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Showing 41 to 60 of 454 Records
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1959 (12) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g materials as well. This was the principle that was laid down in Varasukhi and Co. v. Province of Madras 1951 2 S.T.C. 1., and in Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Co. Ltd. v. The State of Madras 1954 5 S.T.C. 354. It was next contended that there was no intention on the part of the assessee to charge for the packing materials, and that there being no consideration for the transfer of property in the packing materials, it should be held that there was no sale. The Appellate Tribunal has rejected the case of the assessee that he did not intend to charge for the packing materials. That finding of fact, which is supported by the evidence and circumstances of the case, is binding upon us. The conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal that the assessee would be liable to sales tax in respect of the turnover relating to the packing materials for cotton and yarn sold by them is correct. The revision cases fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee for Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (12) TMI 25 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Supreme Court, has a far wider connotation. Lure of gold or woman, if proved to be the cause of the order, will not only entail the cancellation of the order but also the dismissal of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer who passed it. 18.. In the view we have taken, namely, that section 12(2) confines the revising authority to the record, and that rule 14-A in so far as it permits a wider ambit is ultra vires of the provisions of section 12(2), these petitions have to be dismissed, and we decide accordingly. The respondents will have their costs from the petitioner. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each of the three cases. 19.. The validity of rule 14-A in respect of appeals under section 11 does not arise for consideration in this case, and no arguments were advanced on that matter. Nothing we have herein stated should be considered as an expression of opinion as to the validity of rule 14-A in respect of the appellate power conferred by section 11 of the Act. Petitions dismissed.
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1959 (12) TMI 24 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... given the benefit of doubt. We think the word first in the clause indicates which out of the several sales by several persons is liable for there may be several sales of the same goods by several persons and the word first clearly shows what other sales were being exempted from the tax. The clause next shows that such a first sale must be effected within the State of Madras, and the third condition is that the sale must be by a dealer who is not exempted. To put it differently the word first separates the sale liable to tax from several others effected in the State of Madras which would otherwise be liable. In the case before us all the aforesaid three conditions exist, and therefore the complaint by the assessee that he has been illegally assessed is not justified. We therefore think that the question formulated in the revision petition should be answered in the affirmative, and accordingly the revision petition is dismissed. We fix the costs at Rs. 50. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (12) TMI 23 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be taxed and subjected to a penalty in the same order under the Act, there being no express prohibition of such procedure thereunder. In Form XV of the Bombay Sales Tax (Procedure) Rules, 1954, there is no reference to any penalty that can be imposed under section 39-A of the Act of 1953. Yet, curiously enough, we find that in the form printed for use by the department a heading has been inserted regarding the penalty under sub-section (1) of section 39-A. The printing of this heading is obviously in contravention of the requirements of the Act and the rules made thereunder and Form XV of the Bombay Sales Tax (Procedure) Rules, 1954, and the sooner this entry is deleted the better. We think that there is no bar under the Act or the rules made thereunder against the passing of one order embodying an order of assessment as well as an order for the levy of penalty under the Act. The contention raised, therefore, fails and the the application is dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1959 (12) TMI 22 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onus would be on the taxing authority to prove that there was an agreement to sell the packing materials and a sale by the passing of property therein. It is not suggested in the present case that there had been any express contract for the sale of packing materials as such between the assessees and their customers. The question then is whether a contract can be implied in the circumstances of the case. As we said before, the principal contract between the parties was one for service. The packing materials were necessary as an incident to that service. Therefore, although the property in the packing materials might have passed to the customers and the price therefor had also been included in the charges for service, there being no agreement to purchase the packing materials as such which could be implied in the case, there would be no sale of the packing materials. The revision cases are allowed with costs in T.R.C. No. 79 of 1957. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petitions allowed.
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1959 (12) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... T.C. No. 135 of 1959 relates to the assessment for the year 1956-57. Both the appeal and the tax case have got to be dismissed, in view of our finding that the validity of the rule could not be impugned by reason of section 7(e) of the Madras General Clauses Act, W.P. Nos. 400 of 1957 and 282 of 1957 relate to the assessment for the year 1955-56. Independent of the question of the validity of the rules by reason of section 7(e) of the Madras General Clauses Act, the assessment in these cases would be validated by section 9 of Act I of 1957. Rules nisi would be discharged. The result is that W.A. No. 40 of 1958, W.P. Nos. 400 and 282 of 1957 fail, and are dismissed. The respondents will pay the costs of this application in W.A. No. 40 of 1958. The respondent will be entitled to his costs in W.P. No. 400 of 1957. Counsel s fee Rs. 250 in each case. No order as to costs in W.P. No. 282 of 1957. T.C. No. 135 of 1959 will be disposed of separately. Appeal and petitions dismissed.
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1959 (12) TMI 20 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not be found, the action of the taxing authorities to try to realise the amounts of tax from the partners personally is premature. Their Lordships have further observed, We leave undecided the question whether the partners would be personally liable for the balance, if any, remaining due . 13.. The ratio of this case will apply to the facts in the present petition, and we, therefore, hold that the recovery proceedings against a partner are premature. The department is, therefore, directed to realise the arrears of only tax and not penalty initially from the assets of the partnership. We further hold that the partners are individually liable for the debts of the firm since their liability is not limited as in the case of a limited company. Hence we order that if the tax dues only are not fully realised from the assets of the firm, the balance, if any, may be recovered from any of the partners. The application is, therefore, allowed to this extent. Application allowed in part.
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1959 (12) TMI 19 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e turnover referred to in sub-rule (1) an order has already been passed under section 11......... Obviously the turnover cannot refer to the escaped turnover which is also referred to in rule 17(1). Rule 17(1) refers to the whole or any part of a turnover that has escaped assessment. Against the original assessment of the turnover there was an appeal, and subsequently it was found there was an escape of assessment when that turnover was assessed. In such circumstances, if there has been an appeal against the original order of assessment under section 11 rule 17(1-A) comes into play, and the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, when he discovers that there has been a turnover that has escaped assessment, has only to submit the records to the Commercial Tax Officer, who is constituted the assessing authority in such a case by rule 17(1-A). As we said, the view taken by the Tribunal is correct. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (12) TMI 18 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onal grounds also. The questions raised in C.M.P. No. 5527 of 1959 are identical with those in other petitions which stand posted to 21st October, 1959, for disposal. Therefore further proceedings in this case will stand to 21st October, 1959. This case along with C.M.P. No. 5527 of 1959 coming on for further hearing along with W. A. No. 40 of 1958 and W. P. No. 282 of 1957 on Thursday the 12th and Friday the 13th days of November, 1959, and having stood over for consideration this day the Court made the following order. In our judgment in W.A. 40 of 1958 in which we considered W.P. 400 of 1957 also, we upheld the validity of rule 16 of the Turnover and Assessment Rules the only point reserved for decision. In accordance with our directions in that judgment we direct that this petition be dismissed and rule nisi be discharged. The respondent will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fees Rs. 250 as fixed in the consolidated judgment in W.A. 40 of 1958 etc. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (12) TMI 17 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f purchasing oil-seeds and extracting and selling oil. The finished product assumes a totally different form and becomes a new commodity and, in my view, is not exempted from liability to tax. For similar reasons, dealers in nonferrous metals who buy semi-finished goods, cannot be exempted from liability to pay the tax as they turn the material into finished articles after subjecting them to a process of manufacture. Civil Writ No. 898 of 1959, which is on behalf of dealers in non-ferrous metals, cannot be allowed. In Civil Writ No. 1271 of 1959 the petitioners deal in cotton and also buy iron scrap and convert it into a variety of finished goods. In so far as taxes levied on them on iron scrap, they cannot be exempted from paying the same, though in regard to their dealings in cotton, they are on the same footing as the petitioner in Civil Writ No. 359 of 1959. For reasons stated above, I agree with the order proposed by the Honorable the Chief Justice. Ordered accordingly.
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1959 (12) TMI 16 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... What the charging section of the General Sales Tax Act, 1125-Section 3-provides is that every dealer shall pay for each year a tax on his total turnover for such year . The surcharge is on the sales tax so payable. 5.. In other words, the year is the unit and because a few months of the year 1957-58 were anterior to the date on which the Act came into force it cannot be said that the transactions during those months are exempt from the surcharge leviable under the Act. This does not mean that the Act is retroactive in character. A statute is not retrospective simply because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing (Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, page 357.) 6.. Our view is that the Act applies to the whole of the turnover for the year 1957-58, and that this petition should be dismissed. Order accordingly. No costs. Petition dismissed. Since reported as Varkey Thomas and Others v. State of Kerala and Others 1960 11 S.T.C. 60.
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1959 (12) TMI 15 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Company – Membership of ... ... ... ... ..... anies Act prohibiting a transfer of shares to a joint holder in his individual capacity. Joint holders as such are not a distinct legal entity apart from the individual owners who jointly own one or more shares. A transfer of shares whether made to an individual shareholder or to joint holders collectively is not within any statutory ban, or within the prohibition of the articles of association of the company so long as the total number of members of the private company, not including persons who are in the employment of the company, does not exceed fifty as required by section 2(1)(13)(b) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, which with slight modifications corresponds to section 3(1)(iii)( b) of the Companies Act, 1956. For the above reasons, the impugned transfers are not tainted with any illegality and suffer from no flaw or lacuna. In the result, this Letters Patent appeal is allowed and the plaintiff s suit is dismissed with costs of this appeal. Khosla, CJ. mdash I agree.
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1959 (12) TMI 14 - COURT OF APPEAL
Winding up - Liability as contributories of present and post members ... ... ... ... ..... ator made constant but unsuccessful efforts to obtain the contribution for which the A contributory was liable. The position, then, quite shortly, is that no effectual call had been made on the B contributories by March 2, 1959. upon which date two of the old debts in respect of which these contributories would be liable by reason of the A contributory s default were released nor has any valid call been made upon them since. It follows from this Brett s case (No. 2) (supra), that the release of these debts operated to reduce, to the value of the debts, the liability of the B contributories. Upon this point, therefore, the appeal must be allowed and, with Lord Evershed M.R., I prefer to express no opinion on the points with which Wynn-Parry J. dealt in his judgment, but which, as it now appears, do not in fact arise for decision in the present case. Lord Evershed M.R. I have been authorised by Sellers L.J. to say that he concurs in the judgments which have just been delivered.
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1959 (12) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the provision for cancellation of licences on the ground that they have been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation is “a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public” on the exercise of the petitioners’ right under Article 19(1)(f) and (g)?
Held that:- On a consideration of the entire background in which the notice for cancellation was issued, what was stated by the petitioners in their letter dated September 27, and what we find to have taken place at the interviews on the 30th September and the 14th October, specially the fact that the Company’s representatives appeared to have been more concerned to show that the Company was not a party to the fraud than to show that there was no fraud practised at all, we are of opinion that the omission to give further particulars or inspection of papers did not deprive the petitioners of a fair chance of convincing Mr. Bilgrami that the grounds on which cancellation of the licences was proposed did not exist, or even if they existed, they did not justify cancellation of the licences. We are therefore of opinion that the opportunity that was given to the petitioners in the present case amounted to a reasonable opportunity of being heard against the action proposed. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... ered the observation in Pisani's case, (1874) 5 PC 516 concerning decisions extra cursus curiae not affording adequate material for the appellate court to properly exercise its power to review. The same criticism could be justly offered against the view in ILR 47 Mad. 39 for without any express or implied surrender of right to appeal, the acquiescence of parties may put the trial court out of its usual course causing no material on record for proper exercise of appellate powers and giving parties to such a proceeding the right to appeal cannot he accepted as correctly following precedents. I therefore hold that the right of appeal would be lost where there be expressed or implied waiver of such right. Further if the decision appealed against be extra cursus Curiae, no appeal would lie provided the procedure followed by the original court results in consequences mentioned in the observation quoted from Pisani's case ((1874) 5 PC 516). This is my reply to the reference.
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1959 (11) TMI 74 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Littledale, J., observed I am of opinion, that where goods are warranted the vendee is entitled, although he does not return them to the vendor, or give notice of their defective quality, to bring an action for breach of the warranty. This dictum is relied upon, but obviously, the dictum must be understood together with the implications of such a situation. It is for the buyer to establish that the defective qualities existed throughout, and at the time of delivery. Unless he establishes this, the dictum cannot apply. 41. Under those circumstances, we must certainly hold that the appellants are entitled to succeed, since the plaintiffs respondents failed to prove that there was a breach of condition as to the description of these goods, assuming that this was a sale of specific goods by description, or that there was a breach of warranty as to merchantable quality. I hence agree that the appeal must be allowed, and the suit dismissed with costs throughout. 43. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (11) TMI 73 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... idance or reduction of the excess profits tax. Therefore, the formation of the new companies could not have been prompted by a desire to be relieved of a portion of the work. The real or dominant object must have been to divert the profits to the other partners, so that the excess profits tax might be reduced. Having regard to the relationship between the partners, the circumstance that Mr. Karumuthu Thiagaraja Chettiars share of profits were reduced by the arrangement could not militate against the conclusion that it was made with the object of avoiding or reducing the liability to excess profits tax. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had, in our opinion sufficient material for coming to the conclusion that the main object of the transaction was for avoidance of excess profits tax. We answer the question referred to as in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Department Counsels fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (11) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore, to comply with the requirements of the law as laid down in s. 58(1) (a) read with s. 58(2) in the order of renewal made by it in favour of the petitioners on December 15, 1958. The petitioners will get one set of costs from the Mysore Government Road Transport Department which alone has contested these petitions. In Petition No. 76 of 1959. 39. In accordance with the opinion of the majority, we allow the petition and quash that part of the order complained against which specified the renewal of the permits upto September 30, 1959, and direct the Authorities to comply with the requirements of the law as laid down in s. 58(1)(a) read with s. 58(2) in the order of renewal made by them in favour of the petitioners on April 30, 1959. 40. The petitioners will get their costs, except hearing costs as the hearing was common with Petition No. 75 of 1959, from the Mysore Government Road Transport Department which alone has opposed the petition.
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1959 (11) TMI 71 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... But as the language, character and purpose of Section 45G is different, this decision is of no assistance to the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant also cited in support of his argument the case of (1875) 1 Ch D 48 to which I made reference in my judgment dated 2.5-2-1958 in the Sree Bank case, Matter No. 280 of 1957, D/- 25-2-1958 (Cat), Section 10 of the Judicature Act 1875 which was cons- but trued in that case is materially different in its nature and object from the section which is the subject-matter of consideration before us now, and so this decision is also of no avail to the appellant. It may also be noted that the general proposition laid down by lessel, M.R. in this case of (1875) 1 Ch. D 48 has been criticised and modified by Sir Raymond Ever-shed in the case of Hutchinson v. Jauncey (1950) 1 All ER 165. 47. In my view this last contention of the leaned counsel for the appellant must fail. 48. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.
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1959 (11) TMI 70 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Act. Even if the currency notes are returned to the petitioner, they would, the veiy next moment, be liable to attachment for recovery of the penalty. In the circumstances, I think that the proper disposal of these currency notes may well be left to the magistrate; in any event I do not think that a case has been made out for my interference. 23. I might perhaps mention that it was said in the course of the argument that the action of the customs officers in this case was in violation of the right of innocent passage afforded to the vessel by international law. The facts stated by me should suffice to show that there was no such violation, and. in any case, I can decide only in accordance with the municipal law. As I see it, the relevant municipal law is not at conflict with international law, but even if it were, I would have to enforce it and it would be for the legislature to resolve the conflict. 24. I dismiss the petition with costs. (Advocate's fee ₹ 250/-).
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