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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 3057 Records
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1949 (2) TMI 11 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... aran Roy v. Emperor A.I.R. (18) 1931 Cal. 697. 10. In the present case their Lordships are in complete agreement with the Judges of the High Court in declining to act upon the evidence of the approver supported only by the confession of Trinath. These two persons appear to have been nothing but hired assassins. They had ample opportunity of preparing their statements in concert, and in addition, the approver has sworn to two contradictory stories, and Trinath has denied that his confession was true. It is true that no motive is shown for their falsely implicating the appellant, but motive is often a. matter of conjecture. It may be that these two men thought it advisable to say falsely that they were acting on the instigation of another rather than on their own initiative, or they may have had reasons of their own for wishing to conceal the name of the real instigator. 11. For the above reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the conviction of the appellant cannot stand.
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1949 (2) TMI 10 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . and approved by the House of Lords may be referred to - "You cannot earn profits on a notional debt-it is not an asset. It is not an asset which would ever appear in a balance sheet. It must be in the balance sheet for the year as an existing assets, not something which is written back by a re-opening of the balance sheet in some subsequent year so as to let in something which in that year was not an asset at all…..It is quite impossible to treat a receipt, which is to be written back into a previous year for the purpose of ascertaining the profits, as being an asset in the shape of a debt within the meaning of these capital provisions." The question referred to this Court must accordingly be answered in the negative and the sums standing to the credit of the different insurance funds as reserve for exceptional losses cannot be deducted under Rule 2 of Schedule II read with the explanatory sub-paragraph of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940. Das, J.-I agree.
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1949 (2) TMI 9 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... state-merit of P.W. 2 whose evidence has been accepted by both the courts that on the day after the execution of the agreement (Ex P-I) he informed the fifth defendant of the contract of sale. Further, it is found from the document (Ex. 2) admitted as additional evidence on appeal by the learned Subordinate Judge, that at the time of the registration of Exs. I and D-2 as well, as at the time of registration of Ex. D-3, the plaintiff raised an objection to the registration of the sale deeds on the ground that there was a valid and subsisting contract for the sale of the property in his favour and therefore the deeds should not be registered. It is therefore clear on the evidence and on finding of the lower appellate Court that the fifth defendant was not a purchaser for value without notice and has no valid defence to the suit for specific performance. 2. I therefore agree with the conclusion of the lower appellate Court and dismiss the second appeal with costs. 3. No leave.
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1949 (2) TMI 8 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... such sale to a non-member, (sic) it was for the acquisition of a "valuable right" which is to be regarded as a capital expense but not as a trading expense. If the payment of the annuity to Mitchell Innes had not been made contingent upon the receipt of income from Messrs. Ralli Brothers, the observations of Lawrence, J., and Macnaghten, J., would have been of great force. On the special facts arising in this particular case and on the interpretation of the terms of contract as evidenced by the agreements, particularly Exhibit B, it must be held that the amount in question was not an item of capital expenditure but was a revenue expenditure allowable as an admissible deduction under Section 10(2)(xii) of the Income-tax Act as it stood before its amendment in 1946. The question raised must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative. The assessee respondent is entitled to the cost of the hearing in this Court. DAS, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1949 (2) TMI 7 - MADRAS HIGH COURTVATLAWS COPYRIGHT 2013
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... ... ..... timately incurred by the commission agent on behalf of the principal for whom he sold, such as cart hire, loading charges and so on. As the accounts stand, the collection of rusum merely swelled the profits of the commission agency. Had the plaintiffs selling agency business showed as in the case of the buying agency business that as a general rule they passed on the rusum they collected without appro- priating it for themselves, we should have been inclined to have placed the selling agency business in the same category as the buying agency business, and to have exempted it also from sales tax on the total turn- over. Even this not having been established by the plaintiff firm, we think that the learned Distict Judge was quiet correct in his finding that the sales tax was legally and correctly levied on the entire turnover of the selling agency business. The appeal and the memorandum of cross-objections are both dis- missed with costs. Appeal and cross-objections dismissed.
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1949 (2) TMI 6 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Restrictions on commencement of business ... ... ... ... ..... nder a statutory liability to pay them. In support of his contention, he referred me to the judgment of Buckley, J., in In re, English and Colonial Produce Company Limited 1906 2 Ch. 435. This judgment, however, was overruled in In re, National Motor Mail-Coach Company Limited 1908 2 Ch. 515 where Cozens-Hardy, M.R., observed as follows mdash I need hardly say that any opinion expressed by Buckley, J., especially upon this branch of the law, deserves the greatest respect, but I cannot concur in the view which he took, and Mr. Eustace Smith confessed that he had not been able to find any other authority differentiating between a statutory liability and any other liability in relation to this question. There is no other ground upon which the judgment can be supported, and I know of no principle or authority on which that distinction can be maintained. The result is that the claim of Sharada Agencies must be dismissed. I settle the list by deleting the claim of Sharada Agencies.
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1949 (1) TMI 11 - HIGH COURT OF DACCA
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... ... ..... hich has been received should in the present case be treated as income. 3. As to the salami or the rent paid being agricultural income within the meaning of Section 2(1) and as such exempt from assessment under Section 4(3)(viii) of the Act, the matter seems to me to be set at rest by the admission of parties stated in the letter of reference as follows --"In this case it is admitted by both the parties that during the accounting period the land was not used for agricultural purpose." Under Section 2(1) of the Act it is the actual use of the land which is to be looked to as the decisive factor and not the purpose of the lease vide Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1948 16 ITR 330 (PC) and In re Maharajadhiraj Sir Bijay Chand Mahiab 1940 8 ITR 378. For the reasons given above I would answer the questions referred to us, viz., 1(a) and (b) and 2, in the negative, with the result that both items are to be treated as assessable. Amiruddin Ahmad, J. I agree.
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1949 (1) TMI 10 - HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
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... ... ..... f a religious and charitable nature within the meaning of Section 92, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 47. The next question for consideration is whether the Defendant has mismanaged the endowed property and is liable to be removed. Their Lordships discussed the evidence and proceeded 48-53. The trial Court found that the Defendant was not a proper person to be kept in charge of the management of the endowed property that the management of the endowed property, had gone from bad to worse, that some of the property had been lost, that very little income out of the entire property was spent for the purposes of the temple, and that in the interest of the trust it was desirable that the Defendant should be removed and a new trustee should be appointed in his place. We consider that these findings are justified by the evidence on the record. We accordingly hold that the Defendant is guilty of malversation and is liable to be removed. 54. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1949 (1) TMI 9 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
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... ... ..... . In Ambika Churn v. Satish Chunder 2 C. W. N. 689, the learned Judges held that the right to obtain a declaration that the plaintiffs were not liable to assessment under the Bengal Municipal Act would be maintainable even if brought more than three months after the assessment. In Municipality of Faizpur v. Manak Dulab Shet 22 Bom. 637, the same view was taken and it was decided that Section 48, Bombay Municipal Act (corresponding to Section 377, Bihar and Orissa Act) did not apply to a suit for specific performance of a contract or for damages for breach thereof. 4. Lastly, it was urged for the appellant that the case may be remanded and a pleader commissioner may be appointed at his cost to investigate whether the mills are situated within the municipal limits or not. But the prayer is obviously too late and cannot be entertained at this stage. 5. Upon these grounds, I would affirm the decree of the lower Court and dismiss the appeal with costs. Syed Jafar Imam, J. I agree.
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1949 (1) TMI 8 - FEDERAL COURT
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... ... ..... paper book and we cannot ascertain what exactly were the grounds put forward in support of the same. The subsequent order made on the application for review is of a summary character and gives no indication of the reasons which induced the learned Judges to reconsider their previous decision. From such materials as we have got, we are bound to say that in fact there was an omission on the part of the Court to consider the clear provision of Order 41, Rule 33, Civil P.C., when the original judgment was passed; and such omission, which appears on the face of the judgment, would constitute a sufficient ground analogous to those mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1, Civil P.C., and the Court was not incompetent to reconsider the matter if it so desired. The result, therefore, is that we do not feel justified in interfering with the decision of the High Court. The appeal will stand dismissed with costs. Fazl Ali, J. 21. I agree. Patanjali Sastri, J. 22. I agree. Mahajan, J. 23. I agree.
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1949 (1) TMI 7 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e. It seems to me that it is the leseee who is under the circumstances the owner qua at any rate those to whom he has let or sub let such premises. It is consistent with dual owner ship that qua the lessee it may be that the lessor is the owner of the property; and in any proceedings between the lessor and the lessee it would be possible to say that the premises belonged to the lessor and not to the lessee. That is not the case before me. The case here arises between the lessee and those to whom he has let the premises. I have no doubt in my mind that qua the defendants in these two suits the premises in suit belong to the plaintiff and to nobody else so long as the lease is subsisting. That being so, those premises are not excluded from the operation of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, and this Court has therefore no jurisdiction to entertain or try either of these suits. The result, therefore, will be that the suits will be dismissed with costs.
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1949 (1) TMI 6 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... admissibility is susceptible of waiver but not so an objection as to relevancy. Even if Ex. D-18 (b) went in without any demur at the trial the question of the relevancy of its contents, according to the requirements of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, would still be a matter open to consideration here. Judged by such requirements, Ex. D-18 (b) ought to have been ruled out of consideration by the lower appellate Court. 3. The question involved in the case--whether the sale of the original owner in favour of the plaintiff's father was real and operative or nominal and fraudulent--is however in root analysis a. question of fact, on which the Courts below concurred in their conclusion against the plaintiff. I am not satisfied that their conclusion is so far vitiated by material error as to merit reversal or re-consideration. 4. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. 5. The appellant will have to pay the court-fee on the memorandum of second appeal. No leave.
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1949 (1) TMI 5 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... come under the survey settlement, the plaintiffs (trustees) are entitled to the non-agricultural assessment recovered by the Government. 51. In the view that their Lordships hold that the imposition of the non-agricultural assessment under the provisions of Act V of 1879, in the manner indicated above, is valid, no need arises for considering the further question whether the view of the trial Court that the proceedings were validly commenced under Act I of 1865, under Section 2 of the Act of 1879, were carried over as "pending" to be completed under the Code (as they were completed by assessments in 1886) is right. 52. For the reasons given above their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that these appeals should be dismissed. There will be no order as to the costs of these appeals, but the costs as between solicitor and client of the villagers who were added as respondents will, in accordance with the terms of the Order in Council, be paid by the Government.
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1949 (1) TMI 4 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he finding is that he dug the land for the purposes of improvement. If the deft. at any time is found to be misusing the land in that case a proper case for injunction besides damages may arise. How can we restrain the tenant from digging the earth and then for disposing of that earth when the pltf. has not asked the deft to deliver that earth to him or when he has not made any arrangement for delivery of that earth ? In any ease we are not satisfied that this Ct. should exercise the power of restraining the deft. from digging the earth on the land if he digs it for the purposes of improving the holding. 7. The result is that the appeal is allowed, the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge is set aside and the pltf's. suit decreed for recovery of ₹ 42-8-0 which will carry interest at 6 per cent from the date of the decree of the trial Ct. Each party will bear his own costs in all the Cts. in the special circumstances of this case. Mahabir Prasad, J. 8. I agree.
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1949 (1) TMI 3 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... shiva Vishwanath on the security of certain shares pledged by the debtor. These shares, which were assigned to Kunwar Ganesh Singh, were assigned by him to the assessee on the April 30, 1925. Some of the shares were sold for a sum of ₹ 254 during the year 1344F. The remaining shares could not be sold because they were of the company or companies which had gone into liquidation. The assessee thus suffered a loss of ₹ 13,232 which he wrote off as a bad debt in the year of assessment. Upon these facts it must be found that the loss was a business loss and not a capital loss." It will be noticed that the loss was allowed to be deducted because it occurred in the course of money- lending business of the assessee. For these reasons, I would answer both the question in the affirmative. The assessee having failed must pay costs to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa. Hearing fee, ₹ 250. MEREDITH, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1949 (1) TMI 2 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts of that kind. The plaintiff will be given liberty to amend his plaint for valuing the reliefs in para. 10 of the plaint under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act. That value will also be the value for purposes of jurisdiction and he will be given liberty also to amend the valuation which he has already given for purposes of jurisdiction. It is unnecessary for us at this stage to consider the question that was raised by the learned Government Pleader that if the plaintiff puts an arbitrary valuation which is grossly inadequate, the Court would be entitled to ask him to place a proper valuation. The question does not arise for consideration at this stage and we therefore do not propose to consider the same. In the result, this civil revision petition is allowed and the order of the District Munsif set aside and the plaintiff will value the claim in the manner indicated in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs in this civil revision petition. Petition allowed.
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1949 (1) TMI 1 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es meant plants cultivated for food. In this limited sense, will pan be included? Pan is certainly not a food-stuff. It is a masticatory (see the article on betel in the Encyclopaedia Britannica). Some hold that it is also a digestive. But, even so, it is not a food. It is not eaten for its food value, but at the highest as an aid to digestion. It is not served as a part of a meal, but as a supplement to it. As a digestive agent, it might perhaps be considered a medicinal preparation, but the notification is careful to pro- vide that in exempting vegetables, green or dried, medicinal preparations are not included. For these reasons I am satisfied that the View taken by the Board of Revenue is the correct one, and I would, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative. Betel leaves are taxable, and have not been exempted under the notification. The assessees must pay the costs of the reference. Hearing fee Rs. 100. MANOHAR LALL, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1948 (12) TMI 13 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ouncil is not satisfied in this case; hence sanction of the proper authority was not necessary before the institution of the proceedings. Further, it seems to me that the so-called substantial question of law in regard to the interpretation of Section 270 of the Act is not really a question of law at all, but merely a proposition of law. Whether in a particular case, on the facts found, a particular proposition of law would or would not be applicable is not, to my mind, a question of law relating to the interpretation of Section 270 (1) of the Act It is merely a question of the application of the principles of law to the facts of a particular case. For this reason also, it seems to me that there is no substance in the argument raised by the learned Counsel for the applicants to the effect that there is a substantial question of law involved in the case within the meaning of that expression as used in Section 205, Constitution Act. The result is that I dismiss the application.
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1948 (12) TMI 12 - FEDERAL COURT
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... ... ..... years 1929-37. This conclusion harmonizes with the fact that the only person who had the means to acquire these properties and who was interested in acquiring them was Sundaram. Akilandammal might have been in possession of some funds of her own in 1924, but that fact does not effect the decision of the case. Once the defendants' case about the sources of income of the mother and about her being in possession of over ₹ 15,000 by the year 1919 is negatived, then the only conclusion possible on the facts disclosed is the one arrived by the High Court and it is difficult to uphold the contention that the properties in suit were acquired by her. The onus that rested in the plaintiff stood discharged in the particular circumstances of the case and the trial Judge was not right in holding otherwise. 29. The result, therefore, is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Fazl Ali, J. 30. I agree. Patanjali Sastri, J. 31. I agree. B.K. Mukherjea, J. 32. I agree.
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1948 (12) TMI 11 - BEFORE FEDERAL COURT
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... ... ..... under the section in favour of the appellant. They observed further that, even if an account were taken as claimed by the appellant, the resulting reduction of interest would be so insignificant as to make it inadvisable to reopen the whole transaction. The learned Judges view on the construction of Section 8 is in accord with the decision of this Court in Jaigobind Singh v. Lachmi Narain Ram A.I.R. (27) 1940 F.C. 20 where it was further held that this Court would not interfere with the exercise of its discretion by the High Court under Section 8 unless it appeared that that Court "did not apply its mind at all to the question before it or acted capriciously or in disregard of some legal principle or was influenced by some extraneous considerations wrong in law " No such grounds have been suggested in the present case by the appellant's learned Counsel, and accordingly we must decline to interfere. 10. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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