Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 67 Records
-
1972 (12) TMI 92 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... . I cannot for the reason mentioned above agree, with respect, with the view expressed in Tikam Chand's case. It may be mentioned that there is no discussion in the case nor are the authorities mentioned by me noticed therein. In my view the case of Pratab Chand Rattan Chand, was dealing with a different matter and reliance on that case was placed wrongly (if I may say with respect) in Tikam Chand's case. (7) For the reasons mentioned above, in my view the trial court has acted illegally in holding that the document in question did not require any stamp duty. I would, Therefore, set aside the order of the trial court and hold that the document in question is payable otherwise than on demand and is hence insufficiently stamped, I would, Therefore, find the preliminary issued in favor of the petitioner-defendant. (8) The result is that the petition is allowed, but with no order as to costs. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the trial court.
-
1972 (12) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... profession of different religious faith by the victims. According to the investigating officer, P.W. 13, Abdul Khalil's residential house had also been set on fire on May 12 at 8.30 p.m. In our country where the Constitution guarantees to all individuals freedom of religious faith, thought, belief and expression and where no particular religion is accorded a superior status and non subjected to hostile discrimination the commission of offences motivated only by the fact that the victim professes a different religious faith cannot be treated with leniency. They are not only destructive of our basic traditional social order founded on toleration in recognition of the dignity of the individual and of other cherished human values, but have also a tendency to mar our national solidarity. We are, therefore, wholly unable to find any cogent reason for reducing the sentences imposed by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.
-
1972 (12) TMI 90 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... these petitions to the Corporation for the official year 1969-70, the petitioners are agreed that in case the Corporation is restrained by an interim injunction from taking any steps to recover the amount of tax assessed against the petitioners except to the extent of the aforesaid amounts shown against their respective names, the petitioners will pay interest on such balance of the tax at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from today upto the expiration of the period far which the interim injunction is granted. 66. We, therefore, in view of this statement made by the petitioners in these petitions through their counsel Mr. C. T. Daru, grant an interim injunction restraining the Corporation from proceeding to recover the amount of tax assessed against the petitioners for the official year 1960 -70 except to the extent of the aforesaid amounts shown against the respective names of the petitioners and direct that this interim injunction shall endure only upto 22nd January 1972.
-
1972 (12) TMI 88 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... o widen the operation of Section 331 (1) to suits, applications or proceedings which were based on a cause of action for which any relief could be obtained from the revenue court, no matter whether the relief actually prayed for in the civil Court was the same or different. The amendments introduced in 1961 do not affect the present case. This was a simple suit for declaration which is expressly mentioned in Schedule II after the 1956 amendment. In order to test the jurisdiction in relation to such a suit the additions made to Section 331 (1) in 1961 are irrelevant. Assuming that the 1961 amendments were applicable, they will not govern the present suit because of the overriding operation of the saving clause. 11. The present suit was validly filed in 1963 in the civil Court. The civil Court was competent to hear and decide it. 12. Our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. Let the papers be returned to the learned Single Judge with this opinion and answer.
-
1972 (12) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ake it as difficult as possible to the externee to return to the field of his activities." Tulzapurkar J. expressed the same view by saying that "the contiguous area of Thana district is intimately connected with the industrial area of Greater Bombay with cheaper and quicker means of transport and communication." According to Bhasme J. who delivered the judgment of the Bench in Criminal Application No. 149 of 1972, "By reason of the means of communication and proximity, the districts of Greater Bombay and Thana are for all practical purposes one local area or one district." Deshmukh J. in the judgment under appeal, says that "Greater Bombay and Thana districts are ... intimately connected by Several communications". In matters of local colour and conditions the view so consistently expressed by the learned Judges of the High Court must, in our opinion, be accepted as correct. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
-
1972 (12) TMI 86 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... is favour by this Court, he moved the Commissioner for relief; and the Commissioner dismissed the revision on the technical ground that he had no jurisdiction to entertain it since the Revenue happened to file an appeal from the order sought to be revised. It is almost clear that the Commissioner would have granted relief to the petitioner, but for the above difficulty. Therefore, the only thing that can be done under the circumstances is to direct the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to reconsider and dispose of the petitioner's claim for deduction in the light of the decision of this Court on that point. Accordingly, I quash the order, Ex. P2 of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and direct him to dispose of the appeal afresh after considering the petitioner's claim for deduction of the interest paid by him on the account of his cashew nut business according to law. This writ petition is disposed of in the manner stated above. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1972 (12) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... n administrative authority should be made available to the persons concerned in any given case before the authority takes a decision upon that report. The answer to this question also must always depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. It is not at all unlikely that there may be certain cases where unless the report is given the party concerned cannot make any effective representation about the action that Government takes or proposes to take on the basis of that report. Whether the report should be furnished or not must therefore depend in every individual case on the merits of that case. We have no doubt that in the instant case non-disclosure of the report of the Investigating Committee has not can used any prejudice whatsoever to the appellants. In this view of the matter We confirm the order of the Delhi High Court and dismiss this appeal. In the facts and circumstances of the case we direct that the parties will bear their respective costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1972 (12) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... gh Court for refusing to allow the counter-affidavit to go on record at that belated stage. Apart from the question as to delay, that would have also meant a further adjournment to enable respondent 1 to prepare and file his rejoinder. There being thus no reply to the two special civil applications, the High Court had to accept the statements made on affidavit by respondent 1 therein as prima facie evidence of his right to possession of the lands in question. Mr. Desai frankly told us that that was the inevitable result flowing from the absence of any counter-affidavit denying the assertions made on affidavit by respondent 1. The consequence of the absence of any reply affidavit was that Mr. Desai could not urge any specific ground upon which the judgment of the High Court could be challenged by him. That being the position, there is no alternative except to dismiss the appeals with costs. Respondent 1 will get the costs in one set only. Order accordingly. Appeals dismissed.
-
1972 (12) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... be the income of that year though due in respect of an earlier year. We may also refer to the decision in Consolidated Coffee Estate Ltd. v. Workmen( 1970 2 L.L.J. 576.) where it was held that even though the company had been paving bonus in the past by negotiating with its employees, if it insisted that for the year in question it would pay in accordance with the relevant law it could not be prevented from having its liability for bonus determined accordingly. In the result the appeals of the Mills Company are dismissed. The appeals of the Association are allowed in part holding that item 2, i.e., the sums received from the Joint Plant Committee is not a deductible item and item I alone will be a deductible item under item 6(g) of the Second Schedule. As the Association has succeeded in five out of six questions that had to be decided they will get their costs from the management. The Industrial Court will have to re-calculate the bonus on this basis. One hearing fee. G. C.
-
1972 (12) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... of the Schedule read with s. 73 of Madras Act 37 of 1950 which deprives the owners of the statutory right to solarium at the rate of 15 on the market-value of the lands, is invalid, and the owners of the lands are entitled to the statutory solatium under S. 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act in consideration of compulsory acquisition of their land." The learned counsel was not able to satisfy us that the above case was distinguishable. We are of the opinion that the case was rightly decided and must govern this case. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to refer to all the cases referred to us at the Bar. We may mention that Mr. Tarkunde also placed reliance on Art. 31 (A) (1) (a) of the Constitution. It is now well settled that Art. 3 1 (A)( 1 )(a) has relevance to agrarian reforms and development. It has nothing to do with acquisition of land for building of a capital of a State. In the result the appeal, fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1972 (12) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ction 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, when a grant is fed by estoppel, the rule does not operate to create interest in property regarding which the representation is made. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot claim that possession of plot No. 19 be given to them so as to enable them to construct a Dharmshala. The learned Additional Civil Judge in First Appeal observes that the description of plot No. 19 in the map as "Dharmshala" would show that the plot was "more or less in trust" for general benefit. That shows like saying, if the issue be whether there is a binding agreement between the parties, that the agreement is "more or less a contract". Such fluid phrases cannot give rise to legal rights. 9. The High Court was therefore right in concluding that the title of the co-owners to plot No. 19 was not divested and that the plaintiffs had no cause of action to bring the suit. Accordingly, we confirm that judgment and dismiss the appeal with costs.
-
1972 (12) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... minal Procedure Code, only in exceptional cases, when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. The High Court has not found any of these circumstances to exist in the case before us for quashing the charge and the further proceedings. The judgment and order of the High Court quashing the ,charges framed against the accused as well as the other proceedings based thereon, pending in case No. C/344 3 of 1967, are set aside. The learned Presidency Magistrate will proceed with the further trial and give it a very expeditious disposal. We make it clear that the directions given by the Chief Presidency Magistrate regarding the examination of two more prosecution witnesses and the court witness will stand, subject to any modifications that may be made by that Court in regard to the directions I already given by it. In the result, the appeals are allowed. Appeals allowed.
-
1972 (12) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... led the conditions laid down by S. 24. But no provision having been made that apart from the enrolment fee no stamp duty would be leviable on the certificate of enrolment or that the same will be exempt from stamp duty it has been left to the State legislature to amend the relevant schedules in the Stamp Act and impose such duties as they choose to levy on the certificate of enrolment. That has been done by the, States of Uttar Pradesh and Mysore. We have not been informed about such legislation by other States. In order to achieves uniformity it is for the States to refrain from levying any stamp. duty on the certificate of enrolment or the Parliament to enact, proper legislation so as to do away with a feature which is certainly derogatory of the ultimate aim and goal of the Act of having a common Bar for the whole country with uniformity in all material respects. We are, however, constrained to dismiss this appeal but we make no order as to costs. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
-
1972 (12) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e question of the nature of the tenancy created under section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act and Mukherjea, J., speaking for the majority said that the tenancy which is created by the "holding over" of a lessee or under-lessee is a new tenancy in law even though many of the terms of the old lease might be continued in it, by implication; and that to bring a new tenancy into existence, there must be a bilateral act. It was further held that the assent of the landlord which is founded on acceptance of rent must be acceptance of rent as such and in clear recognition of the tenancy right asserted by the person who pays it." The appellant being merely a tenant by sufferance there is no need for any notice before he could be evicted. Thus the judgment of the High Court is correct, in so far as it held the appellant was liable to be evicted. The appeal is dismissed with costs. The petition for reception of additional evidence is also dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
-
1972 (12) TMI 77 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... of the First Schedule of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 or whether they ceased to be mere cotton fabrics as defined in that Entry and fell under Entry 3 of Schedule E to the Act." This decision is a clear authority for the proposition that Entry 15 of Schedule A which incorporated Item 19 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, must be construed having regard to its own language and that it would neither be proper nor helpful to construe it in the light of the provisions of another Act. 29. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that "Hind Rubber Beltings" and "Cooper Rubber Beltings" are not covered by Entry 15 of Schedule A to the Act. Our answer to the first question referred to us is, therefore, in the negative. The second question has not been pressed and it is, therefore, not necessary to answer the same. 30. The assessee will pay the costs of the reference to the Commissioner. 31. Order accordingly.
-
1972 (12) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant is entitled to compensation for the service lines?
Held that:- It seems beyond the pale of controversy that the Umpire did not award compensation to the appellant in respect of the service lines for the sole reason that they were laid at the cost of the consumers. Some market- value the service-lines must have had, even if it be no more than the scrap value. But to the way of thinking which the Umpire adopted, that consideration had no relevance. The service-lines were paid for by the consumers and that for the Umpire, was the end of the matter. That, patently, was the wrong end.
The date of sale being 4/5 May, 1959 the consumers' contribution will roughly represent the market value of the service, lines even if, as, required by the first proviso to section 7(1) of the Act as it then stood, due regard is to be had to the nature and condition for the time being of the "works" to the state of repair thereof, to the circumstance that they are in such a position as to be ready for immediate working and to the suitability of the same for the purposes of the undertaking. Accordingly, we direct that the award of the Umpire will stand amended to the extent that the fair market value of the appellant's undertaking shall be ₹ 23,81,670 plus ₹ 2,38,255, plus ₹ 5,26,962/60 that is to say ₹ 31,46,887/60.
-
1972 (12) TMI 75 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e but that section Itself specifically contemplates more than one levy on declared goods and refund being made in respect of tax levied at all other stages except the one levied under the Central Act. This position is made clear in the decision of this court in Sitalakshmi Mills Ltd. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer(1), where It has been pointed out that section 15 provides that the State Government may levy a tax on declared goods at any stage under the local laws but only on condition that if the goods were sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce the tax, if any, collected on the local sale of such goods has to be refunded. Therefore, the petitioner s extreme contention that there can be only one levy on the declared goods under the Central Act and that they cannot be brought to charge at all under the State Act cannot at all be sustained. The result is the tax case and the writ petition are dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250 each. Petitions dismissed.
-
1972 (12) TMI 74 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... by Central Act 28 of 1969 had not been made. Ultimately, it was held that the petitioner in T.C. No. 197 of 1970, who was also the petitioner before the learned judge in the writ petition, is not entitled to claim exemption under section 10 as a conjoint reading of section 9 of the Central Act and the provisions of the State Act as amended by Madras Act 3 of 1969 makes the position clear that the Central Act before its amendment by Central Act 28 of 1969 enabled the tax to be levied on excise duty. With respect, we entirely agree with the reasoning of Ramaprasada Rao, J., in that case. We have to, therefore, hold that Madras Act 3 of 1969 does not suffer from any of the infirmities pointed out by the learned counsel for the assessee and that the assessee is not entitled to the benefit of exemption under section 10 of Central Act 28 of 1969. The result is all the tax cases and the writ petition are dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 in each case. Petitions dismissed.
-
1972 (12) TMI 73 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... make out a case for discrimination. The result, therefore, is that the two later Supreme Court decisions displace the earlier decision in Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid and Co. v. State of Madras(1). True the said decisions do not expressly say so but the way in which that decision was considered and explained and when the two abovesaid propositions are quite contrary to the one laid down in Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid and Co. v. State of Madras 1963 14 S.T.C. 355 (S.C.). , it cannot be said to be thereafter holding the field or effective. Respectfully following the later Supreme Court decisions, we do not experience any difficulty in holding that item 9(b) of the Third Schedule of the State Act is not discriminatory and does not offend article 304(a) inasmuch as the same rate of tax, i.e., 3 per cent, is applicable to both the commodities, local and brought from outside. For the reasons given, we would dismiss the writ petition with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
-
1972 (12) TMI 72 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... the appellants aid. Once it is admitted that the assessee-in-default was a joint Hindu family and had discontinued the business, the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 3-C will also not be attracted as in terms it does not apply to such a dealer. It covers cases of firms and associations when reconstituted and not a case where the joint Hindu family discontinues business. In such a case there is no dissolution and reconstitution. The joint Hindu family after discontinuing the business would of course continue to be liable to pay arrears of tax and every person, who at the time of discontinuance of the business was a member of the family, would be liable to pay the amount by reason of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 3-C. The proviso will, however, not be attracted, though the assets of the defaulting dealer will be liable to be followed. But the new partnership cannot as such be liable. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
|