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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 696 Records
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1966 (11) TMI 79 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ducts from the ambit of garments by the notification dated 26th March, 1962. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that, by withdrawing the exemption or modifying any notification regarding exemption, the State Government was legislating in the matter of taxes. It was exercising powers already granted by the law. Thus, we do not find any force in the contention of the learned counsel. In view of what we have said above, we do not find any flaw in the impugned notification and the same cannot, therefore, be held to be invalid. As regards the other points raised by the learned counsel, it is sufficient to say that the petitioners have already filed their appeals against the orders of assessment and it will be for them to pursue their remedies under the statute and consequently we are not inclined to exercise our extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution at this stage. In the result we hereby dismiss all the writ petitions with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1966 (11) TMI 78 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e authority, which we have extracted. On the contrary, all that the revisional authority has done is to express its approval of the original authority s order. It is not the function of revision. The order that the Commissioner was proposing to revise was. the order of the appellate authority. He could exercise his powers of revision and set aside that order only if he finds that it suffers from any illegality or impropriety or is the result of any irregularity in the procedure followed. As the order of the Commissioner does not disclose that he has examined or scrutinized the order of the appellate authority from this point of view, we have no alternative but to hold that the order does not disclose any reason empowering the Commissioner to interfere with the appellate authority s order in revision. This appeal is, therefore, allowed, and the order of the Commissioner passed in revision is set aside. The appellant will have his costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (11) TMI 77 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n otherwise, it was argued by Sri N. Rammohanrao, the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Commercial Tax Officer is not justified in seizing 115 bags of jaggery which are admittedly covered by the way-bill. The learned Government Pleader has not been able to justify the action of the Commercial Tax Officer in having seized the goods which are covered by the way-bill. Hence, the seizure of 115 bags is not justified in law. The petitioner is stated to have taken delivery of 115 bags after furnishing security. Hence W.P. No. 971 of 1962 is allowed with respect to 115 bags and it is dismissed with regard to the remaining five bags in respect of which the Commercial Tax Officer may hold an enquiry as contemplated by law. The security taken from the petitioner will, therefore, be cancelled. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed in part but there will be no order as to costs. Writ Petition 1044 of 1962 is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Ordered accordingly.
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1966 (11) TMI 76 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Appellate Tribunal. 7.. In the above view, there is no scope for applying the rule in section 4 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125, and it is unnecessary to consider whether that rule has been abrogated by the repeal of the 1125 Act and by the re-enactment of the 1963 Act. Our attention was invited by the learned counsel to three decisions of the Madras High Court reported in Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Madras Division v. Sri Swami and Company 1962 13 S.T.C. 468. (, Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Madras Division, Madras v. M. Balasundaram and Company 1963 14 S.T.C. 996. and V.N. Surulivel Nadar and Brothers v. The State of Madras 1963 14 S.T.C. 1006. The first of these does not wholly support the petitioner, and to the extent that there is anything in any of them contrary to the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on which we have relied, we cannot agree. In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed no costs. Petition dismissed.
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1966 (11) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the proceedings were initiated before or after the firm was dissolved?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. As the High Court had not at any stage, recorded a definite finding that in fact the firm was dissolved either in February, 1961, or on 8th August, 1961, as claimed by the appellant. The High Court, in its judgment, has, when dealing with the facts, referred to the dissolution of the firm as "alleged" dissolution. This course was adopted by the High Court because of the view of law taken by that Court that it was unnecessary to give a definite finding about the dissolution of the firm, when the appellant was not entitled to claim its benefit even on the assumption that there was a dissolution as alleged. It appears to be necessary that the High Court should now be asked to decide the writ petition, after recording a finding on this question of fact in the light of the law explained
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1966 (11) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
Taxability of tobacco - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As in the present case the third Explanation to section 2(g) incorporates into the definition of "sale" the Explanation occurring in Article 286 in contrast to the Madras Act where there is no such incorporation in the definition of sale under section 2(h) of that Act thus the argument of the appellant must be rejected on this aspect of the case.
The contention of the appellant is that the purchase of tobacco cannot be taxed because it was not "specified in the dealer's certificate of registration as intended for use by him as raw materials in the manufacture of any goods for the purpose of sale by actual delivery in Madhya Pradesh for the purpose of consumption in that State" as required by section 4(6) of the Act is unable to accept the argument of the appellant as correct.
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1966 (11) TMI 57 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Associations and partnerships exceeding certain numbers – Prohibition of ... ... ... ... ..... on, therefore, the Stock Exchange has appeared not merely for the protection of its own interests, but also for the protection of the interest of the investing public, which is one of its duties as can be seen from clause (a) of section 4 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. In that sense, not only was the Stock Exchange entitled to appear, but it was under a duty to appear and it has discharged not only its personal functions but its public functions and has in that sense appeared in representative capacity. The Stock Exchange is therefore entitled not merely to recover its costs of this petition from the respondents, but also to recover taxed costs and as it is appearing in a representative capacity, it is entitled to recover costs taxed as between attorney and client. I, therefore, order that the respondents shall pay to the Stock Exchange, Bombay, its costs of this petition when taxed on the basis of one counsel being allowed as between attorney and client.
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1966 (11) TMI 50 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Alteration of memorandum, Memorandum of association – Special resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of and Representation of Corporation at Meetings of Companies & Creditors, Meetings and proceedings – Contents and manner of service of notice and persons on whom it is to be served
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1966 (11) TMI 48 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Transfer of shares - Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal ... ... ... ... ..... me entered in the share register of the company. It is true that in this case there is restriction on the transfer of shares to an outsider, but these restrictions are not an absolute bar to the transfer to an outsider. In this case the special officer failed to find out a member or an outsider who was willing to purchase the shares and thereupon the shares were sold to the petitioner. In my view the requirements of the articles have been sufficiently complied with and the rights of the petitioner as a shareholder of the company cannot be questioned, challenged or denied on the ground that there was non-compliance with the articles of association of the company. There will, therefore, be an order in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition. Each party other than respondent No. 2 to pay its own costs. Respondent No. 2 will be entitled to retain the costs of this application as between attorney and client out of the assets of the company in his hands. Certified for counsel.
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1966 (11) TMI 47 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Winding up – Appointment of Liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... e words appoint and nominate, are really used interchangeably in the section. I take the view that where a meeting of the members has nominated or appointed a liquidator and no meeting of creditors has been held, nevertheless, until something is done about it at the instance of the creditors, the person nominated or appointed as liquidator by the members at their meeting is the liquidator of the company and therefore, in my judgment, the preliminary point taken by Mr. Bromley that Mr. Phillips has no locus standi before me fails. That deals with the preliminary point. I understand that it has been agreed between counsel that in the event of the preliminary point being decided by myself in the way it has been decided, then the motion for the substantive relief claimed shall stand over for 14 days to enable Mr. Bromley to file an affidavit, and he is prepared to give an undertaking that the commissioners will not proceed further with their distress levy pending the adjournment.
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1966 (11) TMI 46 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... anks (although its operation is not, of course, confined to banks), and the. sub-section should, therefore, in my judgment be given a benevolent construction rather than one which narrows the limits of its operation. Wynn-Parry J., in the Primrose case 1950 Ch 561, appears to have taken a similar view, and to have accepted Mr. Sykes s argument and tacitly rejected Mr. Shaw s. He treated the question as being ultimately one of fact. In the present case, the bank clearly had a purpose in advancing money to the company mdash namely, the purpose of enabling it to meet its commitments. I then ask myself, What commitments ? , and my answer, so far as the money provided under the Alston arrangement is concerned, is wages, which were the whole raison d etre of that arrangement. I, therefore, find as a fact that the sum in question, pound 2,161 11s. 6d., was advanced for the purpose of paying wages, and, accordingly, I propose to make an order as asked by paragraph (1) of the summons.
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1966 (11) TMI 19 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the company was one in which the public were not substantially interested, and after the order was made, each individual shareholder had to be separately assessed in respect of the deemed income?
Held that:- Under sub-section (3) of section 23A before it was amended by the Finance Act of 1955, tax payable on the proportionate share of any member of a company in the undistributed profits was liable to be recovered from the company if it could not be recovered from the shareholder. By the Finance Act, 1955, this clause was deleted and another clause which had nothing to do with recovery of tax was substituted as sub-section (3). By the Finance Act, 1957, that new sub-section (3) has been deleted. Section 45 deals with recovery of tax and, in the context in which it occurs, reference in section 45 to sub-section (3) of section 23A can only mean reference to that sub-section as it stood prior to the Finance Act of 1955. But that cannot be a ground for inferring that by section 23A which is referred to in sections 30 and 31 only intended to refer to the section as it stood before the Finance Act, 1955. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (11) TMI 18 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
This application in revision has been brought by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner against the order passed by Additional District Magistrate, judicial substantially dismissing the petition made before him on behalf of the petitioner, for the safe custody of currency and gold bars and ingots and gold ornaments which were seized in connection with some criminal case pending before him for disposal
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1966 (11) TMI 17 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Same business - crushing and manufacture of oil was a totally different business from dealing in grain and oil seeds and the assessee is not entitled to relief u/s 25(4) of Indian Income Tax Act, 1922
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1966 (11) TMI 16 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Order of the AAC rejecting the appeal on the ground that no appeal lay - such order of AAC is not appellable
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1966 (11) TMI 15 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business of plying trucks - expenditure incurred in replacing petrol engines by diesel engines - these expenditure was of a capital nature hence, not allowable u/s10(2)(xv)
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1966 (11) TMI 14 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Lease of certain quarries in favour of his wife in perpetuity for a consideration of an annual royalty - income from the quarries - includible in the assessment of the assessee under the provisions of s. 16(3)(a)(iii)
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1966 (11) TMI 13 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Dissolved firm - Notices under s. 22(2) and 22(3) were issued to a dissolved firm - held that assessments made on the firm after its dissolution without issuing separate notices to all the partners of the defunct firm was valid
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1966 (11) TMI 12 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Deemed dividend - assessability - s. 2(11)(a) of the IT Act, r/w s. 23A of the IT Act ... ... ... ... ..... The only criticism levelled by the learned counsel against that decision was that no reasons have been given for coming to the conclusion that the previous year opted for that source of income would also be the previous year for the purpose of deemed dividend. It is not correct to say that no reasons have been given. Reasons were given though they may not have been elaborated. The ratio was that, where a company was being taxed in the relevant year as well as in earlier years on dividend income and it had filed a return adopting the period ending December 31 as the previous year, the deemed income also fell to be assessed in the same assessment year. For the reasons given above, the question referred is answered by saying that the deemed dividend income has rightly been assessed in the assessment year 1954-55. The question is answered against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference which we assess at Rs. 250. Counsel s fee is also assessed at Rs. 250.
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1966 (11) TMI 11 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
HUF - deemed dividend - Tribunal held that the income was personal income of the karta and not of the family - whether the 1/2 share held by RR in the partnership firm is held by him as a karta of the assessee HUF or in his individual capacity - held taht share was held by the son in his individual capacity
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