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Showing 21 to 40 of 291 Records
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1990 (9) TMI 347 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e land be caused to be divided by the Financial Commissioner into two equal halves and one half be given possession of to the appellant by dint of his auction purchase and the other half be allotted and given possession of to the second respondent under Rule 34C of the rules. We order accordingly. We direct the Financial Commissioner or the Chief Settlement Commissioner, after notice to the appellant and the second respondent, to divide the land forthwith into two qual halves and deliver possession of the appellant’s moiety to him. They should carry out the above directions within three months from the date of receipt of this order. The parties shall cooperate in carrying out of the directions and we hope that they will be able to live in peace thereafter. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. Under the facts and the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. A copy of the Judgment may be forwarded forthwith to the Financial Commissioner. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (9) TMI 346 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he basis. That was their guarded stand in counter-affidavit as well. But in this Court they have taken contrary stand and have supported respondents who were petitioners before Tribunal. It is undesirable on the part of official bodies to take such stand on policy matters. However, we were saved predicament of sending for the officer, who swore affidavit in this Court, to explain the circumstances in which he deviated from earlier stand and if it was on instruction of Railways, due to fair and reasonable attitude adopted both by Sri Datar and Sri Subba Rao the learned counsel for Union of India and Railways. 7. In the result this appeal is disposed of by directing that the appellants' promotion to the post of Ticket Collector shall be deemed to have been validly made. They shall be restored to their position from which they had been reverted in consequence of the order passed by Tribunal and shall be entitled to consequential benefits. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 345 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in fact issued after the return in each case had been filed. But for some reason or the other the Assessing Officer thought that the proceedings having been initiated under section 147(b) he could not bring to tax the income which had escaped assessment for omission or failure on the part of the assessees to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for such assessments. Thus, it was plainly a case of error of judgment on his part in not bringing to tax that income. It was not due to any omission or failure on the part of the assessees to disclose fully and truly all material facts relating to such assessments. The Assessing Officer had the audit report regarding non-disclosure at the time of initiation of the first reassessment proceedings where returns had been filed but no valid assessment resulted. 10. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessees. 11. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hat no credence can be given to his statement that he had not received the notice in question. In view of these circumstances, we hold that the mere denial by Amarjeet Singh that he did not receive the notice cannot be believed and as such there is no rebuttal of the presumption drawn against him under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. 4. Hence, we cannot fault the reasoning of the courts below. In the circumstances, we dismiss this appeal. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly in view of the fact that the appellant has been carrying on the business at the suit premises for the last about 40 years, we are of the view that a sufficient time should be given to find but alternative premises. We, therefore, direct that the eviction-decree shall not be executed for a period of three years from today subject to the appellant giving the usual undertaking within four weeks from today. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 343 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ot bind the Court, so as to prevent it from giving it its true construction. (see the observation of Lord Blackburn in The Trustees of the Clyde Navigation v. Laird & Sons, 8 AC 658, 670), as quoted in National & Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, 1969 1 SCC 541. We are of the view that the reasoning of the High Court was correct. The Principal Act being an 'existing law' within the meaning of Article 366(10) read with Article 305 of the Constitution, and the provisions of the Amendment Act, 1973 which are impugned in this appeal being clarifica- tory, the previous sanction of the President was not re- quired. See the principle stated in Syed Ahmad Aga v. State of Mysore, 1975 Suppl. SCR 473. We do not, however, ex- press any view as to whether the impugned Act is regulatory or restrictive, for that question, for the present purpose, is, in our opinion, academic. The appeal is dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (9) TMI 342 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... levant to the resolution of the dispute before us. Same is the case with the other decision relied on by the DR, viz, the Supreme Court judgment in the Oriental Timber Industries case (supra) it is not clear how it helps the Revenue s case. 24. In the light of the preceding discussion, we are of the view that the appellants activity of metallising of the printed polyester film brought from outside did not amount to an activity of manufacture for the purpose of levy of excise duty under Heading No. 39.20, sub-heading 3920.31. However, we would like to make it clear that this view should not be taken to cover metallising of bare (imprinted) polyester film. That issue was not before us and there has been no occasion to go into it. 25. In the above view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to discuss the submissions before us on the other aspects of the case such as classification, limitation etc. 26. In the result, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
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1990 (9) TMI 341 - SUPREME COURT
Whether or not there existed compelling circumstances to pass the impugned orders of detention?
Held that:- The detention orders clearly state that the power is being exercised with a view to preventing the smuggling of goods referrable to clause (i) of the subsection. Merely because the number of that clause is not mentioned, it can make no difference whatsoever. So also we see no merit in the contention that the value of goods seized varies in the grounds of detention from that mentioned in the panchnama or appraisal report. How that has prejudiced the detenus is difficult to compre- hend in the absence of any material on record. The submis- sion that the declaration under section 9(1) was required to be communicated within five weeks from the date of its making is not specifically raised in the writ petitions nor was it argued before the High Court. We were, however, told that the declaration was communicated in the first week of January 1990, a statement which was not contested on behalf of the petitioners. In fact the submission was not pursued after this fact was disclosed. We also see no merit in it. Lastly, it was said that the authority had failed to take notice of the retraction of the statement recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962. In fact there is a specific reference to the retraction letter dated 12th October, 1989 and the subsequent letter of 19th October, 1989, wherein the detenus stated that they had signed the letter of 12th October, 1989 without knowing the contents thereof and had in fact not disowned their earlier statement of 5th October, 1989. It is clear from the above that this challenge is also without substance. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (9) TMI 340 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g authority below with regard to levy of penalty is sustainable on the material on record should be decided by the Tribunal only, as a factfinding authority, after considering sufficient cause. Under the facts of this case and in view of section 19A, penalty is sustainable under section 7AA of the Act even without recourse to section 17 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act is answered in favour of the department, but it will not prejudice the assessee s case on merits on remand. 12.. It is, therefore, appropriate that the case be remanded back to the Tribunal to decide afresh. The Tribunal after giving proper opportunity to the assessee, will decide whether there was any reasonable or sufficient cause existed or not for filing return after prescribed period. 13.. In the light of the above observations, both the cases are sent back by this common order to the Tribunal to decide the cases afresh. These revisions are partly allowed with no order as to costs. Petitions partly allowed.
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1990 (9) TMI 339 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... order in the light of the observations we have made. 9.. Therefore, we remit the matter back to the respondent with a direction to pass a fresh order keeping in mind the observations of this Court. 10.. We also must notice the submission made from the Bar that pursuant to the order now set aside by us, a fresh assessment has been made by the assessing authority, the effect of setting aside the order of the Commissioner is that no proper fresh assessment has taken place. Any assessment which now stands concluded is the result of the direction given in the revisional order of respondent-Commissioner. Until and unless the Commissioner interferes with that order which we have set aside technically restoring the appellate orders on the remand made by us, that is the only assessment order which stands subject to the orders in revision yet to be made. 11.. With this clarification this appeal is allowed to the extent indicated and the matter remitted to the respondent for disposal.
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1990 (9) TMI 338 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... from statement of case drawn by the Tribunal, the contract was for sale of timber which was agreed to be severed. For all practical purposes, therefore, the sale was of felled trees, that is, timber . The subsequent sale by the assessee after cutting those timber in the shape of ballis, rafters, etc., would not alter the character of goods so sold by him. This subsequent sale by him must also, therefore, be taken as sale of timber which they had purchased. 7.. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that what the assessee purchased from the forest department was timber. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, is in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. We hold that the entry timber specified as raw material in the dealer s registration certificate includes standing trees also. 8.. Reference answered accordingly. Parties shall bear their own costs of the reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1990 (9) TMI 337 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , no doubt, there is an observation that certain additions made by the assessing officer in the sum of Rs. 8,000 and 1,000 towards the accounts for each year was not justified when the formula of 5 frac12 times establishment expenses was applied to determine the total turnover, on the facts and circumstances of that case. Since that formula for determining the turnover or estimating the turnover was not adopted, and method adopted is different, purchase value of certain goods found in the premises could certainly be added for the purpose of determining purchase turnover for the purpose of section 6 of the Act. 8.. In that view of the matter, on facts the case is distinguishable from the case of Inamdar (S.T.R.P. Nos. 22 and 23 of 1983 decided on 2nd December, 1983-Karnataka High Court) and therefore, there is no merit in the contention advanced by Mr. B.V. Katageri. For the reasons we have given, there is no merit in the revision petition. It is rejected. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (9) TMI 336 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not come into play. It is the specific case of the petitioners that C forms were filed under protest reserving their right to press afterwards a case for reduced rate of tax. On the mere fact that C forms are available to cover the entire turnover relating to the transfer of goods from Uthagamandalam to Cochin describing M/s. RIL, Bombay, as purchasing dealer and the petitioner-company as seller, it cannot be presumed that the movement of goods from Uthagamandalam to Cochin was on the basis of the orders from M/s. RIL, Bombay. As we have already stated, the fact whether the assessee had sold ossein from the Cochin godown and whether such sales are assessable to tax in that State or not are beyond the scope of these tax cases. 15.. For all the above reasons, the tax cases are allowed. The order of the assessing authority in both the cases as confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal are set aside. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1990 (9) TMI 335 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e principal entry, namely, oil-seeds. The comparison of item 88 of the First Schedule to the Act by the Tribunal to interpret the word groundnut is not apposite. In the view we have taken, we do not think it necessary to refer to all the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the assessee to make out a case that groundnut and groundnut kernel are two different and distinct commercial commodities. 11.. The assumption that item 6(i) does not attract single point tax as declared goods on groundnut kernel having been held by us as wrong, as discussed supra, we reject the contention of the petitioner in W.P. No. 4484 of 1982 that item 6(i) of the Second Schedule to the Act violates article 14 of the Constitution of India. 12.. In the result, we dismiss the Tax Cases Nos. 69 and 70 of 1981 and also Writ Petition No. 4484 of 1982. No costs. Tax Cases Nos. 626 and 627 of 1981 filed by the Revenue are allowed. No costs. Assessees petitions dismissed and State s petitions allowed.
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1990 (9) TMI 334 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... I express my deep regrets for my inability to agree with my learned brother, the Hon ble Chief Justice on the applicability of the doctrine of reading down to sustain the offending provisions. I agree with my brothren B.C. Ray and P.B. Sawant, JJ. with their reasoning and conclusions in addition to what I have laid earlier. 46. The appeal is accordingly dismissed, but without costs. Similarly Civil Appeal No. 1115 of 1976 is allowed and the monetary relief granted is reasonable, but parties are directed to bear their own costs. Rest of the matters will be disposed of by the Division Bench in the light of the above law. In view of the majority judgment, Civil Appeal No. 2876 of 1986 (Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress) is dismissed. Civil Appeal No. 11 15 of 1976 (Satnam Singh v. Zilla Parishad Ferozepur and Ant., is allowed and the other cases snail be placed before a division bench for final disposal. C.A. 2876/86 is dismissed and C.A. 1115/76 is allowed.
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1990 (9) TMI 333 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ood as a variety of silk fabric as understood in common parlance. Ordinarily, nobody would understand fabric to include a gas mantle. A gas mantle is not used as a fabric. Due to the chemical processing it acquires a character which is totally different from that of fabric. A fabric when put to fire, is burnt to ashes whereas a gas mantle when put to fire illuminates. We are unable to agree with the submissions of Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the assessee-applicant, that gas mantles are nothing but a variety of artificial silk fabric. We agree with the view taken by D. Basu, J., referred to earlier. In that view of the matter, the first question, namely, (1a) is answered in the negative. The second question, namely, (1b), therefore, does not arise for consideration and need not be answered. 15.. The reference is thus disposed of. There will be no order for costs. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Reference disposed of accordingly.
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1990 (9) TMI 332 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... satisfied. It is not the case of the dealer that one of the conditions is not satisfied. In such circumstances, when the Assistant Commissioner accepted the suggestion of the Sales Tax Officer on September 24, 1979, the same shall be deemed to be prior approval to satisfy the precondition of prior approval of rule 90-A(4) when there is no statutory procedure provided to make such prior approval. 5.. In view of the aforesaid discussion, our answer to the question is in the negative against the dealer by stating that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, in the absence of a definite finding of the prior approval of the Assistant Commissioner required under rule 90-A of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, assessment under section 12(8) of the Act is in accordance with law in view of the fact that the Assistant Commissioner has permitted the Sales Tax Officer to so assess. There shall be no order as to costs. K.C. JAGADEB ROY, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1990 (9) TMI 331 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessment is to the best of judgment, while taking assistance of the accounts in this respect, which is not disbelieved, estimate is to be made keeping in mind that the quantity of black gram as reflected in the accounts were purchased from the cultivators and taxable turnover is to be determined adjusting the amounts paid at the check gate for which receipts were produced. 11.. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the question is to be answered by stating that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the dealer who purchased black gram from the cultivators is liable to pay purchase tax on the turnover of purchase even though at the check gate tax in respect of the goods was collected from the cultivators but such tax in respect of which receipts produced are to be adjusted to the admitted tax payable so that ultimately the demand for the balance tax would be reduced. There shall be no order as to costs. J.M. MAHAPATRA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1990 (9) TMI 330 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to the 1944 Act, as amended by the Finance Act, 1969 with effect from April 1, 1969, will apply. If this is the meaning to be given to cotton fabrics as mentioned in entry 5 of the Fourth Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, the fabric in dispute, namely, rexine, comes within the meaning of cotton fabrics . It is also the common case of the parties that for the relevant years the assessee had paid the additional excise duty as contemplated by the aforesaid Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, for the relevant years in question in the present revision case. Thus, when the goods are covered by the Fourth Schedule, section 8 comes into play, and in view of section 8 (2-A) of the Central Sales Tax Act, the goods in dispute are exempt from the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, respectively. The revision case, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (9) TMI 329 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e liable to be taxed in the State at the last purchase point. The assessee purchased the goods and they sent these goods to their non-resident principals. By sending the goods to the non-resident principals, the purchase by the assessee was complete. The purchase price was also paid. Any commission received by the assessee from the principals after the purchases are over, cannot form part of the purchase turnover of the assessee......... 5.. In the light of the above Bench decision, we are of the view that the Appellate Tribunal was justified in these cases in holding that the commission and quality inspection charges received by the assessees from their non-resident principals will not form part of the purchase turnover of rubber which is liable to be taxed at the hands of the assessees. 6.. The tax revision cases are without merit. They are dismissed. Petitions dismissed. Since reported in 1991 81 STC 63 as Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Ghanshyam Kumar Pasupathinath.
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1990 (9) TMI 328 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... falling under item 17 of Schedule II to the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act. The assessment is liable to be revised to that extent only. The tax liability for the sale of the goods should be calculated at the general rate of 8 per cent. The High Court while entertaining the application passed an interim order permitting the petitioner to continue to pay sales tax at 8 per cent and to furnish security by way of bank guarantee for the remaining 8 per cent of such sales. The interim order was not, however, extended on the prayer of the applicant and as such it automatically stood vacated by operation of law in terms of proviso to section 15(2)(b) of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987. If, however, any security was furnished and if it is still in force, it shall be released in favour of the applicant. The case is, thus, disposed of. There will be no order for costs. P.C. BANERJI (Judicial Member).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Technical Member).-I agree. Application partly allowed.
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