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Showing 101 to 120 of 280 Records
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1951 (8) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e (a) or (e) of Sub-section 1 of Section 47. 12. It is next contended that there is an obvious error on the face of the record, because at the time the Government passed the order the appellant had only one permit, the other permit having already been transferred after the order of the Regional Transport Authority. The second respondent contends that the said transfer was benami because the transferee is the son-in-law of the appellant. We are not called upon to decide that question in this appeal because at the time the Regional Transport Authority passed its order, the appellant was in possession of two permits and whatever happened subsequent to that date is not a matter relevant for consideration when the Government passed its order. It seems to us, therefore, that the order of the learned Judge is perfectly correct and cannot be interfered with. 13. This appeal falls and is dismissed. Since the preliminary objection has failed we direct each party to bear his own costs.
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1951 (8) TMI 24 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as falling within the ambit of the Act. Now, that is obviously not the scheme of the third proviso. The scheme of the third provison according to me is totally and for all purposes to exclude the business of the nature described in that proviso, and, as I said before, that business is a business in which, if it made profits, such profits would accrue or arise in an Indian State. Therefore, in my opinion, the Tribunal was not right in coming to the conclusion that the principle which is deducible from our decision in Murlidhar Mathurawalla Mahajan Association' s case (supra ) was applicable to a case that fell under the Excess Profits Tax Act. The two Acts, although in a sense they are complementary to each other, are based on different principles. And Vjjuiew of the third proviso to Section 5, the principle of that decision does not apply to a case falling under the Excess Profits Tax Act. The result is, we will answer the question in the negative. Tendolkar, J.-I agree.
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1951 (8) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... can be treated as pending observed thus What is the meaning of the word "pending" ? In my opinion, it includes every insolvency in which any proceeding can by any possibility be taken. That I think is the meaning of this word 'pending'. A cause is said to be pending in a Court of justice where any proceeding can be taken in it. That is the test. If you can take any proceeding it is pending. "Pending" does not mean that it has not been tried. It may have been tried years ago. In our opinion, therefore, Section 20 of Madras Act VIII of 1951 applies to this case. 4. In the result the order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Tenali is hereby quashed. Having regard to the fact that on the date when this application was filed in this Court, the new Act had not been passed and on that date the order of the Subordinate Judge was unassailable, we think the petitioner must pay the costs of this application to the respondent. Advocate's fee ₹ 100.
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1951 (8) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... case to have appeared merely for the purpose of elucidating his own judgment and pointing oat the errors in the judgment of the Court below. That is not the proper function of the Court of first instance, and in this case the Registrar is nothing else except the Court of first instance. He must submit to the judgment of lower appellate Court if there is no appeal from that judgment. If there is an appeal, he must submit to the judgment of the final Court of appeal. If his judgment is right, it will be restored by the final Court and the errors of the lower appellate Court will be rectified; if his judgment is wrong, that the lower appellate Court's judgment will be confirmed by the final Court of appeal. But, as I said before, this Court neither need a illumination nor guidance from the Judge of the first instance as to what are the errors in the judgment of the lower appellate Court. 13 We, therefore, make no order as to costs of the Registrar. Bhagwati, J. 14 I agree.
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1951 (8) TMI 21 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r under Section 46(1) which does not even specify what is the amount of the penalty which the assessee has got to pay. Under Section 46(1) there must not only be a formal order which imposes a penalty but it must also specify the actual amount of the penalty which the assessee is liable to pay. After that order is passed then consequential upon that order a notice of demand may be served under Section 29 and the assessee has a right of appeal against such order under Section 30 of the Act. Inasmuch as the order passed by the Income-tax Officer in this case under Section 46(1) does not specify the amount of the penalty the order is bad and the notice of demand is equally bad as it follows upon an invalid order of the Income-tax Officer. In the result the penalty imposed by the Income-tax Officer is not valid in law and we shall therefore answere the question referred to us in the negative. The Commissioner to pay the costs of the reference. Reference answered in the negative.
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1951 (8) TMI 20 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tax paid by the company in the United Kingdom. Now, fortunately, we are not called upon to consider Section 49B. As I said before, that section deals with a question of refund, and here we are not dealing with a case of refund we are dealing with a case where the assessee is entitled to credit in respect of the tax paid by the company under Section 18(5). Sections 16(2) and 18(5) constitute self-contained provisions with regard to grossing up of dividend income and with regard to relief to be given to an assessee in respect of that grossing up. Section 49B deals with an altogether different matter, and that is a case where a refund is asked for by the assessee. This is not a case where the assessee is asking for any refund under Section 49B, and, therefore, Section 49B does not fall for interpretation at our hands. I would, therefore, answer the question put to us in the negative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. TENDOLKAR, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1951 (8) TMI 19 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cer, subject to appeals such as lie. The assessee has failed to satisfy the appellate authorities, and this Court must, therefore, accept the decision rendered. As we have pointed out, there is foundation for the application of the proviso. Whether or not profits or loss could, in the books as they stand, have been calculated is not for this Court to decide. The officer concerned has expressed his inability and the appellate authorities have concerned with him. This concludes the matter, and no question of law arises. Indeed, the question as framed shows that the assessee's contention is that there is no foundation for the action taken. The appropriate authorities have found the stock books to be defective, and we cannot say that that matter was not within their special and exclusive powers, in view of the provisions of the Act. The applications accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 50 in each case, if certified. Applications dismissed.
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1951 (8) TMI 18 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... carefully examine the particular ray of hope on which the Lahore High Court relied in that case we find that the debtor had become insolvent and his estate had become vested in the Official Assignee and the creditor was receiving small dividends from the Official Assignee. On these facts the Lahore High Court held that the debt was in the process of realisation and it could not be considered a bad debt. These are entirely different facts from the facts before us. Here when the High Court delivered the judgment on the 29th of September, 1941, the debt became incapable of realisation and, therefore, according to me the Tribunal was right in fixing that date as the date on which the debt became a bad debt. The result is that we must answer the questions referred to us by the Tribunal as follows - Question No. 1 -In the affirmative. Question No. 2 -In the affirmative. Question No. 3 -In the negative. The assessee to pay the costs of the reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (8) TMI 17 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed by Section 30(2). Therefore the judgment of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner falls in two parts. There is a dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it is barred by limitation and there is also an order refusing to condone the delay as no sufficient ground was made out. To the extent that the appeal is dismissed on the ground that it is barred by limitation the order is appealable and the Tribunal was competent to hear the appeal. To the extent the order refuses to condone the delay that order is made by him under Section 30(2) and is final and cannot be challenged before the Tribunal. Therefore, the answer that we give to the question referred to us is that the appeals before the Appellate Tribunal were competent only to the extent the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the appeals were barred by limitation and were not competent in so far as he refused to condone the delay. The Commissioner to pay the costs of the Reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (8) TMI 16 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cases arising out of our Act. (1) 1949 1 S.T.C. 193 53 C.W.N. 278. It has been pleaded on behalf of the applicant firm that they had no option but to show separately the two items referred to earlier in this order, as their principals, namely, the cigarette manufacturers, insist on the actual catalogue price being shown clearly in cash memo- randums or bills. This trade practice-for it is nothing more-cannot help the applicant in getting over the definition of sale price and turnover as contained in the Act. The essence of the scheme it embodies is that the tax is payable by the dealer, calculated at a specified rate on the totality of his receipts from the purchaser, minus certain items particularised in Section 2(j). Among these items is not to be found any element which the dealer may have recovered from the purchaser in lieu of the sales tax due from him (the dealer) to the State. In the result, this application for revision fails and is dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1951 (8) TMI 15 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... accordingly heard at Tezpur on 6th May, 1950 an advocate appeared on behalf of the petitioners on that day. On 9th May, 1950, the petitioners also submitted a statement of their sales of jute. The enhancement was made on the materials furnished by the petitioners, and it could not be said that it was done without any basis and without giving the petitioners a reasonable opportunity of being heard. All these are questions of fact, in my opinion, and no reference is competent on these questions. We think the learned Commissioner is right in saying that the proviso to Section 31 of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, has been complied with. It was conceded by the petitioners advocate that if the proviso to Sec- tion 31 has been complied with by the Commissioner, his decision to enhance the assessment rests on facts and not on any point of law. The result is that the petition is dismissed with costs. The Rule is discharged. RAM LABHAYA, J.-I agree. DEKA, J.-I agree. Rule discharged.
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1951 (8) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... -3 to P-5 and even if it is taken to be true, will not amount to an offence in the circumstances of this case where the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer went to the peti- tioner s shop on a holiday and during the lunch interval, which he had no right to do under Section 14(2), and also illegally insisted on the petitioner s showing him some private papers and cash and signing in an unauthorised statement prepared by himself. Of course, actual use of physical force is not necessary for obstruction or prevention under Section 14(2). Words causing an apprehension of violence, or acts pre- venting or obstructing the inspection, like locking the premises to pre- vent inspection, or running away with the goods and registers will do, in a proper case where there is a right of inspection under Sec- tion 14(2). In the end, therefore, the conviction and sentence of the petitioner are set aside, and the petitioner is acquitted. The fine, if paid, will be refunded. Conviction set aside.
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1951 (8) TMI 13 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... itioner paid the amount due and therefore he is not guilty of the offence under Section 15(b) of the Sales Tax Act. The conviction and sentence are therefore set aside and the amount if it has been paid shall be refunded to the petitioner. Crl.R.C.No. 788 of 1950 In this case the amount involved is Rs. 440-8-0 and it has been paid by cheque dated 24th September, 1948, which was cashed on 6th October, 1948. For the reasons mentioned in my judgment in CrI.R.C.No. 787 of 1950 the conviction and sentence of the petitioner are set aside and the amount if it has been paid shall be refunded to him. CrI.R.C.No. 1327 of 1950 In this case the amount involved is Rs. 344 and it has been paid by cheque dated 13th October, 1948, which was cashed on 11th November, 1948. For the reasons mentioned in my judgment in CrI.R.C.No. 787 of 1950 the conviction and sentence of the petitioner are set aside and the amount, if it has been paid, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Conviction set aside.
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1951 (8) TMI 12 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Prospectus – Registration of ... ... ... ... ..... at that was a serious difficulty which may be met by reference to the Commissioner for Taking Accounts. There is only one further point which may be referred to, and which I have already referred to shortly, and which I may refer to again, namely, as regards the change in capital structure. I have already referred to the resolution of July 20, Exhibit F, which was duly filed, but a reference to Exhibit 0 may also be made, and in these circumstances, to my mind, there is no substance in this allegation. The capital structure was changed at the end of July, 1946, and the share scrips issued on December 3, 1946, clearly indicate on the face of them what the capital structure of the company was, and there is no evidence whatever before the court that any single shareholder lodged any protest against that position. The suit stands dismissed with costs. The costs of the suit to include the costs of the notice of motion and the chamber summons. Interim injunction to stand dissolved.
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1951 (8) TMI 8 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Winding up – Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... ence caused to litigants, however much it might be regretted, must be looked upon as unavoidable in the larger interest of society which requires that the affairs of banking companies should not be unduly delayed and the winding up should be completed as soon as possible. I am therefore of the opinion that with great respect the learned Judge was in error in the conclusion he came to and this court has jurisdiction under section 45B to decide this matter and the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court has been ousted under section 45A of Act XX of 1950. Therefore, the order of dismissal passed by the learned Judge will be set aside and the appeal will be allowed. The liquidator s costs as between attorney and client will come out of the assets of the banking company. There will be no order as to costs on respondent No. 3. The suit was filed as a summary suit and therefore it will go back to the learned Judge in Chambers for disposal according to law. Bhagwati, J.- mdash I agree.
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1951 (7) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... statute provides that the proceedings 'shall stand transferred'. The transfer is automatic. No order of the Court is necessary. On formal information from the High Court, the records of the proceeding must be sent to the High Court. 18. The Legislature in its wisdom has provided for the transfer and trial of all proceedings that arise out of or in the course of the winding up of a company to the High Court and this Court is bound to act accordingly. The Court cannot construe the section in a way that whittles down the intention of the Legislature. 19. Our Court of appeal had to construe these sections in 'BHARATI CENTRAL BANK LTD. v. RATHINDRA NATH' 54 CW N 975, and this judgment is in consonance to the judgment delivered in that case. 20. I think therefore that the order by the learned Subordinate Judge was rightly made and cannot be assailed. The application is dismissed with costs. Arthur Trevor Harries, C.J. 21. I agree. Gopendra Nath Das, J. 22. I agree.
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1951 (7) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eemed always to have applied to such tenants. It did not apply in either of these two cases when the Small Cause Court decided in favour of the tenants. It may well be that having regard to the view that this Court took in the cases of 'NANDORANI DASSI v. SATYA NARAINM' ANU/WB/0242/1950 AIR1950Cal215 , and 'S. B. TRADING CO. LTD. v. SATYENDRA CHANDRA SEN' 54 CW N 756, the decisions of the Small Cause Court Judges were erroneous. Nevertheless, by reason of Section 5 of the Amending Act they must now be held to have been correct as the section as amended applies to pending cases and these two cases were clearly pending when the Amending Act came into force. 53. The orders of the Small Cause Court in each of these cases therefore cannot be challenged and the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. The hearing fee in each Rule is assessed at five gold mohurs. 54. The Rule in each case is discharged. Gopendra Nath Das, J. 55. I agree. Banerjee, J. 56. I agree.
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1951 (7) TMI 25 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... ed or if the discretion is arbitrarily exercised it can always be set right by the Court for as I have pointed out repeatedly an arbitrary exercise of discretion is no exercise at all. 14. So far as the merits are concerned the true facts appear to be that after the prosecution of the petitioner for contraventions of the Rice Mills Control Order ended in his conviction on 28-12-1950 the petitioner did no approach the Authorities any more for issue of a license to him as he perhaps despaired of getting any license after his conviction. It is denied in the counter-affidavit that there was any demand or refusal before this application for mandamus was made. The petition only sets out vaguely that the renewal of license was refused (Para 8). The petition does not set out clearly that any demand for performance preceded this application for prerogative writ. 15. In my view this petition must fail. The Rule is discharged with costs. The hearing fee is assessed at three gold mohurs.
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1951 (7) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ere, although no actual execution case was pending on 1-1-1939, but an execution case could be filed after that date, and was in fact filed on that date it was "a suit to which this Act applies." I think, therefore, that we may safely in the present case interpret the word "pending" in Section 5 of Act LXII 62 of 1950 to include a case such as the present. 10. The result is, as I have said, that the appeal was to be disposed of on the basis that the law in force at the time when the decree was passed on 31-8-1950 was the law as it stood amended by Act LXII 62 of 1950, and in that view of the matter the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge is entirely correct. 11. I would also add that it would appear that the present view might also be supported on the basis of the amendment of the definition of "tenant" in Act XVII 17 of 1950 which was made by the amending Act LXII 62 of 1950. 12. The result is that this appeal must be dismissed with costs.
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1951 (7) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y the Court in the absence of irregularity or fraud and if the Court were to interfere with such bids, simply because there was a higher bid before the Court at the time of the confirmation. We realise that this may be the result if the Court were to refuse the highest bid, say, of ₹ 10,000 merely because a party at the time of confirmation offers ₹ 10,000. But in our opinion, a sale conducted by an officer of Court would equally become a farce if the Court is obliged to accept the highest bid at such a sale, though the court is convinced that the bid does not represent adequately the real price of the property. In these matters it is not safe to lay down any rule of thumb. The facts of each particular case would ultimately mould the exercise of discretion by the Court. We are convinced in this case that the discretion was very properly exercised and we see no reason to interfere with the order of the learned Judge. 5. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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