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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 996 Records
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1973 (12) TMI 86 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s Tax Act. It granted exemption only to goods mentioned in List II attached to it. Rice bran is not mentioned in this list. Therefore, the notification dated 7th June, 1948, which exempted rice bran from payment of sales tax stood superseded. This view is reaffirmed by the second clause of the notification dated 31st March, 1956, namely, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to direct that with effect from 1st April, 1956, the goods specified in List II hereunder shall alone be exempt from payment of tax. Obviously, commodities which are not mentioned in List II will no longer be exempt from tax with effect from 1st April, 1956, and onwards. It cannot be held that rice bran was exempt from sales tax by virtue of the notification of 1948. In the result, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, we however make no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1973 (12) TMI 85 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... titioner was a partner in the firm. In the instant case, however, as already pointed out above, the assessing authority seems to have recorded a finding that the petitioner was a partner in the firm Munna Lal Gauri Shanker. Ram Avtar s case1972 U.P.T.C. 701. is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. Reliance was then placed upon Sang Bux Singh v. State of U.P. and Others 1974 34 S.T.C. 289 1973 U.P.T.C. 539. in support of the same proposition. In that case the assessee had challenged the assessment order itself for the year 1966-67, in respect of which year there was a finding that the assessee was a partner. Since the assessment order has not been challenged in the present writ petition which Is restricted to recovery proceedings, the decision given in Sant Bux Singh s case 1974 34 S.T.C. 289 1973 U.P.T.C. 539. also does not assist the petitioner. In view of the foregoing discussion we find no merit In this petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (12) TMI 84 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r that the goods for sale clearly connote that the goods so processed must belong to the dealer, as otherwise he cannot be said to have the right to sell them. The clause is clear that the manufacture or processing of goods must be for sale and the clear intendment is that the goods for sale must belong to the dealer who has been allowed a concessional rate of tax in regard to the purchase of the goods under C forms. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention urged for the petitioner. On the facts in the case, it is clear that by using the colour and chemicals for dyeing yarn of others, the assessee has consumed the goods under C forms and not used in the manufacture or processing of goods for sale. In the case where goods are purchased for consumption by a dealer, the concessional rate is not applicable. No other contention has been raised before us. 4.. Accordingly, the revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (12) TMI 83 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... originally assessed by the Sales Tax Officer. This clearly shows that, in such a case, recovery proceedings shall have to be started afresh in respect of the enhanced amount after serving upon the assessee a fresh notice of demand as required by the second proviso to section 8(1-A) of the Act. We are thus clearly of the opinion that, in the instant case, when the revising authority restored the assessment made by the Sales Tax Officer, after it had been reduced by the appellate authority, it was a case of enhancement and interest could be levied only if the petitioner had failed to pay the enhanced tax within six months from the date of the order of enhancement passed by the revising authority as laid down in the second proviso to section 8(1-A). Admittedly, this is not the case here. We accordingly allow the writ petition and quash the recovery proceedings pending against the petitioner for the recovery of interest. The petitioner is entitled to its costs. Petition allowed.
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1973 (12) TMI 82 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ppear to be blurred to some eyes is distinct and clear on a comparison of the provisions of the three Acts and the Rules with those of rule 19 framed under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The excise duty imposed under rule 19 is at a stage which is prior to placing the goods in a fit state for sale while the other is not so connected or integrated with the incidence of sale as to make it a part of the sale price. 10.. For the reasons stated above, I answer the question referred to this court by the Commercial Taxes Tribunal in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue, and hold that the amount of Rs. 54,305 realised by the assessee as excise, welfare and rescue cesses on despatches of coal by road has not been correctly taxed by the sales tax authorities. The decision of the Tribunal affirming their decision is not correct in law. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. N.P. SINGH, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1973 (12) TMI 81 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... agents in gunny bags in pursuance of the directions given by the Government were not liable to pay sales tax on the turnover relating to the price of the gunny bags. In my opinion, the case of Cement Distributors (P.) Ltd. 1973 31 S.T.C. 309 (S.C.). falls in line with those cases where either no field is left for operation of acts of volition in the matter of transactions or the field left is too small to permit the transactions to remain within the ambit of sale. 11.. For the reasons stated above, the question of law referred to this court is answered in the affirmative against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. It is held that, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the transactions under consideration constituted sales and were liable to be assessed under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100 only. NAGENDRA PRASAD SINGH, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (12) TMI 80 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt and the authorities concerned, to the need for a suitable amendment or redrafting the section to avoid confusion in its application and working. We have already pointed out the possible interpretations which the language of the section is capable of yielding. It may be worthwhile to compare the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act which provided for payment of advance tax and for the making of a provisional assessment. See the provisions in the Act of 1922 and the subsequent Act of 1961. These provisions do not enjoin that the assessment, levy and collection should be made during the year as section 18 does. Nor is there any provision for an appeal or a second appeal against the assessment to advance tax or an order of provisional assessment under the provisions of these Acts. It may be worth while to compare these provisions and suitably remodel, if necessary, the provisions of section 18 of the Act. Issue carbon copies of this judgment to counsel. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (12) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the suit village is an estate within the meaning of Section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act ?
Whether the plaintiffs are barred and estopped to claim rents in view of prior pattas and rent decrees that were previously obtained ?
Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit?
Held that:- Allow this appeal, reverse the judgment of the High Court
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1973 (12) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Government would be justified in refusing to consider the question of exemption to all factories other than co-operative sugar factories?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Here, from the point of view of the object of the exempting provision, co-operative societies of sugarcane growers and other new or substantially expanded industries stand on the same footing and there can be no justification for specially favouring the former class of industries by confining the benefit of exemption to them and leaving out of the exemption the latter class of industries. Picking out co-operative societies of sugarcane growers for favoured treatment, to the exclusion of other new or substantially expanded industries, is wholly unrelated to the object of the exempting provision and the policy or rule adopted by the State Government is not legally relevant to the exercise of the power of granting exemption.
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1973 (12) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the basis of annexure P-1 order, respondent No. 4 was entitled to deduct Rs. 60,780 from the amount due to the petitioner in respect of pending bills?
Whether the claim of the respondents to recover a further sum of Rs. 2,35,130.01 from the petitioner is justified?
Held that:- Appeal allowed There was no obligation under the contracts on the part of the DGS & D to procure import licences for the petitioner. On the other hand, the recommendation for import licence made by the DGS & D did not carry with it any imperative obligation upon the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports to issue the import licence. Though under the contract the DGS & D undertook to provide all facilities for the import of the goods for fulfilling the contracts including an Import Recommendation Certificate, there was no absolute obligation on the DGS & D to procure these facilities. And, it was the obligation of the petitioner to obtain the import licence. Therefore, even if the contracts envisaged the import of goods and their supply to the DGS & D from out of the goods imported, it did not follow that the movement of the goods in the course of import was occasioned by the contracts of sale by the petitioner with the DGS & D
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1973 (12) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 8(2)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 is bad for the reason that the provisions thereof offend articles 301 and 303(1) of the Constitution?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Even if it be assumed that the tax at the higher rate imposed under section 8(2)(b) places restrictions on the freedom of trade and commerce throughout the territory of India, as Parliament is competent to impose restrictions on that freedom in the public interest and as the imposition of a tax is normally to be presumed in the public interest no reason to hold that section 8(2)(b) is bad for the reason that it violates article 301. There is no merit in the contention that section 8(2)(b) of the Act offends the provision of article 303(1). Therefore, set aside the decision of the High Court and hold that section 8(2)(b) does not offend articles 301 and 303(1) and is valid.
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1973 (12) TMI 56 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Compromise and arrangement, Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... in language of section 30 would not justify such a conclusion. If that be so how would the new provision providing for limitation for the first time in the Act be administered. An instance in point would be provided by article 137 itself. If the article is construed in a wider sense it would take within its sweep all applications irrespective of the statute that they may purport to invoke. There was no provision for some such application in the old Act. The starting point under the article would be when the right to apply accrues , and the period is three years. The right may have accrued long before the repeal of the old Act, which provided no period of limitation. Could such an application be ever filed under the new Act if section 30 did not save it ? An appropriate provision to deal with such cases was apparently necessary. In the view I have taken of the maintainability of the appellant s petition, the appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances with no costs.
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1973 (12) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Memorandum of association - Ssopecial resolution and confirmation by CLB required for alteration of
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1973 (12) TMI 41 - ITAT INDORE
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... ... ..... see has not challenged these additions in subsequent appeals, but this fact by itself would not establish that even for the year, under consideration the book results of the assessee should be rejected without any specific omission if deficiency in the system of accountancy maintained by the assessee. The learned counsel of the assessee has submitted that in the past certain additions were accepted by the assessee because the accounts were not maintained in great details, as during the year, under consideration. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case we of the opinion that the AAC was quite justified in deleting the addition of Rs. 50,000 made by the ITO towards the trading account. The order of the AAC is therefore, upheld. 6. In view of our above findings, the cross objection filed by the assessee became infructuous and is dismissed. 7. In the result, the appeal filed by the Department as well as the Cross-objection filed by the assessee are dismissed.
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1973 (12) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Seizure of goods - Belief, reasonable belief ... ... ... ... ..... r design to smuggle those into India at Galgalia. There appears substance in the aforesaid contention of learned counsel for the petitioners, and if the contention of the respondents as to the secret information received by them is not found true, then it is not possible to hold that they could have reasons to believe at the time of the seizure of the goods that they were liable to confiscation. 3.If really the respondents had not received any secret information from Nepal as to purchase of silver and silver coins there, by Satyadeo and Parmeshwar and they have concocted that story and on account of the delay in not seizing the goods and issuing receipts at once mala fide on their part may also be inferred. However, in view of the fact that the petition succeeds on the ground that the respondents had no reason to believe at the time of the seizure of the goods that they were liable to confiscation, it is not necessary to record a definite finding on the question of mala fide.
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1973 (12) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
Valuation - Wholesale cash price ... ... ... ... ..... t the wholesale price should be taken on the basis of cash payment thus eliminating the interest involved in wholesale price which gives credit to the wholesale buyer for a period of time and that the price has to be fixed for delivery at the factory gate thereby eliminating freight octroi and other charges involved in the transport of the articles. It is evident, for the purpose of levy of excise duty, only the actual manufacturing cost of the articles and the manufacturing profits will have to be taken into consideration and not the post-manufacturing charges or the freight the rate of Rs. 2.00 per case of 24 bottles charged by the company being post-manufacturing charges cannot therefore be included in the wholesale cash price of the articles. 10. In the result, the petition is allowed and the impugned orders (Annexures I, II and III) are quashed. 11. If the company has already paid the duty under the impugned demands, it is entitled to a refund of the same. 12. No costs.
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1973 (12) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the provisions of section 8(2)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 do not stiffer from the vice of excessive delegation and are, therefore, immune from attack on the ground that Parliament has abdicated its essential legislative function in enacting them?
Held that:- There can be nodoubt that Parliament can repeal the provisions of section 8(2)(b) adopting the higher rate of tax fixed by the appropriate State Legislature in respect of inter-State sales. If Parliament can repeal the provision, there can be no objection on the score that Parliament has abdicated its legislative function. It retains its control over the fixation of the rate intact. In other words, so long as Parliament can repeal the provisions of section 8(2)(b) adopting the higher rate of tax fixed by the State Legislature, it has not abdicated its legislative function.
We are glad to find that our conclusion that Parliament has not abdicated its legislative function by enacting section 8(2)(b) of the Act is in agreement with that reached by the High Court of Gujarat in Rallis India Ltd. v. R. S. Joshi, Sales Tax Officer, [1972 (9) TMI 138 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] and the High Court of Punjab in Tek Chand Daulat Rai v. Excise and Taxation Officer, Ferozepore [1971 (4) TMI 89 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] . Appeals dismissed.
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1973 (12) TMI 37 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Net Wealth, Valuation Date, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... the view taken is that Maithili should have an interest in the income on the valuation date, since she had, according to Mr. Joshi, a vested interest under the trust deed, she must be held to have an interest both in the income as well as the corpus on the valuation date. That argument of Mr. Joshi is misconceived, and, indeed, that precise argument was sought to be advanced before the Supreme Court in Yeshwant Rao Ghorpade s case and was rejected by that court on the ground that, even assuming that the beneficiary had a vested interest, what the court had to consider was whether the trustees held the trust property for the benefit of the minor children as on the relevant valuation date. In the result, this reference must be answered against the revenue. S. K. DESAI J.-I agree and have nothing to add. BY THE COURT Question answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner to pay the assessee s costs of the reference. Question answered in the negative.
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1973 (12) TMI 36 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Gift By Deceased ... ... ... ... ..... view, therefore, this decision of the Mysore High Court is not of any help to the accountable person so far as the facts of this case are concerned. Since we find that the record of the case fails in showing an unequivocal intention on the part of the deceased to throw his self-acquired property in the common stock of the family and then to partition of the same amongst his five sons, the transaction in question cannot in law amount to partition. The said transaction obviously amounts to gift and, therefore, the provisions of section 10 of the Estate Duty Act would be applicable if the other requirements of the section are satisfied. We, therefore, answer the question which is referred to us in the negative and hold that the finding that the deceased did not make a gift of Rs. 90,005 is not justified in law. Reference is accordingly disposed of in favour of the revenue. The respondent-accountable person shall bear the costs of the Controller of Estate Duty in this reference.
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1973 (12) TMI 35 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Dissolution Of Firm, Minor Child, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... come to an end by reason of the death of the deceased. Under these circumstances at least as regards the shares of the profits coming to the share of the minor sons for the period ending on July 1, 1963, their share of the profits was liable to be included in the total income of the deceased-assessee. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us as follows. Out of the amount of Rs. 13,600 the share of the profits coming to the widow, Lilavati, and allocated to her up to July 1, 1963, was not liable to be included in the total income of the assessee for Samvat Year 2019. However, out of the said sum of Rs. 13,600 the shares of profits allocated to the two minor sons, Kirankumar and Sanjaykumar, for the period up to July 1, 1963, were liable to be included in the assessee s total income for Samvat Year 2019 and liable to be assessed in the hands of the assessee for the assessment year 1964-65. In view of the peculiar facts of this case, there will be no order as to costs.
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