Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 551 Records
-
2006 (4) TMI 486 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... developments. The drafter will try to foresee the future, and allow for it in the wording. 39 To the similar effect are the judgments of Delhi and Andhra Pradesh High Courts in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maharishi Ved Vigyan Vishwa Vidya Peetham 1998 232 ITR 170, City Dry Fish Company v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1999 238 ITR 63 and Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Ajay Kumar Sood 1996 217 ITR 686. Respectfully following the above pronounciation of law, we find that since the issue raised in the case is covered by the Division Bench judgment of this court, it will not be in the fitness of things to direct the Tribunal to refer the question of law to this court and keep the matter pending. To avoid unnecessary wastage of time, in our view it would be appropriate to answer the question straightaway by coverting the case into reference. In view of the above discussions, the question raised by the assessee is answered in his favour and against the Revenue. We order accordingly.
-
2006 (4) TMI 485 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... of the assessee based on rule 18(2A) is only to be rejected. The assessee ought to have filed a correct return and tax should have been paid accordingly. Filing of a revised return by the assessee is of no consequence and no argument be built upon the revised return. We therefore find no reason to entertain this appeal. The same would stand dismissed. section 23 would squarely apply with effect from April 1, 1998. Interest has been demanded from December, 1998 to October, 2002. Therefore, in our view, the assessing authority and the Commissioner are justified in demanding interest under section 23(3) of the Act. The contention of the assessee based on rule 18(2A) is only to be rejected. The assessee ought to have filed a correct return and tax should have been paid accordingly. Filing of a revised return by the assessee is of no consequence and no argument be built upon the revised return. We therefore find no reason to entertain this appeal. The same would stand dismissed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 484 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Appeals) accepted the appeal of the petitioner and remitted the case back but from a date when the assessing authority decided the remand case on May 5, 2003 holding therein that there is no tax liability as it is on that date that the issue of levy of tax was finally settled. The contention of the State counsel though seems to be attractive at first blush but the same is not in conformity with settled principles of law as referred to above. In view of our above discussions and keeping in view the binding precedents cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, which could not be controverted by the learned Additional Advocate-General, we direct the respondents to pay interest to the petitioner from November 21, 2001 when the demand was set aside and the case was remitted back till the amount was refunded to the petitioner, in terms of section 12 of the Act. The writ petition is allowed on the above terms with no order as to costs.
-
2006 (4) TMI 483 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... this court is inclined to set aside the impugned proceedings, liberty may be given to the assessing officers to pass fresh assessment orders in accordance with law. The learned counsel for the petitioners has no objection for the same and in fact he cannot have any objection for the same. Accordingly, applying the law laid down by the two honourable division Benches of this court in the above said decisions, viz., Kalyani Oil Mills v. State of Madras 1973 32 STC 542 and in the case of Madurai Soft Drinks (Private) Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 1985 60 STC 94, the impugned proceedings are set aside. But however, the respective assessing officers are at liberty to pass fresh assessment orders/revised assessment orders in accordance with the law, more particularly applying the law laid down by this court in the cases mentioned supra. For the foregoing reasons, the above writ petitions are allowed. No costs. Consequently, the connected pending W.P.M. Ps. are closed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 482 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... urchase only in the circumstances on which no tax is payable and further conditioned by the existence of circumstances provided in clauses (a) to (c) of section 5A. We find that the observations made by the Supreme Court in Shanmuga Traders 39 case 1999 114 STC 1 1998 5 SCC 349 in paragraph 12, came to be made in the facts of the case. The single point of levy was at the point of first sale and not at the point of first taxable sale. The impugned circular, the court held, could not validly shift the point of levy from the first sale to a subsequent sale. Consequently, we find no merit in these writ appeals, for the-reason that we find that the notice is not vulnerable for the reason that it is in violation of section 15(a) of the Central Act or article 286 of the Constitution of India. The provisions of section 5A of the State Act are not ultra vires section 15(a) of the Central Act or article 286(2) of the Constitution of India. The writ appeals fail and they are dismissed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 481 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... et it otherwise. The intention of the Legislature was to continue the provisions of the MPGST Act till December 23, 2001 in the Luxury Tax Act. In view of aforesaid discussion, it is held that under the M.P. Luxury Tax Act, the provision of the MPGST Act, 1958 shall continue up to December 23, 2001 and from December 24, 2001 the provisions of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act, 1994 shall be applicable. Accordingly the matter of the petitioner be dealt with by the authorities. In the result, this petition is allowed. The impugned orders by which the authorities have assessed the petitioner on the assumption that prior to December 23, 2001, the provisions of the M.P. Commercial Tax Act, 1994 shall be applicable to the Luxury Tax Act is not sustainable and accordingly the impugned orders are quashed. The matter is remitted back to the concerned Commercial Tax Officer to decide the matter afresh, in accordance with the directions issued by this court hereinabove. No order as to costs.
-
2006 (4) TMI 480 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... while considering the cause for the delay. In this case, the Tribunal passed the order as early as on March 27, 2001 and as such the first respondent-assessee would have conducted its business and arranged its finances taking into account its non-liability to pay the quantum of tax involved in this case. In such circumstances, the right which has accrued to the assessee by reason of the delay in filing, the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. In this case, as pointed out above, there is absolutely no explanation whatsoever for the undue delay on the part of the State in approaching this court under article 226 of the Constitution of India. For the foregoing reasons, this court is not inclined to entertain the writ petition. On the ground of laches, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly the above writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected W. P. M. P. is also dismissed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 479 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... t due dated August 23, 2004 was sent to the assessee calling for objections, if any, to the proposal to impose tax at the rate of five per cent. Notice was served on the assessee on August 26, 2004 but the assessee did not file any objection. The above facts would clearly show that the assessee had opted for compounding under sub-section (7)/(7A) of section 7. We are of the view, the option once exercised under the statutory form No. 21B is final and binding on the assessee. The assessee cannot later fall back on the general assessment under section 5(1) of the Act. We are therefore in agreement with the orders of the assessing authority and that of the Tribunal. The assessing authority has rightly taxed the turnover at the rate of five per cent in accordance with section 7(7A) holding that drains and culverts cannot be considered as civil works coming within the purview of section 7(7) of the Sales Tax Act. Revision therefore lacks merits and the same would stand dismissed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 478 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... espondents, on the other hand, submitted that the revisional authority was satisfied that non-furnishing of bills containing the rubber stamp was not bona fide and petitioner has wilfully suppressed the bills and torn off the lower portion of the bills and, therefore, penalty under section 69 is imposed. It is for the Revenue to collect material to indicate that the goods had not been subjected to entry in the local area and that taxable event had not occurred earlier and the absence of rubber stamp is deliberate and is not accidental and negligence. No such material was collected by Revenue as observed in para 16 of the judgment. Therefore, order of revisional authority as well as assessing authority is set aside with liberty to assessing authority to pass orders after supplying the material collected by the Revenue to the dealer and dealer will have an opportunity to submit its reply for imposition of penalty. Petition succeeds and is allowed without any order as to costs.
-
2006 (4) TMI 477 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... permitted to do so, it would render the statutory object of prescribing the three-year limitation under section 19A and section 39(2), redundant and meaningless. In my considered opinion the method adopted by the respondents is not permissible in law and therefore, deserves to be quashed. Apart from the above facet of the case, if the impugned order under section 39 of the Act is permitted to stand, it would amount to perpetuating an illegality as this court has already held that the initiation of proceedings for reassessment under section 19A was itself misconceived. In the light of the above, the third ground raised by the petitioner is also decided in his favour. As all the three grounds raised by the petitioner are decided in his favour, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated November 13, 1998 deserves to be quashed and the petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
2006 (4) TMI 476 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
... ... ... ... ..... and rule 205 does not hold good. In any event, when rule 101A has authorised appropriate assessing authority and the general definition of appropriate assessing authority as contained in rule 2(c) brings within its fold the officers of the Central Section having jurisdiction over all the charges in West Bengal, reference to any other rule dealing with a different situation in different context is meaningless. For the reasons aforesaid we are unable to accept the contention of the petitioner that the Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, Central Section is not the appropriate assessing authority for the purpose of determining gross value under rule 101A of the Rules of 1995. We do not find any merit in this application. However, the petitioner is given time till May 15, 2006 to appear before the Assistant Commissioner, Central Section, in response to his notice, if it desires to respond to the said notice. Application is disposed of. B.K. Majumdar (Technical Member). - I agree.
-
2006 (4) TMI 475 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... er section 3A of the Act is relevant and since the total rate of tax under the U.P. Trade Tax Act on the electronic goods is only four per cent the aforesaid notification applies. The subsequent notification dated January 31, 1995 is clarificatory in nature and clarified that the rate of tax means excluding additional tax. In the case of Pappu Sweets and Biscuits v. Commissioner of Trade Tax reported in 1998 111 STC 425 1998 UPTC 1086, the apex court held that the subsequent notification is relevant to interpret the earlier notification. The subsequent notification dated January 31, 1995 appears to be clarificatory in nature to remove the doubts in the earlier notification and shows the intention of the Legislature. In the result, revision is allowed. Order of the Tribunal is set aside and it is held that the turnover of Rs. 1,45,000 was liable to tax at the rate of four per cent under notification dated October 1, 1994 issued under section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act.
-
2006 (4) TMI 474 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... long with rule 23A of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Rules, 1959, the petitioner is entitled for the repayment of the amount paid in excess along with interest as contemplated under law, if there are no legal impediments. Under similar circumstances, this court has so held in W. P. No. 2910 of 2004, by order dated November 1, 2004 and in W. P. Nos. 1652 to 1656 of 2006, by order dated February 21, 2006. In view of the same, the writ petitions are disposed of with the direction to the respondent to give effect to the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (CT), Tirunelveli, dated October 6, 2005 which set aside the order of the respondent and consequently refund the amount of taxes paid in excess along with interest to the petitioner as contemplated under law, if there are no legal impediments, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. With the above direction, these writ petitions are disposed of. There is no order as to costs.
-
2006 (4) TMI 473 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
... ... ... ... ..... cide whether interest should be awarded or if awarded the rate thereof and the period of such award. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and particularly the fact that this application was moved on March 25, 2003 we think it just and proper to award simple interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum from April 1, 2003 till the date of refund of the penalty amount. For the reasons aforesaid the impugned order of seizure and the order imposing penalty passed by the Commercial Tax Officer, Durgapur Range, are set aside. The respondents are directed to refund the penalty amount realised from the petitioner along with simple interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum on the said amount from April 1, 2003 till refund thereof. The respondents are directed to refund the aforesaid penalty amount along with the interest as awarded by this order within four months from the date of communication of this order. B.K. MAJUMDAR (Technical Member). - I agree.
-
2006 (4) TMI 472 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the subject-matter of the borrower's suit before the High Court and Bank's application before the Tribunal were inextricably connected? - Held that:- While the claim of the Bank was for an ascertained sum due from the borrower, the claim of the borrower was for damages which required firstly a determination by the court as to whether the Bank was liable to pay damages and thereafter assessment of quantum of such damages. Thus there is absolutely no connection between the subject matter of the two suits and they are no way connected. A decision in one does not depend on the other. Nor could there be any apprehension of different and inconsistent results if the suit and the application are tried and decided separately by different forums. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the borrower's suit and the Bank's application were inextricably connected.
Whether the provisions of Debts Recovery Act mandate or require the transfer of an independent suit filed by a borrower against a Bank before a civil court to the Tribunal, in the event of the Bank filing a recovery application against the borrower before the Tribunal, to be tried as a counter-claim in the Bank's application? - Held that:- In this case, the first respondent does not wish his case to be transferred to the Tribunal. It is, therefore, clear that the suit filed by the first respondent against the Bank in the High Court for recovery of damages, being an independent suit, and not a counter-claim made in the application filed by the bank, the Bank's application for transfer of the said suit to the Tribunal was misconceived and not maintainable. The High Court, where the suit for damages was filed by the company against the bank, long prior to the bank filing an application before the tribunal against the company, continues to have jurisdiction in regard to the suit and its jurisdiction is not excluded or barred under Section 18 or any other provision of Debts Recovery Act.
Whether the observation in Abhijit (supra) that the suit filed by the borrower against the Bank has to be transferred to the Tribunal for being tried as a counter- claim in the applications of the Bank, is to be construed as a principle laid down by this Court, or as an observation in exercise of power under Article 142 in order to do complete justice between the parties? -Held that:- Decision in Abhijit is distinguishable both on facts and law. Thus the order of the High Court does call for any interference. These appeals are accordingly dismissed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 471 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... . Having failed to discharge the burden, now petitioner could not be permitted to turn around. Even otherwise, the petitioner did not stick to the stand that JCBs were stock transferred but shifted to the stand that they were for rental, which makes the case of the petitioner dubious which does not inspire confidence. The revenue authorities having considered the matter in the proper perspective committed no illegality in passing the impugned orders and raising the demand. In view of the foregoing discussions, in the considered opinion of this court, there is no merit and substance in the present bunch of writ petitions so as to warrant interference by this court in exercise of the extraordinary rit jurisdiction. In the result, all writ petitions fail and accordingly they are dismissed. However, there shall be no orders as to costs. Let a true and authenticated copy of this order under the seal and signature of the Registrar be kept in record of each connected writ petition.
-
2006 (4) TMI 470 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
... ... ... ... ..... value of the materials which were supplied free by the petitioner to respondent No.3 for manufacture of the disputed vessels. Such dispute or question is to be formally raised by making a suitable application to the aforesaid assessing authority within five weeks from this date. (b) If such dispute or question is raised by the petitioner-company, the aforementioned assessing authority will determine the same after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and respondent No.3 and by passing a reasoned order within three months from the date of filing application for the purpose. (c) If it is found that the excess sales tax has been realised by respondent No.3, the petitioner-company will approach the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, West Bengal, for refund of the excess tax and the Commissioner will treat it as an application under section 37(3) of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994 and pass appropriate order of refund within two months from the date of such approach.
-
2006 (4) TMI 469 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... should have effect. (See J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U. P. AIR 1961 SC 1170.) It is settled proposition that the Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the Legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. Since specific provision with procedural details including limitation is provided under section 17 for assessment in case of non-filing of return, there is no necessity to go to the limitation provision in general provision in section 19 for assessment of escaped turnover. Hence, we answer the question in the negative accepting the contention of Revenue. In view of the above, the view taken by the division Bench of this Court in Prabhakarans case 2001 121 STC 586 is overruled. The revision petition is allowed. Judgment of the appellate Tribunal is set aside and Appellate Tribunal is directed to reconsider the appeal on the basis of law declared.
-
2006 (4) TMI 468 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... nswer the reference afresh. Such being the scenario, this court is not estopped from answering the reference made by the Sales Tax Tribunal. In view of the foregoing discussions the questions referred are answered as follows (i) In view of the quotation of the assessee-company, supply order of M/s. CIL and the surrounding factors noted supra, the Sales Tax Tribunal was not correct to hold that the order issued by M/s. CIL was not a contract of sale and that the actual purchase and sale were triggered only when the collieries placed indent with M/s. IDL Chemicals. (ii) The movement of goods from M/s. IDL Chemicals, Rourkela, to different States constitutes sales under section 3(a) of the C.S.T. Act. (iii) The sales having taken place at the exit points of M/s. IDL, Rourkela, the State of Orissa was entitled to levy sales tax on those goods under the Central Sales Tax Act. The reference applications and the STREV are accordingly answered and disposed of. B.P. DAS J. - I agree.
-
2006 (4) TMI 467 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ice shall be determined at one per cent of sale value of exempted goods. The condition No. (iii) is neither separate nor distinct but only after the adopting course of best judgment assessment in condition No. (iii) also like other two conditions (i) and (ii) above, the determination of sale price of containers or packing materials used in sale of exempted goods shall be made at one per cent of the sale value of the exempted goods sold. Therefore, I do not find that the State Government has exceeded the scope of the empowerment provided under section 7(8) of the Act 1993 and in view of the above observations the framing of rule 6A(2) is within the legislative competence and is said to have been made within the parameters and scope of section 7(8) and well within the meaning and in consonance with the legislative competence and power delegated to the State Government. In view of the above observations, the writ petitions stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to cost.
............
|