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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 237 Records
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1983 (3) TMI 276 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... w ex facie that the matters relevant to the grant of a licence in the facts and circumstances of any particular case have duly been considered and taken into account. The order in the present proceedings of the Additional Collector does not appear to indicate ex facie that the matters enumerated in Rule 2 have been duly considered by him. For this reason, and for no other, we set aside the orders of the authorities below and remand the matter for a fresh consideration in the light of the observations we have made in the course of this order. The Additional Collector should complete the enquiry or remand expeditiously and in any case within two months of the date of communication of this order. 12. Incidentally, it would be observed that the order of the Appellate Collector dated 21-1-1982 was dually communicated to the appellant on 4-5-1982, after a delay of nearly 3 months. We do not see any reason why the order could not have been communicated as soon as it was made.
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1983 (3) TMI 275 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... t of the Appellant, to account for the acquisition of the goods or their origin, which were, undoubtedly, within his knowledge. 7. As for proof of mens rea - knowledge or reasonable belief that the goods are liable to be confiscated under Sec. 111 of the Customs Act, 1962 - this was not the first of such cases in which illicit goods in his possession were confiscated. Even as per his own statement, as well as the show cause notice to which there was no reply, in 1973, goods worth ₹ 47,000/- were seized from him and confiscated. He was also penalized to the extent of ₹ 500/-. That he filed an appeal and such appeal was pending on 8-1-1980 when he made the statement is beside the point. He cannot reasonably claim that he was unaware that goods of foreign origin are liable to be confiscated. 8. We see no reason to interfere with the order of the Appellate Collector by which the Appellant had already obtained substantial relief. The Appeal is dismissed.
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1983 (3) TMI 274 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... nsion of an existing unit, of the specified or approved industry or project, subject to the condition of the contract for import being duly registered with the Customs before clearance of the goods for home consumption. If any of these conditions are not satisfied, the goods will be assessed under their respective specific heading occurring elsewhere in the Tariff. 9. Having held that heading 84.66 applies only to initial setting up of a unit, or for substantial expansion of an existing unit, of a specified or approved industry or project and not to any and every contract for importation of machinery and instruments, and since it is the declared case of the appellants that their imports were only for modernisation and replacement of their existing cement plant and no expansion of capacity was involved, we have to agree with the Collector that the appellants were not entitled to the benefit of this heading for their imports. 10. Accordingly, we reject this appeal.
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1983 (3) TMI 273 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... oing by the criterion of normal use, the speaker system, being the sound reproducing system, is an essential part of gramophones and record players and not just an accessory. Even bare speakers can and do perform the function of sound reproduction by being placed in different corners of the room behind some sort of screen or wood panelling. No doubt, woofer speakers work along with tweeter speakers and sometimes even with mid-range speakers to give a rich hi-fi sound reproduction. But that does not mean that woofer speakers, by themselves, cease to be parts of sound reproducing system of gramophones and record players. We, therefore, hold that the subject speakers were correctly charged to countervailing duty as parts of gramophones and record players under Item 37A. C.E.T.; they were not exempt from such duty under notification No. 112/66-CE because this notification expressly excluded speakers and speaker systems from its scope. 4. Accordingly, we reject this appeal.
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1983 (3) TMI 272 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... urally depend upon the nature of the goods in question. Since, in this case, the goods were in the nature of components or parts and not complete machinery, the components by themselves cannot produce any goods. Therefore, whether an outside customer buys these components or appellants themselves use these components, the only use to which the components could be put has to be in the assembly or erection of a chemical plant and it is the complete plant which would produce or process any goods. We, therefore, hold that by removing the subject components to their RandD department in the same factory and using the said components in the assembly and erection of the subject pilot plant, the appellants have satisfied the condition of the main part of the notification relating to use and, as such, they are entitled to exemption under the said notification. 6. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we allow all the three appeals with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1983 (3) TMI 271 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... It cannot be disputed that these proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. Shri Gurbachan Singh’s statement, which is, in essence, much the same as the confession of a co-accused is not only self-exculpatory but requires to be corroborated in material particulars. There is not an iota of such evidence. A search of the Appellant’s residential and business premises did not reveal anything to support the story of Shri Gurbachan Singh. Significantly enough, it would appear that Shri Gurbachan Singh alone was prosecuted and convicted. If his statement were correct, it is incomprehensible as to why the Appellant was not also prosecuted. 6. The entire statement of Shri Gurbachan Singh at best creates a strong suspicion against the Appellant but such suspicion cannot take place of evidence. 7. Therefore, we hold that the imposition of penalty on the Appellant under Section 112 is not warranted by law and, therefore, set aside the penalty and allow the appeal.
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1983 (3) TMI 270 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... right of personal hearing he has to be heard by the adjudicating authority. As this has not been done in the present matter, the Assistant Collector’s order is vitiated by a breach of the principles of natural justice and by the violation of Section 124. 5. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed; the order passed by the Appellate Collector, bearing No. 578/80 issued under C. No. APPL/DLH/PREV/15/79 dated 26-3-1981, and order passed by the Assistant Collector, bearing No. 4/79 issued under C. No. VIII(SB)/10/26/78/281 dated 16-1-1978, are both set aside and the matter remanded to the Assistant Collector for fresh adjudication after giving the Appellant a reasonable opportunity to be heard in person. 6. Considering that this is an old matter, the Assistant Collector is directed to ensure that a hearing is given and orders passed within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. For purposes of record the appeal is taken as allowed.
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1983 (3) TMI 269 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... deposit of duty demanded or penalty levied will cause undue hardship to the appellant, it may in its discretion dispense with such deposit, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may deem fit." 6. A perusal of the aforesaid Section would reveal that where a prayer has been made for dispensing with the deposit pending the appeal, it has to be heard and decided one way or another. It does not appear that the Appellate Collector had decided the issue relating to prior F deposit at all but proceeded to dismiss the appeal itself for failure to deposit the penalty pending the hearing thereof. 7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, now that the deposit has been made, we set-aside the Appellate Collector’s order dated 30-10-1978 and remand the matter for a fresh disposal on merits by the Appellate Collector, after due notice to the Appellant, within two months from the date of communication of this order. 8. Order accordingly.
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1983 (3) TMI 268 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... sted for the appeal being allowed and the appellant’s licence as gold dealer be renewed. 3. We have examined the submissions of the appellant and the respondent. The provisions of Rule 3(ee) stipulate alternative conditions namely that the applicant should either be a wholesale dealer in standard gold bars, article or ornaments or that his turnover with persons other than licensed dealers should not be too low. Thus, one of the two conditions need be satisfied only. We are accordingly in agreement with the appellant’s Advocate’s submission that since the appellant is a wholesale dealer in standard gold bars, the other condition that his turnover is low is not applicable to him. Since one condition has been satisfied the Addl. Collector’s order for refusal of the licence is not correct. Accordingly, we set aside the Addl. Collector’s order dated 30-10-1982 and direct that the appellants licence as a gold dealer for the year 1982 be renewed.
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1983 (3) TMI 267 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... r R.T. 12s were duly assessed under Rule 173-I, of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and no objection was raised at the relevant time. The departmental representative has opposed the submissions of the appellant on the ground that the Appellants Collector’s order and the Asstt. Collector’s order are correct. The quantity subjected to levy of duty has to be treated as a loss in terms of Rule 160 and duty has been correctly demanded by the Assistant Collector. 2. We have examined the submissions on both the sides. While we agree that the demands have been issued for losses covered by Rule 160 of the Central Excise Rules, the demand cannot be sustained irrespective of the time limit prescribed under Rule 10 read with Rule 173-J as in existence at that time. The demand is accordingly clearly time-barred and is not enforceable. In view of the facts, we set aside the orders of the lower authorities and direct that the consequential relief be given to the appellants.
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1983 (3) TMI 266 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... ere is no denying the fact that the demands pertain to the period 1966 to 1972. If the duty is leviable as has been decided by two lower authorities at the earlier stages, it is high time that the same is deposited with the Government as its payment is over-due. This observation is without prejudice to the merits of the case. Perhaps, through the negligence and procrastination of the department, the appellants have been given an unduly long time to keep the money in their hands which was due to the Government. This fact is definitely against the appellants’ request. Apart from this, we find that the appellants are a Government of India undertaking and the question of arise suffering any financial hardship in making the required payment does not arise, especially when the appellant’s share capital is owned by the President of India. We, therefore, find that there are no grounds which would justify the grant of stay. Accordingly, we reject the application for stay.
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1983 (3) TMI 265 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... nd sub-divisions, with varying rates of duty, and Item 18, which covers “man-made fibres, filament yarns and cellulosic spun yarn”. It is thus clear that as between goods covered by the same tariff item there need not be absolute homogeneity either in characteristics or in the applicable rate of duty. There has only to be some common characteristic, which could even be the very fact that the Legislature has included them within the same item of the Central Excise Tariff Schedule. The common characteristic of articles falling under Item 68 is that they are not covered by any other item of the Central Excise Tariff Schedule. This does not mean that the entry is vague, or that it has less legal force than the other entries in the Central Excise Tariff Schedule, for the purpose of levy of excise duty or countervailing duty. 21. In the result, we hold that the Appellate Collector’s orders under appeal were correct. The two appeals are accordingly rejected.
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1983 (3) TMI 264 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... f non-transparent fused silica, they cannot be regarded as glassware under the erstwhile Indian Customs Tariff. Since there was no other specific heading to cover the subject goods, we hold that they were correctly classified under the residuary item No. 87 ICT. 4. As regards the countervailing duty, we find that the goods were neither chinaware nor porcelainware nor glazed clayware and as such their classification under Item 23B(4) was incorrect. Being made of non-transparent fused silica, they were not glassware within the meaning of Item 23A CET either. At the material time, there was no other item available in the Central Excise Tariff to cover the subject goods. We, therefore, hold that the subject goods, being non-excisable at the relevant time, were not liable to any countervailing duty. 5. Accordingly, we reject this appeal in so far as it relates to basic customs duty and allow it with full consequential refund so far as countervailing duty is concerned.
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1983 (3) TMI 263 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ashes are no different. In either case they are used for extraction of the zinc metal contained in them and, therefore, both are classifiable as unwrought zinc only under sub-item 1 of the tariff. It would be incorrect to say that zinc ash arising at post-smelter stage becomes a zinc manufacture like sheet, circle or pipe. 6. So far as the grievance of discrimination based on Bombay Custom House Public Notice dated 3-11-1981 is concerned, we can only say that in our view it would be wrong to consign zinc ash to the residuary Item 68 of the tariff when Item 26B(1) specifically covered it. It is for the Departmental authorities to remove the discrimination, if any, in their assessment practices. 7. To sum up, we hold that since zinc ash was specifically dutiable under Item 26B(1) C.E.T., countervailing duty on the zinc ash imported by the appellants was correctly charged and no refund of such duty is legally due to them. 8. Accordingly, we reject this appeal.
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1983 (3) TMI 262 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... a separate marketable product, not specified in Item 26B, they have to be assessed under the residuary Item 68 only. The appellants are well aware that in their own case the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta have decided that zinc calots are classifiable under Item 68. This might mean multi-point tax but it is not double taxation on the same product, that is, zinc calots. Multi-point taxation has, by now, become a normal feature of our Central Excise system and the case of zinc calots is not, therefore, a unique one. As regards the appellants’ prayer to give retrospective effect to Notification No. 118/75-CE, we find that exemption notifications are effective from the date of their issue and neither the Central Government have powers to grant such exemptions with retrospective effect nor does this notification say that it is effective retrospectively. In the circumstances, we find no merit in the appellants’ pleas. 4. Accordingly, we reject this appeal.
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1983 (3) TMI 261 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... rice was the actual effective duty after taking into account any exemption available to the goods. The appellants were asked whether, in view of this amendment to Section 4, they would like to withdraw their present appeal. The appellants stated that they desired to pursue their appeal since they wanted to challenge the vires of the retrospective amendment of 1982. 4. We have carefully considered the matter. It is beyond the powers of this Tribunal to go into the vires of any provision of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, as this Tribunal itself is a creature of that Act. We can only interpret the law as it is. Since the amendment of 1982 has made it clear beyond doubt that only the effective duty actually paid by the appellants, after taking into account the exemption available under Notification No. 198/76-CE, was deductible from their cum-duty price to arrive at the assessable value of their goods, the present appeal has to fail and it is rejected accordingly.
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1983 (3) TMI 260 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... happened to be specifically classifiable elsewhere. 4. We have carefully considered the matter. As per the accepted cannons of interpretation, the word “namely” has a meaning quite different from “such as” or “e.g.” or “the like”. The word “namely” is not illustrative but restricts the scope of the Entry to the articles named therein. As regards the appellants’ argument of Government’s intention, it is also well settled that when the natural meaning of the Entry is clear, there is no scope for any intendment or presumption. The position in the instant case is that only free wheels and rims, which were specifically named in Item 35, fell under that tern and the subject spokes, nipples and washers, being neither specified in Item 35 nor in any other item of the Tariff from 1 to 67, the Department has correctly held them to fall under the residuary Item 68. 5. We, therefore, reject this appeal.
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1983 (3) TMI 259 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the detaining authority had applied its mind to the relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of the petitioner's detention?
Held that:- The order of detention was issued, that is to say passed, on November 7, 1981 and we must have regard to the state of circumstances which were in existence on that date. Shri Capoor seems to suggest that the Advisory Board's opinion dated October 19, 1981 came into existence after he had made up his mind to pass an order of detention against the petitioner on October 8, 1981 and therefore he could not take, or need not have taken, that opinion into account. The infirmity of this explanation is that the order of detention was passed against the petitioner on November 7, 1981 and the Advisory Board's opinion in Shamsi's case was available to the State Government nearly three weeks before that date. If that opinion were available before the order of detention was passed in this case, it was the duty of the State Government to place that opinion before the detaining authority in order to enable it to consider whether, an order of detention could be passed against the petitioner despite that opinion especially when, one of the grounds on which the two orders of detention are based is identical and relates to the same incident. We would like to add that having seen the original order of detention which was made available for our inspection by the officers of the State Government, we were baffled to find that though Shri Capoor's signature bears the date October 8, 1981, the column for date, in the left hand corner at the bottom of the order of detention, has remained or become blank.
set aside the order of detention dated November 7, 1981 passed against the petitioner by the Government of Maharashtra and direct that to the extent that his detention is attributable to the said order of detention, he shall be released forthwith
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1983 (3) TMI 258 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... alloy along with aluminium. If the aluminium has been predominantly used while making the alloy, then Explanation (2) of Item 27 would come into play. These facts do not exist in the instant case. Nor that is the case of the Department. 5. emsp We cannot enlarge the scope of the definition of containers as has been contended by Shri Kumar. Even without the plastic cap on, the aluminium collapsible tube still remains aluminium collapsible tube within the inclusive definition of containers given in Explanation (1) to Item 27. Considering the nature of the goods and also the fact that the caps made of plastic had been separately manufactured and excise duty paid they have to be treated separately while charging the weight based portion of the duty of Excise on aluminium as envisaged in Item 27 of the Central Excise Tariff. For the above reasons, we hold that the order of the Appellate Collector cannot be sustained. The appeal it thus accepted and the impugned order is set aside.
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1983 (3) TMI 257 - SUPREME COURT
Whether under Section 19 or Section 20 of the CPC can also be invoked on the ground that the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain within the jurisdiction of the court?
Held that:- Here it could not be disputed that the appellant does carry on business in the City of Jaipur and if that be so, there can be no doubt that the Court in Jaipur City would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the respondents against the appellant. In that event, Clause 17 of the Contract of Carriage conferring ex- elusive jurisdiction on the Court in Jaipur City and excluding the jurisdiction of other courts would be valid and effective.
Thus the High Court was in error in taking the view that the jurisdiction of the Court of Civil ; Judge, Allahabad was not excluded by Clause 17 of the Contract of Carriage and that Court had jurisdiction to entertain that suit. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court as also the order passed by the Civil Jude. Allahabad and taking view the Court of the Civil Judge, Allahabad has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
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