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Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 696 Records
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1966 (10) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pecific performance did in fact provide that all the defendants in that suit that is, including Kanji should sign the deed of conveyance. But it appears that through some misconception Kanji was not made to join in that conveyance and was only made to attest that document. But that would not, in our view, make any difference in the conclusion that as between Kanji and Lalji on the one hand and respondents 1 and 2 on the other the possession of the former could not be adverse and therefore there was no question of the suit of respondents 1 and 2 for redemption being barred by limitation. Further, being an attesting witness, Kanji both for himself and on behalf of Lalji was made fully aware that the sale deed conveying the title of the property was being passed in favour of respondents 1 and 2 and that the only right henceforth in them was to receive the mortgage amount and no more. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Y.P. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (10) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 957 Orissa, 112., the Orissa High Court held, on a consideration of the relevant conditions of employment, that a temporary extra- departmental branch post-master was not a person holding a civil post, but the observation in that case that a part- time employee cannot be the holder of a civil post outside the regularly constituted services is too wide and cannot be supported. In Sher Singh v. State of Rajasthan I.L.R. 1956 6 Rai. 335, 339-340, the Rajasthan High Court held that a chaudhari appointed under the Land Revenue Act of Bikaner is not entitled to the protection of Art. 311. The report of the case does not disclose the functions of the chaudhari and the regulations governing his employment. In Bindu Nath v. State of Assan A.I.R. 1959 Assam. II S. , the Court found that the applicant was never appointed to the post of a Mauzadar, and no question of the protection of Art. 311 could arise in the circumstances. The appeal is dismissed with costs. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (10) TMI 157 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... heless the limitation would be saved by the provisions of Act 1 of 1959. No such question was raised at any time before the income-tax authorities or the Tribunal, and the questions referred are not couched in terms of sufficient amplitude to cover any such enquiry on the basis of the amended law. In fact, as already observed, the questions are extremely narrow and relate specifically and directly only to the second proviso to section 34(3) of Act. In any case, the question of the applications of the amendment effected by Act 1 of 1959 would certainly require investigation of some facts. In these circumstances, we are not called upon to express any opinion on the applicability of the amendment effected by Act 1 of 1959. For the reasons given above, we would answer the questions in favour of the assessee. The department will pay the costs of the assessee, which we assess at ₹ 350. Counsels fee is also assessed at ₹ 350. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1966 (10) TMI 156 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o have passed upon the death of the father under s. 5 of the Act. The question was examined by the Board which found that the property was purchased entirely out of the funds of the deceased that for the purpose of income tax the deceased had declared the entire property as his own, and that the income therefrom was exclusively assessed in his hands. On these facts the Board held that though the property stood in the joint names of the deceased and his wife, she was merely a name-lender and the entire property belonged to the deceased and was rightly included in his estate for the purpose of estate duty. In view of this finding of fact it is not possible to accept the argument of the appellant that only half the share of the property should be taken for the purpose of estate duty assessment. o p /o p For the reasons expressed, we hold that the decision of the High Court is correct and this appeal must be dismissed with, costs. o p /o p G.C. o p /o p Appeal dismissed o p /o p
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1966 (10) TMI 155 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... agreement between himself and A.V. George, that he did not pay any advance to him, and that he had nothing to do with the finding of purchasers for the 22 plots. A reading of the sale deed--quite apart from the other evidence available--is sufficient to demonstrate the falsity of the assessee's statement. The fact that the assessee did not have the resources to buy even an estate worth a lakh of rupees when he entered into the agreement for the purchase of the Kuttikal Estate for ₹ 6 lakhs is of equal importance. In the light of what is stated above, we must answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the department. We do so with costs; advocate's fee ₹ 100. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Appellate Tribunal as required by sub-section (5) of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1966 (10) TMI 154 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re was an implied surrender of the lease, if any, created by the document dated March 2, 1939. There is no force in this contention. The lease dated November 3, 1951 was not granted in accordance with the Rules made under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 and by s. 4(2) of that Act was void and of no effect. The lease dated December 2, 1939 is the only subsisting lease and could properly be modified by the Controller. o p /o p The lease was for excavating white clay. In order to bring it in conformity with the Act and the Rules, its period could be cut down to 20 years from December 2, 1939. Actually, the Controller cut down the period to 25 years from December 2, 1939. The appellant can have no just grievance against this order. For the reasons given in our judgment in C.A. Nos. 172-174 of 1963, the other contentions of the appellant are rejected. o p /o p The appeal is dismissed with costs. o p /o p Y. P. o p /o p Appeal partly allowed. o p /o p
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1966 (10) TMI 153 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ese words show that document filed is a true copy of the award and as it bears the signature of the umpire, it is a signed copy thereof. It may be added that the words "now I hereby reproduce a true copy of the said award which is as follows" which appear at the beginning of the document and which are signed by the umpire Sri Dildar Hussain also in our opinion are sufficient to show that what was produced in court was a signed copy of the award as required by s. 14(2). In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider the alternative argument raised on behalf of the appellant. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the orders of the courts below and, holding that a signed copy of the award has been filed as required by s. 14(2), direct that further proceedings will be taken in the matter as required by law by the Subordinate Judge in whose court the signed copy of the award was filed. Costs of this Court will abide the final result. G.C. Appeal allowed
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1966 (10) TMI 152 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... his or her "total income during the previous year exceeded the minimum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax". Apart from the sum of ₹ 24,500 which the Income-tax Officer took to be her income from an undisclosed source and also took the same amount as income from an undisclosed source of the husband, the only other income was of ₹ 669. Therefore, so far as the assessee is concerned, it was open to her to argue that she was not obliged to file any return under section 22(1) of the Act. It is also not necessary to decide whether the primary facts in the shape of her account books were disclosed to the Income-tax Officer during the course of the assessment proceedings taken against the Hindu undivided family in respect of this very sum of ₹ 24,500. For the reasons given above, we would answer the question referred in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The department will pay the costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 250.
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1966 (10) TMI 150 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... for sale of the mortgaged property. We therefore partly allow the appeal and declare that the amount due to the bank on April 9, 1953, the date of the suit, would be ₹ 15,956/7/- plus compound interest at the rate of ₹ 6/- per cent per annum with monthly rests up to that date minus the two sums, namely, ₹ 1,498/10/3 and ₹ 100/- shown as paid on May 14, 1948 and November 24, 1949, and thereafter ₹ 6/- per cent per annum simple interest will run. The trial court will modify the preliminary decree passed by it accordingly and give the appellants three months’ time after the preliminary decree has been so modified to pay the amount failing which the bank would be entitled to pray for a final decree for sale of the properties mortgaged. ’Mere will be no personal decree. The bank will get proportionate costs in the two courts below. As the defence of the appellants has failed on the main question, they will bear their own costs throughout.
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1966 (10) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re fail. In our view, the High Court was in error in allowing the appeal of the respondent only on the ground that the said alterations did not appear to have caused any harm to the premises or that there was no such finding by either of the two courts below. The basis of the High Court's judgment was on the interpretation which it sought to put on clause (c)an interpretation commended by Mr. Desai for our acceptance. As already stated, even if the alterations did not cause any damage to the premises or did not substantially diminish their value the alterations were material alterations and on that basis alone the appellants were entitled to evict the respondent) We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the High Court and restore the judgment and decree passed by the First Additional Civil Judge, Varanasi, whereby he directed the eviction of the respondent. The respondent will pay to the appellants their costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (10) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ragraph (6) of paragraph 2 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, and is vested, inter alia, with the executive functions of the District Council. The validity of the Rules is not in issue. It is not contended that the Rules are ultra vires the Regulation. The discretion vested in the licensing authority by Rules 4, 5 and 7 is not restricted by condition No. 1 of the license. The licensing authority may refuse to renew or to issue the license if it finds that such a course would promote the interests of the Scheduled Tribes. In the present case, the Executive Committee found that the maximum limit of non- tribal traders had been reached, and in the interest of the tribals it was not desirable to issue license to more non-tribal traders. It is neither alleged nor shown that the Executive Committee discriminated between similarly situated persons. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. ORDER In accordance with the Opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed with costs.
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1966 (10) TMI 147 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Emperor (A.I.R. 1926 Bom. 178.) and In re Ramasamier(A.I.R.'16 Cr. L.J. 713.). None of the cases cited either for the one side or the other directly arose under s. 198 first part in a committal proceeding. The later view is distinctly in favour of allowing the prosecution to continue except in those cases where the Code it sled says that on the absence of the complainant the accused must be either acquitted or discharged. The present is not one of those cases and in our judgment the Presidency Magistrate was right in proceeding with the inquiry by allowing the mother to carry on the prosecution, and under s. 495 the mother may continue the prosecution herself or through a pleader. We see no reason why we should be astute to find a lacunas in the procedural law by which the trial of such important cases would be stultified by the death of a complainant when all that the s. 198 requires is the removal of the bar. The appeal fails and it will be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (10) TMI 146 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... which we are inclined to accept acquired some support from the fact that section II makes the purchaser and not the seller primarily responsible for payment of the fee and it is only when the purchaser cannot be identified that the seller is made liable. Mr. Agarwala at first also urged that the fee under s. 11 (1) amounted to a tax and that it was in fact a sales tax. But at the last moment he stated that he- did not wish to press that contention and requested us not to express any opinion thereon. Since the contention is not pressed we need not express any opinion on that question and confine ourselves to the question as to the interpretation of the words "bought and sold" in that section. In our view the construction placed by, the High Court on s. 11(1) was a correct construction and therefore the respondent-committee had rightly charged the appellants with said fee. The appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed...
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1966 (10) TMI 145 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... k concerned with the encashment of the cheque were acting bonafide. There was no negligence on the part of the customer according to whose resolution, the cheque had to be signed jointly by two persons. The fraud could only be perpetrated because of the complicity of the employees of the bank, no doubt, with the help of one of the officers of the Union. The dishonesty of a particular officer of the Union was not the proximate cause of the loss to the bank. In our opinion, the case of G. C. Kurbar and Another v. Balaji Ramji Dange(A. 1. R. 1941 Bombay 274.) referred to in the judgment of the High Court has no application to the facts of this case. In the result, the appeal succeeds, the judgment of the Patna High Court is set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge restored. The appellants do not want a decree against respondent No. 7. Consequently, there will be no decree as against the said respondent. The other respondents must pay the costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (10) TMI 143 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t be imposed before the end of the year. One possible way of imposition of penalty under section 10(7) of the Act may be to take proceedings under that provision, to come to a definite finding about the alleged fault or default of the dealer and to impose the penalty in certain permissible proportion to the quantum of tax liable to be assessed and to leave out the working of the amount to the proceedings of the assessment of the tax if the same have not yet taken place. That, however, is not the precise question with which we are faced at present. For the aforesaid reasons, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and it is held that penalty could be imposed by an appropriate authority under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act on a dealer under section 10(7) of the Act before the end of the year . Costs of the reference will be included in the costs of the writ petition. INDER DEV DUA, J.-I agree. PANDIT, J.-I also agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1966 (10) TMI 142 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ice of assessment and demand expired), interest at 18 per cent. per annum calculated on the amount then remaining due with effect from 1st February, 1964 (the date on which the period of thirty days prescribed in the notice of assessment and demand expired), till the date of final payment of the dues should also be recovered as arrears of land revenue, in terms of section 8(1-A). The imposition of penal interest has been effected by the Sales Tax Officer and not by the Collector. All that has been left to the Collector is the arithmetical computation of the actual amount to be recovered by way of interest. That, in my opinion, had necessarily to be left to the Collector because the Sales Tax Officer, when he issued the recovery certificates, would not be in a position to anticipate the date when the dues would be paid and consequently the amount of interest leviable thereon. This contention, therefore, must also fail. The petition is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1966 (10) TMI 141 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tisfied that the authorities under the Sales Tax Act, such as Sales Tax Officer or the Commissioner of Sales Tax and persons appointed to assist him are executive officers. If they are executive officers, then it is clear that a vakalatnama or mukhtyarnarna filed in the case before them is required to be stamped with the court-fee stamp of Rs. 2 under the Court-fees Act and not under the Bombay Stamp Act. We must therefore hold that the second contention of the petitioner is also well-founded and the authorisation in each of these cases, which are in the form of a power-of-attorney, or mukhtyarnama or vakalatnama, as the case may be, is not required to bear a nonjudicial stamp of Rs. 3.30 under the Bombay Stamp Act, but shall bear court-fee stamp of Rs. 2 as provided in item 12 of the Second Schedule to the Bombay Court-fees Act. The result therefore is that each of the petitions is allowed and the petitioners are entitled to costs against the respondents. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (10) TMI 140 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tisfied that the authorities under the Sales Tax Act, such as Sales Tax Officer or the Commissioner of Sales Tax and persons appointed to assist him are executive officers. If they are executive officers, then it is clear that a vakalatnama or mukhtyarnarna filed in the case before them is required to be stamped with the court-fee stamp of Rs. 2 under the Court-fees Act and not under the Bombay Stamp Act. We must therefore hold that the second contention of the petitioner is also well-founded and the authorisation in each of these cases, which are in the form of a power-of-attorney, or mukhtyarnama or vakalatnama, as the case may be, is not required to bear a nonjudicial stamp of Rs. 3.30 under the Bombay Stamp Act, but shall bear court-fee stamp of Rs. 2 as provided in item 12 of the Second Schedule to the Bombay Court-fees Act. The result therefore is that each of the petitions is allowed and the petitioners are entitled to costs against the respondents. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (10) TMI 139 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the Income-tax Act see Muthappa Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1938 6 I.T.R. 725. , Seth Kalekhan Mahomed Hanif v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1963 50 I.T.R. 1. and Pulavarthi Viswanadham v. Commissioner of Incometax 1963 50 I.T.R. 463. In all these cases it has been laid down that once the assessment is reopened under section 34 the Income-tax Officer is not limited to the information which he had received and on the strength of which he had asked for a reopening of the case and reassessment of the assessee, and if he thereafter discovers that some other items of income have escaped assessment then he Is entitled to take them also into account and assess them if they had not for any reason been assessed earlier. For the reasons given above, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is also assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1966 (10) TMI 138 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... they have been obtained, e.g., if the raw material likely to deteriorate is in stock much in excess of the present requirement of the dealer, he can sell it without the fear of being booked for offence under this clause. Even if the dealer resells the goods which affords him a good margin of profit, he will come within this clause. Business expediencies must be acknowledged and due allowance given for the conduct of the business. (1964 Edition, page 176). 6. In the light of all that is stated above, we feel that the interests of justice require that there should be a further consideration of the matter before any penalty is imposed on the petitioner and for that purpose, we quash the orders impugned before us and direct a fresh disposal in accordance with the law. We need hardly add that we express no opinion on the controversy and that the authority concerned should reach its conclusion untrammelled by any observation, that we may have made in this judgment. Orders quashed.
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