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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 454 Records
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1959 (11) TMI 49 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te (Vide Doorga Prosad v. Secretary of State 1945 13 I.T.R. 285 at 286 (para. 6).). Apart from the question of the assessee being exposed to criminal prosecution under section 15 for non-payment of any fee due from him, it becomes a debt which can be recovered under section 52 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act II of 1864, as amended by Act XV of 1939 under which all sums due to the State Government including compensation for any loss or damage sustained by them as a consequence of a breach of contract, may be recovered in the same manner as arrears of land revenue under the provisions of the Act, unless the recovery thereof shall have been or may hereafter be otherwise specially provided for. In the circumstances, the contention that the licence fee does not become due and the nonpayment of the same ends only in forfeiture of the privileges cannot be accepted. These revisions, therefore, fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rch, 1949. The verification in support of the petition and of the further affidavit of Dhirendra Nath Banerji show that the statements and the statement (exhibit C) annexed to the further affidavit are based on information derived from the records kept at the office of the petitioner. The records relied upon are not before this Court. The materials on the record do not show clearly whether the deduction claimed on this ground was at all disallowed and if so, on what ground. I have no doubt that it the points were pursued before Sinha, J., he would have called for further materials. In these circumstances, it will be a travesty of a justice if we allow Mr. Das to raise this point. We have, therefore, decided that Mr. Das ought not to be allowed to raise this point in this appeal. No other point has been argued before us. It must follow, therefore, that the appeal must fail. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Certified for two counsel. LAHIRI, C. J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 47 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... specified in sub-section 1955 S.C.J. 672 6 S.T.C. 446. of section 3 of the Andhra State Act, 1953, and the territories specified in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956, in the State of Andhra Pradesh and as a consequence of the re-organisation, the State of Hyderabad ceased to exist. Thereafter both the Telangana and Andhra areas constituted the territory of the State of Andhra Pradesh. The preservation of the pre-existing sales tax laws by reason of section 119 of the States Re-organisation Act has not the effect of constituting the movement of goods from one area of the State into another area an inter-State transaction. The territory of the State of Andhra Pradesh being one, the transaction in question must be held to be an intra-State sale and not an inter-State sale. That being the position of law, the petitioners contention is unsustainable. The revision case is therefore dismissed with costs. Advocates fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 46 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... axed, no matter whence they have come. But they must be taxed alike with all other such goods in the State. The tax must be general, and laid equally on all goods of the kind to be taxed, whether their State of origin be the taxing State or another. And what I say of tax applies to other imposts and burdens. The Supreme Court of America has laid down a similar rule under the American Constitution under its commerce clause (see Welton v. State of Missouri91 U.S. 275 23 L.Ed. 347. 9.. We are, therefore, of opinion that the provision in the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act (No. 30 of 1950) permitting the imposition of sales tax on sales of imported bura sugar in Madhya Bharat is discriminatory and unconstitutional and cannot be enforced against the petitioner. A writ shall accordingly issue prohibiting the respondents from levying or recovering any sales tax on the sale of bura sugar by the petitioner. 10.. The petition is allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1959 (11) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... authority may appeal to the Commercial Tax Officer concerned . It is not necessary to set out the proviso or the other subrules of rule 13. Rule 1(1) specifically makes any original order of an assessing authority appealable. The order passed under rule 17(1) is an original order of assessment, and, in this case, it is an order of the assessing authority, because, as we have pointed out, it was the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer who came within the scope of the definition of assessing authority in section 2(a)(2). Therefore, the order passed under rule 17(1) was appealable under rule 13(1), subject, of course, to the other conditions specified in section 11. There was certainly nothing to indicate that any of the other provisions of section 11 barred the appeal by the assessee. The view of the Tribunal that the appeal preferred to the Commercial Tax Officer was maintainable is correct. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 44 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nstituted. The Port Trust Act does not constitute the Board of Trustees of the Port Trust for the purpose of carrying on any business in buying and selling with a view to make a profit. There would, therefore, be no liability on their part to pay sales tax on the charges collected in respect of the water supplied by it to the ships. The view of the lower court on this point cannot, therefore, be sustained. But on the other question, namely, the scope of section 18 of the General Sales Tax Act, we agree with the lower court that the provisions of the section would not be applicable to suits for recovery of amount illegally collected as sales tax, and that the rule of limitation applicable therefor is that contained in Article 62 of the Limitation Act. Vide State of Madras v. Abdul Kader 1953 4 S.T.C. 202 (1953) 2 M.L.J. 181.. The appellant would, therefore, be entitled to a decree for the entire amount claimed. The appeal will be allowed with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (11) TMI 43 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uld be deemed to have been made under a mistake of law. If ex hypothesi the refund was due it was due because of the judgment of this court upholding the objection to the validity of the charging provision there could be no mistake in law in making the refund and the mere fact that the proviso has been re-enacted with retrospective effect cannot have the effect of rendering the refund then made either illegal, unlawful or one under a mistake of law. If authority were needed for what I consider so obvious a proposition I might refer to the decision of Rajagopalan, J., in Soundarapandian and Bros. v. Agricultural Income-tax Officer (1957) 2 M.L.J. 434. . I consider that the demand for the repayment of the amount refunded is not justified by law, and that the petitioners are entitled to the reliefs which they seek by these petitions. The petitions are accordingly allowed and the rules nisi made absolute and the notices of demand quashed. No order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1959 (11) TMI 42 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ly a rule framed by the Government cannot conflict with a specific statutory provision vesting jurisdiction to assess escaped turnover in a specified authority, the assessment authority. We have already pointed out that the Madras Act did not contain any specific statutory provision either prescribing the officer who should assess escaped turnover or even specifically providing for the conditions under which escaped turnover could be assessed. Thus the position is that rule 17(1-A) and rule 17(3-A) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules do not conflict with any express statutory provision in the Madras General Sales Tax Act. There is therefore no scope for applying to this case the principle laid down by the learned Judges of the Andhra High Court. Since the validity of rule 17(3-A) was the only substantial point taken in the proceedings before us and that fails, the petition has to be dismissed. The petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 41 - BIHAR
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... ... ..... nsiderably, by as much as 50 per cent. or so, an assessment to the best of judgment on a figure of Rs. 35,000 cannot be supported. Even the Inspector s report which is available on this occasion, although it does not deal with any transaction during the year in question, contains no basis of his estimate of a daily sale of Rs. 200. The reasons given about the location of his shop and the period during which it is kept open, are factors which have remained constant throughout the 6 year period, and offer no explanation for any significant increase over the -turnover assumed in the past. Taking all the circumstances into account, it appears to the Board proper that the turnover on which the assessment against the petitioner should be based, should be reduced to a figure of Rs. 24,000. The slight increase over the last year is justified by the higher amount returned by the assessee, as compared with the last year. 3. The petition is allowed on the above terms. Petition allowed.
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1959 (11) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
EXEMPTION — SALE IN THE COURSE OF IMPORT — SALE OF IMPORTED MILK POWDER — ASSESSEE TAKING DELIVERY OF DOCUMENTS OF TITLE AFTER PAYING TO BANK — CLEARING AGENT DELIVERING GOODS TO BUYERS WHO PRODUCE DELIVERY ORDERS ISSUED BY ASSESSEE — WHETHER SALE BY ASSESSEE TO BUYERS A SALE IN THE COURSE OF IMPORT.
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1959 (11) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
Appeals filed by the State of Bihar (hereinafter called the appellant) against three separate registered dealers with a certificate issued by the Patna High Court under Article 132(1) of the Constitution that they involve a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of Article 20(1) of the Constitution
Held that:- In dealing with the question we cannot ignore the fact that the relevant provisions which fall to be construed in the present appeal impose a serious penalty on the registered dealer, and so, even if the view for which the appellant contends may perhaps be a possible view, we see no reason why the other view for which the first respondent contends and which appellant contends may perhaps be a possible view, we see no reason result we hold that the proviso to section 14A cannot be invoked against the first respondent and so the order of forfeiture passed against him by the second respondent is unjustified and illegal.
In view of this conclusion it is unnecessary to consider the objections raised by the first respondent against the validity of the proviso on the ground that it contravenes Articles 20(1) and 31(2) of the Constitution. We may incidentally add that during the course of the arguments before us we have also heard all the learned counsel on the question as to whether the said proviso contravenes the provisions of Article 19(1)(f) as well. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (11) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up – Overriding preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... in respect of any portion of the chitty debts due to the company left after satisfying the charge, since, in respect of that surplus, no third party has an interest and the matter is entirely one of an account between the chitty debtor concerned and the creditor foreman. It is said that the foreman should realise only so much of the chitty debts due to him as will suffice to satisfy the charge of his chitty creditors leaving balance in the hands of his chitty debtors so as to be available for set-off against the ordinary debts due to them. Alternatively, that he should rateably distribute any available surplus amongst his chitty debtors in payment of the ordinary debts due to them. To this extent, it is said my earlier statement that the surplus would be available to the general body of creditors requires qualification. This, I apprehend is something which will never actually happen and therefore I leave the question entirely open to decision against that most unlikely event.
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1959 (11) TMI 24 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order, Debts of all descriptions to be admitted to proof and Avoidance of certain attachments, executions, etc.
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1959 (11) TMI 23 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... e disclosure of the facts relating to the promotion, formation and working of joint stock companies and secondly, by enactment of such suitable provisions for the holding and conduct of company meetings as will enable active and competent shareholders to take an effective part in the business transacted in them. . . . (See T.R. Srinivasa Aiyangar s Companies Meetings, Accounts, Audit and Investigations 1957 page 14 and following T.R. Srinivasa Aiyangar s Companies Administration 1958 page 1 Gore-Browne s Handbook of Joint Stock Companies, 41st Edition, page 410 and following Buckley on the Companies Acts, 13th Edition, page 319 and following Ghosh s Indian Company Law, 10th Edition, Part II, section 789 and following). Therefore the applicant is directed to hold an extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders as contemplated by section 391 of the Companies Act as per rules, and then move this court under section 394 of the Act and which will be considered then on merits.
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1959 (11) TMI 22 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the liquidators had remained in occupation of the premises not for the purpose of winding up but "because they could not think of any suitable method of getting rid of the premises in spite of all their desire to do so?
Held that:- Unable to agree with the High Court that under rule 97 of the Company Rules, if the premises remained in the occupation of the liquidators, not for the purpose of winding up, the landlord is entitled to priority in respect of payment of rent. On the view taken by us, the appeal will be allowed, the order passed by the High Court set aside and the order passed by Mr. Justice Brij Mohan Lall restored with costs in this court and in the High Court.
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1959 (11) TMI 21 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... riginal decree-holder in favour of the new bank as a result of the amalgamation of the two banks and that the new bank is entitled to execute the decree in the capacity of assignee-decree-holder. Thus the assignment had only to be recognised after notice to the parties concerned, and execution allowed as contemplated by Order XXI, rule 16, Civil Procedure Code. There is no question of any amendment of the decree. The learned Judge was wrong in thinking that the decree has to be got amended. 2. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the order of the lower court is set aside. The lower court will proceed with the execution application in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above.
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1959 (11) TMI 2 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Penalty - Customs ... ... ... ... ..... ffence as mentioned in Section 167(8). That whatever is not a person who is dealing with the goods subsequent to the arrival thereof without his being concerned in illegal importation thereof into India. It appears to me that the words person concerned relate to all those who may have an interest already accrued in the illegal importation prior to the period of time of such importation. That however I have no reason to decide in this case and does not arise before me. So far as the petitioners are concerned I cannot hold that they were persons concerned in the importation of these two slabs of gold into India. That they have been helping Shankarlal in destroying the evidence of gold of foreign origin smuggled into India does not in any manner make them persons concerned in the offence as mentioned in Section 167(8). The petitioners are accordingly entitled to have the penalty imposed upon them quashed. The impugned order as against the petitioner will therefore stand quashed.
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1959 (11) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Natural justice ... ... ... ... ..... ndings therefore cannot lead to the determination of the questions to whether it comes within one item or the other. Apart from the faulty determination of the question it appears that exhaustive enquiries were made but unfortunately all these enquires were ex parte and without notice to the petitioner and behind his back. It has now been held that these proceedings are quasi-judicial proceedings and therefore enquiries upon the results of which the Customs authorities rely, cannot be made behind the back of the person concerned. For both these reasons this order of the Assistant Collector of Customs dated October 16, 1956, being Ext. F to the petition, cannot be sustained and the rule is made absolute and a writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing this order and a writ in the nature of mandamus is issued directing the respondent not to give effect to it. The matter must now be determined in accordance with law. It is desirable that the matter should be expedited.
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1959 (10) TMI 47 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
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... ... ..... ssed for the grant of a permanent license to him after fulfilling all the conditions for the grant of such a license. The Revenue Divisional Commissioner rightly pointed out that so long as a permanent cinema house was not located in the town the temporary license granted to the petitioner was being renewed from time to time, even though it involved some risk to public safety, but since a permanent building was put up there was no necessity for continuing the temporary license and the attending risks also. 21. I see therefore no unconstitutionality either in the Orissa Act 11 of 1954 or in the appellate order dated 2nd September 1958 passed by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner, Northern Division, Sambalpur. 22. The petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 200/-(Rupees two hundred only) to be apportioned equally between opposite parties 1, 2 and 3 on the one hand and opposite party No. 4 on the other. Sujit Barman Roy, J. 23. I agree.
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1959 (10) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tled to the intermediate grade. We are of opinion that this view of the Authority is correct. 5. The question then arises whether we should interfere in our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, when we are satisfied that there was no failure of justice. In similar circumstances this court refused to interfere and did not go into the question of jurisdiction on the ground that this Court could refuse interference unless it was satisfied that the justice of the case required it see A.M. Allison v. B.L. Sen, (1957)ILLJ472SC . On a parity of reasoning we are of opinion that as we are not satisfied that the justice of the case requires interference in the circumstances, we should refuse to interfere with the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition of the appellant. We accordingly dismiss the appeal, but having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the case which we have referred to above we order that each party will bear its own costs of this appeal.
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