision for appointment of another arbitrator on the recusal/withdrawal of the said arbitrator, the said omission is made up by Section 15(2) of the Act and unless arbitration agreement between the parties provides a categorical prohibition or debarment in resolving a question or dispute or difference between the parties by a substitute arbitrator in case of death or the named arbitrator or non-availability of the said arbitrator, Courts have the power to appoint substitute arbitrator, which power is given by Section 15(2) of the Act as this provision is to be given liberal interpretation so as to apply to all possible circumstances under which the mandate of the earlier arbitrator may be terminated.
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2015 (10) TMI 2619 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction - Waiver of demurrage charges - refund of demurrage along with interest - representation explaining the reason for delay in clearing the goods - Held that: - This Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over Ext.P18 order passed by the 3rd respondent or conduct a fact-finding enquiry as to whether the petitioner has committed violation of the statutory provisions as found in Ext.P18 order. Therefore, it is for the petitioner to challenge Ext.P18 order of the 3rd respondent by filing a statutory appeal under Section 128 of the Customs Act, before the Commissioner (Appeals), Kochi - petition dismissed - decided against petitioner.
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2015 (10) TMI 2618 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Duty Drawback - Section 74 of the Customs Act, 1962 - While leaving India, the passenger got an endorsement done of the goods imported by him on his ticket signed by an Inspector of Customs as evidence of having exported these goods - whether the impugned goods were same as which were exported? - Held that: - the identity of exported goods with regard to imported goods could not be established to the satisfaction of Assistant Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner as required under law. In this case the only document produced by the passenger was the air ticket with an endorsement which is neither a proper document nor does it contain particulars of the goods imported and exported. Further, no declaration under Section 77 was made by the respondent nor any order permitting the clearance of the goods for exportation, by the proper officer was issued. Therefore, it was not feasible to establish the identity of the impugned goods as the same which were imported to entitle them to drawback - Commissioner (Appeals) has erred in allowing drawback of the duty paid by the passenger at the time of importation when there was substantive non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 74 of the Customs Act, 1962 - revision application allowed.
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2015 (10) TMI 2617 - ITAT MUMBAI
Reopening of assessment - assessee has contravened the provisions of section 13(1)(c), 13(3) and section 11(4), as a result of which capital expenditure has to be disallowed - Held that:- On a perusal of the reasons recorded for re–opening, we do not find any such allegation made by the Assessing Officer which satisfies the condition of proviso to section 147. On the contrary, as it appears, the re–opening of assessment is on the basis of facts and material which are already disclosed by the assessee either in the return of income or during the original assessment and on the basis of which the original assessment was made. No new tangible material has come to the possession of Assessing Officer to form a belief that income has escaped assessment.
It is also pertinent to mention here, in the appeal preferred against the original assessment order, Commissioner (Appeals) has accepted assessee’s claim of exemption under section 11 of the Act. Thus there being no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment, the re–opening of assessment on a change of opinion, that too, after expiry of four years from the end of relevant assessment year is invalid. - Decided in favour of assessee
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2015 (10) TMI 2616 - CESTAT ALLAHABAD
Manufacture - production of PVC insulated winding wires amounts to manufacture or not - Held that: - no manufacture is involved if the wire of higher cross-dimension is drawn into the wire of lesser cross-dimension - in the present case, the final product for which exemption is being claimed is PVC Insulated Winding Wire. The input and the finished products are clearly distinct products and are known in the market as such. It would not require much imagination to show that process of making of PVC Insulated Winding Wire from simple wire is a process resulting in a different product and thus amounting to manufacture.
Whether the PVC winding wire should be made from wire exceeding 6 mm cross-sectional diameter? - does it mean that the wire exceeding 6 mm cross-sectional diameter should be in the hands of the appellant themselves - Held that: - even if the wire of cross-dimensional section exceeding 6 mm was not in their hands, it does not mean that the same was not the source of the material out of which PVC wire were made - The exemption on manufacture of PVC Insulated Winding Wire was available only if the input was wire of maximum cross dimensional area exceeding 6 mm of copper. We do not find under the notification any reference to the fact that PVC Winding wire should be made from cross-dimensional area less than 6 mm. This would be a mere presumption and has not been explained by the learned Counsel. Once the conditions of the notification are laid down, we see no reason to deviate from the same.
Time bar - Held that: - it is impossible for the Central Excise authorities to know that the assessee was using such wire. It was only after audit was conducted that the true facts came to light. Therefore, there is clear suppression of facts in claiming the benefit of notification wrongly. The extended period in such case is invocable.
Whether the plea that the benefit of Modvat credit on the inputs should be given in case the benefit of exemption is denied, is justified? - Held that: - had they not availed the benefit of Nil rate of duty under the exemption, Modvat credit on the inputs would have been available - we allow the benefit of the Modvat credit on the inputs subject to verification by the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner.
There was mis-statement of facts, the mandatory penalty under Section 11AC is imposable.
Appeal disposed off - decided partly in favor of appellant.
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2015 (10) TMI 2615 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Advance Authorisation scheme - issuance of Export Obligation Discharge Certificate - denial on the ground that petitioner does not satisfy third condition namely, ‘imported goods shall be manufactured in India’ - Held that: - ‘Deemed Exports’ benefit for non-mega power project would be available for supply of capital goods if the categories of supply of goods by main/sub-contractors as mentioned in Paras 8.2(a) to 8.2(g), provided ‘goods are manufactured in India’.
In the case on hand, capital goods like Turbine, Generators, etc., have been imported and as such, they have been installed in the power project - Since export policy having been brought for import substitution and if the project authorities were to import the same, then said project authority cannot be heard to contend that imports substitution has taken place.
From facts on hand, it is explicitly clear that the goods imported under advance authorisation licence have been supplied as such to the project and they have not been manufactured in India and as such, these goods as ‘capital goods’ would not be entitled for exemption under advance authorisation.
Petition dismissed - decided against petitioner.
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2015 (10) TMI 2614 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Misdeclaration of the export of goods - DEPB Scheme - procedural infirmity - applicability of rule 19 of CER, 2002 - applicant initially exported the goods under ARE-1 No. EX/109/2005-06, dated 31-10-2009 under DEPB scheme, duly sealed and signed by the Inspector of Central Excise. At the port of export, the Customs officials refused to sign the same on the ground that the ARE-1 was not signed by the Superintendent, Central Excise. That being advised by the Customs authorities the applicant prepared another ARE-1 with the same number and date and same details and the same was produced before the Customs authorities as self-sealing in order to export the goods expeditiously. That the Customs authorities after being satisfied allowed the export and signed the duplicate copy of the ARE-1.
Held that: - the applicant has contravened the provisions of Rule 19 of the Rules, ibid inasmuch as the applicant has prepared parallel set of statutory documents which cannot be created. ARE-1 is in the nature of an application made to the proper officer for removal of goods for export under Rule 18. If for any reason such an application is not found fit for use to remove the goods for export it should have been withdrawn or amended with the approval of the proper officer as laid down in Notification No. 43/2001, dated 26-6-2001. There is nothing on record to show that any such effort was made by the applicant. The applicant instead created a parallel set of statutory documents which is not laid down in Notification, therefore is not correct.
Imposition of penalty u/s 11AC - Held that: - the order passed by Commissioner (Appeals) is erroneous and not maintainable, the question of imposition of penalty does not arise.
Application rejected.
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2015 (10) TMI 2613 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Remission of duty - Rule 21 of CER, 2002 - imposition of penalty u/r 25 of CER, 2002 - storage loss - destruction of molasses - rejection on the ground that the bursting of the tank was neither due to natural reasons nor unavoidable accident - applicability of Board Circular F. No. 261/15CC/1/80-CX 8, dated 6-2-1982 - Held that: - Government notes that penalty shall be imposed on a manufacturer if he removes goods in contravention of the provisions of the Central Excise Rules and Notifications issued thereunder - In the present case it is an uncontested fact that provisions of Rules 4, 6 & 8 ibid have been violated by the applicant.
The duty is payable on the loss of goods but the same has not been paid. The applicant was liable to take all reasonable steps to safeguard Government revenue involved in the impugned goods and were liable to pay duty on the same which they failed to do. Therefore, provisions of Rules 4, 6 & 8 have been contravened and penalty has been rightly imposed by the original adjudicating authority.
Demand of duty, interest and penalty upheld - revision disposed off - decided against assessee.
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2015 (10) TMI 2612 - CESTAT MUMBAI
Unjust enrichment - whether the incidence of duty, for which refund is sought for, has been passed on or otherwise? - Held that: - appellant have produced books of account and balance sheet to the original authority and also to the appellate authority, which clearly shows that the amount of excess duty paid has been shown as receivable in the books of account. Moreover the Chartered Accountant also certified that duty for which refund was sought for, has been shown as receivable in the books of account. Chartered Accountant also certified that no depreciation was claimed on the excess duty, depreciation claimed only on the cost of machinery excluding the excess duty - appellant have successfully exhibited, on the basis of books of account and C.A. Certificate, that incidence of excess duty paid for which refund was sought for, has not been passed on to any other person - appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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