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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 42 Records
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1962 (5) TMI 35 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eing wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business. As my learned brother has pointed out, the onus is upon the assessee to prove the allowability of the deduction, i.e., to prove that the expenditure was laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business. But the purpose is frequently not capable of direct proof except by bald statement. The income-tax authorities would not, therefore, be justified in refusing to accept a bald statement about the purpose because it is uncorroborated. They must have materials to justify disbelief of the bald statement and to find that a purpose other than that of the business partly accounted for the expenditure. The materials pointed out by my learned brother were sufficient for the income-tax authorities' and the Tribunals' finding that the payment of the commission was not an expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother.
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1962 (5) TMI 34 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rtly not deductible it is for the assessee to show which is the part that is deductible and, if he fails, the whole of the expenditure should be disallowed. In this case the assessee has failed to show how much of the rent paid for the leases could be attributable to the use of the forests in the business of timber and forest produce. The present case is governed more by the cases of Kauri Timber Co. Ltd. 1913 A.C. 771, Coltness Iron Co. 1881 6 App. Cas. 315 and Alianza Co. 1906 A.C. 18 referred to by my learned brother, than by the case of Mohanlal Hargovind 1949 17 I.T.R. 473 (P.C.). BY THE COURT.--Our answer to the reference is in the negative. Let the reference be returned to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal along with a copy of the judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar as required under section 66(5) of the Income-tax Act. The department shall be entitled to its costs, which we assess at ₹ 200. Reference answered in the negative.
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1962 (5) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ation by that party. In this view we must hold that the order dated July 5, 1956, is not liable to be set aside on the ground that the procedure followed at the inquiry by the Deputy Superintendent of police was in violation of the rules of natural justice. It is hardly necessary to add that cl. 8 of s.545 of the Bombay Police Manual cannot be held to be bad as contravening the rules of natural justice. This finding however does not dispose of the entire matter. It is the contention of the respondent that the Deputy Inspector General of police was not entitled in revision to enhance the punishment and this question has not been decided by the learned Judges. It is therefore necessary to remand this case for hearing on this and all other issues which might arise for decision. We accordingly set aside the order in appeal and remand the case for hearing on the other points in this case. Costs of this appeal will abide the result of the hearing in the Court below. Case remanded.
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1962 (5) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s under the contract can never be transferred and so the notification would become futile. They accordingly contend that word or' should be read as an& and that on that construction unless both the rights and liabilities under the contract are non-transferable it is not a non- transferable contract as defined in a. 2(f). The appellants urge that on this construction no contract would be non- transferable as rights under a contract can always be transferred unless it is personal in its character and the section would become practically useless. The intention of the legislature as expressed in the section is, it must be admitted, clouded in obscurity and uncertainty. But in the view we have taken, that the contract is on its terms properly construed, non-transferable, it becomes unnecessary to decide between the arrival contentions as to the true import of s. 2(f). In the result the appeals are allowed with costs one set throughout and one hearing fee. Appeals allowed.
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1962 (5) TMI 31 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... merely a diversion of part of the office allowance to which the assessee was entitled. Presumably the view of the Tribunal was on the basis that there was no consideration for the payment of this amount. It is, therefore, clear that it could not be said that the payment of this sum of money was an admissible deduction under any part of section 10 of the Income-tax Act under which alone it could be allowed. Clearly, the payment was not influenced by business considerations. It appears to have been influenced by considerations of relationship and other extraneous considerations such as the desire to evade liability for payment of the proper amount of tax. It follows that the question relating to the amount of ₹ 3,000 should also be answered in the negative. Both the references should, therefore, be returned to the Tribunal with the above answer. The department should get the costs of both these references assessed at ₹ 100 each. Questions answered in the negative.
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1962 (5) TMI 30 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... formity with normal accountancy principles and in accordance with the mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the company." Although the opinion of auditors like Price Waterhouse Peat & Co. are entitled to respect, our attention was not drawn to any such principles of accountancy in any standard book on the subject. In deference to the said opinion, we are prepared to accept that if the basis of liability had been determined during the year of account computation made within a few days after the close of the year but included in the balance-sheet and profit and loss account for the year in conformity with the practice regularly followed by the assessee would entitle it to include the same in the year of account. But as the very basis of liability was not determined in the year of account the answer to the second question also must be in the negative. The assessee must pay the costs of the reference. LAIK J.--I agree. Questions answered in the negative.
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1962 (5) TMI 29 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... um of ₹ 100 out of an estimated compensation which may go even beyond ₹ 4,00,000 is in any sense of the term a substantial part of the said compensation. The Government has clearly broken the condition and, therefore, it has no jurisdiction to issue the declaration under s. 6 of the Act. In this view it is not necessary to express my opinion on the other questions raised in this case. In the result the said notification is quashed and respondents 1 to 5 are hereby prohibited from giving effect to the said notification and taking any proceedings thereunder. It is common case that the order in Writ Petition No. 246 of 1961 would govern Writ’ Petitions Nos. 247 and 248 of 1961 also. A similar order will issue in these two petitions also. The respondents will pay the costs of the petitioners in all the petitions. By COURT In view of the majority opinion the Court dismissed the Writ Petitions with costs. There will be one set of hearing fee. Petitions dismissed.
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1962 (5) TMI 28 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at the company has been putting off the payment of the claim of the petitioning creditor from time to time and having agreed to make the payment, has suddenly gone back upon it, simply to delay payment, not being in a position to do so. 9. Apart from these facts, we have had placed before us the balance-sheet and the Profit and Loss account of the company for the year ending 30th June, 1957-58 and 1959. It is obvious from these balance-sheets and Profit and Loss accounts, that the company is not commercially solvent but that it is unable to pay its debts in every sense of the term. (His Lordship after considering the Balance Sheet concluded.) 10. For these various reasons, we think that the court below was correct in coming to the conclusion that the application should be dismissed with costs, and we see no reason to interfere with this finding. The result is that this appeal is dismissed with costs. Certified for two Counsel. Interim orders are vacated. Law, J. 11. I agree.
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1962 (5) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... id before the arbitrators from agitating the question of the validity of the contracts in the present proceedings.(4) The last contention of the appellants is that the contracts dated September 7, 1955, and October 17, 1955, are non-transferable specific delivery contracts, as defined in s. 2(f) of the Act and under s. 18 they are exempt from the operation of s. 17, and that they are therefore not hit by the notification dated October 29, 1953. The facts are similar to those considered by this Court in Khardah Company Ltd. case 1963 (3) SCR 183. with which these appeals were heard, and for the reasons given by us in our Judgment in those appeals delivered to day, we accept the contention of the appellants, and hold that the contracts in question are not hit by the notification dated October 29, 1953. In the result the appeals are allowed, with costs throughout, one set in Civil Appeals Nos. 389 and 390 of 1960 and one in Appeals Nos. 391 and 392 of 1960, and one hearing fee.
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1962 (5) TMI 26 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respective grants made by the outgoing proprietors in favour of the respondents convey any rights to them which could be enforced against the appellant, the State of Madhya Pradesh, after the coming into effect’ of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (Madhya Pradesh Act of 1951)?
Held that:- Whatever may have been the nature of the grant by the outgoing proprietors in favour of the respondents, those grants had no legal effect as against the State, except in so far as the State may have recognized them. But the provisions of the Act leave no manner of doubt that the rights claimed by the respondents could not have been enforced against the State, if the latter was not prepared to respect those rights and the rights created by the transactions between the respondents and their grantors did not come within any of the saving clauses of s. 5.Appeal allowed.
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1962 (5) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rship of the shares is ancillary to the main decision. It is therefore not necessary for me to consider the argument of Mr. Desai that jurisdiction attaches on the principle of effectiveness propounded by Dicey, but which has been criticised by the present editors of his book and by Cheshire. In my opinion, this controversy does not arise in this case, which must be decided on the plain words of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For the reasons above given I would dismiss the appeal of the sons of Ramalingam (Civil Appeal No. 277 of 1958) and allow that of the executors (Civil Appeal No 278 of 1958), dismissing C. S. No. 214 of 1944 with costs throughout. In the light of what I have decided I would have considered the remaining appeals and passed appropriate orders therein but this is unnecessary as my brethren take a different view in the two main appeals. By COURT In view of the majority Judgment, there will be decree in terms as stated in the Judgment of the majority.
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1962 (5) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was any such emergent condition in the jute trade aid industry at the relevant time as divided the sellers and buyers of raw jute into two conflicting camps so as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension in the minds of the sellers that they will not get a just decision from the appointed arbitrator?
Held that:- It is true that on an application under s. 5 it is not necessary to show that. the arbitra or is in fact biased and it is enough to show that there is a reasonable ground for apprehension that the arbitrator will be biased. But the reasonable ground must be established to the satisfaction of the Court to which an application for leave to revoke' the authority of an appointed arbitrator is made. No such reasonable ground is made out in the present appeals. There were no such exceptional circumstances in these cases as would justify us to come to the conclusion that the appointed arbitrator would be disqualified as a result of bias by reason of a conflicting class interest.
Clearly the parties contemplated that in case the buyer failed to furnish the license to import Pakistan Jute within the period mentioned, the contract would be deemed to be cancelled which meant that the contract was to be treated as non est for all purposes. If the contract was deemed to be cancelled, it must mean that the right and obligations of the parties came to an end simultaneously. It was not really necessary to insert the words "with out any difference on both sides" in the bought notes and such addition in the sold notes did not make any difference to the rights of the parties. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (5) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
Has the Collector jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the goods are liable to be confiscated?
Whether goods have been imported contrary to the prohibition or restriction imposed by an order made under Section 3(1) of the Act of 1947?
Whether there has been a breach of a condition of a licence and whether, therefore, confiscation should be ordered under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act and further penalty imposed?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Order of prohibition restraining the Customs authority from proceeding with the enquiry under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act. The tribunal has no jurisdiction to proceed with the inquiry under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act.
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1962 (5) TMI 22 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ment or liability to assessment from the tax due under the Act on the sale of 62.5 pounds of oil and 37.5 pounds of cake. No other construction is possible on the wording of the notification and we must hold that such is the case. 9.. It is common ground that the purchase turnover of local copra is alone taxable under the Act. It is also not disputed that the assessee has purchased a quantity of local copra sufficient to produce Rs. 6,02,826-39 worth of oil and Rs. 80,810-34 worth of cake. It must follow that he is entitled to an exemption to the extent provided by the notification from the tax due on the sales of Rs. 6,02,826-39 worth of oil and Rs. 80,810-34 worth of cake. 10.. A fresh calculation on the basis of what we have stated above is necessary in this case. We direct accordingly. 11.. We allow the tax revision case in the manner and to the extent indicated above. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1962 (5) TMI 21 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ding to the return, was paid on 30th November, 1960. It has been admitted at the bar that the appeal taken against this assessment order has since been dismissed. No attempt has been made to refer to the appellate order and indeed the petitioner s counsel did not even endeavour to challenge that order in the present proceedings. Adverting to annexure A , it may be pointed out that this order is not being assailed in its entirety and the assessment in respect of the purchase of old ornaments for making new ones has been conceded to be liable to tax. On the material on the existing record to which our attention has been drawn by the petitioner s counsel, I do not think it is possible to hold the impugned order (annexure A ) to be tainted with such a serious legal infirmity appearing on the face of it as would induce me to quash the assessment on the writ side. The result is that this petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. FALSHAW, C. J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (5) TMI 20 - SUPREME COURT
Conviction orders challenged - the trial of the appellants was illegal because of want of complaint by the Sales Tax Officer under section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. In our opinion a Sales Tax Officer is not a Court within the meaning of section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code and therefore it was not necessary for a Sales Tax Officer to make a complaint and the proceedings without such a complaint are not without jurisdiction. The appellants were rightly convicted. The appellant Jagannath Prasad must surrender to his bail bonds.
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1962 (5) TMI 19 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... k this view even when the Orissa Act and the rules made thereunder provided for assessment of the taxable turnover for each quarter. 7.. In our opinion, the word period occurring in section 11(5) of the Act covers the whole period during which a dealer, being liable to pay tax under the Act, had wilfully failed to apply for registration. The limitation of three calendar years has to be computed from the end of this period. That being so, no part of the assessment made on 2nd June, 1955, was barred by time. 8.. Our answers to the two question are (i) The word period in section 11(5) of the Act means the whole period during which the dealer has been liable to pay tax under the Act and has nevertheless wilfully failed to apply for registration. It does not mean any lesser interval of time. (ii) No part of the assessment made on 2nd June, 1955, was barred by time. 9.. The dealer, Battulal, shall pay all costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 75. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (5) TMI 18 - CHANCERY DIVISION
Memorandum of association – Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of
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1962 (5) TMI 16 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Associations and partnerships exceeding certain numbers – Prohibition of ... ... ... ... ..... sary to decide that point for the purpose of disposing of the case before them. In my view, it will not be proper to extend the decision in Senaji Kapurchand v. Pannaji Devichand as well as the decision in Firm of Pannaji Devickand v. Kapurchand, 1926 51 MLJ. 667 out of which the Privy Council case arose, to a case of a registered company for the purpose of section 4 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, or section 11(2) of the Companies Act of 1956. But, as observed at the outset, the circumstances of the case show that only three individuals had joined the suit partnership therefore it is unnecessary to decide the point raised as to whether a registered company should be deemed to be a person or not. Out if a decision is required I am inclined to hold the view that a registered company entering into a partnership enters it as a single legal person, and not as a group of individuals comprising of its shareholders. The second appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. No leave.
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1962 (5) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there are materials for the Tribunal to hold that the sum of ₹ 2,87,422 aforesaid represents a loss of capital ?
Held that:- There was hardly any element of investment which contemplates more than payment of advance price. The resulting loss to the assessee company was just as much a loss on the revenue side as would have been, if it had paid for the ready crop which was not delivered. In our judgment, the decision of the High Court that the expenditure was not in the nature of a capital expenditure, and was deductible as a revenue expenditure is right. The appeal fails and is dismissed
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