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Case Laws
Showing 281 to 300 of 313 Records
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1953 (2) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was not possible to hold on those facts that any prejudice androse in the case by these two applications being sent by the appellants to the Sub- Divisional Magistrate or that any action was necessary for the protection of the tribunal which was engaged in hearing the case under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. As observed by Rankin C.J. in Anantalal Singha v. Alfred Henry Watson ((1) (1931) 58 Cal. 884 at 895), the jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a, substantial interference with the due course of justice and that the purpose of the court’s action is a practical purpose and it is reasonably clear on the authorities that the court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety. The result is that we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court against the two appellants and acquit them of the charge under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Appeal allowed.
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1953 (2) TMI 37 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lanation to para. 10, West Bengal Food-grains Control Order, which provides that any stock of rice or paddy in the possession or under the control of the members of a household shall be deemed to be in the possession or under the control of the head of the household. This only limits the liability in the case of the members of a household to the head of the household, and makes other members not liable. If it is established in the course of the trial that Anil Kumar Samanta and Sunil Kumar Samanta belong to the same household, then only the petitioner who is the head of the household will be liable in view of the explanation. But if they do not belong to the same household, then both would be jointly liable in view of the definition of "person" as contained in the General Clauses Act, 1897. That is a question that will have to be decided at the trial; but the contention raised by Mr. Mukherjee cannot be accepted in this Court. This Rule, is therefore, discharged. ;
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1953 (2) TMI 36 - TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tigation as well as in the course of it should be considered. These pro- ceedings, however, were not necessitated on account of any false return submitted by the assessees. After assessment, realising the inadequate and perhaps the un-supportability of the return made by them, the assessees conceded their liability to pay sales tax upon a much larger amount of turnover than was admitted by them in their return and took exception only to the levy of sales tax upon the exports outside India. He however sought in his application the cancellation of the entire proceedings relating to the sales tax. In view of these conflicting circumstances, I consider it proper not to disallow costs altogether to the petitioners but to make the burden of the respondents very light. Under the circumstances I allow the petition and quash the sales tax proceedings to the extent above indicated and give the prohibition asked for with costs and Advocate s fee which I fix at Rs. 25. Petition allowed.
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1953 (2) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
CHANGE OF LAW — RIGHT TO APPEAL ON PAYMENT OF TAX ADMITTED TO BE DUE - INITIATION OF ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE AMENDMENT BUT COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT AFTER AMENDMENT
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1953 (2) TMI 26 - IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Form of contracts ... ... ... ... ..... f of the company in writing signed by any person acting under its authority, express or implied. ) That section, as I read it, is merely dealing with the way in which a company makes contracts, and I do not find that this present contract was one made with Mr. Newborne as agent for the company. This was a contract which purported to be a contract with the company, and I find myself in full agreement with the way in which this matter was expressed by the trial judge when he said This company was not in existence and.............the signature on that document, and, indeed, the document itself.............is a complete nullity. I agree, therefore, that the appeal fails. Romer L.J. I agree with the judgment of Parker J., and also with my Lord s judgment, and there is nothing that I can usefully add. There was also an appeal by the defendants, but in view of the decision of the Court of Appeal this was not pursued. Solicitors Godfrey Davis and Foster Ashurst, Morris Crisp and Co.
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1953 (2) TMI 25 - HIGH COURT OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN
Winding up - Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... t an inadequate price. In seeking to control action of its officer there is no rule that the court can do it only on the complaint of an aggrieved or interested party. The decision in Hanseswar Ghosh v. Rakhal Das Ghosh was followed by the Lahore High Court in Data Ram v. Deoki Nandan and by the Madras High Court in the case referred to by the learned Judge, namely, Sayyed Kasim Sahib v. Official Receiver, Guntur. In the above view of the matter the question whether respondent No. 1 was a person aggrieved need not be decided. When the court s officer is reported to be guilty of fraudulent conduct in the discharge of his duties the court has not only jurisdiction but is also in duty bound to inquire into the officer s conduct before his action is ratified. It is on this basis that the learned Judge posted the first respondent s petition (CM.P. 4180) for evidence and we hold that the course adopted is thoroughly warranted by law. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.
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1953 (2) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Company – Membership of ... ... ... ... ..... espect of one share there cannot be more than one member. No authority whatever has been adduced by Mr. Desai for this proposition. It is difficult to understand on principle why, if in respect of one share more than one person is interested, they cannot all be registered as members if they have all applied to the company and the share has been allotted to all of them. In our opinion, therefore, the learned Judge below was right when he held that in respect of the debt of plaintiff No. 2 the company was entitled to claim a lien under its articles in respect of the shares which plaintiff No. 2 held jointly with plaintiff No. 1 and/or plaintiff No. 3 and/or Harkuverbai who is defendant No. 4 to the counterclaim. The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs in favour of respondent No. 1. Liberty to respondent No. 1 s attorneys to withdraw the sum of Rs. 500 deposited by the appellants and to apply the same in part satisfaction of the decree passed herein.
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1953 (2) TMI 18 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... in a case where an assessee wants in winding up proceedings to reopen an assessment which has been made by the Income-tax authorities. It is up to him to show that there is some reason which requires the assessment to be set aside. I, therefore, negative the contention of the Liquidator on this point. In making payment to any of the employees the liquidator would be entitled to set off any claim which the bank may have against the said employee. Mr. Das s client will be paid in accordance with the order of Bachawat, J. Rs. 716 be returned to the parties whose ornaments were pledged with the bank and sold by the bank. Mr. Das s client will pay his own costs Mr. Chowdhury s clients are entitled to costs settled at Rs. 250. Government will pay its own costs. The Liquidator will get his costs of this application as between attorney and client, certified for counsel. Liquidator will get his costs before the Referee assessed at Rs. 100. Let the application be taxed as of a motion.
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1953 (1) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... inst her, it would have been a different matter. But as her acquittal is so intimately related to the charge of the main offence, and as it took place only for the reason that she was held guilty of murder, there is no bar to the restoration of the conviction under section 201. 25. The result is that Ranjit Singh's Appeal No. 74 of 1952 is dismissed, but we substitute for the sentence of death the sentence of transportation for life, having regard to the time that has now elapsed since the occurrence and the probable motive of prevention of cruelty to a helpless woman. Kalawati's Appeal No. 73 of 1952 is allowed, and her conviction and sentence under section 302 discharged, but we convict her of an offence under section 201, Indian Penal Code, and sentence her to three year's rigorous imprisonment. 26. Appeal No. 73 allowed. Appeal No. 74 dismissed. Sentence reduced. Agent for the appellant in Appeal No. 73 B. R. Anand. Agent for the respondent G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
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1953 (1) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he reversed decree. The sale being inevitable under the amended decree the judgment-debtor was clearly not entitled to restitution. It was held in Gansu Ram v. Parvati Kuer A.I.R. 1941 Pat. 130, that where a judgment-debtor could not have paid even the reduced decretal amount and the sum realized at the sale was less than the decretal amount the situation could not have been altered in any way had the decree been modified before, instead of after the sale, and the judgment-debtor could not invoke the provisions of section 144, except by showing that the sale was in substance and truth a consequence of the error in the original decree. The observations made in this case have apposite application to the facts and circumstances of this case. 15. For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that there is no merit in either of these appeals and we dismiss both of them with costs. 16. Appeals dismissed. Agent for the appellant C.P. Lal Agent for the respondent Rajinder Narain.
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1953 (1) TMI 29 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
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... ... ..... land in the possession of his mediate landlord, namely, the raiyat. Hence there is no discrimination between a raiyat and under-raiyat arising out of the extent of the land in their respective possession. The discrimination arises out of their respective status and rights as recognised in the Orissa Tenancy Act and the impugned Act has nothing to do with such discrimination. 28. I would therefore reject the petition with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at three gold mohurs. B. Jagannadhadas, C.J. 29. I agree with the judgment of my learned brother. I would, however, reserve my opinion as regards Section 17, Orissa Tenants Protection. Act, for fuller consideration when any question relating to the actual application of that section, on the facts of a case, arises. For the purposes of the pre sent case, it is enough to say that the validity or invalidity of Section 17 of the Act (which is a separate and severable provision) in no way affects the validity of the rest of the Act.
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1953 (1) TMI 28 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l against the order dealing with the quantum of the tax payable and it was, no doubt, entitled to "pass such orders thereon as it thought fit" (see Section 33 (4) of the Act). The words 'such orders thereon as it thought fit' are no doubt, very wide but they must relate to the matters that arise in the appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The appeal in this case, as we have already said, related to the quantum of the tax payable and in that appeal, the question whether there was sufficient cause for not complying with the previous notice did not arise, no appeal having been filed against the order under Section 27 though an appeal was provided for by the Income-tax Act. 9. In the circumstances of this case, the view taken by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal appears to us to be correct and the answer to the question referred to us is, therefore, in the negative. 10. The assessee must pay the costs to the Department which we assess at ₹ 300.
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1953 (1) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for agricultural purposes in the accounting year. The purpose for which the lease was originally given or the purpose for which the land was being used at the inception of the tenancy before the year of assessment is immaterial. In the present case, as this point was not discussed at an earlier stage of this case the relevant enquiry was not made but it seems to me that there is much force in the contention that the land from which income was derived in the present case was not used for agricultural purposes and condition No. 3 was not fulfilled. In the result the assessee is not liable to be assessed to agricultural income-tax for the sum of ₹ 7,994 which was sought to be assessed in regard to the selami received by the assessee in the present case. As the assessee has succeeded the Board must pay the costs of this hearing as also of the hearing before the Federal Court. Certified for two Counsel as of a defended suit. SEN, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (1) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... estment in Government Promissory Notes of money lying idle in the Bank can be deemed to be one of the declared objects of the Bank. The petitioner having failed to show that the investment was made for carrying out some purpose for which the Bank has been founded, the only ground, as it seems to me, on which the interest from the investment might be held to be profits from the business disappears. Bardswell, J.-I agree that the interest derived by a Co-operative Bank from its investments in Government securities is not to be regarded as part of the profits of its business qua such Bank. I would take it that the exemption is meant as an encouragement to the employing of as much capital as possible for the financing of co-operative societies and so extending the scope of co-operation. The investing of money in Government securities does not further the cause of co-operation but is only a means of keeping from lying idle funds that cannot immediately be used for such a purpose.
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1953 (1) TMI 25 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... the provisions of Section 16(3)(a)( ii) of the Indian Income-tax Act. Learned counsel has urged that Srimati Chanda Devi's case (supra) was wrongly decided because an examination of the whole section indicates that the individual contemplated in that sub-section is one who is capable of having a wife and as a woman cannot have a wife, the sub-section cannot apply to her. This argument was considered in our previous decision and there is, therefore, no reason to say anything more. We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative.
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1953 (1) TMI 24 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hether or not there is any evidence to support the Commissioners' finding, it is not for the court to consider how the court itself would have viewed the matter had it been res integra. If left free I might well have come to a different conclusion from that to which the Commissioners have come; but unless I can be satisfied that there was no evidence to support their finding, then I am bound to give effect to it." It cannot be said that in the case with which we are here concerned there was no material to support the finding of the Income-tax Tribunal. For the above reasons, I hold that the answer to the question submitted should be that the view taken by the Tribunal, that in the circumstances of the case the nature of the activities carried on by the assessee was not in the nature of business activities but in the nature of mere investments, is correct. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. RAMASWAMI, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (1) TMI 23 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt but the duty to pay interest is imposed by the statute. Apart from this I think (with great respect) that the Allahabad decision is of doubtful authority. The decision is not consistent with the principle laid down in Schulze v. Bensted 1915 7 Tax Cas. 30 and Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Barnato 1934-36 20 Tax Cas. 455. The Madras High Court expressly declined to follow the Allahabad case in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Narayanan Chettiar 1943 11 I.T.R. 470. For the reasons expressed I hold that in the circumstances of the case the amount of ₹ 10,497 which was realised by Gokulchand and the amount of ₹ 41,813-6-0 paid as interest under Section 18A have been rightly taxed as income in the hands of the Maharajah. The questions must accordingly be answered in favour of the Income-tax Department. The assessee must pay the costs of the reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. SARJOO PRASAD, J.―I agree and have nothing to add. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (1) TMI 22 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mittee that the plaintiff's suit was barred and the reason given is that "the respondent Velu could only be entitled as heir to his father Nataraja, and from him and through him, and consequently his suit was barred by article 114," This portion of the judgment, it seems, was overlooked by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court and also by the Madras High Court in the case referred to above. The fact that under the ordinary law of inheritance the plaintiffs would come as the heirs of the husband of Rajlakshmi is immaterial. That would not be deriving their right to sue through and from the widow, and in this view of the case the plaintiffs' suit cannot be held to be barred. The result, therefore, is that we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore those of the trial judge with costs to the appellants in all courts. Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellants Sukumar Ghose. Agent for respondent No. 1 R. R. Biswas.
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1953 (1) TMI 21 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r profound respect for the opinions of the learned Judges who decided them, that the several cases relied on by the respondent were not correctly decided. Reference was made, in, course of argument, to section 6 of the West Bengal Act LXII of 1950. That section refers to orders or decrees made between the commencement of Act XVII of 1950 and Act LXII of 1950, i.e., between the 30th March, 1950, and the 30th November, 1950, and cannot have any application to the order for possession made in this case on the 27th February, 1950. For reasons stated above this appeal must be allowed and the order made by the High Court should be set aside and the respondents' application under section 18 (1) of Act XVII of 1950 should be dismissed and we order accordingly. In the circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs except that the parties should bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellant S. C. Bannerji. Agent for the respondent Sukumar Ghose.
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1953 (1) TMI 20 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... his individual capacity and the proceedings against him were hence without jurisdiction. The argument was rejected by Patanjali Sastri J. who said that even assuming that the notice did not; give the correct particulars as to the person or income which the authorities sought to assess the irregularity must, in the circumstances of the case, be deemed to have been waived by the assessee. 6. In our opinion the present case falls within the ambit of the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in -- AIR 1953 SC 429 (A)' and it must be held that the proceedings before the taxing authorities purporting to tax the Hindu undivided family of Gulabrai Manoharlal and demanding the tax assessed from the six divided constituent members under Section 29, Income-tax Act are legally valid and that the question framed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal must be answered in favour of the Income-tax Department. The assessee must pay the cost of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250/-
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