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Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 374 Records
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1955 (8) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat the assessee was the owner of firm Harish Chandra Satish Chandra. The Bombay High Court, in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Gokaldas Hukumchand, 1943 11 I.T.R. 462 had occasion to deal with a case where very similar facts were found. In that case also, firms were inter-connected and the owner of one had financed the other. In fact, in that case, there were closer associations between the assessee and the partners of the firm, the profits of which were sought to be assessed as the profits of the assessee. It was held that the circumstances could merely give rise to a suspicion but could not justify holding that the assessee had a share in the other firm. The principle laid down in that case is applicable to the case before us. Consequently, our answer to the question referred to us by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is in the negative. The assessee will be entitled to its costs from the department which we assess at ₹ 250. Reference answered in the negative.
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1955 (8) TMI 39 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lf to the proper question at issue, and considered whether the sums in question could fairly be taken as part of the concealed profits of the business and having considered that matter, it decided against the assessee and held that the amount should be restored as concealed profits from undisclosed sources. The question which I have so long been discussing has been referred in the following terms - "Whether on the above facts and circumstances of this case, the addition of ₹ 23,563 as income from undisclosed sources is legally justified when an estimate of gross profit on the turnover was already made and the sum of ₹ 50,000 added as suppressed income of the assessee from business." The answer to the question must, in my opinion, be in the affirmative. As one of the two questions was of some difficulty, we direct that the Commissioner of Income-tax shall get half of his costs from the assessee. LAHIRI, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1955 (8) TMI 38 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al should have given a personal hearing to the applicant. It was urged that a bearing was given by the Minister concerned, but we feel that in the absence of a rule or law to that effect the hearing by the Minister is not the same thing as the hearing by a quasi -judicial tribunal like the Rajpramukh in the present case by virtue of S. 3 of the Ordinance. We are, therefore, of opinion that as the applicant was not given a hearing by the Rajpramukh before the order in dispute was passed, we should set aside that order and direct that the case of the applicant should now be heard in the manner provided by S. 4(d) of the Ordinance. 16. We , therefore, allow the application, and quashing the order of the Rajpramukh communicated to the applicant on 3 -4 -1954, order that the applicant should be heard in the manner provided by S. 4(d) of the Ordinance. Considering, however, the circumstances of the case, we are of opinion that parties should bear their own costs before this Court.
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1955 (8) TMI 37 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , this application succeeds in part only. The rule is therefore made absolute to this extent that a writ of mandamus is issued directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect to or take steps under the following notices (1) Notice dated 19-5-1955, issued by D. G. Banerjee to Sree S. N. Jajodia, partner of Messrs Calcutta Motor and Cycle Co., being Ex. A to the petition; (2) Notice dated 20-5-1955, issued by J. Smith to the partners of the petitioner firm, being Ex. B to the petition; and (3) Notice dated 23-5-1955, issued by D. G. Banerjee to the petitioner firm, being annexure 'A' to the affidavit of Mannalal Jajodia affirmed on 23-5-1955. A writ in the nature of Certiorari is also issued quashing the orders contained in the said notices. 31. The rest of the rule is discharged. All interim orders are vacated, except the interim orders in respect of the three notices abovementioned, which had merged in this final order. 32. There will be no order as to costs.
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1955 (8) TMI 36 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion was led and the accused were examined. As we hold that there has been proper committal of the accused in respect of the offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, we have the option of either to direct the learned Judge and jury to proceed with the trial in respect of the offence under section 420 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code or to quash the proceedings. As, however, evidence in respect of the charge under section 471 read with section 467 of the Indian Penal Code has already been led before the jury on a substantive charge we think it should be proper to exercise our powers under section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code and to direct that the proceedings from the stage of empanelling the jury before the Additional Sessions Judge, Bombay, should be quashed and that the Sessions Court should proceed to try the three accused before a fresh jury for the offence under section 420 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Ordered accordingly.
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1955 (8) TMI 35 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... first occasion. But, for one reason or other, they were not able to substantiate the facts by placing the necessary and relevant material before the Tribunal. Section 12-A(6)(a), in our view, is not intended to give two opportunities to every assessee to establish his case before a Tribunal. It is really conceived in the interests of the assessee, who was not able to place some facts before the Tribunal at the first instance which would have made a difference in its decision. In the instant case, the petitioners sought for review on the ground that they were not able, on the first occasion, to place their evidence before the Tribunal as the documents were in Gujarathi language. For the aforesaid reasons, we cannot say that the evidence to substantiate the plea of commission agency is a new fact within the meaning of section 12A(6) of the Act. The review petition was rightly dismissed. The revision fails and is dismissed with costs-Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1955 (8) TMI 34 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be substituted in place of the State of Bihar. This application for amendment has been made on the footing that the description of the petitioner in the substantive application is a mere misdescription. We cannot accept the view that the substantive application suffers from any misdescription, because the State of Bihar was entirely different from the Commissioner of Sales Tax and it cannot be said that the expression the State of Bihar was a misdescription of the authority known as the Commissioner under the Bihar Sales Tax Act. Secondly, we do not think that an amendment should be allowed in the circumstances of this case when more than forty-five days have already passed from the date of the refusal by the Board to refer any question of law to this Court. For the reasons given above, we hold that the application is not maintainable and must be dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs. KANHAIYA SINGH, J.-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1955 (8) TMI 33 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ies by Canadian manufacturers or producers within the meaning of the taxing statute, and that the payments made under them constituted the sale price of goods produced or manufactured in Canada. (1) 1928 A.C. 340. (2) 108 E.R. 461. We have cited this decision only to show that, in the case of a taxing statute, we should be guided by the general scope of the enact- ment and the express provisions of the statute and not by considerations that might weigh in a case arising under the Statute of Frauds or similar statutes. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the packing materials were goods and that there was a sale in regard to them within the meaning of the Act. If so, the turnover in respect of the transactions in ques- tion was certainly liable to sales tax. The Sales Tax Tribunal was, therefore, right in negativing the contention of the petitioners. The revision petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in all the revisions. Petitions dismissed.
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1955 (8) TMI 32 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lty of an act of discrimina- tion in exempting the other articles from sales tax but not sugar. It is said that there is general policy of encouraging cottage industry and it is said that the articles mentioned in paragraph 8 have been exempted in furtherance of this policy. It may be that there is a policy to encourage cottage industry. That does not mean that every cottage industry must necessarily be exempted from the payment of sales tax. The producers of sugar may be able to make higher profits and the Government thought that they should pay sales tax of 6 pies per rupee. The fact that there has been an improper discrimination has been denied in the counter-affidavit and, on the facts and circumstances proved in the case, I am unable to hold that the petitioners have succeeded in proving that the State Government has committed any act of improper discrimination in imposing sales tax on khandsari sugar. This petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1955 (8) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the cases against him alone were separated in the course of the trial, and the cases against him having been split up, the cases against the petitioner alone cease to be against the firm as such, and if the firm is not prosecuted, it has been held that the conviction cannot stand against the individual partner alone. It is true that the petitioner has admitted in his statement that he and Subramania Mudaliar were partners of the firm and that he failed to pay the balance. But his admission has no legal force inasmuch as the prosecution cannot be laid against him alone and the trial cannot be proceeded against the petitioner alone individually. I am, therefore, reluctantly compelled to set aside the convictions and sentences on the ground that the prosecutions have not been against the firm as such and that, therefore, they must fail. In the end, the convictions and sentences are set aside and the accused acquitted. The fines, if paid, will be refunded. Convictions set aside.
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1955 (8) TMI 30 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s decision has been followed by this Court in all subsequent cases. The view of the Calcutta High Court is also the same but for a different reason, for a Division Bench of that Court held in Ram Krishna Biswas v. Mohendra Nath Mazumdar(2), decided in 1900 that an order for payment of a daily fine is illegal inasmuch as it is an adjudication in respect of an offence which has not been committed when such order is passed. The recurring fine imposed on the present applicant is therefore illegal and must be set aside. In the result his conviction under section 14 (b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and the fine of Rs. 500 thereunder is upheld. But the order imposing a fine of Rs. 10 per day on him so long as the breach continues is set aside. With this modification this revision is dismissed. The applicant should pay up his fine of Rs. 500 without delay. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is refused. Petition dismissed. (1) (1918) I.L.R. 40 All. 569. (2) (1900) I.L.R. 27 Cal. 565.
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1955 (8) TMI 29 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Requirements with respect to memorandum ... ... ... ... ..... ecided in favour of defendant No. 1 bank, but defendant No. 1 bank should pay the plaintiffs the costs of the issues decided against defendant No 1 bank. Mr. Buch, learned counsel for the official liquidator of the mills company, has argued that the plaintiffs should be ordered to pay the costs of the mills company which is represented by the liquidator. It is stated that the liquidator has not incurred any costs by filing the written statement and the attitude taken up by the liquidator is not contentious and he has submitted to the orders of the court. In my opinion the plaintiffs must also pay the costs of defendant No. 2 company. As regards defendants Nos. 11 to 20, who are the shareholders of the company supporting the plaintiffs, Mr. Nariman, their learned counsel, has rightly stated that the proper order for costs, so far as they are concerned should be that they should bear their own costs. Therefore, there will be no order as to the costs of defendants Nos. 11 to 20.
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1955 (8) TMI 22 - HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
Winding up - Liability as contributories of present and post members, Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... the purpose of the present revision, no question is raised as to whether the meeting at Nagpur to wind up the company was in order and whether the list of contributories was properly made. Nor is the court concerned at this stage with the question whether the restrictions on commencement of business in section 103 were complied with or not and the consequence of non-compliance with that provision. So I must proceed on/the basis that the winding up of the company and the appointment of the liquidator were decided upon at Nagpur. On the authorities the suit is one for enforcing a new liability which springs into existence, in the event of the company being wound up. So it is necessary for the plaintiff to set forth as part of his cause of action that the event has occurred. As that has occurred at Nagpur, it must be held that a part of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the trial court. The revision applications accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs.
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1955 (8) TMI 21 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Court – Jurisdiction of and Winding up - Power of High Court to retain winding up proceedings in district Court
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1955 (8) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Directors - Power of and Winding up – Application for ... ... ... ... ..... the fact that the majority of the shareholders are opposed to the petition, It will be then open to the court before passing final orders to have a meeting of the shareholders convened to ascertain the wish of the majority. Article 99 of the Articles of Association of the petitioner company provides inter alia that the directors may exercise all such powers and do all such acts and things as may be exercised or done by the company, and are not hereby or by Statute expressly directed or required to be exercised or done by the company in or with the consent of a general meeting. It is not suggested that there is any statutory provision expressly requiring the consent of a general meeting for the presentation of a winding up petition. It follows therefore that the directors have the power to do what the company could have done, namely, to present the petition. I agree with Balakrishna Ayyar J. that the petition was validly presented. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1955 (8) TMI 18 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Powers and duties of auditor ... ... ... ... ..... e, not only to the shareholders who employed him, but to the cause of joint stock enterprise in the country in general. He does so, because by not bringing to the notice of the shareholders matters which it is material for them to know and leaving the directors free to deal with the funds and the business of the company as they choose, he makes it possible for them to bring the company to ruin and thereby he contributes to the destruction of public confidence in joint stock enterprise. It is, therefore, not possible to regard the lapse of the respondent too lightly. We have given this matter our careful consideration and we think that, in all the circumstances of the case, the ends, of justice will not be served, unless the penalty imposed be substantial. We direct that the respondent be suspended from the membership of the Institute of Chartered Accountants and from practice for two years from the date of this order. Each party to bear its own costs. Lahiri J. mdash I agree.
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1955 (8) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Writ Jurisdiction - Alternative remedy - Pen ... ... ... ... ..... n the first place, there is no suggestion anywhere in the record that the Customs Authorities requisitioned the assistance of section 21 in assessing these fountain pens to duty. The judgment of the Collector is clear and he holds that the articles in question are assessable under item 61(8). But even on merit it is difficult to understand how section 21 can possibly have application to this case. As the marginal note correctly points out, it deals with goods partially composed of dutiable articles. Nobody has ever suggested that a fountain pen is a composite article consisting of different articles, some of them dutiable and some of them not dutiable. A fountain pen is one article which can only fall either under item 45(3) or item 61(8). Section 21 applies to entirely different set of facts which are not present before us. 10.Therefore, in our opinion, the learned Judge was right in the view that he took. The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.
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1955 (7) TMI 36 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... ence to the grant to Kasim Ali Beg, (2) that the form of the transaction as a lease of land in which the operative words "were to demise, let and farm let" did not detract from the transactions being a grant and (3) that the subsequent conduct of the lessee and his tenants in invoking the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act on the footing that the village was an estate would throw light upon the nature of the tenure created by the lease. Our discussion of the case would show that the Tribunal committed a patent error in respect of all these three matters. If their conclusion had been reached on the basis of such erroneous premises which go to the root of the matter, we are clear that the case is one not merely of an erroneous decision but of error on the face of the record which would attract the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 27. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250.
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1955 (7) TMI 35 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stock of descent under this system who is past the child-bearing age which is fixed at 50 and a female who is capable of bringing into existence new members. 176. We do not see anything irrational either in fixing the critical age at 50, or in the provisions consequent upon the condition of such a female member. A similar attack is made on the distinction between the provisions in sub-s. (4) and that in sub-s. (5) and the devolution prescribed in the latter provision. But all these were part of the system which the enactment has merely adopted and rationalised. We do not see therefore any substance in this objection that S. 35 or S. 36 violates' Article 14 of the Constitution. In the result, we are clearly of the opinion that the impugned provisions of the Madras Aliyasathana Act are valid in their entirety. The records, will be transmitted to the Sub-ordinate Judge of South Kanara who will dispose of the suits in the light of our decision. V.S.B 177. Answer accordingly.
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1955 (7) TMI 34 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s a case of escapement of tax and proceeding under Section 26 of that Act. 8. In the present case, as I have pointed out, the assessment proceedings had not come to an end. The return was still pending. Whether it was pending before the territorial Income Tax Officer or the Income Tax Officer, Special Circle, is immaterial so far as the assessee is concerned. He had filed a return and an assessment could have been made by the department under Section 23 in pursuance of that return. Under those circumstances, it cannot be said that the income chargeable to Income Tax had escaped assessment, and therefore, the Income Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 34 of the Act. 9. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question in the negative and hold that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessment under Section 34 is not valid. The assessee is entitled to his costs. 10. Hearing fee one hundred rupees. S.P. Mohapatra, J. 11. I agree.
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