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Showing 101 to 120 of 1801 Records
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1978 (12) TMI 32 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Computation Of Capital For Surtax Purposes, Dividend Reserve ... ... ... ... ..... ility was contingent or whether it could be ascertained with reasonable accuracy. In any event such finding of the AAC has been negatived by the Tribunal. Mr. Sengupta invited us to send back the matter for further enquiry on the basis of the balance-sheet. By reason of the facts stated hereinbefore and the Tribunal having rejected the application of the revenue whereby it sought to incorporate the basic facts on which the case of the revenue depended in the order, we are not satisfied that this is a fit and proper case where a further enquiry should be made in the matter. No doubt on occasions the High Court has remanded matters to the Tribunal for further enquiry, but that course is followed only in exceptional cases and generally where an item of evidence produced before the authorities below had not been considered. This is not the case here. For the above reasons, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (12) TMI 31 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income From House Property, Income From Property, Lease Rent, Rates And Taxes, Rental Income ... ... ... ... ..... id facts found by the Tribunal, the conclusion reached by it that these stalls are buildings within the meaning of s. 22 of the Act cannot be regarded as perverse. Similarly, it should be held that the Tribunal was right in holding that the rental income from these stalls is assessable under ss. 22 to 27 and not under s. 56 of the Act in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in East India Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. 1961 42 ITR 49 (SC). We, accordingly, answer question No. 1 in the negative and question No. 2 in the affirmative and both in favour of the assessee. We propose to make no order as to costs. Let it now be recorded here that we express no opinion on the argument of Mr. Sukumar Mitra, learned counsel for the assessee, that two conceivable views are possible regarding the finding of the Tribunal on the question whether these stalls are buildings and, therefore, it cannot be said that the aforesaid finding of the Tribunal is perverse. DEB J.--I agree.
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1978 (12) TMI 30 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessment Order, Orders Passed, Powers Of Commissioner ... ... ... ... ..... ssessment. It is, therefore, clear from the language of s. 33B(1) that the power of the Commissioner is not confined to an order of assessment passed by the ITO but it extends to all orders passed by him if the Commissioner considers that such orders are erroneous in so far as they are prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. Further, as the Commissioner is empowered by s. 33B(1) to pass such order as the circumstances of the case may justify, it cannot be said that he had no jurisdiction to pass those orders directing the ITO to pass orders afresh under s. 23A(1) of the Act. Moreover, the approval of the IAC to drop the proceedings cannot affect the power of the Commissioner under s. 33B(1) of the Act. We, accordingly, answer the question in the negative and in favour of the revenue without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case which the Tribunal will decide when the matter goes back to it. There will be no order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.--I agree.
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1978 (12) TMI 29 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Interest On Advance, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... hich has accrued to the assessee. The Tribunal was, therefore, perfectly justified in the absence of an order of allotment from the ITO assessing the firm in excluding the amount of interest which has accrued to the assessee as a partner of the firm as a separate item of assessable income. In view of the discussion made above the answer to the first portion of the reference, namely, as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 42,595 accrued as interest on the advances made by the assessee to M/s. Ramgarh Industries Coal Co., is in the affirmative and against the assessee whereas the second part of the question, namely, as to whether the said amount was taxable in the hands of the assessee, for the reasons recorded above, is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The reference is answered accordingly. As the assessee has succeeded substantially she is entitled to costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 200. S. SARWAR ALI J.-I agree.
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1978 (12) TMI 28 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Family Property ... ... ... ... ..... must be held that the widow, the sons and all the daughters of Iswardas have inherited all these properties absolutely under s. 8 of the Act in equal shares and per capita and not per stirpes, and as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants in terms of s. 19 of the Act. The widow and the daughters have relinquished their interest in all these properties in favour of the sons of Iswardas as admitted by Mr. Bagchi before us and, therefore, each son of Iswardas became the absolute owner of one-third share in all these properties. Hence, their respective sons have no interest whatsoever in these properties during the lifetime of their respective fathers and no part of the income of these properties is includible in the assessment of the assessee in the status of a HUF. In the premises, we are not impressed by the arguments of Mr. Bagchi and answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee without making any order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.--I agree.
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1978 (12) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains, Market Value ... ... ... ... ..... the Tribunal held that it was not possible to establish that the object of the assessee was to avoid or reduce the tax liability. The observations of the Tribunal though not expressed very clearly, appear to conform with our view. It appears to us that, apart from the fact that the market price of the asset transferred was higher than the transfer price, the ITO had no further material or evidence before him so that he could have reason to believe that the object of the assessee in making the transfer was to avoid or reduce the tax liability. The Tribunal held that the revenue authorities had no other proof to come to the said conclusion and without any further evidence or material the conclusion arrived at by them could not be sustained. We see no reason to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal. For the above reasons the question referred is answered in favour of the assessee and in the affirmative. There will be no order as to costs. BIMAL CHANDRA BASAK J.---I agree.
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1978 (12) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Net Wealth, Wealth Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... ircumstances of each case, the nature of the business, the prospects of profitability and such other considerations will have to be taken into account as will be applicable to the facts of each case. But, one thing is clear, the market value, unless in exceptional circumstances to which we have referred, cannot be determined on the hypothesis that because in a private limited company one holder can bring it into liquidation, it should be valued as on liquidation by the break-up method. The yield method is the generally applicable method while the break-up method is the one resorted to in the exceptional circumstances or where the company is ripe for liquidation but none the less is one of the methods. We direct the Tribunal to apply the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court noted above and determine the value of the said shares. The reference is disposed of accordingly. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. BIMAL CHANDRA BASAK, J.-I agree.
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1978 (12) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ot be said to have committed default under s. 139(1) of the Act at all, and, therefore, the question of the assessee being liable to penalty for any default alleged to have been committed under that sub-section would not arise. In this particular case, admittedly, the notice by the ITO was issued after the assessee had failed to furnish the return voluntarily within the time prescribed under s. 139(1) and, therefore, a default has been committed by the assessee even before the ITO issued the notice under s. 139(2). In such a case, simply because the assessee subsequently filed the return of income in response to the notice issued by the ITO under s. 139(2) of the Act, it will not have the effect of wiping out the default committed or disabling or preventing the ITO from penalising that default under s. 139(1) read with s. 271(1)(a) of the Act. Hence, we answer the question referred to this court in the affirmative and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (12) TMI 24 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Civil Servant, Income Not Forming Part, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... es with numerous legitimate devices for permissible avoidance and equally numerous concealed conduit pipes for illegal evasion and perhaps running into phenomenal figures, on the one hand, and moderate incomes from known sources or fixed incomes with little or no scope for permissible deductions or legitimate avoidance and fortunately none for evasion, on the other. Unfortunately for the petitioner, none of these matters are justiciable in view of their policy content and are matters that fall within the exclusive purview of the authorities that determine the taxation policy of the country. It is not possible for this court to pronounce on these or to base any relief on them. All that this court can do is to express a pious hope that in any future reorientation of taxation policy, these features would perhaps enter due consideration of appropriate authorities. In the result, there is no option but to dismiss the petition. There would, however be no costs. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (12) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Nature And Character ... ... ... ... ..... take a totally inconsistent view when the question of payment of interest by the Central Govt. arises under s. 214 of the Act. It is worthwhile pointing out that just as in the case of s. 214 payment of interest by the Central Govt. is mandatory, so also under s. 217 payment of interest by the assessee is mandatory. If the Commissioner can hold, notwithstanding the mandatory provisions of s. 217 without purporting to take action under r. 46 of the I.T. Rules, that no action need be taken for recovery of the interest from the assessee, it must inevitably follow that the mandatory provisions of s. 214 also must apply and interest is payable by the Central Govt. to the assessee. In view of this peculiar feature present in this case, without deciding the general question raised before us by the learned counsel for the revenue, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1978 (12) TMI 22 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Dispose Of, Income Tax, Waiver Of Penalty, Wealth Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... that issue of a notice meant actual service of the notice under s. 17 of the Act and this view was confirmed by the Supreme Court in the case reported in 1975 99 ITR 581 (CWT v. Kundan Lal Behari Lal). It is, therefore, clear that the notice under s. 17 of the Act must relate to the particular return in regard to which penalty for failure to file it within time, is imposed. No counter-affidavit has been filed in this case and it is not the case of the Commissioner either that any notice under s. 17 or under s. 14(2) of the Act had been issued to the petitioner in the status of HUF. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the filing of the return was anything but voluntary . The view taken by the Commissioner cannot be supported on the facts in the case. Accordingly, the order of the Commissioner is set aside with a direction that he shall dispose of the application filed by the petitioner under s. 18(2A) of the Act on the basis that the returns were filed voluntarily. No costs.
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1978 (12) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Trade Union ... ... ... ... ..... es. The Tribunal has duly considered the relevant rules and the actual activities of the assessee and come to the conclusion that the primary object of the assessee was the regulation of the relationship of its members and the employees. It cannot be said that such conclusion of the Tribunal is erroneous or perverse. None of the facts found on which the decision of the Tribunal is based has been challenged which thus stand concluded. As contended by Dr. Pal, the decisions cited on behalf of the revenue do not advance the latter s case inasmuch as the same involve consideration of the question whether any property or income of an assessee was wholly or exclusively used for charitable or religious purposes. This is not the question with which we are concerned. For the reasons as stated above the assessee succeeds in this application. The question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-- I agree.
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1978 (12) TMI 20 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
A Firm, Estate Duty Act, Principal Value Of Estate, Property Passing On Death ... ... ... ... ..... the value of his share in the net partnership assets as on the date of dissolution or retirement after a deduction of liabilities and prior charges. This clearly indicates that the amounts, which were withdrawn from the capital account of the partnership and gifted to Frenibai were not the amounts exclusively in the hands of Shri G. D. Anklesaria and in view of these facts now appearing in the additional statement and in the light of our judgment dated 25th January, 1978 (reported in 1978 113 ITR 885 (MP)), and that to the facts of this case the principle of Munro s case 1934 AC 61 2 EDC 462 (PC) would be applicable and applying this principle the amounts so credited into the account of Frenibai could not be included in the estate of the deceased as property passing or deemed to pass on his death under s. 10 of the E.D. Act, 1953. Our answer to the question is, therefore, in the negative. Under the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1978 (12) TMI 19 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing, Estate Duty Act, Income Tax Rules ... ... ... ... ..... sent on August 26, 1975, send him the challan forms and that the challan forms would be received within such time as would enable him to send his appeal memo along with the duplicate of the challan form to reach the Tribunal well before August 30, 1975. We are, therefore, satisfied that there is no case made out whatsoever by the petitioner to condone the delay in the present case. On the other hand, the conduct of the petitioner speaks much against such contention. In the circumstances, we do not think that the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal rejecting his prayer for condonation of delay and dismissing his appeal on the ground of limitation is either unreasonable or improper and requires any interference from this court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under arts. 226 arts. 227 of the Constitution. The result is that the petition is dismissed and the rule is discharged. There is no appearance on the other side hence, there will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (12) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Computation Of Capital, Mistake Apparent From Record, Priority Industry, Rectification Of Mistakes
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1978 (12) TMI 17 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Dispose Of ... ... ... ... ..... - 63 to 1967-68. This finding of the Tribunal is sufficient to answer the point raised by learned counsel for the revenue before us. In fact, the third question in T. C. No. 394 of 1974, having regard to the form in which it has been referred to the court, will not admit of any further contention on the part of the learned counsel for the revenue as to the correctness or otherwise of the conclusions of the Tribunal in this behalf. Under these circumstances, we answer all the questions raised in these references except question No. 2 in T. C. Nos. 1427 to 1432 of 1977 in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. As far as the second question in Tax Cases Nos. 1427 to 1432 of 1977 is concerned, a reading of the order of the Tribunal will show that no such contention was put forward before the Tribunal and, therefore, the question does not arise out of the order of the Tribunal. The assessee will be entitled to his costs of these references. Counsel s fee Rs. 500, one set.
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1978 (12) TMI 16 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Additional Super Tax, Undistributed Profits ... ... ... ... ..... w, the proceedings under s. 104 initiated thereafter must be held to be in continuation of the original proceedings as laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision considered hereinbefore. Therefore, at the time of the amalgamation both the liability to declare and distribute dividend and the proceedings resulting from non-payment of correct dividend were in existence. By amalgamation such liabilities did not come to an end. To hold otherwise would mean that the assessee would not only be absolved from the liability to pay correct dividend but also the person in whose hands the said dividend should go and be treated as the latter s taxable income would also be exempted. In our view, the scheme of the Act and the scheme of the amalgamation did not envisage this conclusion. For the above reasons we accept the contentions of the revenue. We answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BIMAL CHANDRA BASAK J.--I agree.
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1978 (12) TMI 15 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
From Other Sources ... ... ... ... ..... hat the learned judges were connecting the deposit made by Kevalchand with the income received from such deposit. However, for the purpose of the applicability of s. 12(2) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, or s. 57(iii) of the I.T. Act, 1961, what has to be correlated or connected is not the deposit with the income received from such deposit but the earlier borrowing and the payment of interest thereon with the subsequent earning of interest from the deposit. That question the learned judges had not considered in the conclusion which they had recorded in the passage which we have extracted. In view of this, the above decision cannot be said to be of any assistance to the assessee to sustain its claim in the present case. Under these circumstances, we answer the question referred to this court in T.C. No. 392 of 1974 in the negative and against the assessee. The department will be entitled to its costs of these references. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (Rupees five hundred only), one set.
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1978 (12) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Limitation For Completing Assessment, Provisions Of I.T.Act, Super Profits Tax
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1978 (12) TMI 13 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... para. 10 of its order that The assessee believed rightly or wrongly that her divided son had claim upon jointly (sic) family estate left by her husband to that extent there was an assumption of an antecedent title of some (sic) though not backed by any legal right and thereupon she entered into a family arrangement acknowledging her son s claim and allotted the same to him as and for his share. In view of this finding in the present case, it is clear that at the time when the family arrangement was entered into, the parties genuinely and bona fide thought that the son, Thiagarajan, had the right to a half share in the properties left behind by Srinivasan and it was on that basis that the document of November 12, 1959, was brought into existence. In this view, there would be no gift liable to gift-tax because any allotment of the property to Thiagarajan was not without consideration. The result is, the question is answered in the affirmative and against the revenue. No costs.
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