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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 1801 Records
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1978 (11) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence 'of course it is possible but not in the least probable' the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice." In Khem Karan v. State of U. P. AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1567, this Court observed (at p. 1569). "Neither mere possibilities nor remote possibilities nor mere doubts which are not reasonable can, without danger to the administration of justice, be the foundation of the acquittal of an accused person, if there is otherwise fairly credible testimony." Where the trial Court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule. That is what the High Court has done in this case. The appeal is dismissed Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rit in this contention. The plaintiff may have valid reasons for entering into a compromise with defendants 1 and 34 who might have made good a part of the loss suffered by the plaintiff. But apart from the allegation of fraud, the suit was substantially based on the scope of authority conferred by Exts. P-l and P-2 to sell lands and the acquisition of the title. by the purchasers From the attorney defendant 34 in exercise of the authority conferred by Exts. P-l and P-2 and, therefore, a compromise with defendants 1 and 34 would not render the appeal against the rest of the defendants infructuous or untenable. The third contention was that the plaintiff left India and his evidence having remained incomplete, the same could not be read in evidence. After we explained the relevant documents, we are satisfied that there is no substance in this contention. As all the contentions raised by the appellant fail, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. N.V.K. Appeal dismissed .
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1978 (11) TMI 157 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ght in stopping there. The High Court should have further considered the question whether the order for maintenance which was deemed to be an order under Section 125 of the new Code could not be cancelled under the provisions of Section 127 of the new Code. Once the order under Section 488 is deemed to be an order under Section 125 of the new Code, it must be so deemed for all purposes including the application of Section 127 of the new Code. Section 127 provides for consequential orders upon proof of a change in the circumstance of any person receiving, under Section 125, a monthly allowance, or ordered under the same Section to pay a monthly allowance to his wife, child, father or mother, as the case may be. The admitted attainment of majority of the respondent and the change of the law were surely circumstances which entitled the appellant to have the order in favour of the respondent cancelled. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court.
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1978 (11) TMI 156 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... But it will be hazardous for us to base our decision on any such speculation, when the appellant, himself, instead of taking any such plea, has, with obdurate persistency stuck to the position that the respondent's service has been terminated without any reason, which comes perilously near to admitting that the power reserved to the employer under the conditions of the employment, has been exercised arbitrarily. In the absence of any information from the appellant indicating that the respondent was marked off for discharge on the basis of an intelligible differentia having a reasonable nexus with the object of maintaining the efficiency and integrity of the public service, we are constrained to hold, in agreement with the High Court, that the impugned order suffers from the vice of unfair discrimination and is violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, we uphold the decision of the High Court and dismiss this appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 155 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ellant in that case was at the relevant time working as Assistant in Co-ordination III of D.G.T.D. at Udyog Bhavan, New Delhi. His contention was that sanction accorded by Shri K. Rajaram, Deputy Secretary to Government of India in the Ministry of Industrial Development and Company Affairs (Department of Industrial Development) was not valid and that he could only have been prosecuted under a sanction that may be accorded by the Home Ministry. In respect of this contention it was conceded on behalf of the State that in the absence of such sanction the prosecution must fail. The judgment proceeds on concession and not on any analysis or examination of the relevant provisions. Therefore it in no way helps the appellant in this case. This being the only point that could be raised in this appeal by limited leave and such contention being without merit, the appeal fails. and is dismissed. As the appellant is dead there is no question of his surrendering to Bail. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 154 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gal power to punish a person or destroy her service career in a manner not warranted by law by putting a rule which makes a useful provision for the premature retirement of government servants only in the ’’public interest", to a purpose‘ wholly unwarranted by it, and to arrive at quite a contradictory result. An administrative order which is based on reasons of fact which do not exist raust therefore be held to be infected with an abuse of power. So when it has been conceded by Mr. Lekhi that there was nothing on the record which would justify the impugned order dated March 26, 1976, of the appellant’s premature retirement under clause (j) (i) of Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules, and that the Government was not in a position to support that unfair order, that order must be set aside, for it amounts to an abuse of the power which was vested in the authority concerned. The appeal is allowed with costs and it is ordered accordingly. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (11) TMI 153 - SUPREME COURT
Smuggling of Cargo of contraband goods - detention orders - Held that:- It is quite clear from the facts set out in the grounds of detention, that the appellant was the person who was actually engaged in the act of smuggling of the contraband stainless steel rolls into the Indian customs waters. It is, therefore, clear that for all intents and purposes the appellant was the actual smuggler and not a mere abettor. Furthermore, the activities of the appellant were such that his case would be covered by both clauses (i) and (ii) of s. 3(1) of the Act. Thus, there was due application of mind.
It is manifest that the appellant could in the instant case be detained under sub-s.(1) of s. 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 both under clauses (i) and (ii) thereof. In any case, even assuming that the appellant was merely an abettor of the smuggling of 12 rolls of stainless steel sheets on this occasion, still his activities in this transaction afforded sufficient grounds for the prognosis that he would have himself indulged in actual smuggling of the balance lot of 8 rolls of stainless steel sheets remaining behind at Dubai, if not detained, and as such cl. (i) s. 3(1) of the Act was properly invoked. W.P.dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 152 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... uo; contention that it should be treated as rubber product under Tariff Item 16A(2) is not tenable because it is neither plates, nor sheets, nor strips to be included as rubber product under the Tariff Item 16A(2). As the product remains as rubberised fabric classifiable under Tariff Item 19I(i), the demand for processing surcharge has correctly been made. The Order in Appeal is, therefore, based on the facts of the case and is correct in law. The Revision Application is accordingly rejected.
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1978 (11) TMI 151 - SUPREME COURT
Whether or not the courts below were legally justified in discharging the respondents?
Held that:- The High Court correctly pointed out that the records before the Trial Judge show that the Collector Vijayasekharan had valued the land at the rate of ₹ 1.70 lakhs per acre as far back 1: as 3-2-1970 and if two years later the valuation was raised to ₹ 2 lakhs it cannot be said that the land was in any way over-valued. Lastly, there does not appear to be any legal evidence to show any; meeting of mind between respondents No. 1 and 2 at any time. Although the Collector at the time of the acquisition was a distant relation of respondent No. 1 he had himself slashed down the rate of compensation recommended by the Revenue officer from ₹ 2,10,000 to ₹ 2,00,000 and it was never suggested by the prosecution that the Collector was in any way a party to the aforesaid conspiracy.
For these reasons, therefore, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court that there was no sufficient ground for trying the accused in the instant case. Moreover, this Court could be most reluctant to interfere with concurrent findings of the two courts in the absence of any special circumstances. For the reasons given above, the judgement of the High Court is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 150 - SUPREME COURT
Detenu release orders - Held that:- Appeal allowed. Questions whether the confessional statements recorded on December 13 and 14, 1977 were voluntary statements or were statements which were obtained from the detenu under duress or whether the subsequent retraction of those statements by the detenu on December 22, 1977 was in the nature of an after thought, were primarily for the detaining authority to consider before deciding to issue the impugned detention order but since admittedly the aforesaid vital facts which would have influenced the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other were neither placed before nor considered by the detaining authority it must be held that there was non application of mind to the most material and vital facts vitiating the requisite satisfaction of the detaining authority thereby rendering the impugned detention order invalid and illegal. For these reasons we set aside the impugned detention order.
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1978 (11) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the detenu be set at liberty?
Held that:- There was no material before the 4th respondent for coming to the conclusion that the detenu "engages" in transporting smuggled goods. To this extent we have to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no material for coming to the conclusion that the detenu was "engaging" himself in the unlawful activities. The detenu has been under detention from 4th July, 1977 and the period of detention permissible under section 3 is only one year. Section 9(1) enables the authority to make a declaration which would have the effect of extending the period of detention to two years from the date of detention by virtue of amendment to section 10 by Amending Act 20 of 1976. As we have found that the order under section 9(1) has not been validly made and as the detenu has been in detention for more than one year his continuance in detention is not sustainable. In the circumstances, we allow the petition.
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1978 (11) TMI 148 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... placed the bar of estoppel in the way of the revenue and, on that basis, it could not have refused to determine, independently of the facts of this case, as to what was the true rate of tax leviable on the sales of scrap batteries effected in favour of the assessee on the basis whether those scrap batteries were covered either by entry 42B of Schedule C or entry 22 of Schedule E. The foregoing discussion would show that the Tribunal erred in law in failing to determine whether, on a true and correct interpretation, the goods in question were covered by entry 42B of Schedule C or entry 22 of Schedule E and that it also fell into an error in invoking the doctrine of estoppel on the facts and circumstances of the case. The question reframed by us will accordingly stand answered in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the Commissioner of Sales Tax. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (11) TMI 147 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t of rayon fabrics and, so far as the second sari was concerned, it contained as much as 17.80 per cent of cotton. Even assuming that this subbreak up can be looked into for purposes of finding out whether the articles in question fell within the relevant entries, even then, we do not think that they will satisfy the test which we have indicated above for purposes of claiming exemption under the relevant entries, inasmuch as in the first sari the mixed material is silk, the basic material of viscose rayon should be 60 per cent as prescribed under item 22(ii), and the second sari had admittedly less than 40 per cent of basic material of cotton prescribed under item 19. The result, therefore, is that we accept this reference of the revenue and answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee shall pay costs of this reference to the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Gujarat. Reference answered in the negative.
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1978 (11) TMI 146 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the contract was, therefore, the delivery of the bricks after manufacture. We are of the opinion that these observations apply to the contract in the present case with great force. The property in the ballast was entirely of the assessee. They have to manufacture the same and stack them for facilitating delivery. Therefore, the conclusion which is inescapable is that the essence of the contract was the delivery of the ballast after manufacture and the labour involved is only incidental to the supply of the ballast. After a careful consideration of the entire material placed and the various decisions cited before us, we have no hesitation in holding that the contracts in question are only for the sale of the ballast and not for work and labour. The contractors, therefore, were rightly assessed on the turnover of the supply of the ballast. In the result, the writ petitions are dismissed with costs, one set in W.P. No. 3645 of 1971. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petitions dismissed.
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1978 (11) TMI 145 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ibunal will be restricted to the evidence on the record and it may not be entitled to take additional evidence. That may result in injustice. In the circumstances, we think it appropriate, following the decisions of the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Cotton Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay 1970 26 S.T.C. 263 (S.C.)., and Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal v. Indian Molasses Co. P. Ltd. 1970 78 I.T.R. 474 (S.C.). , to decline to answer the question on the ground that the Tribunal has failed to consider and decide in proper light and perspective and on the basis of the evidence on record the question whether the ahar was a mechanically produced cattle-feed, properly so-called. It will be open to the Tribunal to dispose the appeal under section 69(4) in the light of the observations made by this Court after determining the questions which ought to have been decided. The reference accordingly stands disposed of, with no order as to costs. Reference not answered.
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1978 (11) TMI 144 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the context of section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, we think it appropriate to decline to answer the questions on the ground that the Tribunal has failed to consider and decide the question whether the articles or goods in question in which the assessee deals are wire rods. It will be open to the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal under section 69(4) in the light of the observations made by this Court after determining the said question which ought to have been decided. We wish to clarify that the only question which requires to be determined under section 69(4) is whether the said articles or goods are wire rods. If the answer to the said question is in the affirmative, the Tribunal will dispose of the appeal on the basis that those goods are covered by entry 27. If the answer to the said question is in the negative, the appeal of the assessee must obviously fail. Reference accordingly stands disposed of with no order as to costs. Reference disposed of accordingly.
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1978 (11) TMI 143 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng of a competition or some event like completion of training at a particular institution. We cannot conceive of a person normally going to a shop and purchasing trophies, shields, crests and mementoes like these for the purpose of decorating his drawing room. These articles are normally purchased for being presented to persons who have succeeded in some competitive events or have attained some particular distinction or achieved a particular rank. The main purpose of giving these articles is to commemorate an event or to honour an achievement and not for the purpose of decoration. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the said articles could not be said to be ornamental metalware within the meaning of the said expression in entry 13 of Schedule E to the said Act. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The applicant must pay to the assessee the costs of these references. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (11) TMI 142 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... deals with the question of certified copies of documents, reads as follows Any person who is a party to a proceeding under the Act or under these rules may apply to the appropriate authority having jurisdiction in respect of such proceeding or having the custody of the records pertaining thereto, for a certified copy of a document produced or filed in such proceeding or of an order passed by such authority. This would again show that an order is not regarded as being included in the term document . In view of this, in our opinion, the authority to receive any notice or document in connection with the assessment proceedings did not include an authority to receive the assessment orders. In our view, the Tribunal was correct in the conclusion at which it arrived. In the result, the question referred to us in all the three references is answered in the affirmative. The applicant to pay to the respondents the costs of these three references. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (11) TMI 141 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... alty will come to be imposed causing hardship even in bonafide cases. In fact, this very case is an instance on the point for no penalty is leviable. On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Tribunal in the instant case is correct, namely, that since fireclay purchased by the assessee against certificate in form 19 was used by it in the manufacture of stoneware pipes, firebricks and lime, which were ultimately sold against form C to the Ahmedabad Electricity Co. Ltd., which is a certified electrical undertaking, without payment of any tax, the assessee was liable to pay purchase tax under section 16 in respect of the goods covered by the certificate in form 19. The question referred to us by the Tribunal is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the revenue and against the, assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the State of Gujarat. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (11) TMI 140 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lt with the objects and reasons of the said U.P. Act, which, inter alia, stated These judgments have created legal difficulties in the assessment and collection of tax on the aforesaid commodities. Besides, the dealers have started applying for the refund of tax already collected on these commodities. This will have serious repercussions on the State s revenue. Accordingly, it is proposed to amend sections 3-A and 3-D to provide for the levy of tax on the aforesaid commodities as seperate items. It is also proposed to validate the past levy, assessment and collection of tax on the above commodities.......... 3.. Challenge to section 7 of the U.P. Act validating earlier levies, notwithstanding the previous judgments to the contrary, was rejected by their Lordships. Respectfully following Hira Lal Rattan Lal s case 1973 31 S.T.C. 178 at 183 (S.C.)., the present petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. SANDHAWALIA, C.J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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