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Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 612 Records
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1960 (11) TMI 13 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sum of ₹ 15,608 should have been included in the assessee company's 'profit' for the purpose of determining whether the payment of a larger dividend than that declared by it would be unreasonable ?
Held that:- By the fiction in section 10(2)(vii), second proviso, read with section 2(6C), what is really not income is, for the purpose of computation of assessable income, made taxable income; but on that account, it does not become commercial profit, and if it is not commercial profit, it is not liable to be taken into account in assessing whether in view of the smallness of profits a larger dividend would be unreasonable.
The High Court was right in holding that the amount of ₹ 15,608 was not liable to be taken into account in considering whether having regard to the smallness of the profit made by the company, it would be unreasonable to declare a larger dividend.Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the notification is validly made under section 12 or is it ultra vires the powers conferred on the Central Government by that section?
Does the notification apply to the assessment in the present case, which is an assessment for the year 1951-52 ?
Held that:- The notification of 1956, was validly made under section 12 and is not ultra vires the powers conferred on the Central Government by that section.
The Central Government has, therefore, the power to make an order or give a direction so as to remove the difficulty from the very beginning, and that is what the notification of 1956 does. It applies to the assessment of 1951-52; indeed, it applies to all assessments made under the Indian Income-tax Act in which paragraph 2 of the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1950, operates.
The notification of 1956 creates no unequal treatment of persons in a like situation; it applies to all who are in a like situation, namely, all those to whom paragraph 2 of the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1950, applies. We consider that the challenge to the notification based on article 14 is wholly unsubstantial. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the distribution of the right to apply for the shares of the Bank of India by Navjivan Mills Ltd., in favour of the assessees amounted to a distribution of 'dividend' ?
Held that:- Dividend need not be distributed in money; it may be distributed by delivery of property or right having monetary value. The resolution, it is true, did not purport to distribute the right amongst the shareholders as dividend. It did not also take the form of a resolution for distribution of dividend; it took the form of distribution of a right which had a monetary value. But by the form of the resolution sanctioning the distribution, the true character of the resolution could not be altered. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was right in holding that the distribution of the right to apply for and obtain two shares of the Bank of India (at half their market value) for each share held by the shareholders of the mills amounted to distribution of dividend. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the business activities of the company to wit, manufacture and sale of sugar and sale and purchase of gunnies, jute, mustard seeds constituted the same business within the meaning of section 24(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ?
Held that:- A question of law did arise in the case, on which the High Court should have asked for a statement of the case. Appeal allowed and direct the High Court to call for a statement of the case from the Tribunal on this question, and dispose of it, according to law.
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1960 (11) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the petitioner had carried on its business only till the twenty-eighth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five ?
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in not allowing the sum of ₹ 41,998 (Rupees forty-one thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight) on sale of machines and ₹ 3,700 (Rupees three thousand and seven hundred) on the sale of lorry as a deduction from the total income of the applicant ?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The High Court correctly answered the first question in the affirmative, holding that there was evidence on which the Tribunal could reach the conclusion that the business had, in fact, been continued only till August 28, 1945.
On the second question, the High Court was of correct opinion that the business having been carried on for at least a part of the account year, section 10(2)(vii) was applicable, and that, therefore, this allowance had to be made under that clause. The High Court, therefore, answered the question in the negative. The High Court refused to grant a certificate to appeal to this court, but the Commissioner of Income-tax applied for and obtained special leave, and this appeal has been filed.
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1960 (11) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the conditions precedent for the assumption of jurisdiction under section 34 were not satisfied?
Held that:- The conditions precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction under section 34 of the Income-tax Act did not exist and the Income-tax Officer had therefore no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notices under section 34 in respect of the years 1942-43, 1943-44 and 1944-45 after the expiry of four years.
We have therefore come to the conclusion that the company was entitled to an order directing the Income-tax Officer not to take any action on the basis of the three impugned notices. In view, however, of the fact that the assessment orders have already been made we think it proper that in addition to an order directing the Income-tax Officer not to take any action on the basis of the impugned notices a further order quashing the assessment made be also issued. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the income derived by the company from shops and stalls is income received from property and falls under the specific head described in section 9?
Held that:- The income received by the appellant from shops is indisputably income from property; so is the income from stalls from occupants. The character of the income is not altered merely because some stalls remain occupied by the same occupants and the remaining stalls are occupied by a shifting class of occupants. The primary source of income from the stalls is occupation of the stalls, and it is a matter of little moment that the occupation which is the source of the income is temporary. The income-tax authorities were, in our judgment, right in holding that the income received by the appellant was assessable under section 9 of the Income-tax Act. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there is in this case any legal evidence to support the inference of the Tribunal that the partition in question was not genuine and meant to be acted upon?
Held that:- As the partition set up in this case was of December 30, 1944, whereas the partition set up in the earlier case was of October 16, 1944. As the High Court has pointed out on the additional facts which were proved before the Tribunal including the statements on oath of the sons of the respondent and the other relevant material it cannot be said that there were no materials before the Appellate Tribunal for finding in favour of the respondent and in favour of the partition being genuine. The decision of the High Court was right and this appeal must also fail and is dismissed with costs.
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1960 (11) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the order of the Income-tax Officer could be restored in toto in view of this finding, because the Income-tax Officer had taken the whole of the income of the firm into Chhotalal's individual assessment?
Held that:- The Tribunal was trying to unravel the motive for the formation of the new firm with an old lady and two minor sons in place of Chhotalal, and what was observed by the Tribunal was in connection with the motive which suggested itself to it, and was not based on any material. Even if the Tribunal mentioned those suspicions, we do not think that they entered into the solution of the problem before it. Suspicions and surmises are best avoided ; but in the present case, the order of the Tribunal proceeded on such solid facts that the speculation about the motive of Chhotalal did not make any material difference to the finding reached, though we cannot help saying that the Tribunal would have been well-advised to leave speculation out altogether.Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was any material to hold that the Bombay branch of your petitioner sold 1,66,188 pieces of sovereign to the Karachi branch at market rates?
Held that:- The order passed by the Income-tax Officer does not refer to any evidence in support of the assertion made by him that the Bombay branch of the appellant sold sovereigns to the Karachi branch.The criticism of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner about the unsatisfactory character of the evidence has a bearing on the local sales and not on the despatches to Karachi. The Tribunal merely accepted the conclusion of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner ; it gave no independent reasons in support of its order. The income-tax authorities did not find that on a comparison of the rates at which the sovereigns are debited in the Bombay branch and the rates at which they were credited in the Karachi branch, any profit was earned by the Bombay branch.
In our view, a question of law arises from the judgment of the Tribunal which confirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We accordingly direct that the Tribunal do draw up and submit a statement of the case on the following question which arises from the order of the Tribunal \
" Whether there was any material to hold that the Bombay branch of the assessee sold 1,66,188 pieces of sovereigns to the Karachi branch ?
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1960 (11) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the decision of the Tribunal that the firm is not genuine and not registerable under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act is right in law ?
Held that:- A question of law arises out of the order of the Tribunal, namely, " whether in the facts and circumstances found by the Tribunal, there was material to come to the conclusion that the partnership firm constituted by the deed of partnership dated November 16, 1949, was not genuine? " We would accordingly allow these appeals, set aside the order of the High Court of Mysore dated October 8, 1958, and direct that the Tribunal be required to state a case on the question indicated above and refer it to the said High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 2 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Evidence - Proof ... ... ... ... ..... there is no other clinching circumstance to connect the petitioner with the posting or with the writing on the envelopes which contained the notes, it cannot be said that the guilt has been established beyond all reasonable doubt. 6. The conviction and sentence of the petitioner are, therefore, set aside and he is acquitted. The revision petition is allowed. The fine amount, if paid, will be refunded. 7. Since the revision petition is allowed, the appeal by the State against the acquittal of the respondent in the appeal has to fail, since it is on the same facts that the State seeks to set aside the acquittal of the respondent accused of an offence under Section 167(81). If the offence under Section 23(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is not made out, the offence under S. 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act also is not made out. The appeal against the acquittal by the State is dismissed. Exs. D. 2 and D. 3, the passports belonging to the accused will be returned to him.
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1960 (11) TMI 1 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Whether R and his sons were entitled to have their agricultural income separately assessed, or whether the income of all was liable to be assessed in the hands of R as the Karta of a HUF - proceedings are remanded to the Commissioner for disposal afresh
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1960 (10) TMI 108 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... first defendant, who was not entitled to it, under the mistaken impression that the money was due to her. There was, therefore, an obligation on her part to refund the money. Such liability must be deemed to have arisen on the date of the payment itself (Vide Baker v. Courage and Co., 1910 1 KB 50 . This obligation to refund was certainly incurred during the occupation period because the payment was between the two dates, 15-3-1942 and 5-9-1945. The term debt no doubt, is commonly used to, describe liabilities which have an origin in contract; but we see no reason why we should, restrict the connotation of that term to such liabilities only. Anything due and payable is a debt. On this point, therefore, we agree with the learned trial judge that no amount can be recovered by the plaintiff from the first defendant, even assuming that the first, defendant was liable to repay the amount paid to her agent. The appeal is therefore dismissed, but, in the circumstances without costs.
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1960 (10) TMI 107 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... heir, is liable to pay out of the estate of the deceased the tax payable by the deceased. Under the will and codicil executed by the petitioners mother, the petitioner got nothing from the estate of the mother and the assessments in question related to the income of the mother during the three years 1950-51, 1951-52 and 1952-53. The petitioner cannot, therefore, be regarded as the legal representative of his mother and the fact that he was one of the legatees under the will executed by his father does not make him the legal representative of his mother. 6. It follows that the petitioner is not liable to pay half the tax assessed as payable by the petitioners mother. The writ petition are, therefore, allowed and a writ of mandamus will issue in each case as prayed for. The petitioner will get his costs only in writ petition No. 460 of 1958 but not in the other two writ petitions. Advocates fee Rs. 100. Costs awarded shall be payable by the second respondent. Petitions allowed.
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1960 (10) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed if the contention urged on behalf of the appellants were accepted. The Legislature not having chosen to provide that the complaint of the Public Prosecutor shall also be signed by the person aggrieved, we will not be justified in the absence of compelling reasons to so hold. 11. The observation made by Mr. Justice Bavdekar in C.B.L. Bhatnagar v. The State AIR1958Bom196 What section 198B(13)......... means........ is that any complaint which may be made under section 198B must also satisfy the provisions of section 198, that is, the complaint will have to be made both by the person aggrieved, and by the Public Prosecutor , and by Mr. Justice Raman Nayar in R. Sankar v. The State I.L.R. (1959) Ker 195 that a complaint by a person aggrieved is not dispensed with even in regard to cases falling under section 198B, do not, in our judgment, correctly interpret sub-section (13) of section 198B. In the view taken by us, this appeal must fail and is dismissed. 12. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (10) TMI 105 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e pointed out above, is firmly established by the decisions of the various courts in this country and the courts in England. Consequently, we hold that the present suit for the balance of the unrecovered amount can certainly be maintained and we overrule the defendants' contention on this score also. 48. For the reasons mentioned above, we, therefore, partly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and decree the plaintiff's suit for Rs. 17480/-. We also allow interest on this amount from the date of the promissory note, that is the 24th February, 1943, up to the date of realisation at six per cent per annum simple. The rest of the plaintiffs claim will stand dismissed. As to costs, we think that the interests of justice would be fully satisfied it we allow the plaintiff three-fourths of the costs incurred by him in this Court as well as the court below and that the defendants should bear their own costs throughout. We order accordingly.
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1960 (10) TMI 104 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... merely because a few restrictive covenants are also imposed upon the assessee in order to safeguard the interests of the former employer by restraining the assessee from entering into a com- petitive business, or by requiring him to observe forbearance in advising others who are carrying on a rival business. In the present case, the assessee has received compensation for the loss of his employment. He had no doubt entered into restrictive covenants also but for observing these covenants, he was not required to render any kind of active service to his former employer. His relations with the employer as an employee were completely severed and the restrictive covenants only required him to forbear to do certain things for the unexpired period of the first agreement. Therefore, under the facts and circumstances of the present case, the payments received by him were not of a revenue nature in whole or in part. The reference is answered accordingly. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (10) TMI 103 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to be assessed to tax each in his individual status. Section 41(1) in express terms directs that the tax shall be levied on the receivers "in the like manner and to the same amount as it would be livable upon and recoverable from the person on whose behalf such income, profits or gains are receivable." In this case the "person" to be assessed, the person whom the receivers represented, was the Hindu undivided family, and that was the only legal basis available in this case for the assessment levied on the receivers. 16. We answer the first question against the assessee. Section 41(1) is mandatory. Our answer to the second question also is against the assessee; despite the division in status the members continued under a liability to be assessed as a Hindu undivided family. We answer the third question in the affirmative and against the assessee. 17. The assessee will pay the cost of this reference. Counsels fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (10) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hands; there must be many papers which a Chief Minister has to deal with in the day to day business of administration. If the Chief Minister did not remember the circumstances, it would have been easy for him to say so. If he remembered the circumstances, he could have refuted the allegations with equal ease. This is not a case where the refutation should have been left to Secretaries and other officers, who could only speak from the records and were not in a position to say why the Chief Minister passed certain orders. The petitioners are obviously suffering from a sense of grievance that they have not had a fair deal. We have held that there is not legal justification for that grievance; but in an executive as well as judicial administration justice must not only be done but it must appear that justice is being done. An affidavit from the Chief Minister would have cleared much of the doubt which in the absence of such an affidavit arose in this case. 22. Petition dismissed.
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