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Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 613 Records
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1960 (10) TMI 82 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... State where the goods be situate and under a covenant of the sale, or should such a movement be incidental to the bargain, nevertheless the sale would be liable to tax under the statute. The majority pronouncement of the Supreme Court on section 3(a) is clear, and the taxing authorities must proceed to assess afresh in the light of the aforesaid observations. Accordingly we allow all these writ petitions, vacate the assessment orders and direct the taxing authorities to proceed afresh in view of the legal position clarified above. Costs will abide the final result. This order will cover all the O.Ps. The collection of the tax as per the provisional assessments has been stayed subject to furnishing of security which has been done. As the provisional assessments have been vacated, it is clear that there is no tax, whose collection can be stayed. Therefore, the stay order becomes unnecessary and the security furnished to get the stay order should be released. Petitions allowed.
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1960 (10) TMI 81 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oard of Ghazipur v. Deokinandan Prasad 1914 I.L.R. 36 All. 555 A.I.R. 1914 All. 338. , it was held that a suit for refund of excess amount paid as octroi duty was governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act. We hold that the present case was governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act and as the suit was brought within six years from the date of the cause of action for refund, the claim was within time. The appellant has also claimed interest on the amount of refund. We do not allow any interest for the period before suit. However, we direct that the amount of refund shall carry interest from the date of suit until realisation at 3 per cent. per annum. In the result, the decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit is set aside. Instead, the claim of the appellant is decreed for Rs. 1,836-15-0. This amount shall carry interest at 3 per cent. per annum from the date of suit until realisation. The respondent shall pay the costs of the appellant throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (10) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sales involved in the case fell "within the purview of the Explanation to section 2, sub-section (12) of Assam Sales Tax Act XVII of 1947?
Held that:- The appeal must therefore be allowed and the order passed by the High Court set aside. In the present case, no direction has been given by an authority competent for reopening the assessment and the Superintendent had no power to reassess the income under section 19 assuming that the section applied to a case where the assessee though registered had failed to include his sales in a particular commodity in his turnover, because the period of limitation prescribed in that behalf had expired.
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1960 (10) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on a proper interpretation of the relevant Articles of the Constitution, sales under which goods were delivered outside Bihar but for consumption not in the State of first delivery, were exempt from tax under the Bihar Sales Tax Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. If there is a sale falling within the terms of the Explanation, it is "inside" the State of delivery-cum-consumption and that State alone can levy the tax. Such a sale is outside all other States, which are prohibited from taxing such a sale by reason of any territorial nexus however close or cogent. The passage extracted, however, does not deal with cases where the sale in question does not satisfy the requirements of the Explanation leading to the fixation of the fictional situs of the sale determining the State by which the tax might be levied.
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1960 (10) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee, who is a manufacturer and a dealer of non- edible oils and who elected the previous year as the basis of his assessment in the assessment year 1948-49, is liable to be assessed at the flat rate of 3 pies per rupee on the whole of the turnover of the previous year, or whether he is liable to be assessed at the rate of 3 pies per rupee and 6 pies per rupee on the turnover of the previous year in pro portion to the two periods from 1st April to 8th June, 1948, and from 9th June, 1948, to the 31st March, 1949?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The turn over of the previous year is fictionally made the turnover of the year of assessment: it is not the actual or the real turnover of the year of assessment. By the imposition of a different tariff in the course of the year, the incidence of tax liability may competently be altered by the Legislature, but for effectuating that alteration, the Legislature must devise machinery for enforcing it against the taxpayer and if the Legislature has failed to do so, the Court cannot resort to a fiction which is not prescribed by the Legislature and seek to effectuate that alteration by devising machinery not found in the statute. We are therefore of the view that the conclusion of the High Court is correct.
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1960 (10) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
As the respondent-company's transactions in question clearly fall within the notification by the State Government dated February 5, 1954, exempting such sales from tax by reason of their nature as well as the assessment years concerned, the respondent- company would be entitled to the benefit of the tax exemption conferred by the notification - Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (10) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
Whether hardened or hydrogenated groundnut oil (commonly called Vanaspati) is "groundnut oil" within the meaning of rule of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939?
Held that:- Appeal allowed in part and the order of the High Court in so far as it denied to the appellant the benefit of the deduction in the turnover provided by rule 18(2) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules is set aside. From the contents of this invoice it would be seen that the appellant has charged a price inclusive of the railway freight and would therefore be outside the terms of rule 5(1)(g) which requires that in order to enable a dealer to claim the deduction it should be charged for separately and not included in the price of goods sold. The conditions of the rule not having been complied with, the appellant was not entitled to the deduction in respect of freight.
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1960 (10) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called and Restriction on exercise of voting rights of members who have not paid calls, Etc.
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1960 (10) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Oppression of mismanagement – Application of sections 539 to 544 to proceedings under sections 397 & 398
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1960 (10) TMI 38 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Winding up - Prosecution of delinquent officers and members of company ... ... ... ... ..... nt liquidator, states that cases have been actually launched only in respect of offences mentioned in clauses (b), (c), (f), (g ) and (h) of paragraph 3 of the application and that prosecutions in respect of the remaining offences are awaiting the disposal of this appeal. It is difficult to say that a good citizen would consider it his duty to pursue so many prosecutions for similar and petty of offences in a criminal court after a lapse of over ten years. The sounder view is that it is sufficient if smaller number such as five or six are selected for being pursued. As the approach of the learned District Judge was erroneous, the order is set aside and the petition is remanded for fresh disposal in the light of the observations in this judgment. The validity of the pending prosecutions already launched will not, of course, be affected because the sanction by the company court is not a condition precedent for their validity. The parties will bear their own costs in this court.
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1960 (10) TMI 20 - IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Winding up - Meetings to ascertain wishes of creditors or contributors ... ... ... ... ..... in an affidavit. Neither the opposing creditors nor the company chose to file any evidence at all, and in my view it is not the law, and never has been, that under those circumstances a judgment creditor is not entitled to his remedy. I observe that in the passage in Buckley, which alone gives some colour to the respondents case, the creditors are spoken of as creditors of like degree. I am not sure I understand what that means. Of the three creditors here one has a judgment on which it has tried to effect execution, the second has a judgment and the third none, and it may be that has Something to do with what the textbook says. It does seem to me that a creditor who has pursued his remedy to judgment and has proceeded to execution and finds no assets at the company s place of business other than assets claimed by some third party is at least entitled to put the opposition upon their oath as to why they oppose his otherwise just demands. I would, therefore, allow the appeal.
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1960 (10) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up - Power of High Court to retain winding up proceedings in district Court ... ... ... ... ..... edure Code seem to be based on this principle. Therefore, if what the legislature meant by section 437 of the Companies Act, 1956, was that a proceeding could be validly retained and continued in a court lacking inherent jurisdiction if the High Court makes a direction in that behalf, one would have expected it to state so in clear and unambiguous terms. The actual language of section 437, as I have already shown, seems to indicate the contrary. It would be strange if, after having conferred jurisdiction primarily on the High Court, and having empowered only the Central Government to confer jurisdiction on district courts, the Legislature thought that a person should be allowed to institute proceedings in a court on which the Central Government did not think it fit to confer jurisdiction and then come to the High Court and have the proceedings validated. I dismiss the petition. I am grateful for the able assistance rendered to me by Mr. V. Balakrishna Eradi as amicus curiae.
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1960 (10) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the circumstances of the case the assessment of a sum of ₹ 28,000 to income-tax in the hands of the assessee is legally valid under section 34 of the Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- Learned counsel for the appellant has made a futile attempt to show that the appellant contested the quantum of assessment also and in the High Court the validity of assessment even with regard to its quantum was challenged. The record of the High Court settles the question conclusively ; and neither in the application for leave to appeal to this court, nor in the statement of the case filed here on behalf of the appellant, was it stated that learned counsel did not make the concession as recorded in the judgment of the High Court or that he disputed the quantum of assessment for any of the three years in question. Appeals dismissed.
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1960 (10) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the amount received by the appellant from the trust, property in his character as a shebait was exempt from liability to pay income-tax?
Held that:- In the present case, the appellant has no beneficial interest in the trust property. The appellant so far as his remuneration is concerned is again not the direct recipient of the income of the trust : the source and the character of the income are both altered when agricultural income is appropriated under the covenant in the deed of trust as remuneration for services rendered. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (10) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the proceedings for assessment were commenced within the period of limitation prescribed for serving notice of assessment under section 34(1)(a) of the Act?
Held that:- The High Court was therefore right in holding that the proceedings for assessment were properly commenced within the period of limitation prescribed by section 34(1)(a) from the close of the year of assessment. The appeal fails and is dismissed
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1960 (10) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the proportionate profits on the goods of the value of ₹ 4,10,785 were received or were deemed to be received in British India, in the year of account, by or on behalf of the assessee company within the meaning of section 4(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ?
Held that:- The income, profits or gains must be deemed to have been received in the taxable territories, and the answer to the question ought to have been in the affirmative. We accordingly allow the appeal, and answer the question in the affirmative. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (10) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was any material before the Tribunal for the finding that the wages had been inflated?
Held that:- If the income-tax authorities chose not to accept these explanations as correct, that does not mean that the finding as to inflation of wages at which they arrived was a finding based on no material. The materials were there ; what happened was that the income-tax authorities did not accept as correct the explanations offered by the assessee-company. We do not think that the non-acceptance of the explanations given by the assessee-company converts the question of the inflation of wages, which is essentially a question of fact, into a question of law. The High Court was, therefore, right in its answer to the first question.
The Tribunal accepted some of the explanations as good explanations ; yet the Tribunal found that the defects in the keeping of acquittance rolls or the wages record indicated an inflation of wages and held that the Income-tax Officer was right in adding back ₹ 50,000 in respect thereof. This finding of the Tribunal can have only one meaning, namely, that there was an inflation of wages. Therefore, we are of opinion that it is idle on the part of the assessee-company to contend that no opportunity was given to it to explain the defects in the acquittance rolls.. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (10) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether onus of proving the import of the goods lay on the appellant?
Held that:- We cannot accept the contention that by reason of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act the onus lies on the appellant to prove that he brought the said items of goods into India in 1947. If Section 106 of the Evidence Act is applied, then, by analogy, the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence must equally be invoked. If so, it follows that the onus to prove the case against the appellant is on the Customs authorities and they failed to discharge that burden in respect of Items 1 to 5. The order of confiscation relating to Items 1 to 5 is set aside.
Coming to Items 6 to 10, we have no reason to reject, as we have been asked to do, the statement made in the order of the Collector of Central Excise dated October 27, 1951, that the appellant accepted that Items 6 to 10 were smuggled goods from Pakistan. having regard to the circumstances under, and the manner, in which the said confession was made, we have no reason to doubt the correctness of the statements of fact in regard to this matter made in the orders of the Customs authorities. If so, it follows that the finding of the Customs authorities that the appellant purchased the said items, which were smuggled goods, should prevail. The order of confiscation of these five items will, therefore, stand. Appeal partly allowed.
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1960 (9) TMI 126 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ecuniary jurisdiction. After the Bombay Civil Courts Act became applicable to this area, the Civil Judge, Senior Division, will have jurisdiction to deal with the suit. The suit is yet on the file of the District Court. It must now be transferred to the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, for disposal in accordance with law. Order accordingly. There will be no order as to costs of this Civil Revision Application. 9. The petitioner has made an application, being Civil Application No. 1325 of 1959, along with the Civil Revision Application, which I have just now decided, for appointment of a receiver. Since I have disposed of the Civil Revision Application, this application will not survive in this Court. But in-stead of asking the petitioner to make another application in the trial Court, I direct that this Civil Application be forwarded to the Civil Judge, Senior Division, who will deal with it on merits after giving an opportunity to the opponents to put in their say.
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1960 (9) TMI 125 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... with the provisions of the rule making provisions and in the guise of Section 16, Government cannot override or by-Pass either Section 8 or Section 40. Section 16 does not, therefore, dispense with the rule making duty of the Government. I find myself in agreement, also with the answer to the second question posed in the judgment of my brother Pandit, J. that no rule, to which reference has been made by the learned Advocate General, applies to the occupants of urban agricultural land in respect to payment of compensation, and, no provision has been made for the holders of this class of evacuee property. I also concur that where the provisions as to making of rules are mandatory, Press Notes or any other executive instructions are no substitutes for the statutory rules, and as such they have not the force of law and the petitioners, therefore, are not bound either by the Press Notes or the memorandum which are of no legal effect. I, therefore, subscribe to the order proposed.
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