|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 85 Records
-
1962 (9) TMI 90 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... mere fact that the partners did not adhere to the term relating to payment of interest as provided in that instrument can be no ground for refusing to register the firm. This is what the Tribunal stated "It is not the department's case that the profits as ascertained by the firm were not divided amongst the partners in accordance with their individual shares as specified in the instrument of partnership governing the constitution of the firm." What we wish to emphasise is that the ground for refusing to register can be the non-existence of the firm as constituted by the instrument of partnership and not mere subsequent deviation from one of the terms relating to the marking of accounts. In this view, the firm is entitled to registration under section 26A of the Income-tax Act on the basis of the application dated April 4, 1958. The reference is, therefore, answered in the manner indicated above. All the costs of this reference shall be borne by the department.
-
1962 (9) TMI 89 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the share of the heir shall be and it specifies it clearly to be that share on partition, if partition had been effected immediately, before the coparcener's death. Though factually no partition may have taken place, the quantum of the share of the female heir is effectively determined by this provision and no curtailment of that share is permissible on foot of the existence of the joint family or of the valid exercise of the power of the father to make a gift. 17. It follows that the plaintiffs' share will have to be determined without reference to the gift. 18. We can see no justification for the disallowance of mesne profits and costs, even on the ground that the plaintiffs have put forward a "bloated" claim. The plaintiffs will be entitled to proportionate costs here, in the memorandum of cross objections, and in the court below, and also to mesne profits from the date of suit. 19. The appeal is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs therein.
-
1962 (9) TMI 88 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ad yet a long term to run and would not be available. There is the further fact of the acquisition of another 250 shares by Shyamsunder from Lala Ramrattan Ji in February 1945. It was only when these 250 shares are added to the original holding of 8,750 shares of Shyamsunder that his total holding comes to 9,000 shares out of which the assessee held 1,125 shares. There could be no other motive at all for the purchase of the additional 250 shares in February 1945, except the motive of gain. For all these reasons the question referred must be answered in the affirmative. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar under section 66(5) of the Act. The department shall be entitled to its costs fixed at Rs. 200. M.C. DESAI C.J.--I agree that the question be answered in the affirmative. I also agree with the order preferred by my brother Brijlal Gupta. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1962 (9) TMI 87 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ch are words of transfer, the transaction could not be said to be a transaction of surrender. He has in that connection invited our attention to certain observations in Provident Investment Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax where their Lordships have pointed out a distinction between a transfer and relinquishment. In our opinion there is no transfer either intended or expressed in the document, which is before us. We have already dealt with that part of the document is one of transfer. In our opinion, the document of 21st July, 1955, is a document of surrender whereby Bai Kasturbai has relinquished her interest under the trust deed and has thus accelerated the benefit to the charities under the trust deed. 7. In our opinion, therefore, the answer to the question referred to us must be in the affirmative. We answer accordingly. Commissioner will pay the costs of the assessee. No order on the notice of motion. No order as to costs. 8. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1962 (9) TMI 86 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... owed, but the Court was wrong in doing so. In view of Section 34 of the Act and the stay of the suit under Section 34, the provisions of Chapter II should have been followed by the parties and the Court lost sight of this fact. 8. It is next contended that the Court has inherent power to pass the order in question. But where the Act is clear and where the Act does not contemplate an order under Section 25 of the Act but contemplates that the parties should follow the provisions contained in Chapter II, to pass an order under Section 25, which is in Chapter IV of the Act, is clearly a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction and is not warranted by the application of the principle of inherent powers. 9. The revision, application is, therefore, allowed and the order of the lower Court is set aside. The question whether an order under Section 12(2)(b) of the Act should be passed should be considered by the Court at the proper stage. No order as to costs throughout.
-
1962 (9) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... aken into consideration. In view of these features which characterise the commitment proceedings we are of opinion that those proceedings can be regarded as part of the same judicial proceeding which culminated in the decision of the court of Sessions. Upon that view it would follow that even when the Sessions judge is unable to say which of the two contradictory statements is false or even where he is of opinion that the statement before the Committing Magistrate is false it is for him and him alone to act under s. 479- A(1). We, therefore., reject both the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Prem. For these reasons we hold that the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate was right in discharging the appellant and that the High Court was in error in setting aside the order of discharge and directing the Chief Presidency Magistrate to proceed on the basis that the complaint was made after following the procedure laid down in ss. 476 to s.479, Code of Criminal Procedure. Appeal allowed.
-
1962 (9) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... for that would, by eliminating general competition in a large field and by creating wide- spread dissatisfaction amongst the employees, materially affect efficiency. Therefore, like the special provision improperly made under Art. 15(4), reservation made under Art 16(4) beyond the permissible and legitimate limits would be liable to be challenged as a fraud on the Constitution. In this connect ion it is necessary to emphasis that Art. 15 (4) is an enabling provision; it does not impose an obligation, but merely leaves it to the discretion of the appropriate government to take suitable action, if necessary. In the result, we allow the writ petitions and direct, that an appropriate writ or order or direction should, be issued restraining the three respondents from giving effect to the impugned order in terms of the prayer made in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph 38 of the petitions. The petitioners would be entitled to their costs, one set of hearing fees. Petitions allowed.
-
1962 (9) TMI 82 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o have dismissed the revision petition under section 53 of the Act summarily without fixing a date of hearing and without issuing a notice to the petitioner. We express no opinion on the question whether execution of the certificate is barred by the law of limitation. The point should be determined by the Board of Revenue in accordance with law. We pass the following order We adjudge and declare that the notice under section 7 of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, was duly served on the petitioner. The order of the Board of Revenue dated November 11, 1961, is hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted to the Board of Revenue so that the Board of Revenue may decide the question whether execution of the certificate is barred by the law of limitation and thereafter dispose of the objection of the petitioner in accordance with law and in accordance with the observations made above. Each party will pay and bear her or its own costs. CHATTERJEE J.--I agree.
-
1962 (9) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... established that the land was never the raiyati land of the appellant but was the pradhani jote of Maharaj Rai Ghatwal. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether in the facts and circumstances of that case the decision of the High Court was correct. We need only say that this case did not purport to decide that the entry Bakasht would always imply the negation of a raiyati right. It may be mentioned that the attention of the learned judges ,who decided this case was drawn to the High Court’s decision in the case now under appeal before us and they distinguished it by saying that the earlier decision should be held to be a finding restricted to its own facts. and circumstances. Our conclusion therefore is that the High Court was right in holding that the sale of May 15, 1935 was void with respect to the raiyati interest and only the right to receive rent passed by this sale to the defendants first party. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (9) TMI 80 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... on for the purpose of levy of tax, it should equally be open to the legislature to vary the incidence of tax in so far as the two classes are concerned. In fact, the resident is liable to be taxed on his total world income, while a non-resident is liable to be taxed only on the territorial income but at a rate dependent on the total world income. We are not concerned with the question whether tax can be imposed on the non-resident in the same manner as the resident on the total world income. We are only dealing with the question whether a rate of tax dependent upon the classification of the assessee as resident or non-resident has a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. We are unable to see any constitutional disability in this regard and we cannot agree that article 14 is in any way violated. The question is answered against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered against the assessee.
-
1962 (9) TMI 79 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e Income-tax Act, 1922, has jurisdiction not only with regard to questions of law but also in respect of questions of fact. Consequently, it could come to its own conclusions even in respect of matters of fact and it had no obligations whatsoever to come to those conclusions only after first criticising or accepting the findings of the Tribunal. Under the circumstances, we are not impressed with the second submission of Mr. Pathak also. We have come to the conclusions that the Tribunal was right in holding against the assessees. We, therefore, answer question No. 4 in the affirmative and against the assessees. In the result, questions Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are answered in favour of the assessees and question No. 4 against them. Inasmuch as some of the questions have been decided in favour of the assessees and the others against them, we think it proper not to award costs in this case. We, however, assess the fee of the learned counsel for the department at a figure of ₹ 500.
-
1962 (9) TMI 78 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the bills was not known nor could the amount be approximately calculated by the assessee. As we have said above from the claim of ₹ 50,000 the solicitors dropped down to a claim of ₹ 24,000 and odd. The assessee had not acknowledged the liability for the payment of this amount. It was only after the bill had been finally settled during the assessment year that the liability for the payment of the same accrued against the assessee. In the circumstances, we think that, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, question No. 3 must be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. We, therefore, answer this question in favour of the assessee and hold that the assessee was entitled to claim the expenditure of ₹ 24,000 in the year under assessment. In view of the fact that the parties have partly succeeded and partly failed, we direct them to bear their own costs. We, however, assess the fee of learned counsel for the department at ₹ 300.
-
1962 (9) TMI 77 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... and should not be discriminatingly proceeded against in the absence of his brother, Rajagopalan. His contention was that the estate of the deceased has become altered in its character by becoming part and parcel of the joint family estate of himself and his brother. For the purpose of an escaped assessment against Chidambara's estate the subsequent character of the property in the hands of Vridhachala or Ramanathan is of no consequence as the only question is who is the legal representative liable to be proceeded against under the Act. Ramanathan admits that he is the karta of a joint family of himself and his brother. If that is the true position his brother also is effectively represented in these proceedings. Whichever way one looks at the matter, it is obvious that the estate of Chidambara is properly represented in the proceedings under section 34. The question is answered against the assessee who will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
-
1962 (9) TMI 76 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... . At best it can be said that there was some slight mistake of procedure. It is well established that procedure is but the machinery of the law--the channel and means whereby law is administered and justice reached. It strangely departs from its proper office when, in place of facilitating, it is permitted to obstruct, and even extinguish, legal rights, and is thus made to govern where it ought to subserve (See Henry J.B. Kendall v. Peter Hamilton 1879 4 App. Cas. 504 and Chhotey Lal Kishan Lal v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1962 45 I.T.R. 490. For the reasons mentioned above, we find no merits in the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee and answer the question referred to us in the affirmative in favour of the department and against the assessee. The assessee shall pay the department a sum of ₹ 200 by way of costs of this reference. The fee of the learned counsel for the department is also assessed at the same figure. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1962 (9) TMI 75 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... on of the partition of the assets of the joint family, income and capital assumed the character of capital in the hand of the divided members. In our opinion, therefore, the department and the Tribunal went wrong in holding that the sum of 9,045 dollars received by each of the three assessees was revenue receipt taxable as income. Learned counsel for the department does not support the view of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the opting for the "special scheme" by the family disentitles the individual assessees from claiming these amounts as capital. This aspect of the matter was considered in Muthiah v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1959 35 I.T.R. 339 and, following that decision, we hold that it would not be proper to take that circumstance into account in answering the question in the present case. The question is answered in favour of the assessees, who will get their costs from the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered accordingly.
-
1962 (9) TMI 74 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ed even though the machinery was not in active use and was kept idle. This case, however, is not of any great help because the machinery there was undoubtedly actively used for some time during the accounting year and, therefore, it was machinery used for the purposes of the business even though in a later part of the accounting year it was not in active use. I, therefore, decide that section 10(2)(vii) together with the second proviso is applicable in the instant case and the question must be answered in the affirmative. BRIJLAL GUPTA J.--I agree. BY THE COURT.--We answer the question in the affirmative and direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar as required by section 66(5) of the Income-tax Act. We further direct that the assessee shall pay to the Commissioner of Income-tax his costs of the reference, which we assess at ₹ 200. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1962 (9) TMI 73 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ared to the written down value of the boat. That is not a circumstance at all germane for determining the nature of the repairs. As we pointed out in the order calling for a revised statement of the case, the view of the Tribunal that the boat had gone up in re-sale value or its efficiency had increased is all speculative and is certainly belied by the certificates of registration. The expenditure was incurred only in replacing rotten planks, in sheathing the bottom of the boat with copper sheets and re-caulking and in incurring a considerable amount by way of labour charges in that connection. We are accordingly satisfied that all the decided cases on that point are in support of the assessee's claim that this is nothing more than current repairs eligible for allowance under section 10(2)(v) of the Act. The question is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered accordingly.
-
1962 (9) TMI 72 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... were shattered long before the relevant year of account. At best, he could only have had hope of realising something from a decree against Baij Nath Gauri Datt but even that suit was decided by the civil judge of Mathura on the 29th March, 1940, against him. Even if this could be said to have been a flicker of hope it was completely snuffed in the assessment year 1941-42, and no possible hope could have survived justifying the assessee in claiming the debt as bad in the relevant assessment year 1942- 43. On a consideration of the evidence on the record it cannot be said that there was no material for the Tribunal to have come to the conclusion that the two debts had become bad prior to the year of account. For these reasons, all the three questions are answered against the assessee and in favour of the department. The assessee will pay the costs of this petition which we assess at ₹ 200. The fee of learned counsel for the department is also assessed at the same figure.
-
1962 (9) TMI 71 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... overed by the assessee from his constituents by legal action. If, in these circumstances, the constituent was either unable to pay dues or refuses to pay the same to the assessee, because of the legal disability on the part of the assessee to recover them from him, the loss resulting therefrom could be said to have fallen on the assessee at the point of time when the inability of the constituent or his refusal to pay occurred. If such position occurred in the year of account, the assessee would be entitled to treat it as loss of the year of account and have it deducted from his profits or gains of his business. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal was right in the view that it has taken, that the assessee was entitled to have the amounts allowed to him in the respective assessment years. In the view that we are taking, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the assessee. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1962 (9) TMI 70 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f law. The result is that upon the admitted facts in the present case, the loss has arisen from transactions which must be held to be "speculative transactions", within the meaning of the expression as used in the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 24 read with Explanation 2. Consequently, the losses cannot be set off against profits and gains on headings which are non-speculative transactions, i.e., in respect of transactions in which delivery had been given. The result is that the question that has been asked should be answered as follows (1) Upon the facts and circumstances of this case, the transactions were in the nature of speculative ones within the meaning of the first proviso to section 24(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and that the loss of ₹ 6,39,897 cannot be set off against the profits and gains of the business. The Commissioner of Income-tax is entitled to his costs. Certified for two counsel. DATTA J.--I agree. Question answered accordingly.
|
