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Case Laws
Showing 221 to 240 of 313 Records
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1953 (3) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s they stand is in any way in violation of any of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Learned counsel wanted to rely upon decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the due process clause of the Fourteenth. Amendment of the Constitution and (2) the system of assessment and procedure relating to it followed in England and in the United States. We refused to hear him on these points because we consider that these have no bearing on the question to be decided in this case. 6. As already mentioned, the appellants in this case are content with urging these general grounds attacking the validity of the provisions of, the Income-tax Act and the procedure prescribed by them and have nothing whatever to say about the orders actually passed against them. Indeed, these orders are the subject-matter of appeals before the tribunal under the Act. 7. We find no substance in any of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants, and the appeals are therefore dismissed.
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1953 (3) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was not very happy. It has certainly led three judges to think that the intention of the legislature was not brought out by the language. People who are not lawyers may well be misled into thinking that the notification issued under the ordinance has terminated with its repeal and not having been re-issued under the Act, the provisions of which again in clear language provide that it only extends to areas specified in the schedule and which gives power to extend it, that those areas are excluded from the scope of the Act. It would have been much simpler if the legislature made its intention clear by use of simple and unambiguous language. 12. Because of the undertaking given by the learned Attorney-General not to proceed any further in this matter, it is not necessary to set aside the acquittal order of the respondents, which will remain as it stands. 13. Appeal allowed. Acquittal not set aside. Agent for the appellant G. H. Rajadhyaksha. Agent for the respondents Ganpat Rai.
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1953 (3) TMI 51 - HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI
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... ... ..... hat land would be an adequate basis for finding that land requisitioned by the order of the S. D. O. in October 1952, was requisitioned mala fide. 60. We do not think that in the circumstances of this case, the charge of mala fides can be regarded as substantiated. No actual bias or prejudice has been attributed to the requisitioning authorities. The requisition is for a public purpose. The property was requisitioned under a valid enactment. If on facts, it can be shown that the requisitioning authorities exceeded their jurisdiction to any extent, the redress must be obtained by a regular suit. 61. In the result, this petition must be dismissed, and we order accordingly. We make no order as to costs. The Rule is discharged. 62. The case involves substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is, therefore, allowed to the petitioner under Article 132, Clause (1) of the Constitution, Haliram Deka, J. 63. I agree.
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1953 (3) TMI 50 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... capital under Rule 2 of Schedule II. In view of these considerations I think that the credit balance of ₹ 1,02,161 in the present case cannot be held to be 'reserve' within the meaning of Schedule II, Rule 2 of the Act. Mr. Jain placed much reliance upon the decision of Chagla C. J. in --'Commissioner of Income Tax v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd.'AIR 1951 Bom 420 (B). I need hardly say that I have the greatest respect for the opinion of Chagla C. J. but for the reasons I have stated I have reached a different conclusion on the point. 6. In the result I hold that the credit balance of ₹ 1,02,161 in the profit and loss account on 1-1-1947 should not be included in determining the capital of the company under Rule 2, Schedule II of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947. 7. I would accordingly answer the question in favour of the department. The assessee must pay the cost of the reference hearing fee ₹ 250/-. Jamuar, J. 8. I agree.
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1953 (3) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to prove in the trial Court and which was accepted by it. These defects would undoubtedly warrant a reconsideration of the evidence by the lower appellate Court. It is no doubt true that the learned Judge recorded an alternative Ending even on the assumption that the evidence of D. Ws. 4, 8 and 9 was admissible. But it is rather difficult to separate how much of his finding was coloured by the fact that his evidence was inadmissible and that the pleading was inadequate or insufficient. However it is unnecessary to adopt that course, as in my opinion the finding on the first point is sufficient to dispose of this second appeal. 10. It follows from the foregoing that the decision of the learned District Judge must be set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge restored with costs here and in the Court below. The appellant will pay the court-fee payable to the Government which will of course be included in the costs recoverable from the respondent. (Leave to appeal is refused).
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1953 (3) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ch is provided by way of penalty or punishment for the commission of a crime or offence. In spite of his labors Shri N. C. Taluqdar has not been able to point out to us any provision of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, which constitutes what is contemplated under section 431(2), a penalty or punishment for the commission of a crime or offence. The offence that the respondent could be charged with is defined in section 421 of the Act and the punishment for that offence provided in section 500 is fine and not forfeiture. 10. We are therefore of the opinion that the order of the District Magistrate, Bankura, under sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, dated 14th August, 1951, was not an order of forfeiture of property within the meaning of the proviso to rule 9, Chapter II, Part I, of the Rules of the High Court, and Chunder J. had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the reference. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. 11. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (3) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Tribunal to refer such a question to the High Court. Mr. Kolah says that inasmuch as we have already directed the Tribunal to refer this question of law and to draw up a statement of the case with regard to it, our order has become final and we must proceed to express our opinion on the second question as well. Now, if this Court has no jurisdiction to require the Tribunal to state a case in matters where no application was made by the assessee under Section 66(1), we cannot confer jurisdiction upon ourselves by requiring the Tribunal to state the case. There is no question of our order becoming final. The question is with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court and if the jurisdiction is absent, no order passed by the Court can confer jurisdiction upon it. Therefore, in our opinion, it is not open to us to answer the second question which has been raised by the Tribunal at our instance. The result therefore is that we must answer the first question in the affirmative.
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1953 (3) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... see if we could distinguish the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, but we find it difficult to do so, and if the Calcutta High Court has laid down the law, then on the principle that this Court has always accepted in interpreting an All-India statute we must accept the law as laid down by a sister High Court. We must confess that it is with some reluctance that we have come to the conclusion that we have because, as we have already point out, there is considerable force in the contention of Sir Nusserwanji. But that is more a matter for the Legislature than for us. As far as we are concerned, we must accept the decision of the Calcutta High Court as correctly laying down the principle of law, and if we follow that principle of law, the only conclusion that we can come to is that the Tribunal was right in the view that it took. The result is that the two questions submitted to us will be answered as follows First question in the affirmative. Second question in the negative.
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1953 (3) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the railway administration to offer to the consignor that they will carry the entire risk if the consignor is willing to make payment of the percentage on value authorised under Section. 75 and if the consignor fails to do so the railway administration is entitled by virtue of the approval of the form under these circumstances by the Central Government to obtain a risk note in form 'X'. In the present case, therefore, in my opinion, the railway administration was perfectly entitled to obtain a risk note in the form in which they did and the railway administration has fully protected itself by this note. 15. I agree with the order proposed by my Lord the Chief Justice and I also join in the recommendation that Government will consider the case of the appellant from the point of view indicated in the judgment of my Lord the Chief Justice. 16. PER CURIAM. Liberty to the appellant to withdraw the sum of ₹ 500 deposited for security of costs. 17. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (3) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... f which all necessary facts are set out in the statement of the case. The question raised will be - "Whether the order of the Commissioner acting under Section 33B (1) setting aside the order of the Incom3-tax Officer while an appeal from that order was pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was valid?" and we answer that, question in the negative. Question No. 2 It is unnecessary to answer this question. Question No, 3 "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the orders passed by the Income-tax Officer, dated 21st June, 1952, are bad in law, as fresh notices as required by Sections 22 and 23 of the Income-tax Act were not given by the Income-tax Officer to the assessee ?" In our opinion it is unnecessary to decide this question because all proceedings taken by the Income-tax Officer pursuant to the orders passed by the Commissioner under Section 33B must be bad inasmuch as we have held that the orders of the Commissioner are bad.
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1953 (3) TMI 43 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 36 4 I.T.R. 108. On the particular facts presented in this case, we are of opinion that there was no material before the Income-tax authorities to justify the assessment on ₹ 11,000 which represented the value of high denomination notes encashed in the name of the assessee's wife, Hemprabha Ganguli. In the result, we hold that there was no material before the Income-tax authorities to justify the assessment on ₹ 11,000 representing the value of the high denomination notes encashed in the name of the assessee's wife, Hemprabha Ganguli. We also hold that there was material before the Income-tax authorities to justify the assessment on ₹ 4,000 representing the value of the high denomination notes encashed in the name of the assessee, Rai Bahadur S.N. Ganguli. We, accordingly, answer the question formulated by the Tribunal in the manner indicated above. There will not be any order as to costs of hearing of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (3) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hallenge the assessment made by the Income-tax Officer, and if anything, Sections 30 and 31 should be liberally construed in favour of the assessee rather than against him so far as to deprive him of the right to appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, we are rather inclined in favour of the more liberal interpretation put by the Allahabad High Court than the construction put by the East Punjab High Court on these two sections. The question submitted to us does not really bring out the controversy between the department and the assessee. We would, therefore, re-frame the question and the re-framed question will be "Whether the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner dated the 20th of September, 1950, is an order under Section 31 and appealable?" and we answer that question in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. No order on the notice of motion except that the Commissioner should pay the costs of the motion. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (3) TMI 41 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to bring it in the category of agricultural income it may be necessary for the assessee to establish that such use was being made of the land and human skill, labour and money were being spent on it so that the income may be deemed to be agricultural income, when normally it would not be so. In the case before us, the pasturage or land used for grazing of cattle normally used for agricultural purposes, is an agricultural activity and it is not necessary to spend money, human skill and labour to make it agricultural. We may point out that we do not propose to express any opinion on the question whether income from every kind of trees not of spontaneous growth but on the growth of which labour and money have been spent is "agricultural income", as the point does not arise in this case. The result, therefore, is that our answer to the question is in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at ₹ 400. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (3) TMI 40 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s entirely independent of the business of the assessee as a casual and non-recurring receipt. The Tribunal has framed a question with regard to the casual and non-recurring nature of the receipt as the main question and in the alternative it has framed the question with regard to the receipt being a capital receipt. In our opinion the main question is whether the receipt is a capital receipt or a revenue receipt and the argument at the Bar has proceeded on that basis. Therefore we will treat question No. 2 as question No. 1 and answer it in the affirmative and we will also hold, if necessary, that the receipt is of a casual and non-recurring nature. We will frame question No. 2 as follows - "Whether in any event the receipt of ₹ 57,435 is of a casual and non-recurring nature and therefore exempt from taxation under Section 4(3)(vii) of the Income-tax Act?" and the answer is in the affirmative. The Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (3) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o we feel a nominal fine would have met the ends of justice even on the view the learned Judges took of the law. The charge on the second count relating to the 6 bales is a similar one and the facts follow the same pattern. They have been detailed in the High Court's judgment, so it is not necessary to do more than outline them here. The quota-holder here is Beharilal Bairathi. In this case also, Dharsi Moolji paid Dwarkadas Khetan for the goods and the Mills sent the bales to Dharsi Moolji for- delivery in the same truck as the 13 bales. Dharsi Moolji refused to accept these bales also, so they were deposited in the Dady Seth godown along with the other thirteen. Dwarkadas Khetan & Company has been entered as the person to whom delivery was made. For the reasons given above, we hold that this was a true and accurate return. The appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence in each of the four cases is set aside. The fines, if paid, will be refunded. Appeal allowed.
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1953 (3) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... remand committing the accused to further custody till the 11th March. It has been held by this Court that in habeas corpus proceedings, the Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the institution of the proceedings. The material date on the facts of this case is the 10th March, when the affidavit on behalf of the Government was filed justifying the detention as a lawful one. But the position, as we have stated, is that on that date there was no order remanding the four persons to custody. This Court has often reiterated before that those who feel called upon to deprive other persons of their personal liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be their duty, must strictly and -scrupulously observe the forms and rules of the law. That has not been done in this case. The petitioners now before us are therefore entitled to be released, and they are set at liberty forthwith. Petition allowed.
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1953 (3) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o future interest at the rate allowed for one year and six months period, beginning from 9th March, 1943, and ending with 12th September, 1944. The appeal is therefore allowed to the extent indicated above. The decree of the High Court will be modified and plaintiff will be entitled to damages in the sum of ₹ 93,000 on the 3,000 Indian Iron shares. The decree given to the plaintiff in respect of' ₹ 6,762-8-0 is set aside over and above the' decree for ₹ 9,100 in his favour set aside by the High Court. In the calculation of future interest the plaintiff will not be allowed interest from 9th March, 1943, to 12th September, 1944. In the result the decree given to the plaintiff in the sum of ₹ 61,787 is reduced to ₹ 42,175. He will get interest at six per cent. per annum from 5th April, 1937, until payment or realization except for a period of one year and six months. Plaintiff will get proportionate costs throughout. Appeal allowed in part.
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1953 (3) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ted between them " in the language of article 64 of the Limitation Act. The same happened in the present case. The acknowledgment which forms the basis of the suit was made in the ledger of the plaintiffs in which earlier mutual accounts had been entered and truly speaking, the suit was not based merely on this acknowledgment but was based on the mutual dealings and the accounts stated between them and was thus clearly maintainable. o p /o p Mr. Bindra drew our attention to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ghulam Murtuza v. Fasihunnissa((1935) I.L.R. 57 All- 434.) , wherein it was held that even if an acknowledgment implies a promise to pay it cannot be made the basis of suit and treated as giving rise to a fresh cause of action. We have examined the decision and we are satisfied that it does not lay down good law. o p /o p For the reasons stated above this appeal has no merits and we accordingly dismiss it with costs. o p /o p Appeal dismissed’. o p /o p
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1953 (3) TMI 35 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... we have not permitted Mr. Palkhivala to advance the argument that ₹ 19 lacs did not constitute the income of the assessee company but constituted the income of someone else and this income was gifted or transferred to the assessee company. We will reformulate the question to read as follows "Whether there were materials to justify the finding of the Tribunal that the transaction of purchase and sale of 13,74,000 shares was an adventure in the nature of trade?" and having reformulated the question we answer it in the affirmative. There is a notice of motion taken out by the assessee company asking us to raise further questions. In our opinion the questions either do not arise out of the findings of the Commission or they are already dealt with in the question which we have considered on this reference and answered. The result is that the assessee company must pay the costs of the reference and the costs of the notice of motion. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (3) TMI 34 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nterpretation is that the President or the third Member to whom the case is referred may only agree with the quantum of assessment taken by one or other of the two differing members and it is not open to him to take a third view as regards quantum of assessment. For these reasons we think that the opinion of the President in this case is not legally valid and that the assessment cannot be legally completed in accordance with the direction contained in the order of the President of the Appellate Tribunal. The two questions formulated in the statement of the case must be answered to the above effect. The result therefore is that the reference under Section 5A(7) to the President of the Tribunal is incompetent and the case must now go back to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for being dealt with and disposed of in accordance with law. In the special circumstances of this case we do not propose to make any order as to the costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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