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Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 1160 Records
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1975 (11) TMI 171 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y would have passed the order oh the basis of the relevant and existing grounds, and the exclusion of irrelevant or non-existing grounds could have affected the ultimate decision see State of Maharashtra v. B.K. Takkamore (Supra), State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mahapatra (3). 20. For the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the High Court was right in holding that there was no justification for interference with the impugned orders in the exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismis this appeal but without any order as to costs. 21. Before we part with this judgment, we would like to observe that if the appellants are landless tillers and one of them is an ex-servicemen, than their claims for allotment of land from the surplus pool in this revenue estate or elsewhere should be given due consideration and priority by the authorities concerned under any scheme relating to the allotment of surplus area framed in pursuance of the Act, Rules or any other law.
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1975 (11) TMI 170 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... refore fail. 40. Now remains the case of Ranglal. The case against this appellant is that a large number of ornaments including Ex. 18, Ex. 19, Ex. 22. Ex. 23, Ex. 28, belonging to Smt. Nazarbai, have been recovered either from his possession or from the possession of other persons, including PW 1, Shrilal, Fateh Mohammed, PW 3, Chishulal, PW 8, Jagdish Chandra PW 16, to whom he had transferred them by way of pledge or otherwise. 41. Here again, there is no evidence on record that the possession of these ornaments had been acquired or transferred by theft or extortion etc. In short it had not been established that these ornaments were 'stolen property' as defined in Section 410, Penal Code. Thus the sine qua non for a charge under Section 411, Penal Code was non existent in this case. 42. For all the reasons aforesaid, we allow the appeal of Chandmal and Ranglal, set aside their convictions and acquit them. They be set at liberty forthwith, if not otherwise required.
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1975 (11) TMI 169 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tter when he observed that the Government servant is not to be penalised and cannot be deprived of the safeguards provided by rule 3.14 because of the fact that the competent authority had not taken the necessary steps. As the Governor has deconfirmed the appellant from the post of Block Development and Panchayat officer, the suspended lien of the appellant on the post of Agricultural Inspector would stand revived with effect from February 26, 1969. The promotion of the appellant in the parent Agricultural Department from the post of Agricultural Inspector to that of District Agricultural officer by the impugned order cannot in the circumstances be held to suffer from any legal infirmity. We accordingly accept the two appeals, set aside the judgments of the learned single Judge and the Full Bench and dismiss the writ petitions filed by Prithvi Singh, Bhale Ram and Teja Singh respondents. The parties in the circumstances shall bear their own costs throughout. Appeals allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 167 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fused admission to the appellant to LL.B. Part III or for that matter to refuse permission to appear at the examination on a ground which was not mentioned in the impugned order. Having gone into the circumstances mentioned above, we are of the view that the impugned order suffers from errors of law patent on the face of the record, and in any event this was not a case which should have been dismissed by the High Court in limine. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the University dated June 26, 1973, is hereby quashed by a writ of certiorari. The respondent is directed to declare the result of LL.B. Part II Examination in which the appellant had appeared on May 19, 1973 and also to give him an opportunity to appear in the three subjects in which he had failed in LL.B. Part I Examination, at the next examination which may be held by the University. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 166 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ery order passed by the Collector under the Act, subject to an order passed in appeal under section 16 would be final. If successive applications under section 3 are permitted to be made, the finality attaching to the order of the Collector as provided in section 13 would become meaningless, apart from the uncertainty and confusion that would result. That there should be finality in litigation and a person should not be vexed twice for the same cause are well established principles of general application. If any authority is needed, we may refer to two decisions of this Court where this matter has been elaborately considered Daryao & Ors. v. The State of U.P. & Ors.(1) and Burn & Co. v. Their Employee(2). The Additional Collector was therefore right in dismissing the application made on October 17, 1965 and the reasons given by the High Court for setting aside that order, in our opinion, are not sound. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court in favour of Smt. Indira Gandhi are amply borne out by the evidence to which our attention was drawn briefly by the learned Counsel for the parties. The expenses incurred by the political party, together with the expenses incurred by her are not shown to exceed t 695. Finally, there is no merit in the contention that the constitutional amendment is bad because it was passed when some members of the Parliament were in detention. The legality of the detention orders cannot be canvassed in these appeals collaterally. And from a practical point of view, the presence of 21 members of the Lok Sabha and 10 members of the Rajya Sabha who were in detention could not have made a difference to the passing of the amendment. 696. In the result, I hold that clauses (4) and (5) of Article 329A are unconstitutional and therefore void. But for reasons aforesaid I allow Civil Appeal No. 887 of 1975 and dismiss Civil Appeal No. 909 of 1975. There will be no order as to costs throughout.
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1975 (11) TMI 163 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... k . The Asstt. Collector has demanded duty on the Sodium Silicate from the appellants because they issued Sodium Silicate from the tanker without any supervision by the Central Excise Officers. The Asstt. Collector has not quoted any authority under which such supervision was necessary. On the other hand the appellants have recorded the clearances of these goods from their store room in their R.G.I. and R.T. 12. These entries have not been disputed by the Asstt. Collector. It, therefore, appears to me that the subject quantity of Sodium Silicate has been properly accounted for and therefore no duty should be charged thereon. I, therefore, quash the order of the Assistant Collector and accept the appeal.
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1975 (11) TMI 162 - COLLECTOR, CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... from the market. They admit that they are selling their product under the trade mark “Autoring” by fixing an aluminium foil lable but they add that this marking is given only to differenciate their shock absorvers from that of their repairers in Jama Masjid, who also install their markings and dates on the shock absorvers reconditioned by them. It is also seen that the Asstt. Collector has not disputed in his order that the shock absorbers are those which have been repaired by the appellants. The Assistant Collector contends that after reconditioning they assume a distinct form and are re-saleable in the market as fully manufactured new goods. This argument of the Asstt. Collector is not sustainable on facts. There are a number of other articles which are reconditioned and then sold in the market but this reconditioning does not make them new manufactured goods. In the above view of the matters I set aside the order of the Asstt. Collector and accept the appeal.
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1975 (11) TMI 161 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... redominantly made of plastic material both in quantity and value and the metal sleeve used is a non-essential part fixed only to decorate the plastic container. I find from the samples of the product in dispute that these containers are actually plastic containers and the metal sleeve is not intended to hold its contents. These containers, therefore, cannot be classified as metal containers contemplated under Item 46 of the Central Excise Tariff and the resultant demand raised and confirmed cannot be sustained. Having regards to the above facts, I set aside both the orders appealed against and accept the appeal. Demands raised against the appellants shall be withdrawn.
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1975 (11) TMI 160 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the provisions of the Luxury Tax on Tobacco (Validation) Act, 1964 (Act 9 of 1964) enacted by the State Legislature of Kerala are void on the grounds that (1) the State Legislature lacked the legislative competence to enac that Act, and (2) the provisions of the Act contravened article 301 of the Constitution and were not protected by article 304?
Held that:- The fact that the levy of excise duty is in the form of licence fee would not detract from the fact that the levy relates to excise duty. It is, however, essential that such levy should be linked with production or manufacture of the excisable article. The recovery of licence fee in such an event would be one of the modes of levy of the excise duty. Where, however, the levy imposed or tax has no nexus with the manufacture or production of an article, the impost or tax cannot be regarded to be one in the nature of excise duty.
The charging section 3 of this Act creates a liability for payment of luxury tax on the stocking and vending of tobacco. There is no provision of this Act which is concerned with production or manufacture of tobacco or which links the tax under its provisions with the manufacture or production of tobacco. The same is the position of the rules issued on August 3, 1950 and January 25, 1951 and Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer on behalf of the appellants has frankly conceded that those rules are in no way concerned with the production or manufacture of tobacco. It would, therefore follow that the levy of tax contemplated by the provisions of section 3 of the Act has nothing to do with the manufacture or production of tobacco and, as such, cannot be deemed to be in the nature of excise duty. Argument that the provisions of the Act fall under entry 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution must, therefore, be held to be bereft of force.
We agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that such levy directly impedes the free flow of trade and as such is violative of article 301 of the Constitution. The requirement of the proviso regarding the sanction of the President has been satisfied. It is no doubt true that the assent of the President was given subsequent to the passing of the Bill by the legislature but that fact would not affect the validity of the impugned Act in view of the provisions of article 255 of the Constitution. section 6 of the impugned Act is invalid because it provides for payment of an amount which had been refunded in pursuance of the order of this Court is bereft of force. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (11) TMI 159 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ause both the periods mentioned in the statute have long passed. The law provides that the Sales Tax Officer may, if he is so advised, retain copies of the documents but he is under no circumstances authorised to retain them beyond a period of 60 days. The seizure of the documents being against the mandatory provision of law has to be set aside and we order accordingly. The documents mentioned at S. Nos. 6, 7 and 8 will be returned forthwith to the petitioner-factory. It will also be entitled to costs of this petition, which are assessed at Rs. 200. Regarding the documents mentioned at S. No. 4, no relief can be given to the petitioner-factory in these proceedings because the Income-tax Officer, who impounded this document has not been impleaded as a party. It shall, however, be open to the petitioner-factory to seek the appropriate relief by making an application to the said authority or by availing of other remedies which may be available to it under law. Petition allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 158 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd protecting the same from rainy water and other vicissitudes of nature. These distribution boxes can under no circumstances be treated as containers as contended by Mr. Anantha Babu. A container, in the ordinary parlance, cannot be considered to be a distribution box manufactured for a specific purpose with a particular metal which required specifications. A container is one which can be normally used for storing or carrying any article or goods. The distribution box would always be with the meter, fuses, cleats, screws and others. It would not be separate. Even assuming that a meter can be used without the distribution box, from the nature and character of the distribution box, we must hold that it is a necessary adjunct without which the meter cannot be effectively, safely and usefully made use of. In these circumstances, we see no reason to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal and the T.R.C. merits dismissal and is hereby dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (11) TMI 157 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts. In support of this contention, Mr. Shah referred us to the decision in Santumal v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax 1963 14 S.T.C. 287 at 297-298. decided by a Division Bench of this Court. Although this contention does not appear to us to be without merits, it is not open to us to go into the same, because the question referred to us is only as to whether the finding that the sales made to M/s. Keshavji Hirji were not genuine is contrary to the rules of natural justice, arbitrary, perverse and Illegal. In the result, in our view, the question posed for our consideration must be answered in the affirmative. As far as the costs are concerned, taking into account the length of time for which the matter has gone on and the fact that both the sides have briefed more than one counsel, we think that it is proper that the respondent should be directed to pay to the applicants a sum of Rs. 1,500 as the quantified costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (11) TMI 156 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and would not be violative of the legislative intent. So far as the second part of the prayers of the petition, namely, injunction restraining the respondents from enforcing the certificate mentioned in paragraph 30 of the petition is concerned, it can hardly be disputed that the petitioner is entitled to the same and the said certificates should not be enforced. In the premises, there will be an order in terms of prayers (a) and (b) and the respondent-Commercial Tax Officer is directed to refund to the petitioner the sums of money, which the petitioner has paid for the various years for which due evidence would be produced before the respondentCommercial Tax Officer. There will also be an order in terms of prayer (f) restraining the respondents from enforcing the certificate mentioned therein. The rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Let there be a stay for operation of this order for six weeks from date. Petition allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 155 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d for the manufacture of oil. It is only those commodities which are in commercial circles dealt with as oilseeds that are covered by the entry and not every seed from which by some process or other oil could be extracted. If we apply these decisions, certainly fried groundnut kernel could not be held to be an oil-seed. When it is fried, the germinating property in the groundnut kernel is lost. Most of the oil content, if not all, is also lost by frying. In commercial parlance also, fried groundnut is not dealt with as an oil-seed. We are, therefore, of the view that fried groundnut kernel could not be treated as an oil-seed liable to single point tax as declared goods under item 6 of the Second Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, and it is liable to multi-point tax at 2 frac12 per cent. The order of the Tribunal is, therefore, set aside and the assessment order is confirmed. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 154 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed that the life of the present legislature would start from the date when it was elected. Moreover, we think that when a legislature has power to make retrospective laws there is no legal limitation on it as to the date from which it would affect retrospectively the right of the citizens. The third point was that since appeals are pending against the original assessments made at the rate of 2 per cent it would be the appellate authority under section 9(3) of the Act which will enhance the assessment in accordance with the amended law if applicable and the Sales Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to reassess the petitioner by a notice under section 21 of the Act. This is a fallacious argument. It is settled law that the appellate authority while exercising its jurisdiction under section 9(3) of the Act does not take into consideration new circumstances and new material it is confined to the material on the record. This petition has no force. It is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (11) TMI 153 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... imposed on the dealer. A discretion, which is in the nature of a judicial discretion, must be exercised by the officer before determining the quantum of penalty. The learned Judge has also directed this aspect of the matter to be borne in mind by the officer, if he determines to impose a penalty on the dealer. 8.. In the light of the above, we confirm the judgment under appeal in so far as it set aside exhibit P6. We hold that there has been no violation of sub-section (b) of section 10. The question whether there has been a violation of sub-section (d) of section 10 will be considered by the officer concerned afresh after affording a reasonable opportunity to the dealer. The officer will also determine the quantum of penalty to be imposed in the light of what is stated above, if he decides that a penalty has to be imposed. We allow these appeals to the extent indicated and dispose of them on the above terms. We direct the parties to bear their costs. Appeals partly allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 152 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e word scent or perfume , the particular article must be capable of vaporisation at the ordinary or normal temperature of the atmosphere, therefore, could not be accepted. Dhoop or dhoopbattis do not vaporate under atmospheric temperature alone. Therefore, that could not be put as a test by itself though that might also be a relevant test. In this case, the Tribunal had tested the sample and before us also the sample of these articles were produced. We find that it emanates a sweet and pleasant smell and it does not also appear to require sufficient heat for the odoriferous element to evaporate. Therefore, even the test propounded by this court in the decision, Mettur Sandalwood Oil Co. v. State of Madras 1965 16 S.T.C. 9., is satisfied. We, accordingly, hold that the articles in question are perfumes within the meaning of entry 51 of the First Schedule to the Sales Tax Act. We, accordingly, dismissed the petitions with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 each. Petitions dismissed.
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1975 (11) TMI 151 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is not powerless to interfere at the very initial stage. Some of the activities of a person may be included in the definition of dealer while others may not. Where incidence of tax is sought to be attracted in respect of an activity for which a person cannot be called a dealer , the starting of proceedings under the Act would be wholly without jurisdiction and can be struck down. The Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirumagal Mills Ltd. 1972 29 S.T.C. 290 (S.C.). approved of the above principle. Accordingly, I quash the impugned notice vis-a-vis the revision sought to be made for banquet charges and cafeteria sales , but uphold the same vis-a-vis the rest of the items mentioned in the impugned notice. The rule is made absolute in the terms mentioned above and discharged vis-a-vis the items in respect of which I have held the notice to be valid. In view of the fact that there is partial success of both the parties, I make no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1975 (11) TMI 150 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e is admitted by the assessee that would clinch the matter in his favour in regard to the maintainability of the appeal. This view which we take is fortified by the amendment, which has now been introduced by the U.P. Legislature in section 9(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. What it lays down under clause (a) to the proviso therein is that no appeal shall be entertained unless the appellant has furnished satisfactory proof of the payment of not less than.........the amount of tax or fee due under this Act on the turnover of sales or purchases, as the case may be, admitted by the appellant in the returns filed by him or at any stage in any proceedings under this Act, whichever is greater. For the reasons discussed above, we answer the two questions referred in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P. We assess the costs payable by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., to the assessee at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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