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Showing 21 to 40 of 437 Records
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1997 (3) TMI 627 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... overnment of India for preparing draft schemes for the two banks which we have perused are also based upon facts and figures as evaluated by the Reserve Bank of India and its inspectors from time to time and we are satisfied that the reasons are relevant for purposes of section 45(1) as well as section 45(4). 41. As the reasons are now set out substantially in the counter-affidavits and as it has been fairly stated by the learned Solicitor-General of India that the appellants can file objection to the reasons so set out in the counter-affidavit, it will be for the appellants to include in their objections their response to the said reasons referred to in the counter-affidavits. As the reasons are certainly relevant to the passing of an order of moratorium and for preparing a draft scheme, it is not for this court to go into their sufficiency. 42. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold on Point No. 6 against the appellant. 43. The letters patent appeals are, Therefore, dismissed.
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1997 (3) TMI 626 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... list, the two competing trade marks appear to be prima facie entirely different and dissimilar. (8) Considering the overall position and taking into consideration the entire principles and factors laid down for the purpose by the various decisions, as referred to, I am of the considered opinion that no temporary injunction, as sought for by the plaintiffs, is required to be granted in the present case pending disposal of the suit. (9) Accordingly, the application of the plaintiffs stands rejected, subject to the condition that the defendant shall maintain accounts of the sale of the product and submit the same half yearly to this Court and furnish an undertaking within six weeks from today that if in case on merits subsequently it is found that the plaintiffs are entitled to the perpetual injunction, as prayed for in the suit, the defendant would pay damages as is ascertained by the Court. (10) With the aforesaid direction and observation, this applications stands dismissed.
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1997 (3) TMI 625 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... In our view, by necessary implication the suit is not maintainable. Therefore, the respondent is at liberty to avail the remedy of appeal within six weeks from today and raise the factual objections before the Board and the Board/appellate authority would consider and dispose of them, as indicated earlier, on merits. 11. It is next contended that the respondent has been charged huge amount. It would be difficult for him to pay the amount in lump sum. Therefore, he may be given permission to pay the amount in installments. We find that the request is genuine and in view of long lapse of time, we direct that the respondent would pay the amount in demand in six monthly installments. First installment shall be paid on or before April 5, 1997. In case he succeeds in appeal or in the proceedings, the Board shall refund the amount with interest at the rate of 12 per cent annum from the date of deposit. 12. The appeal is accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances, without costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 624 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to succeed or fail on its own case depending upon the oral and documentary evidence on record. In this case, as the complainant failed to prove satisfactorily that he has sufficient capacity to lend the amount of ₹ 1,25,000/- and more so, by way of cheque and his failure to prove that the amount was actually drawn by the accused, the accused cannot be punished for an offence under Section 138 of the Act. 3. Further I have seen Ex.P. 2 where in the entire body of the letter was typed but only the sum of ₹ 1,25,000/- was written both in figures and words in ink. The appellant failed to offer any satisfactory explanation for showing the sum of ₹ 1,25,000/- both in figures and words in ink when the entire body of the letter is in typing. For all these reasons, I am of the opinion that the Magistrate rightly acquitted the accused and the Judgment do not call for any interference by this Court. 4. The criminal appeal is dismissed accordingly. 5. Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (3) TMI 623 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Lakshmi Commercial Bank Limited, Civil Revision No. 65/85 decided on 3rd July, 1996 and Siri Krishan Bharadwaj v. Manohar Lal Gupta, AIR1977Delhi226 . (18) For the foregoing reasons the impugned order dated 22nd April, 1991 rejecting the application of the petitioner for leave to defend and decreeing the suit is hereby set aside subject to the condition that the petitioner furnishes Bank guarantee for the decretal amount calculated till today within a period of four weeks from the date of this order. In case of failure to do so, the revision petition shall stand dismissed. (19) A copy of this order be sent to the concerned Additional District Judge through learned District Judge for information and for proceeding further in accordance with law in case the petitioner furnishes the Bank guarantee as mentioned above. (20) In case the Bank guarantee is not furnished within four weeks from the date of this order the plaintiff would be entitled to pursue her execution application.
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1997 (3) TMI 622 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , the High Court has confirmed the same. Thus this appeal, by special leave. Learned counsel for the respondent contends that the offence with which he was sentenced under Section 325 IPC does not involve his moral turpitude and, therefore, the imposition of punishment of reduction of his scale of pay and also denial of back wages, is clearly illegal and that the appellants are not entitled to challenge the order. We find no force in the contention. The respondent having accepted the order of the appellate authority and joined the post on June 5, 1989, it was not open to him to challenge the order subsequently. By his conduct he has accepted the correctness of the order and then acted upon it. Under these circumstances, the civil Court would not have gone into the merits and decided the matter against the appellants. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The orders of the High Court and the appellate Court stand set aside and that of the trial Court stands confirmed. No costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 621 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ossession can be given in favour of the person having valid nomination under the provisions of Section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act. The dispute as to the question of title is not to be decided within the limited scope and ambit of Section 69 and 70 of the cooperative Societies Act. We, therefore, dispose of this appeal by directing that in view of the finding by the Tribunal that the respondent had obtained a valid nomination from the deceased Ranendra Kumar Acharya, the respondent is entitled to get the possession of the said flat in accordance with the provisions of Section 70 of the Cooperative Societies Act. But the dispute as to the title of the said flat should not be held to have been decided either by the Cooperative Tribunal or by the High Court by the impugned judgment. Such question is kept open to be decided by an appropriate forum if such challenge is made before the appropriate forum. This appeal is accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 620 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the claim of the respondents could not have been allowed by the Tribunal. The doctrine of "Equal pay for equal work" Has no application in such a situation. An evident mistake cannot constitute a valid basis for compelling the administration to keep on repeating that mistake. Personal pay is granted to employees on various grounds. In certain services where the matriculation is the minimum educational qualification for a particular post, and a graduate joins that post, additional increments are given to him to start with. Increments are also given to male employees for undergoing family planning operation. Such personal pays cannot furnish a ground for invoking the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work". Because it was a mistake it was treated as personal pay for existing incumbents. And for future incumbents, the appropriate pay scale was given. For the above reasons the appeals is allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside. No order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 619 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fact the sale deed was acted for valid consideration. The omission to cite an authority of law is not a ground for reviewing the prier judgment saying that there is an error apparent on the face of the record, since the counsel has committed an error in not bringing to the notice of the Court the relevant precedents. In fact, since the respondent had claimed that it is not a sale deed but was executed for collateral purpose, it was for the respondent to establish that the sale was for real consideration and he had a valid sale deed duly executed by the appellant. The High Court wrongly placed Burden on the appellant and reviewed the order and heard the matter on merits. The entire approach of the learned single judge is not correct in law. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned order of the High Court stands set aside and decree of the appellate Court, as confirmed by the High Court in the first instance, is upheld. In other words, the suit stands decreed. No costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 618 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... us that any relaxation was in defeasance of the above Regulations. The Division Bench, therefore, was not right in upholding the power of the Board in directing relaxation of the statutory Regulations and consideration of the cases without considering the claims of all the eligible persons. Moreover, later the Board itself cancelled 1970 panel. Regulation issued for promotion of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes should also be considered. Admittedly, they were not considered. Since the claims of all the persons are not before us, we do not propose to close the matter at this end. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the Division Bench and direct the concerned authorities to determine the promotions of all the eligible persons in accordance with the statutory Regulations and pass appropriate orders within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of the order. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The writ petition subject to the above directions. No costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 617 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... be rejected in view of the decision of the Madras High Court in A.N. Kutti v. A.N. Ussan AIR 1927 Mad. 1134, a copy of which is provided by the assessee. The very definition of the word 'trust' would negate the plea of the Departmental Representative because "trust- is defined in section 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, as an obligation annexed to the ownership of property and arising, out of a confidence reposed in, and accepted by, the owner or declared and accepted by him for the benefit of another or of another and the owner. In view of the categorical definition, the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the aforesaid decision held as follows "The fact that the trustees are enjoying the beneficial interest in the trust property together with the beneficiaries does not make it anytheless trust property." Therefore, this contention also fails. 14. In the result, the appeals of the department for both the years are found to be without merit and are dismissed.
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1997 (3) TMI 616 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 36, was made to the Sessions Court for modifications of the charge so as to make it consistent with Section 219. That application was not pressed and the Court was invited to dispose of the other application made by them for quashing the charge and discharging them. As we are inclined to allow this appeal the Sessions Court will have to now consider afresh whether the charge is required to be altered or amended. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgement and order passed by the High Court and direct the Sessions Court to proceed further with the trial in accordance with law. The trial Court shall do so after re- examining the material and hearing the learned Public Prosecutor and the lawyer for the accused on the question of amending or altering the charge so as to make it consistent with the relevant provisions of the Code and also after considering whether it will be possible to try all the offences at one trial or that they will have to be tried separately.
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1997 (3) TMI 615 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as published. As stated earlier, the award was made and symbolic possession was taken on December 17, 1988. Under the circumstances, the land stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. After the proceedings had become final, the writ petition came to be filed on May 19, 1989. The mere fact that due to lapse of time no action was taken after the filing of the writ petition, does not give ground for interference. The further fact that public purpose must have been served by constructing the quarters for the officers elsewhere, is without any substance. The mere fact that on account of the pending litigation, no construction was made, is no ground to say that notification under section 4(1) was vitiated by any error of law; equally, increase in the prices of the lands is no ground. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court stands set aside. The notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Act stand restored. No costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 614 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed. For the same reasons, special civil Application Nos. 1403 of 1993 and 4400 of 1993 have to be dismissed. Special Civil Application Nos. 1109 of 1988 and 1696 of 1991 filed by the promote officers relating to fixation of seniority have become infructuous on account of resolution dated January 31, 1992. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the judgment of the High Court dated may 4, 1994 in L.P.A. Nos. 195 and 196 of 1993 is set aside and the said appeals are dismissed and consequently the judgment of the learned single judge special civil application No. 896 of 1992, filed by the promotee officers and allowing Special civil application No 1447 of 1991 filed by the directly recruited officers is restored. So also Special civil application Nos. 1403 of 1993 and 4400 of 1993 filed by the promotee officers are dismissed. Special Civil Application Nos. 2124 of 1986, 877 of 1988, 1109 of 1988 and 1696 of 1991 are dismissed as having become infructuous. No orders as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 613 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ear 1988 and the same has got to be assessed at the market value as on the date of grant. 28. Thus, agreeing with the view of the ld. Accountant Member I hold that the transfer of Flat No. 24-B, Miramar, 3, Nepean Sea Road, Bombay-36 to the assessee by his employer for consideration of ₹ 2,31,000 was not for commercial consideration and that the transfer was as a result of employer-employee relationship. There was no transfer of the flat in the year 1977 or in the year 1981, the transfer was in the year 1988. Therefore, a benefit was granted by the employer to the employee assessee in the year 1988. The value of the perquisite would be the difference between the market value of the flat on the date of transfer and the actual considera-tion paid by the assessee. The answer to the question referred to me under section 255(4) given by me, thus, is in negative. 29. Now let this order be placed before the regular Bench for passing consequential order in accordance with law.
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1997 (3) TMI 612 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ntry to the said society in November 1983. But his membership of Dronacharaya Co-operative Group Housing Society remains unaffected. From the records it has been brought to our notice that the appellant had already deposited a sum of ₹ 3,35,015 on different dates between October 1981 and June 1991. by interim order dated llth July, 1996 this Court had directed the respondent no. 3 - the Dronacharaya Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. to keep one Hat available for the appellant in the event of his success in this appeal. Said respondent no. 3 though has entered appearance but no counter- affidavit has been filed. In view of our interim direction dated llth July,1996 and now that the appellant succeeds in this appeal, we direct that the said respondent no. 3 would give a flat to the appellant on the appellant satisfying any other condition that may be required to be made. This appeal is accordingly allowed but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 611 - ITAT PUNE
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... ... ..... the same principle will apply for deduction u/s 35AB of the Income-tax Act. The CIT (A) has rejected the claim only on the ground that the amount is not actually remitted and, therefore, the same is ‘not paid’ as required u/s 35AB of the Act. However, she does not seem to have given due weightage to the definition of the word ‘paid’ u/s 43(2) of the Income-tax Act. In the present case, the assessee has provided the amount of additional liability on account of exchange fluctuation in the books of account. The liability is thus incurred by the assessee as held by the Bombay High Court in the case of Padamjee Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd. (supra) and hence is ‘paid’ as defined u/s 43(2) of the Income-tax Act. Consequently, the assessee is entitled to the deduction of ₹ 2,39,807 being 1/6th of ₹ 14, 38,842. This ground of the assessee is, therefore allowed. 125 to 133. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues.
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1997 (3) TMI 610 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... d conjectures and the conclusion is the result of suspicion which cannot take the place of proof in these matters. 14. In view of the above discussions, facts and circumstances of the case as well as the settled principles of law, we are of the opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the Assessing Officer was based purely on suspicions and the CIT (Appeals) was justified in deleting the additions having been made only on suspicions. The order of the CIT (Appeals) is upheld and the Revenue’s appeal is dismissed. As regards to D.R’s plea relating to consideration of Assessee’s explanation by the CIT (Appeals) submitted before him, without giving opportunity to Assessing Officer, we have bound that the CIT (Appeals) has not based his decision on that explanation, rather has accepted the Assessee’s plea made before the Assessing Officer to the effect that the figures on loose paper No. 44 were rough working of the Firm. This plea is therefore, rejected.
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1997 (3) TMI 609 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... against him was set aside on the ground that the appellant did not hold any domestic enquiry. it has already been seen above that the Appellate Authority has to come to its own conclusion on the guilt of the employee concerned. since the Appellate Authority has to come to its own conclusion on the basis of he evidence recorded bu it , irrespective of the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry the rule laid down in Ratna’s case (supra) will not strictly apply and the opportunity of hearing which is being provided to the respondent at the appellate stage will sufficiently meet his demands for a just and proper enquiry. 28. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The Judgment and order dated 12.2.1996 passed by the Appellate Authority is set aside and the case is remanded back to the Appellate Authority to dispose of the appeal filed by the respondent under section 41 of the Act afresh in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. No. costs.
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1997 (3) TMI 607 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
Whether, the agent appointed by the applicant to solicit orders from the purchasers of air-time and to pass on those orders to the applicant for acceptance, could be construed as a permanent estab- lishment of the applicant in India ?
whether any part of the business profits earned by the applicant could still be deemed to accrue or arise in India and, therefore, liable to tax in India, if the answer to above question is negative?
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