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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 1160 Records
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1975 (12) TMI 11 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... ning and, therefore, we are not entitled to enlarge the meaning of the word fertiliser on any consideration of common usage of the word fertiliser . In fact, the restrictive nature of the use of the word namely has been even extended to the interpretation of documents in 1908. The Law Reports, I Chancery Division, at page 185 Brocket, In re Dawes v. Miller-- 1908 1 Ch 185 (Ch D) . In that case, while interpreting a will the use of the word namely was interpreted as equivalent to what the testator meant by the use of the generic description. We are, therefore, of the view that by the use of the word namely in item 13, the legislature has restricted the application to those enumerated items and since the bonemeal manufactured by the assessee is not one of those enumerated items, the assessee is not entitled to the rebate claimed. We, accordingly, answer the reference in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (12) TMI 10 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessing Officer, Assessment Notice, Original Assessment, Reassessment Notice ... ... ... ... ..... ince reported 1978 115 ITR 471 (Cal) under art. 226 of the Constitution, and as no affidavit has been filed by respondent No. 2 denying the case of the petitioner, namely, that the said document was produced before him by the petitioner at the time of original assessment I hold that there was no failure or omission on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all relevant facts for the purpose of assessment and that the condition precedent for issuing the impugned notice has not been fulfilled in this case. In the premises, the impugned notice dated March 24, 1973, is hereby quashed and the respondents are restrained from giving effect to the said notice. If, in the meantime, any assessment has already been made in pursuance of the said impugned notice the same is also quashed and is hereby set aside. The rule is made absolute without any order as to costs. The operation of this order will remain stayed for eight weeks from today as prayed for by the respondents.
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1975 (12) TMI 9 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which is now in question, are vested, cannot be said to be itself a literary institution, nevertheless, the buildings being appropriated, for the purposes of free public libraries, being devoted exclusively to that use, and incapable of being legally applied to any other purpose, may properly be said to be the property of a literary institution. A similar liberal meaning was attached to the property owned by a religious and charitable institution, namely, Dayalbagh Satsang Sabha, by the Allahabad High Court in its decision reported in CIT v. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha 1954 25 ITR 472. We are, therefore, of the opinion that merely because the immovable properties, namely, the buildings and the lands of the college, have not so far been formally vested in the petitioner society, it would not in any manner deprive it of the character of an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100.
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1975 (12) TMI 8 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Income, Estimated Income, Income From Business, Income From Other Sources, Undisclosed Income, Unexplained Cash Credits
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1975 (12) TMI 7 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Religious Purpose, Wealth Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... ) Ltd. 1974 97 ITR 140 that the deduction in question should be made not from the gross amount of dividend but from the net amount thereof. Therefore, if this question is required to be answered, we would say that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the assessee was entitled to tax deduction in accordance with S. 85A of the Act calculated on the amount of gross income and not on the amount of dividend as reduced by any amount of expenditure on the same by way of interest. To summarise, our answer to the first question is in the negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. Our answer to question No. 2 is in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Our answer to question No. 3 is in the negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee and our answer to question No. 4 is that the income from dividend must be assessed under S. 56. This reference is accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs.
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1975 (12) TMI 6 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Income, Mutual Benefit Society ... ... ... ... ..... on fund of the club, which is the property of the permanent members. We fail to see how it could be an income of the club. These fees go to constitute the fund, with the aid of which amenities are provided to the members. So these fees, whether received from permanent members or from other members of the club, are not income and are not, therefore, assessable to tax. We are fortified in this view by two Bench decisions of this court, in Secunderabad Club v. CST 1957 8 STC 850, and CIT v. Merchant Navy Club 1974 96 ITR 261. Even the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the fees received from the permanent members cannot constitute income . By parity of reasoning, the same varieties of fees, received from other members also, cannot be income . They go towards the common fund of the club. For the foregoing reasons, we answer the question in the negative, i.e., against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. The Revenue shall pay costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1975 (12) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Capital Employed - company was not required under the law to deduct at source tax from the dividends which they were declaring to the shareholder - company was entitled to an appropriate certificate from the Income-tax Officer u/s 197(3). The appeals are, therefore, dismissed and the impugned orders are set aside. The company will be entitled to approach the Income-tax Officer for such appropriate certificates u/s 197(3) as may be admissible on proper computation under the relevant rules
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1975 (12) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of rules 112B and 112C with reference to article 14 of the Constitution - Rule 112B relates to the release of the articles seized u/s 132(5) and merely provides that Officer shall deliver the same to the person from whose custody they were seized. Rule 112C provides for the release of the remaining assets, and it is to the effect that they shall be paid to the person from whose custody they were seized - Both rules beneficial rules - rules are valid
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1975 (12) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
whether it is open to the Income-tax Officer to change his opinion subsequently on the same materials and reopen the original assessment - we would refrain from giving any definite decision on this point, particularly when in the view we take in the instant case, this point does not really arise for determination in this case, which is really based on another principle, namely, that the information was derived by the Income-tax Officer from fresh facts
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1975 (12) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee should be informed of the reasons for transfer of a file and whether the reasons are to be recorded in the order for transfer - non-communication of the reasons in the order passed under section 127(1) is a serious infirmity in the order for which the same is invalid. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed and the orders of transfer are quashed
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1975 (11) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ted version. It is also true that the appellant had been most unwise in not sending a Registered letter in reply to the registered notice received by him on 8th January, 1971 by the complainant. His version that he spoke to the complainant on the telephone and sent a letter in reply on 15th January, 1971, of which a copy was Ex. RI, had been rejected by the Committee on the ground that the Advocate's conduct did not appear to he above board We cannot help thinking that the Committee had been unduly swayed by the unsavory background of the appellant so that it could not see its way to giving the appellant even the benefit of doubt in the instant case. 12. In the circumstances of this case, we think that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. We, then fore, allow this appeal and set aside the order disbarring the appellant who, we hope, has learnt now to conduct himself in a more satisfactory manner in his dealings with his clients. We make no order as to costs.
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1975 (11) TMI 181 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... according to natural justice cannot be exhaustively enumerated. A duty to act judicially will arise in the exercise of a power to deprive a person of legitimate interest or expectation that additional price would be paid. The factors which power to an exercise of powers judicially are the nature of the interest to be affected, the circumstances in which the power falls to be exercised and the nature of the sanction, if any, involved. It is clear that the purpose and purport of the 1966 Control order, the scheme of having sugarcane growing areas reserved for factories and in particular, the payment of additional price point to the inescapable conclusion that the sugarcane growers are to be heard not only when additional price is filed but also when any exemption is granted to factories from payment of additional price. For these reasons, the judgment of the High Court is affirmed. The appeals are dismissed. Each party will pay and bear its own costs. P.H.P. Appeals dismissed.
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1975 (11) TMI 180 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ppearing for the respondents, and I reject the same. 14. In the result, there will be an order in terms of prayer " B " subject to this that the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 would return the transfer deeds with the relative shares to the respective petitioners within a fortnight from date. There will be an order in terms of prayer " A " subject to this that the petitioners would return the said documents within a month from date. There will be an order in terms of prayers " D " and " E" subject to this that such rectification of register of members of the respondent-company is to be made within two months from date. Having regard to the facts of this case that the petitioners having not cancelled the stamps on the transfer deeds when the relative share-scripts were lodged for transfer with the respondent-company, I do not think that it is fit for making any order for costs of this application, and, therefore, there will be no order of costs.
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1975 (11) TMI 178 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. But, in the case before us, "the concurrent finding of the courts below is that the landlord neither pleaded nor proved that the premises was let out only for the business of food grains. Therefore, the first part of clause (O) of Section 108 was not attracted and the landlords or owners of the premises could not claim to have a cause of action under the first part. As regards the second part of clause (O) of Section 108, we have pointed out that the lower courts concurreritly found that the installation of an electric motor and machinery for running the flour mill would not cause any damage within the meaning of the second part of clause (O) of Section 108. Therefore, the landlords had no cause of action under that second A part also." The operative parts of the judgments of the lower courts dismissing the suit were, therefore, correct. ( 14. ) For the foregoing reasons, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1975 (11) TMI 177 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... ent application immediately after 24-7-1973 when Chinnappa Reddy, J., held that the University could not maintain the appeal, if the petitioner really wanted to do so. Filing this petition 13 months after the above decision is only an afterthought and is in any case vitiated by gross negligence. We are not, therefore, inclined to grant this petition for transposition in this case. (45.) Since this is sufficient to dismiss the petition, we are not expressing any opinion on any other question relating to transposition as it is wholly unnecessary in the context of the present case. (46.) SInce we have held that the appeal is not maintainable and the petition for transposition cannot be granted, it is not necessary to go into the question of merits relating to the actual value of the lands as on the date of the notification. (47.) For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal and the petition for transposition with costs. (48.) Appeal and petition for transposition dismissed.
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1975 (11) TMI 176 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... affixing it in the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the premises. Though no objection could be taken for sending the registered notice to the last known address of the petitioner, when it was returned unserved, the department should have taken action to serve the petitioner by affixing it in the outer door or some conspicuous part of the premises in which that person last resided as provided under Rule 11(c). Unless such an affixture was effected notice could not be deemed to have been served on the petitioner and therefore, there was no commencement of the proceedings under Section 23. Compliance with the conditions prescribed in Section 19-G is mandatory, if the department wants to retain the amounts beyond the period of one year. Since notice as required by the Rules had not been effected, the extended period is not available to the department. 6. The petition is accordingly allowed, and the rule nisi is made absolute. But, there will be no order as to costs.
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1975 (11) TMI 175 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed to be and is conceived as a useful thing and is therefore an "article". The Statement of objects and Reasons to the Act says that many an advertisement causes the ignorant and the unwary "to resort to quacks who indulge in such advertisements for treatments which cause great harm". The appellant may not be a quack, so will be assume, but his "machines of science" designed to confer on man kind the blessings of 'New Life, New Vigour, New Spirit, New Wave" are most likely to trap the ignorant and the unwary. The articles of commerce which he has benefully advertised must, as far as possible and without doing violence to the language of the Act, be brought within the mischief of the Act. It does no violence either to common sense or to rules of interpretation to say that a machine is an "article". In the result, we confirm the judgment of the High Court, though for a different reason, and dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (11) TMI 174 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ate court to the effect, that the plainiff had failed to prove that defendant 1 was in a position to dominate his will, was not wrong or unreasonable. In any case, it did not suffer from any "illegality, omission, error or defect such as is referred to in sub-section (1) of section 100". It was a finding of fact and the High Court in second appeal, had no jurisdiction to interfere with the same, even if it appeared to be erroneous to the High Court, the error not being of a kind indicated in section 100(1). Since the plaintiff had failed to substantiate the first element essential to the proof of undue influence, the High Court was wrong in holding that the burden had shifted on the defendant to show that the Hiba-bil-Ewaz was not induced by undue influence. For these reasons we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the suit, but, in the circumstances of the case, leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 173 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the documents produced before us that the move was made by the Superintendent, Delhi Special Police Establishment, by requesting the Secretary, Law Department of the Government of Madhya Pradesh and the decision was taken by the State Government as it appears from the letter- of the Under Secretary dated January 28, 1969, to the Advocate General, Madhya Pradesh. The appeal was thereafter filed in the name of the State of Madhya Pradesh. No objection, therefore, can be taken about the competency of the appeal being filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh in this case. As a matter of procedure it will be even permissible for the appeal against acquittal to be filed by the public prosecutor under the direction of the State Government or the Central Government without impleading either as a party. The objection of the appellant is, therefore, devoid of substance. We may mention that no such objection was even taken in the High Court. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1975 (11) TMI 172 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ttempt was made to sustain the attack under Arts. 14 and 26 (d) of the Constitution but finally hardly any arguments were addressed worth noticing on these points... The High Court has rightly left open the question whether the Turner's choultry is a private or a public charitable institution. This the Municipal Council is entitled to agitate before the Deputy Commissioner under S. 77 of the Act... Before the High Court some of the writ petitioners had claimed that their institutions were religious denominations within Art. 26 and were therefore entitled to the protection guaranteed by that Article. "The High Court has, quite rightly, observed that these matters should be agitated in a proper forum and they have been left open for determination if and when so desired. This indisputably was the correct course to follow." No other point has been argued before us. The appeals fail and are dismissed. The parties shall pay and bear their own cots. Appeals dismissed.
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