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Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 706 Records
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1961 (10) TMI 108 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed in effect and substance as a continuation of the predecessor Court when the entire jurisdiction, power and authority possessed by the successor Court can be traced to the predecessor Court and the decisions of the predecessor Court must, therefore, tie accorded the same binding character and effect as if they were decisions of the successor Court. This, in my opinion, is the true ground on which must rest the binding authority of decisions of the High Court of Bombay given prior to the appointed day qua this High Court. 146. I, therefore, agree with the answer given by My Lord the Chief Justice in the majority judgment to the question referred to the Special Bench and hold that the decisions of the High Court of Bombay given prior to the appointed day i.e., 1st May 1960, do not constitute "law in force" within the meaning of Section 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, but have the same, binding force and effect as if they were decisions of this High Court.
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1961 (10) TMI 107 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... e annexure "B" to the statement of the case and summary of these agreements in so far as payment of bonus goes is annexure "A" to the case. We fail to see how from these agreements it can be inferred that the bonus paid to the employees was not out of profits. On the other hand, these documents would show that the agreement relating to payment of bonus was reached between the employer and the employees after the completion of the year, when the position as regards the available profits must have been ascertained. 8. In our opinion, therefore, the first question will have to be answered in the negative. We answer the question accordingly. In view of our answer to the first question, the remaining questions do not survive and need not be answered. In the circumstances of the case, especially in view of the fact that care was not taken in getting framed the real question that arose in this case, we make no order as to costs. 9. Questions answered accordingly.
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1961 (10) TMI 106 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . But that is a different matter. In the absence of any express provision in the Income Tax law and on general principles we do not see why a partner in an unregistered firm should not be permitted to claim a set-off in respect of his share of loss in an unregistered firm against the profits of his other business simply because the department does not choose to determine the losses of the unregistered firm." 8. With these observations we respectfully agree. In our view, the Income Tax Officer cannot, by his own act or omission, put the assessee at a disadvantage, unless a discretion is given to his under the law to do so, with a view to depriving the assessee of any advantage which he may derive in claiming the set- off. No such discretion has been provided under the Act. 9. In this view, our answer to the question in both the references is in the affirmative. These references are accordingly ordered with costs in R.C. No. 1 of 1960. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1961 (10) TMI 105 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e accounting year or not provided the Income-tax Officer was satisfied about the genuineness of the firm. We have, however, to decide the question, which has been referred to us according to the position in law and, as we have already stated, we must answer it by saying that the assessee firm was not entitled to obtain registration for the assessment year 1953-54. That the assessee firm was not entitled as of right to obtain registration under section 26A would, however, not disentitle the income-tax authorities to permit registration following the instructions, which have been issued by the Board of Revenue as we find from the observations of Hidayatullah J. referred to above. In view of the finding of the Tribunal that there is no material on the basis of which the genuineness of the firm can be questioned or suspected, the assessee, we hope, may not find it difficult to obtain registration for the assessment year 1953-54. The assessee will pay. the costs of the department.
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1961 (10) TMI 104 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... would be urged against him that he did not write off the debt in that year. Therefore, the assessee always finds himself on the horns of a dilemma and it is the duty of the department to take a sympathetic view of the matter if in fact that debt was never recovered. Therefore, if the debt was not allowed to the assessee in the year of account, there is not reason why the department should not consider allowing him this debt in the next year." 9. The material on the record shows that out of the sum of ₹ 2,23,162 the assessee had been able to recover only two sums, namely, ₹ 8,322 and ₹ 42,000. The assessee had not been able to recover anything beyond that up to now. There cannot be any doubt that the balance of the amount that had remained to be recovered had subsequently become a bad in some year or other. 10. Our answer to the second question is in the negative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the department. 11. Questions answered in the negative.
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1961 (10) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d have as against their new sovereign, were those, and only those, which that new sovereign by agreement express or implied, or by legislation, chose to confer upon them." Thus, before the respondents could claim the 'benefit of s. 299(1) of the Constitution Act, 1935 they had to establish that on November 9, 1947, or thereafter they possessed legally enforceable rights with respect to the properties in question as against the Dominion of India. They could establish this only by showing that their pre-existing rights, such .as they were, were recognized by the Dominion of India. If they could not establish this fact, then it must be held that they did not possess any legally enforceable rights against the Dominion of India and, therefore, s. 299(1) of the Constitution Act, 1935 avails them nothing. As already stated a. 299(1) did not enlarge anyone's right to property but only protected the one which a person already had. Any right to property which in its very.
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1961 (10) TMI 102 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... led to exemption from payment of tax on the said amount of ₹ 2,45,557. We do not consider it necessary to deal with the other decisions referred to by counsel for the parties inasmuch as in our view the decision in each case turned on the facts of that case and none of them is a direct authority on the question which falls for our consideration in this case. Before parting with the case, it has to be said that a notice of motion was taken out by the counsel for the Commissioner for correction of the statement of the case. It was not opposed on behalf of the assessee. The notice of motion is allowed and the statement of the case would stand so corrected. In the print supplied to us, a copy of the appellate order of the Tribunal was not included. But the copies were filed before us during the course of the hearing. They be taken on record. In the result, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee.
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1961 (10) TMI 101 - MAHARASHTRA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ive or were not in existence at the time the Act came into operation. For reasons stated above, in our opinion, the action of the first Expenditure-tax Officer, first respondent hereto, in issuing a notice under sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act was without jurisdiction and, therefore, void in law. The notice issued by hint is, therefore, liable to be quashed. In the. result we set aside the said notice and further direct the first respondent not to take any steps or proceedings under the Act against the petitioners in respect of the expenditure incurred by the late Maharaja of Morvi during the period 1st April, 1957, to 17th August, 1957. The rule is accordingly made absolute against the first respondent to the extent as stated above. The first respondent shall pay the costs of the petitioners. The rule against the second respondent is discharged. In the circumstances of the case, we do not consider it necessary to make any order as to costs of the second respondent.
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1961 (10) TMI 100 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ur of the trustees and not in favour of the minors. The argument is that tinder section 16(3)(a)( iv) the transferees of the assets have to be the minor children themselves and, therefore, when cine transfer is not to the minor child, but to the trustee, though for the benefit of the minor child, it is not a transfer to which the provisions of section 16(3)(a)( iv) of the Act applies. We do not think it necessary to answer this question in view of our answer to the second question. Even on the footing that the settlement by a trust deed would amount to an indirect transfer in favour of the beneficiaries under the settlement, we have held in dealing with the second question that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there were no direct or indirect transfers by Keshavji and his son in favour of their own minor children. That being so, we do not answer the first question as being unnecessary to be answered. The assessees will get their costs from the Commissioner.
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1961 (10) TMI 99 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s", in the other clauses, as already stated, we have no doubt that the entire amount had not become due to the assessee on the date of the agreement. It is difficult to assume that option was given to the debtor not to pay his debt. 9. It is true that the assessee has, in its books of account, treated that the entire amount of ₹ 48,000 had accrued due to it on the date of the agreement, but to that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, hardly any importance could be attached. 10. In our opinion, therefore, it is not possible to hold that the Tribunal was in error in holding that the two amounts of ₹ 12,000 and ₹ 6,000 received by the assessee from the two respective principals are taxable under section 10(5A) of the Act. The answer to the question referred to us, therefore, will have to be returned in the affirmative. We answer it accordingly. The assessee shall pay the costs of the Commissioner. 11. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1961 (10) TMI 98 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d its sale, it would have been possible to hold that any profit arising from such an adventure was in the line of the business of the assessee by reason of his association with the firm of managing agents. This is not the case here. This was an independent transaction of the assessee, which, in our opinion, displays all indications of its being an acquisition of a capital asset, and its subsequent sale after a fairly lengthy interval of enjoyment of that property did not result in any revenue profit. In the light of the argument addressed to us and in the light of the real point at issue, we modify the second question to read "Whether the sum of ₹ 1,75,000 is assessable as profit from an adventure in the nature of a trade?" and answer that question in favour of the assessee and against the department. In this view, it is unnecessary to deal with the other question that has been stated. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1961 (10) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e payment of wages during the leave period, for under that section the management would have to pay at a rate equal to the daily average of their total full time earnings for the days they worked. The factory registers would show the total full time earnings of each worker for the days during the month immediately preceding his leave. The average shall be taken of the earnings of those days and the daily average of those earnings would be the criterion for fixing the wages during the leave period. I cannot, therefore, say that s. 79 of the Act by its impact on s. 80 thereof makes it inapplicable to a worker of the category with which we are now concerned. This argument, therefore, is rejected. No other question was raised before us. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. By Court. In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed, the order of the Court below set aside and the appellant acquitted. Fine, if paid, will be refunded. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (10) TMI 96 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he court of King's bench; commanding, upon good cause shown to the Court, the party complaining to be admitted or restored to his office." 11. For these reasons, I consider that in the present case a writ of mandamus should go principally to respondents Nos. 2 and 3, commanding them not to give effect to the order, and to withdraw their recognition of the existing Managing Committee constituted of respondents Nos. 4 to 13. But in order to make that Writ effective and as consequential to that writ I would issue a direction under Article 226 of the Constitution to respondents Nos. 4 to 13 to make over charge of the school to the Managing Committee appointed by the Samaj, by its resolution dated the 27th March, I960, and to its Secretary, Sri J. Kundu, and to desist from interfering with the management of the school by the Samaj. 12. I would accordingly allow this application, but I propose to make no Order as to costs. Choudhary, J. 13. I agree. Sahai, J. 14. I agree.
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1961 (10) TMI 95 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... wspaper (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1958 SC 578, in support of the contention that it is only legislation directly dealing with the right mentioned in Article 19(1) that was protected by it and, if the legislation was not a direct legislation on the subject the said Article would have no application, the test being not the effect or result of the legislation but its subject matter. A similar argument advanced in the Supreme Court by the learned Attorney General is dealt with at pages 618 and 619 of the Report and has been accepted. Finding myself alone under the necessity of deciding this point and, as at present advised, I accept the argument of the learned Government Advocate and hold that in the present case at the instance of the decree-holder it cannot be held that Section 49M is unconstitutional and violates any fundamental right of the decree-holder. 88. In the result, I would dismiss both the appeal and the Civil Revision but would make no order as to costs.
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1961 (10) TMI 94 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e government exercises his powers of eminent domain and acquires property, public funds have to be utilised for the payment of compensation to the true owner and not merely to any claimant who cares to appears on the screen. The Government have a special responsibility in this regard. and cannot later take refuge behind the pretext that the compensation was pain to the claimant who actually appeared while others did not appear. So long as that is the situation the acquiring officer has aright to make such a reference, even if a dispute or controversy as to title arises on the documents before him. He cannot be made liable for costs, and it is the party who has to bear the costs incurred in establishing the title of the party to receive the compensation amount. 5. According, I allow the second the appeal and direct that award of costs against the Government by the learned Additional District Judge be set aside. The parties will bear their costs here. No leave. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (10) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is new sovereign in the matter of establishing their rights in the municipal courts of the new sovereign because that provision only protected such rights as the new citizen had at the moment of his becoming a citizen of the Indian Dominion. It did not enlarge his rights nor did it cure any infirmity in the rights of that citizen This is the view which we have taken in our judgment in State of Gujarat v. Jamadar Mahomed Abdulla 1962 3 SCR 970 . In that case the rights of the grantees from the former ruler of Junagadh were not recognised at any time by the Dominion of India and so we held that even after becoming citizens of the Indian Dominion they could not assert those rights in the municipal courts of the Dominion of India. We adhere to that view and reject the first argument of Mr. Viswanatha Sastri. Since we agree with the rest of the judgment there is nothing more that we need say. Petitions 79 of 1957. 168 of 1958 and 4 of 1959 allowed. Petition 167 of 1958 dismissed.
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1961 (10) TMI 92 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... that some of the terms of the lease do indicate in a certain manner that the assessee wanted the theatre and its equipment to be maintained in the manner in which it had maintained it while it was exhibiting motion pictures itself, so as to be available to it in the same condition when it would resume the exhibiting of films itself. In our opinion, therefore, the view which the Tribunal has taken in the present case, that income which the assessee received from the lease of the theatre and its equipment was not its income from business in which it was engaged is erroneous and, consequently, the first question referred to us in this reference should be answered in the negative. We order accordingly. In the view that we have taken and the answer which we have given to the first question, the second question does not arise for consideration and need not be answered. We do not, therefore, proceed to answer the second question. The assessee will get its costs from the department.
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1961 (10) TMI 91 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... conclusion that type building would have cost not less than ₹ 60,000 "even on a most modest and conservative estimate." We are not satisfied that the estimate was based on nonexistent or insufficient material and must hold that the difference between the return and the estimated cost, ₹ 39,500, should attract the penalty as contended by the department. In the light of what is stated in paragraphs 3 to 13 above we must answer questions Nos. 2 and 3 in the negative and in favour of the assessee so far as the sum of ₹ 30,000 is concerned and in the affirmative and against the assessee so far as the sums of ₹ 10,000 and ₹ 39,500 are concerned. The three questions referred are answered as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) so section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Questions answered accordingly.
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1961 (10) TMI 90 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... owed in any assessment of the prior years, the written down value of the machinery continues to remain the cost price incurred by the assessee in acquiring the machinery or the assets. It is not necessary to refer to the other case on which reliance has been placed by the assessee. The decision on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Joshi, Commissioner of Income-tax v. National Electrical Industries 1959 37 I.T.R. 131 in our opinion, has no bearing on the question we have to consider and is of little assistance to the department. The question that fell for consideration in the case related to the priority between the benefit of exemption from payment of tax under section 15C and the set-off in respect of loss of the previous year under section 24(2) of the Act. For reasons stated above, the answer to the question referred to will have to be in the affirmative. We answer accordingly. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1961 (10) TMI 89 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sh Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer 1962 1 SCR 676. In that case the Supreme Court discussed the case law on the subject and said "... where the rights of a person are affected by an order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned". What we are concerned with, however, is not the starting point of a period of limitation but the expiry of a period of grace granted to the assessee in spite of his default and terminating-automatically- on an assessment being made. We see no reason to hold, in such a case, that the making of the assessment is not when the officer does so, but when the order is communicated to the assessee. It follows that the appeal should fail and has to be dismissed. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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