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1980 (3) TMI 61 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Voluntary Disclosure Scheme ... ... ... ... ..... s in their own cases and not to camouflage their income as somebody else s income declared in the hands of somebody else. It is in this context that the plea of double taxation of the same income has to be considered. The scheme did not mean that income should not be taxed in the hands of its real owner just because it was declared by somebody else. It only guaranteed that the declared income will not be taxed twice over in the hands of the declarant. However, as observed by my learned brother, we are bound by the decision of the Delhi High Court given in the case of Rattan Lal 1975 98 ITR 681. An appeal against the same is stated to be pending in the Supreme Court, and may come up for hearing early. I have, therefore, not considered it advisable that the controversy need be referred to larger Bench of this court. So far as this court is concerned, that decisions operative and, therefore, the appeal of the assessee must be allowed in terms of the ratio laid in that decision.
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1980 (3) TMI 60 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Registered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... one made by the ITO pursuant to the Commissioner s order and the four years period of limitation prescribed under s. 35(5) was to be computed from that date. In our opinion since the apportionment of total income amongst the partners constitutes a part of the procedure of ascertainment and imposition of tax liability on the firm as also on the partners, the final order shall be taken to have been passed on the date on which such apportionment order is made and for purposes of amendment under s. 155(1) or (2), four years period is to be counted from the date of that order. On this view ofthe matter the assessee s claim for set-off could not be treated as legally not maintainable. It was clearly an allowable claim and the Appellate Tribunal rightly accepted it. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, against the department and in favour of the assessee. The respondent-assessee is entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200 and counsel s fee in like figure.
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1980 (3) TMI 59 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... er question No. 1 in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. We now reframe question No. 2 as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in confirming the quantum of penalty? As already stated, in the quantum appeal the Tribunal has remanded the question of inclusion of capital gains in the assessment of the assessee.Therefore, in our opinion, the Tribunal was not justified in confirming the quantum of penalty which included the capital gains. In the premises, we answer question No. 2 in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal will re-hear both the parties on the issue of inclusion of penalty relating to capital gains after the quantum appeal for the aforesaid assessment year is finally disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of the order of the Tribunal passed in the quantum appeal be kept on the record as desired by the learned counsel for both the parties. R. N. PYNE J.-I agree.
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1980 (3) TMI 58 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ntend that the income ceased to be his income and formed part of the HUF. The 4th contention should, therefore, be rejected. We, therefore, answer the questions referred to us in these references as under ITR 357/77 Questions Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. ITR 178/77 Questions Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. ITR 218/78 In the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. ITR 186/76 In the negative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. ITR 11/75 In the negative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. ITR 158/76 In the negative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. ITR 161/78 In the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. In the facts and in the circumstances of these references, there should be no order as to costs in each of them.
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1980 (3) TMI 57 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Capital For Purposes Of Deduction, Company, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... cting interpretations, there is no sensitive balance with which to weigh the pros and cons and determine with scientific accuracy which side is the weightier and, perhaps, in the drawing of the ultimate inference one way or the other, the subjective element is not altogether excluded. However, to us, it appears that the above discussion tends to support the conclusion that the view taken by the Karnataka, Madras and Bombay High Courts is preferable to the interpretation sought for by the department. We hold accordingly. We would like to add, without detracting from the firmness of our above conclusion, that even if one does not agree with it, one can hardly fail to agree with the Madras High Court that, at the worst, this is an instance of legislative ambiguity, which needs to be resolved in favour of the taxpayer. For these reasons, we answer the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the revenue. We, however, direct that the parties do bear their own costs.
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1980 (3) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Assessment, Estate Duty, Mistake Apparent From Record, Rectification ... ... ... ... ..... d in the petitioner s claim. On all accounts, it is the company which must feel aggrieved if the demand for duty on it under the impugned assessment order were found illegal. In point of fact, however, the company not only abides by the assessment, but swears that it is the only correct method of adjusting the liability, in the circumstances. The petitioner might, for all I know nurture a grievence against the company for accepting an impost of this kind without question. But rectification of the assessment order is not the right way for the petitioner to settle her private scores either with the, company or with those in control of its affairs. These latter considerations also bear on the question of this court s discretion, and all of them undoubtedly seem to me to be against the granting of the rule in the writ petitions. For all the reasons stated above, I agree with my learned brother in his order dismissing the writ petitions. I also agree with his direction for costs.
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1980 (3) TMI 55 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Property Passing ... ... ... ... ..... ake any distinction in the above two situations and to our mind this amount of maintenance determined under s. 27 of the Act is payable to Dariyab Kanwar in her own right allowed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of jagirs Act. As Dariyab Kanwar is not claiming this amount by way of succession or inheritance, nor does this amount pass on the death of Raja Harisinghji as contemplated under s. 5 of the E.D. Act, such amount has been rightly held by the Tribunal as being not includible in the estate of late Raja Harisinghji. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative and hold that the Tribunal was right in holding that the amount of Rs. 1,08,000, representing the commuted value of the maintenance allowance payable to the widow of the deceased, could not form part of the dutiable estate of the deceased in the facts and circumstances of this case. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1980 (3) TMI 54 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Assets, Net Wealth ... ... ... ... ..... ot be treated as asset, this aspect has not at all been considered by the High Court. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the amounts representing the outstanding bills which were due to the assessee, but not actually received by him on the valuation date, did not constitute his wealth as on that day as the assessee was maintaining cash system of accounting. In view of this conclusion, our answers to the two questions are as follows (i) Reg. 1st question On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not right in holding that the bills receivable by the assessee as on the valuation date are includible as assets in his net wealth. (ii) Reg. 2nd question In view of our answer to the 1st question, the 2nd question, namely, as to whether the notional income-tax liability on the bills receivable as on the valuation date is deductible under s. 2(m) of the W.T. Act, in arriving at the net wealth of the assessee, does not survive for consideration.
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1980 (3) TMI 53 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Gift, Goodwill ... ... ... ... ..... 105 ITR 92 (SC) was of unequal partition. In a partition two or more than two persons are involved while in throwing one s self-acquired property into the common stock of the family it is only a unilateral act of the coparcener doing so which is involved. It is not, therefore, possible to extend the view taken in regard to an unequal partition to the throwing into common stock. We are thus inclined to take the view that the throwing of a separate property by a coparcener into the common stock of the joint family does not amount to disposition and it would not be a property deemed to pass under s. 9(1) read with s. 27(1) of the Act. Section 10 also is not attracted to such a transaction. We, therefore, answer question No. 1 in the affirmative, in favour of the accountable person and against the department and the second question in the negative, in favour of the department and against the accountable person. In view of the divided success, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1980 (3) TMI 52 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC ... ... ... ... ..... given by the AAC. It must, however, be pointed out that the Madras decision in portions underlined by us above did say that the ITO is free to disregard the direction of the AAC. With this we disagree. Once it is recognized that s. 251(1)(a) authorises the AAC to issue directions, it should follow that the ITO cannot act contrary to those directions. It may still be debatable whether the ITO can go outside the directions to do something under s. 143(3) of the Act not covered by the directions of the AAC. But, as such a question is not before us, it would be hypothetical to attempt to discuss it here. But we must say that the judgment of this court reported in Pulipati Subbarao and Co. v. AAC of Income-tax 1959 35 ITR 673 is clearly supportable on the language of s. 251(1)(a) of the I.T. Act. For the aforementioned reasons, we answer the question referred to this court in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The assessee shall get his costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1980 (3) TMI 51 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... to hold that the properties and assets standing in the name of Smt. Surajbai which were acquired or invested out of the amount of Rs. 2,00,000 said to have been accumulated, belonged to the assessee-family but there was no material on record to hold that the Nagpur property standing in her name belonged to the assessee-family. The third question referred to by the Tribunal has not been pressed before us by the assessee as stated earlier. Our answers to the questions referred to by the Tribunal are, therefore, as follows Answer to question No. 1 is in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Answer to question No. 2 is in the affirmative to the extent of the properties and assets standing in the name of Smt. Surajbai which were acquired or invested out of the amount of Rs. 2,00,000 and excluding the Nagpur property standing in the name of Smt. Surajbai. Question No. 3 is not answered because it is not pressed. The notice of motion is not pressed. Assessee to get the costs.
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1980 (3) TMI 50 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Place Of Accrual Of Income ... ... ... ... ..... rt held that there was considerable force in the argument advanced by the counsel that the fact that the goods were to be delivered f.o.r. Indore, does not make the property in the goods pass at Indore. In that case the court held that the property in the goods passed in Part A and Part C States where the delivery was made and the income accrued only when the purchaser paid the price through the bank. On the parity of reasoning we hold that the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the property in the goods passed to the customers as the residents of Part A and Part C States. The answer to question No.1 is given in the affirmative. As regards question No. 2 the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties have rightly urged that the ITO himself has apportioned the profits and as such the question does not arise and need not be answered. The reference is answered as indicated above. In the facts and circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs.
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1980 (3) TMI 49 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Best Judgment Assessment, Contract Business ... ... ... ... ..... t profits. It was now well settled that while making a best judgment assessment, though there must necessarily be guess-work in the matter, it must not be arbitrary. In the instant case, the basis on which the computation is made is not disclosed in the order. Learned counsel for the department was unable to support the impugned order. The assessment order cannot but be held to be arbitrary. The order dated 7th August, 1976, passed by the ITO and that dated 23rd September, 1977, passed by the Commissioner, therefore, deserve to be set aside. The ITO, however, shall be at liberty to pass the assessment order afresh in accordance with law. For all these reasons, this petition is allowed. The order dated 7th August, 1976, passed by the ITO and that dated 23rd September, 1977, passed by the Commissioner are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this petition. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1980 (3) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... an expectation or hope of succeeding to his property. These observations apply with full force to the case before us. The assessee does not automatically succeed to the Baronetcy and, as pointed out by the learned judge, the expectancy or hope of succeeding to the Baronetcy is nothing more than spes successionis as understood in s. 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. On a consideration of the provisions of the Act which created the Baronetcy, it is obvious to us that the contention advanced on behalf of the revenue before the Tribunal and on this court that the assessee had any contingent interest in the trust property, held for the benefit of the Baronet for the time being, is in the nature of any contingent interest was wholly misconceived and unwarranted. Consequently, the question referred will have to be answered against the revenue. The question referred is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the revenue. The revenue to pay the costs of this reference.
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1980 (3) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ta High Court is clearly attracted to the facts of the present case. In the finding which has been recorded by the Tribunal, the Tribunal has accepted the view of the AAC and observed that there was nothing to show that the assessee s claim is in excess of the normal amounts that are paid to the employees year after year . Therefore, the mere fact that some adjudication had taken place, the nature of which is not fully disclosed, will not affect the position that the amounts set apart were on the same basis on which payments were made during the previous years. If, to that extent, the employer did not dispute his liability to pay bonus, the amounts so set apart clearly represented an ascertained present liability in respect of payment of bonus. These amounts were, therefore, rightly treated as debt owed by the Tribunal. In this view of the matter, the question referred must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The revenue to pay costs to the assessee.
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1980 (3) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... saction which admittedly, even according to the assessee, was brought about by her acting in both capacities. It was not the case of the assessee that when she purported to advance loans in the names of the minor children, those loans were received by the father or at least were shown to have been received by the father. Indeed, as already pointed out, the very basis on which the Tribunal has proceeded was that it was perfectly competent for the assessee to create a liability against the minors by her acting as their natural guardian by taking a loan from herself in her individual capacity. The question as to whether the father was in the picture at any stage does not now become relevant. It will, therefore, not be possible to accept the contention that any additional statement of case should be called for. In the view which we have taken, the question in this reference must be answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. Revenue to get the costs from the assessee.
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1980 (3) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Priority Industry ... ... ... ... ..... of generation and distribution of electricity. The import entitlement in this case was given to the assessee on the basis of its export of the goods manufactured by them. Certainly, therefore, the import entitlement was directly attributable to the export of goods manufactured and the business of sale of forgings and stampings. A similar question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this court in CIT v. Universal Radiators (P.) Ltd. (T.C. Nos. 451 and 452 of 1976, dated January 8, 1980) 1981 128 ITR 531. There it was held that the amount of incentive would qualify for the relief under s. 80-I, which provision was similar to s. 80E. The export incentive, thus, being bound up with the manufacture, sale and export, the assessee is entitled to get the relief under s. 80E even in respect of these profits and gains. We, accordingly, answer the reference in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1980 (3) TMI 44 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... o reopen the assessment. In view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case referred to above, we are of the opinion that respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment and to issue notice under s. 148 of the Act to the assessee for reopening the assessment of the three years referred to above, and to proceed with the reassessment, and the notice issued by him and the reassessment proceedings deserve to be quashed. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, these petitions are allowed. The notice dated July 17, 1978, issued by respondent No. 1 under s. 148 of the Act for reopening the assessment of the assessment years 1975-76, 1976-77 and 1977-78 and the reassessment proceedings pending before respondent No. 1 in respect of the said three years are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of these petitions. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner after verification.
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1980 (3) TMI 43 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Income ... ... ... ... ..... own as to when K. L. Khanna had died and that the payments made to his widow were entirely gratuitous and had not been made on account of commercial expediency. As the employee had died some time after his retirement, any payments made to his widow, which are not made as a matter of practice, would obviously be gratuitous payments and not because of any commercial expediency. If the payments had been made to the widow of an employee who had died during the course of his employment, then there would be something for the assessee to show that the payments were made because of commercial expediency but when an employee has retired and got all the benefits of his service in the company any payment made after his death to his widow would not entail any commercial expediency. We, therefore, find no reason to differ from the view of the Tribunal and questions Nos. 3 and 4 are accordingly answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. No costs. B. S. DHILLON J.-I agree.
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1980 (3) TMI 42 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Accounting, Income, Mercantile System ... ... ... ... ..... eived by the assessee, there is no condition imposed upon the refund that the money must be paid back to the purchasers. It may be that the purchasers may resort to some litigation to try their luck to have a share of the money which was refunded by the State and it is in that sense that the Supreme Court observed in Abdul Quader s case 1964 15 STC 403 (SC) that the question of any recovery by the purchasers was one as between the dealer and the purchaser. In these circumstances, the bare principle that a liability can be claimed as deduction in the computation of the total income if the accounts are maintained on mercantile system of accounting, would not be of any avail to the assessee. Therefore, the basis on which the amount was claimed to be not taxable, must fail. In the result the question in ITRC NO. 38 of 1976 is answered in the affirmative and against the department. The question in ITRC No. 121 of 1977 is also answered in the affirmative, but against the assessee.
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