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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 313 Records
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1953 (11) TMI 19 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pable of being enforced by a criminal sanction made any difference in this respect. In any view this question was not raised in any of the courts below and has not been indicated even in the respondent's statement of the case. We do not think that it would be proper to allow this question to be raised for the first time before us, as it requires consideration of the different provisions of the Defence of India Act and also of the implication of illustration (d) appended to section 56 of the Contract Act. In our opinion, the events which have happened here cannot be said to have made the performance of the contract impossible and the contract has not been frustrated at all. The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court of Calcutta are set aside and those of the courts below restored. The plaintiff will have his costs in all the courts. Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellant S. C. Banerjee. Agent for the respondent No. I R. R. Biswas.
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1953 (11) TMI 18 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... deliver on 5th January, 1953, was not a valid judgment because the other member of the Bench died before it could be delivered. The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court which purports to be its judgment is set aside. As it is no longer possible for the Bench which heard the appeal and the confirmation proceedings to deliver a valid judgment we send the case back to the High Court for re-hearing and delivery of a proper judgment. 1953. November 23. BOSE J. The order for stay dated the 25th May, 1953, has now expended itself. The death sentence cannot be carried out as there is no valid decision of the appeal and no valid confirmation. The position regarding that is as it was when the appeal was, made to the High Court. The second and the third appellants will surrender to their bail as they are now relegated to the position which they occupied when the appeal was filed in the High Court. Appeal allowed. For the appellant Naunit Lal. For the respondent C. P. Lal.
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1953 (11) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ech and expression is not denied to the appellants, nor are they prohibited from forming associations or unions. The Act makes no discrimination between textile workers as a class but lays down a reasonable’ classification to the effect that a certain percentage of membership possessed by a union will be allowed to represent the workers as a class to the exclusion of others, but there is nothing to prevent the other unions or other workers from forming a fresh union and enrolling a higher percent-age so as to acquire the sole right of representation. The appellants challenge the validity of the Act as infringing their fundamental rights and yet they base their case of discrimination on the provisions of the same Act. This position is not in accord with reason ,or principle. We hold, therefore, that the appellants have made ,out no case for interference with the orders of the courts below. We uphold the convictions and sentences and dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (11) TMI 16 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... deprived of the benefit of exemption from taxation twice over, (1) 1902 1 K.B. 388 at 396. (2) (1913) L.J.P.C. 139. for the simple reason that he did not comply with the directory provi- sions contained in rule 18. Mr. Veeraswami on behalf of the Govern- ment submitted that some value should be attached to the words subject to the conditions appearing in rule 5(1)(k). But, as already observed, the effect of these words subject to the conditions depends upon what is intended to be achieved by the rules and what exactly is the scope and purpose of the rules framed. In my view, the conditions that have to be satisfied under rule 18 are not absolute and it is sufficient if they are substantially complied with, which has been the case in this appeal. I am therefore of the view that the decision arrived at by the learned Second Additional City Civil Judge is correct and the decree of the lower Court has to be upheld. This appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (11) TMI 15 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of this observation, it is clear that the learned Judge applied the principle of autre fois acquit in Ramautar Lal s case(2), only because he came to the conclusion for reasons, which need not be considered at present, that the Court which held the first trial was not incompetent to try the accused for the offence with which he was being charged at the second trial. It seems to be manifest that the present case comes within the four corners of sub-section (4) of Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Proce- dure and the trial which is pending before Mr. D. Prasad cannot be held to be barred under the provisions of that section. The result is that I hold that the trial pending against the petitioners is neither illegal nor barred under any provision of law. No other point has been raised on behalf of the petitioners. I would, therefore, dismiss their application and discharge the rule. JAMUAR, J.-I agree. Application dismissed. (1) A.I.R. 1947 Pat. 290. (2) A.I.R. 1948 Pat. 32.
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1953 (11) TMI 14 - HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
Transfer of Shares – Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal and Powers of Court to rectify register of members
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1953 (11) TMI 13 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... order. If they were prior to the winding up order and within the period mentioned in section 230(1)(a), the decision is obviously right. But if they were subsequent to the winding up order, then with great respect to the learned Judge, we must dissent from him. Under section 230, the material date is the date of the winding up order and not any subsequent date. If on the date of the winding up order there was a notice of demand of payment of the tax under section 18A, any subsequent assessment after the winding up would not destroy the preferential right of the State under section 230(1)(a) of the Indian Companies Act. It may be that if the final assessment is less than the amount collected under section 18A, the company may be entitled to a refund of the excess. But that does not have a bearing on the preferential right under section 230(1)(a) of the Indian Companies Act. The appeal is dismissed with costs. The liquidators can have their costs from the assets of the company.
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1953 (11) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Confiscation ... ... ... ... ..... r to fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000 or both and may confiscate the goods in respect of which the offence has been committed. 5.It is clear from a perusal of this section that the only jurisdiction and power which the Court has got under this section is to confiscate the goods in respect of which the offence has been committed upon conviction and not otherwise. If once the High Court set aside the conviction and sentence passed upon the appellant the High Court has neither the jurisdiction nor the power to confirm the order of confiscation of the two blocks of gold which has been passed by the learned Magistrate. 6.We are of the opinion that the order made by the High Court in regard to the confiscation of the two blocks of gold was manifestly illegal and without jurisdiction. The learned Counsel for the State was unable to support the decision of the High Court on this point. The appeal will therefore be allowed and the order of confiscation of the two blocks of gold set aside.
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1953 (10) TMI 48 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rned Official Liquidator that in this case, there with a change in the constitution of the Managing Agents and inasmuch as the change had not been recognised under. Section 87-BB, the Managing Agents ceased to function, and that therefore they became wholly incompetent to borrow any loan on behalf of the company. There is no evidence now placed before me as to the time or nature of the change in the constitution of the managing agency; and even otherwise, that may not make much difference, because the same result should flow, from the fact that prior to the present loans, a provisional liquidator was appointed. However, it is unnecessary to consider this question further; and it will be left open to the Official Liquidator to examine it in case the Andhra Bank chooses to prefer a claim as an ordinary creditor. 5. The application falls and is dismissed with costs of Official Liquidator and the contesting creditor, Messrs. Soundararajan & Co. Counsel's fee, ₹ 250.
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1953 (10) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... which the parties belong there was any such well-recognised practice or belief. The defendants in the written statement make no assertion about it. But on the other hand, the plaintiff in paragraph 12 of his plaint asserts that the - "Institution of samadhi and ceremonies connected with it are not usual in the community to which the parties belong". 14. Indeed it may be assumed that such a practice is not likely to grow up amongst Hindus where cremation and not burial of the dead is the normal practice, except probably as regards sannyasis and in certain dissident communities. We see no reason to think that the Madras decisions are erroneous in holding that perpetual dedication of property for worship at a tomb is not valid amongst Hindus. 15. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the appeal but in the circumstances without costs. 16. Appeal dismissed 17. Agent for the appellant S. Subramanian 18. Agent for the respondent M. S. K. Aiyangar
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1953 (10) TMI 46 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... -4-1952 is admitted to be a mistake. The reference must accordingly be quashed as regards bonus for 1949-50. 18. The last point urged is that the Government had no Jurisdiction under Act 14 of 1947 to amend a reference made under Section 10, of the Act and that' accordingly the Memorandum No. 59079 dated 25-6-1952 amending the reference made on 24-3-1952 is without Jurisdiction. The objection is one of form and is without substance. It would have been open to the Government to make under Section 10 an Independent reference concerning any matter not covered by the previous reference. That it took the form of an amendment to the existing references & not an additional reference is a mere technicality which does not merit any interference in these proceedings. 19. In the result, there will be an order quashing the reference so far as bonus for 1949-50 is concerned. Save as aforesaid, the petition will be dismissed with costs, of the workers' advocate fee ₹ 250.
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1953 (10) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mselves and refused to give the plaintiff his legitimate share. The High Court has held that this claim of the plaintiff must fail. All that he purchased at the execution sale was the undivided interest of the coparceners in the joint property. He did not acquire titled to any defined share in the property and was not entitled to joint possession from the date of his purchase. He could work out his rights only by a suit for partition and his right to possession would date from the period when a specific allotment was made in his favour. In our opinion, this is the right view to take and Mr. Daphtary, who appeared in support of the appeals, could not satisfy us that in law his client was entitled to joint possession on and from the date of his purchase. The result is that these appeals are dismissed with costs. 13. Appeal No. 53 allowed. 14. Appeal Nos. 54 and 55 dismissed. 15. Agent for the appellant Rajinder Narain. 16. Agent for the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 P. G. Aggarwal.
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1953 (10) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... assets of the partnership of the amounts found due and payable to them. In this view it is not necessary to record any finding on issue 3 because if the defendants get all the amounts invested by them in full there can be no further claim as co-owner over the properties purchased with these amounts. Such a claim is also not properly within the scope of the present suit. 15. In the result the decree of the lower court dismissing the suit is set aside and a preliminary decree is passed referring the matter to the Official Referee for ascertaining the amounts due and pay able to the defendants on account of the amounts advanced by them under Exs. P. 1 and D. 7. Oh payment of the amount, so found due the plaintiff will be granted a declaration that the partnership under Ex. P. 2 is void. The defendants will have a charge on the partnership assets for the amounts found payable to them. The costs of both parties here and in the court below will be provided for in the final decree.
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1953 (10) TMI 43 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is intended to modify rights in estates; the Act is not against the provisions of Article 19(f) because it imposes nothing more than reasonable restrictions upon the rights of individuals and these restrictions are in the interests of general public; the classification between displaced and non-displaced persons is also a reasonable classification; and none of the provisions of the Act are against the letter or spirit of the Constitution. I would therefore hold that the Act is 'intra vires' the Constitution and the petitions of the landlords are liable to be dismissed. I would accordingly dismiss them but in the circumstances of the case make no orders as to costs. Falshaw, J. 16. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment of my learned brother Khosla J. and I agree with his views and cannot usefully add anything thereto. I accordingly agree that the petitions should be dismissed. Soni, J. 17. I agree with my learned brother Khosla J. and have nothing to add.
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1953 (10) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... have excluded all time taken up in good faith before an arbitrator just as the time taken up in prosecuting a suit or an appeal in good faith is excluded. But obviously the Legislature did not intend that parties should waste time in infructuous proceedings before arbitrators. The Legislature has clearly indicated that limitation having once begun to run, no time could be excluded merely because parties chose to go before an arbitrator without getting an award or without coming to Court to get the necessary order indicated In Section 37(5). 8. In our opinion, therefore, In view of Section 37(5), Arbitration Act it is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to exclude any time taken up in arbitration proceeding's. The result, therefore, is that the suit is barred by limitation and the learned Judge was right in dismissing it. The rest of the judgment is not material to the report.) The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. 9. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (10) TMI 41 - COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Act, 1950, is also devoid of legal sanction behind it and accordingly it is also declared to be void. It follows therefore that the acts found to have been committed by the revision petitioner in contravention(sic) of Sections 7 and 17 of the Paddy (Acquisition and Movement) Control Order cannot amount to commission of offences under law for which he could be convicted and sentenced. 7. In the result we result both these revision petitions and hold that the conviction entered and the sentence passed against the petitioner-accused in C. C. No. 11/1950 and C. C. No. 12/1950 on the file of the Special First Class Magistrate's Court at Cranganore, are unsustainable in law. The conviction and sentences are quashed and the petitioner is acquitted of the offences charged against him in these two cases. The fine, if already realised from him in these cases, will be refunded to him. The value of the paddy recovered from him and forfeited to the State will also be refunded to him.
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1953 (10) TMI 40 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , but on the contrary renders the law itself uncertain by giving rise to two conflicting orders claiming apparently equal obedience from the Registrar. In such an event the Registrar who is empowered under Section 7 of the Act to cancel the certificate of recognition of a union would not know whether he should or should not make a further enquiry into the question of cancellation of the certificate granted to the petitioner. The Registrar cannot comply with either the order of this Court or that of the Appellate Tribunal without at the same time flouting the other. In view of Section 30(3) of the Act, if the submission of the petitioner be correct, the Registrar would be liable to be committed for contempt whether he disobeys one order or the other. It is not right for this Court to pass an order, which whether obeyed or flouted, places a public authority in inevitable jeopardy. The petition is dismissed with a certificate for appeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution.
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1953 (10) TMI 39 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s democratic right to individual freedom, Meaning thereby a claim to socially irresponsible control over a huge industrial concern and over the lives of tens of thousands of human beings whom it happens to employ, He is talking in a dying language" 10. The industrial tribunals under the industrial disputes act, 1947, Are charged with a difficult and delicate task and in the interests of industrial peace they should be allowed to discharge their duties without delay or interference. Any employer who feels the urge to move this court will do well to note that article 226 of the constitution is no charter for the preservation of antique concepts of contractual rights in the field of labour relations against the impact of awards which are liberal or legislation which is progressive. we allow the appeal with costs, Advocate's fee rs. 200/ -. The appellant will also have his costs in o. P. No. 15 of 1952 from the petitioner therein, Advocate's fee rs. 200/ -. allowed.
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1953 (10) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing a lump sum, undoubtedly that would, have been a capital expenditure; or even if instead of paying a lump sum it had paid the amount fixed for the goodwill by certain instalments, each instalment would have been in the nature of a capital expenditure. But in this case, as the partnership did not acquire anything in the nature of a permanent asset, the payment to Bai Tarabai is not a capital but a revenue expenditure." 3. In our opinion, the present case falls under the former category as the terms of the agreement embodied in the letter clearly establish that what was acquired by the assessee was not merely the user of the name but the goodwill itself in consideration of paying the amount in three instalments. The expenditure, therefore, has been rightly held to be capital expenditure and the question referred to us must therefore be answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. As the assessee has failed, he must pay the costs of the respondent, ₹ 250.
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1953 (10) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it is sufficient that those who took an active part in the proceedings under section II are impleaded. It is not necessary to implead each and every creditor who either did pot appear or put forward a written statement under section 10 or took no active part in the proceedings under section 11(2). In the view that we have taken it is not necessary to decide the question whether the High Court was right in not exercising its powers under Order XLI, rule 20, in impleading the creditors as respondents to the appeal. For the reasons given above we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and remand the case to that court for hearing the appeal in accordance with law on its merits. If the High Court thinks fit that the presence of any creditors would help the court in arriving at a true decision of the matter it in its discretion may give notice to the creditors of the date of hearing, We leave the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed.
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