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Showing 61 to 80 of 612 Records
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1960 (11) TMI 131 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on, and that there was no incorrect valuation at the time of the general assessment. Hence, the Special Officer had no jurisdiction to enhance the valuation or assessment. In view of this finding, they have rightly decreed the suit. 35. The first point raised by the learned Advocate General must, accordingly, be rejected. It is unnecessary to consider the second point because, even if the Special Officer could alone take the place of the committee, referred to in Section 117, for the purpose of disposing of the objection filed under Sub-section (3) of Section 107, he could not give himself power to enhance the valuation and assessment of the holding in question by a wrong decision on the jurisdictional facts, viz., that there was an incorrect valuation at the time of the general assessment and that that was due to misrepresentation or fraud. 36. For the reasons given above, I would dismiss the appeal with costs. V. Ramaswami, C.J. 37. I agree. Kanhaiya Singh, J. 38. I agree.
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1960 (11) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of explaining them". It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the right to cross-examine the witnesses who give evidence against him is a very valuable right, and if it appears that effective exercise of this right has been prevented by the enquiry officer by not giving to the officer relevant documents to which he is entitled, that inevitably would be that the enquiry had not been held in accordance with rules of natural justice. That is the view taken by the High Court, and in the present appeal which has, been brought to this Court under Art. 136 we see no justification for interfering with it. In this connection it would be relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in Khem Chand vs. Union of India & Ors. 1958 S.C. R 1080 at p. 1096, where this Court has emphasised the importance of giving an opportunity to the public officer to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him. The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1960 (11) TMI 129 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing people in the villages would become a mere play-thing in the hands of scheming people who may be only too prone to oppress others -- for one reason or another, and even in the name of religion. I, therefore, unshesitatingly hold that a case for grant of mandatory injunction is fully made out in these cases The other reliefs asked for are more or less consequential or incidental and call for no particular discussion. 34. I, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the judgment and decrees of the learned Senior Civil Judge and restore those of the trial Court. The defendants are allowed one month's time from the date of this judgment to remove the impugned structure on the land ABCD in plan Ex. 1 themselves; but should they fail to do so, the plaintiffs will have the right to have the same demolished by execution at the expense of the defendants. The plaintiffs will have one set of costs in each suit from the defendants throughout. Leave for further appeal is refused.
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1960 (11) TMI 128 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
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... ... ..... ue that Shri Anand did not file his power when he signed the revision and presented it to this Court. He thought that he could act on the basis of his power filed in the trial Court. I found that this was not correct because revision is not a continuation of the suit, but is altogether a separate proceeding. Shri Anand then filed a vakalatnama, and the delay was condoned on February 12, 1960, when the revision was admitted. The revision petition was in fact filed within 45 days. Omission to file a vakalatnama was an irregularity and it could be cured. The preliminary objection is, therefore, overruled. (The rest of the judgment is not material for this report -- Ed.)
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1960 (11) TMI 127 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... efore to reiterate the position in law upon this point, which seems to me to have been clearly enunciated above. I have been informed that this decision is the subject matter of an appeal to the Supreme Court. But until the decision is set aside, it must be taken to be good law. For these reasons, I hold that the second point raised is also without substance and that the Assistant Collector of Customs has got ample jurisdiction to proceed with the matter and hold the enquiry and that this application is premature. Lastly, I find that the question of delay has been mentioned in the affidavits although it was not pressed before me. It does seem that there has been considerable delay in coming to this court, which has not been satisfactorily explained. However, it is not necessary to decide this case upon this preliminary point. 8. The result is that this application must be dismissed.The rule is discharged.Interim orders, if any, are vacated.There will be no order as to costs.
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1960 (11) TMI 126 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent. The account books submitted by the assessee do not even mention the name of the lady. In the Hathfer Khata the expression used for the deposit is Upper Sey. There was also no evidence produced by the assessee before the income-tax authorities to establish that the amount really belonged to the lady concerned. In these circumstances we think that there were sufficient materials before the income-tax authorities to hold that there was wilful suppression by the assessee of the particulars of his income within the meaning of section 28(1)(C) of the Income-tax Act. We accordingly hold that the penalty imposed under section 28(1)(C) of the Income-tax Act is legally valid and, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the second question referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal must also be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Income-tax Department. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (11) TMI 125 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ot; is intended to indicate that the expenses should relate directly to the income seems to us to be opposed to the inference that is naturally derivable from the proviso to which we have referred. The learned judges who decided Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax v. Pullangode Rubber and Produce Co. Ltd. 1960 40 I.T.R. 681 (Ker.) do not appear to have considered the impact which the; proviso has upon the main provision. We accordingly hold that the expenditure incurred upon the clearings containing immature plants would properly be includable in the expenses of cultivating the crop. The crop in the context is not merely with reference to the particular tree from which the yield is derived but the entire plantation consisting of both mature and immature plants. The petition is accordingly allowed. The assessment is direct to be revise in the light of what has been stated above. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 100. Petition allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 124 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e directions given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner might be complied with by the Income-tax Officer and it is then only that all the relevant material would be on the record to enable the authorities to decide the case properly. We are unable to appreciate this contention. The principal ground in the appeal to the Tribunal related to the validity of the proceedings under section 34 and, in declining to give its decision on the question raised, the Tribunal, as observed above, acted on an erroneous view of the law that in the absence of a subsisting demand the appeal had become infructuous. The propriety of proceedings under section 34 should have been determined upon the material already on record. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the question referred to us should be answered in the negative. The assessee will have its costs which we assess at ₹ 200. Fee of learned counsel for the Department is fixed at the same amount. Question answered in the negative.
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1960 (11) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , the essential condition for acquisition for a public purpose is that the cost of the acquisition should be borne, wholly or in part, out of public funds. Hence, an acquisition for a Company may also be made for a public purpose, within the meaning of the Act, if a part or the whole of the cost of acquisition is met by public funds. If, on the other hand, the acquisition for a Company is to be made at the cost entirely of the Company itself, such an acquisition comes under the provisions of Part VII. As in the present instance, it appears that part at any rate of the compensation to be awarded for the acquisition is to come eventually from out of public revenues, it must be held that the acquisition is not for a Company simpliciter. It was not, therefore, necessary to go through the procedure prescribed by Part VII. We, therefore, agree with the conclusion of the High Court, though not for the same reasons. The appeal, accordingly, is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 122 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he only penalty which can be imposed upon an assessee is one under section 28(1)(a) of the Act. Our answer to this question makes it unnecessary for us to answer the second question referred to us which has become purely academic. As already pointed out by me, the omission on the part of the Income- tax Officer in this case to separate the two sets of penalties has made it impossible for any one to identify the penalty imposed under section 28(1)(a). The question as to whether it is incumbent on the Income-tax Officer in all cases where he imposes penalties both under clauses (a) and (b) of section 28(1) to separately quantify the penalties imposed under each of these clauses is one which does not arise for consideration and we should not, in my opinion, express any opinion on it. In the circumstances of this case it does not appear to me that we should direct the Commissioner of Income-tax to pay the costs of the assessee. HEGDE, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (11) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... election is to be held but that would only mean that it has to be held within a reasonable time of the commencement of the new Act. The course suggested by me is not without the support of precedents. Thus in Salmon v. Duncombe (1) (1886) 11 App. Cas. 627., the Judicial Committee in construing a statute omitted from it the words " as if such natural born subject resided in England " because the retention of those words would have prevented the person contemplated getting full power to dispose of his immovable property by his will which it was held, the object of the statute was, he should get. With regard to the other point argued in this .appeal, namely, whether the Municipal Committee even if properly constituted, has power to sell the land mentioned in the petition, I agree, for the reasons mentioned in the judgment delivered by the majority of the members of the bench, that it has such power and have nothing to add. The appeal therefore fails. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... his aspect and have kept in mind the undisputed right of the legislature to decide what provisions are necessary to give effect to the main object of the legislation. In these cases the petitioners have complained that the main object of the impugned provisions is not the prohibition of slaughter of animals which are still useful; the impugned provisions as they are worded really put a total ban on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and buffaloes and for all practical purposes they put a stop to the profession and trade of the petitioners. We have held that this complaint is justified in respect of the main provisions in the three Acts. We, therefore, allow the three writ petitions and direct, as we directed in Md. Hanif Quareshi's case (1) 1959 S.C.R. 629.the respondent States not to enforce the Acts or the rules made thereunder in so far as they have been declared void by us. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs of the hearing in this Court. Petitions allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f secrecy on the document; nor, in my view, public interest demands such secrecy. In a conflict between the administration of justice and the claim of privilege by the State, I have no hesitation to overrule the claim of privilege. Before closing, I must notice one fact. In this case, the Chief Secretary filed an affidavit. But, in my view, the minister should have done it. The respondent did not object to this either in the district court or in the High Court. In the circumstances, I would not reject the claim of privilege on the basis of this procedural defect. In the result, I would allow the appeal in respect of the minutes of the cabinet and dismiss it in other respects. As the parties have succeeded and failed in part, I direct them to bear their own costs throughout. BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority, this appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court restored with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (11) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y the terms of the statute. The last point that has been urged is that even if s. 20(1) applies, the Scindias are bound to take back the appellants. Suffice it to say that there is no force in this contention either. As soon as the appellants became by force of law the employees of the Corporation, as they did so become on August 1, 1953, in the circumstances of this case, they had no further right against the Scindias and could not; claim to be taken back in their employment on the ground that they were still their employees, in spite of the operation of s. 20(1) of the Act. Nor could they claim any of the alternative benefits specified in the order of reference, as from August 1, 1953, they are by operation of law only the employees of the Corporation and can have no rights whatsoever against the Scindias. We are therefore of opinion that the tribunal's decision is correct. The appeal fails and is thereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 117 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s for which the Income- tax Officer made the addition were at all proper or relevant. These reasons given by the Income-tax Officer, however, have not been expressly approved of by the Tribunal. The Tribunal itself proceeded in an unreasonable manner to make an estimate which as mentioned above was quite unjustified and based on no material. We are unable to hold that the so-called finding given by the Tribunal was a finding of fact at all. It is purely an arbitrary guess based on no material whatsoever. Having heard learned counsel at some length we are of opinion that the answer to the second question must be in the negative. As we have answered to second question in the negative and in favour of the assessee, learned counsel for the assessee does not press that the first question may be answered. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at ₹ 200. We fix the fee of the learned counsel for the Department at the same amount. Reference answered accordingly.
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1960 (11) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the power of the Governor under Art. 310 to terminate the services of a Government servant at pleasure is part of the executive power of the State under Art. 154 of the Constitution?
Held that:- Paragraph 489 only empowers the holding of a departmental trial in regard to a police officer only after a police investigation under the Criminal Procedure Code. When a rule says that a departmental trial can be held only after a police investigation, it is not permissible to hold that it can be held without such investigation. For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that para. 486 is mandatory and that, as the investigation has not been held under chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, the subsequent inquiry and the order of dismissal are illegal.
For the foregoing reasons we hold that, as the respondent was dismissed without complying with the provisions of para. 486(1), the order of dismissal is illegal and that the High Court is right in setting aside the order of dismissal. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed
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1960 (11) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the levy imposed by the impugned Act amounts to a fee relatable to Entry 23 read with Entry 66 in List II?
Held that:- It is difficult to hold that the field covered by the declaration made by s. 2 of this Act, considered in the light of its several provisions, is the same as the field covered by the impugned Act. That being so, it cannot be said that as a result of Entry 52 read with Act LXV of 1951 the vires of the impugned Act can be successfully challenged.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the impugned Act is relatable to Entries 23 and 66 in List II of the Seventh Schedule, and its validity is not impaired or affected by Entries 52 and 54 in List I read with Act LXV of 1951 and Act LIII of 1948 respectively. In view of this conclusion it is unnecessary to consider whether the impugned Act can be justified under Entry 50 in List II, or whether it is relatable to Entry 24 in List III and as such suffexs from the vice of repugnancy with the Central Act XXXII of 1947. The result is the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1960 (11) TMI 114 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ere construing there is similar to the provision before us. This decision supports the view that we are taking. In Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Madurai Division, Madurai v. A. Anantharama Nadar and Sons 1970 25 S.T.C. 276., a Division Bench referred the matter to a Full Bench. The Full Bench was asked to consider whether the sale of agricultural produce by an agent of the principal who has grown the said produce will be liable to tax. The Full Bench answered the question in the affirmative. It was required to answer the question on the basis of the definition of the word turnover in section 2(r) of the Madras Sales Tax Act. Section 2(r) is similar to section 2(i) (including the proviso) of our Act. This decision also supports our view. In the result, our answer to the two referred questions are in the affirmative. The Commissioner of Sales Tax shall get costs which we assess at Rs. 100. There shall be a single set of costs. References answered in the affirmative.
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1960 (11) TMI 113 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Act as including horticulture observed that it gave an indication that the word agriculture was used in a narrower sense. It is for the reason, it has been held, that the decisions bearing on the definition of that word as contained in the Madras Estates Land Act would afford no assistance in deciding a matter under the Indian Income-tax Act. For these reasons we hold that the expression agricultural produce in rule 5 is confined only to the agricultural produce understood in a narrow sense and excludes horticultural produce. Therefore, the notification now impugned is not obnoxious to rule 5(2)(f) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules. It follows that the notification is valid and cannot be successfully attacked. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. As the same principle applies to T.R.C. Nos. 18 of 1960, 15 of 1960 and 56 of 1960, they are also dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each of them. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (11) TMI 112 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ice. 7.. In the above view we hold that rule 17(3-A) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules and the substituted rule 13 of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules are invalid since the provisions of section 19(4) of the Sales Tax Act are not complied with. Therefore we allow T.R.C. No. 92 of 1959 in part and set aside the order of the Commercial Tax Officer, Malabar South, Kozhikode, reopening the assessment on the petitioner and assessing him on an escaped turnover of Rs. 6,19,764. To this extent the assessment order of the Commercial Tax Officer and the order confirming the same by the Appellate Tribunal are set aside. In T.R.C. No. 93 of 1959 we set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal as well as the Department and remit the case to the assessing officer for assessing the petitioner under the old rule 13, if the said authority so desires. In the circumstances of these cases we direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Ordered accordingly.
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