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Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 2141 Records
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1981 (12) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, HYDERABAD
Valuation - Refund of duty paid under protest on cost of packing - Duty paid under mistake of law - Excise Duty - Levy of - Scope - Writ jurisdiction
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1981 (12) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Rule 10 - Quasi-judicial proceedings - Omission or repeal ... ... ... ... ..... e an order passed in proceedings taken in pursuance of the notice dated 8th of August, 1980. It was also pointed out to us that the order of the 6th October, 1980 (Annexure 5 to the counter-affidavit) is not an order addressed to the petitioner but is a communication sent to the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Agra. There appears to be force in this contention for the communication is advisory in nature, and does not have the determinative character of an order passed in a quasi-judicially proceedings. 3. We, accordingly, allow the petition and quash the notice dated 8th August, 1980, and direct the respondents not to take any action on the basis of the aforesaid notice. We issue the same direction in respect of the notice dated 25th December, 1980 (Annexure 2) to the counter-affidavit which is a corrigendum of the show-cause notice dated 8th of August, 1980. There shall be no order as to costs. The security furnished under the interim order of this court is discharged.
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1981 (12) TMI 38 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Revision - Short Levy - Demand Notice including partly time barred demand - Legality - Classification List
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1981 (12) TMI 37 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Ice Cream Combination Cooler - Liability to Duty - Classification - Finding of Fact - Not Challenged
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1981 (12) TMI 36 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Limitation, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... n, agreeing with Sri Gulati, we find that in the order passed by the AAC in the appeal of Deo Prakash Gupta, as a consequence of which the assessment of the assessee-firm was sought to be reopened, there was no direction as to how the income excluded from the assessment of Deo Prakash Gupta was to be dealt with. All that was said by the AAC was The impugned assessment also is, therefore, liable to be set aside directing the Income-tax Officer to assess the appellant on his 10 annas share in the income of the firm instead of the entire income in the above manner. The assessment was accordingly set aside with a direction to make it afresh. In other words, there was no direction given by the AAC in that appeal for the inclusion of any income in the firm s case. In the result, we answer question No. 3 in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. Questions Nos. 1 and 2 are returned unanswered. The assessee is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 250.
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1981 (12) TMI 35 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... f the matter. Therefore, we remand the matter to the Tribunal to decide whether the sum of Rs. 40 lakhs or any part hereof which was retained by the assessee and in respect of which interest was paid, was utilised in the business of the assessee. If it was so, then the interest should be considered as an allowable deduction being an expenditure incurred for facilitating the carrying on of the business. If not then, of course, it cannot be allowed. We dispose of the matter as follows In that view of the matter, the matter is remanded to the Tribunal. So far as the sum of Rs. 1 lakh is concerned it is not allowable as held by the Tribunal for the reasons mentioned hereinbefore and so far as payment of interest of Rs. 1,85,123 is concerned, the same should be allowable after the Tribunal has examined the facts and if it finds that it was utilised in business. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1981 (12) TMI 34 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... vy penalty, it is not obligatory that penalty should be levied. An assessee is visited with penalty when his conduct is contumacious or there is a wilful disregard of legal obligations. The WTO could in a given set of facts condone the delay by not penalising the assessee. That power of the WTO is exercisable by the appellate authorities. The Tribunal, in our view, has exercised that power in coming to hold that, on the facts of the case, A situation for the imposition of penalty had not arisen. Learned standing counsel does not dispute the power of the appellate authority. We find that cogent reasons have been advanced by the Tribunal to come to that conclusion. We would, accordingly, hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was fully justified in directing the deletion of penalty. Since the assessee has not appeared in spite of notice, there would be no order for costs of these references. BEHERA J.-I agree with my Lord the Chief justice.
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1981 (12) TMI 33 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal went wrong in directing the ITO to recompute the penalty by confining the default to the period after the issue of the notice under s. 148 of the Act for the assessment year 1968-69 and the notice under s. 139(2) of the Act for the assessment year 1969-70. The issue of a notice under s. 139(2) of the Act did not wipe out the accrued default of non-compliance with the statutory obligation under s. 139(1) of the Act. Mr. Ray for the assessee contended that the Tribunal did not go into the quantum of penalty as the sustainability of it was examined and the assessee s contention was accepted. It becomes difficult for us to accept this contention at this stage particularly when learned standing counsel contends that since that question was never raised and has assumed finality, we should not make any observation which might embarrass the revenue. There would be no order for costs. BEHERA J.-I agree with my Lord the Chief justice.
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1981 (12) TMI 32 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Company, Reserves, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... f the said Act. Another point that has been urged is that at least 80 of the contracts had been worked out. Therefore, the amount set apart as reserve for taxation was really in respect of tax liability. The company had made profits in the course of working out the aforesaid contracts and the company was merely setting apart an estimated amount of tax on the accrued income. In this case the company was keeping its accounts on completed contract basis, as has been pointed out by the AAC. Therefore, the profits could be taken into consideration only after the contracts were fully worked out. In any event, this point is concluded by the judgment of this High Court in the case of the assessee in the earlier year. In the premises, respectfully following the decision of this court in the case of the assessee for the assessment year 1963-64, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1981 (12) TMI 31 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Limitation, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... with regard to the assessments made by the ITO in the case of her deceased husband. The question for consideration before the Commissioner (Appeals) was whether the ITO was justified in reopening the assessments of the assessee by including the income derived by the as e from her share in the estate of her deceased husband, E. C. Cowasji, in her total income. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal, in our opinion, was right in holding that the Commissioner (Appeals) was not competent to issue directions to cancel the assessments made in the case of the deceased, Cowasji, and to refund the taxes to the concerned taxpayers. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal was right in modifying the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) as aforesaid. For all these reasons, our answer to the questions referred to us are in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1981 (12) TMI 30 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Accrual Of Income, Amount Forgone ... ... ... ... ..... crual of income, or deemed accrual of the said income. I am also, cognizant, on the strength of CIT v. Shoorji Vallabhdas and Co. 1962 46 ITR 144 (SC), that the substance of the matter, despite being accrual, is the income, and if income does not result at all, there cannot be a tax, even though in book-keeping, an entry is made about a hypothetical income which does not materialise. I am also aware on the strength of Kedarnath jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1971 82 ITR 363 (SC), that entries in the books of account, if mistakenly not made, would not take the tax outside the ambit of law, if it is otherwise due. All these principles would come to apply in a set of facts. And the set of facts as emerged from the present controversy, are that no in come accrued to the petitioners. For the foregoing reasons, there is merit in these petitions which deserve acceptance. Accordingly allowing them, I quash the respective impugned orders of the Commissioner, but with no order as to costs.
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1981 (12) TMI 29 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Expenditure Tax ... ... ... ... ..... IT 1973 90 ITR 332 (Guj)as taking the same view, although without giving detailed reasons. No separate discussion of these Madras cases is necessary since they also relate to s. 30(1) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, under which an appeal was held to be not maintainable against a rectification order made under s. 35(1) of that Act. The reasons given by us for distinguishing the Gujarat decision in 1973 90 ITR 332, equally apply to the Madras decisions. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the AAC as well as the Appellate Tribunal erred in holding that no appeal lie s under s. 21(1) of the Expenditure-tax Act, 1957, against an order of rectification made under s. 31 of that Act. Consequently, the aforesaid question referred is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee as under An appeal lies under section 21 of the Expenditure-tax Act, 1957, against an order of, rectification passed under section 31 thereof. Parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1981 (12) TMI 28 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Registered Society, Taxable Entity ... ... ... ... ..... e other (cl. 3), which can be said to be a charitable purpose. In the case of such a trust, where the trustees can utilise the income for both charitable and non-charitable purposes the entire income is liable to tax on the principle of Mohd. Ibrahim Riza s case 1930 LR 57 IA 260 AIR 1930 PC 226, already referred to. There is no scope in such a case for exempting any portion of the income merely because it is in fact applied for charitable purposes. We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that a portion of the income of the Sabha was exempt under s. 11. In our opinion, having regard to our answer to questions Nos. 1 and 2, the answer to question No. 3 has to be that neither the whole nor any part of the income of the Sabha can be said to be exempt under ss. 11 and 12 of the I.T. Act, 1961. In the result the reference is disposed of in the manner already indicated. However, having regard to the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1981 (12) TMI 27 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he concealed profits was taken into account the assessee would be liable to distribute dividend only to the extent of 60 . The argument appeared to us to be plausible, but we feel that our hands are tied by the decision of the Supreme Court given in the matter in proceedings under s. 23A(3) of the Act. We are, therefore, of the view that the assessee-company was liable to distribute 100 of the distributable profits. We accordingly answer the first question by saying that the assesseecompany was not a company in which the public were substantially interested. The second question is answered in the affirmative, the third question is answered by saying that the amount of Rs. 19,43,222 was available to the assessee-company for purposes of distribution under s. 23A. So far as the fourth question is concerned, our answer is that the company was liable to distribute 100 of the distributable profits, and not 60 . The Department is entitled to its costs, which is assessed at Rs. 250.
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1981 (12) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... npaid, which was a definite liability and not a mere contingent liability. It will be observed that in the above case, the matter was considered by this court on the basis of the application of ordinary accountancy principles, apparently because the case related to a point of time when the W.T. Rules did not make a specific provision for the valuation of unquoted company shares and for valuation of interests in partnership firms. It seems to us that even after the promulgation of the relevant rules, to which we have earlier alluded, the principle does not stand altered from the one which has been adumbrated in the above decision. The position, if anything, is a fortiori as respects contributions to approved gratuity funds governed by the I.T. Act and Rules, Having regard to the considerations we have stated above, our answer to the question of law is in the affirmative and against the Department. The Department will pay the costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500 (one set).
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1981 (12) TMI 25 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Export Market Development Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... 2 and 3 are concerned, we answer them by saying, (a) that the assessee would be entitled to the deduction of Rs. 5,18,435 but not the deduction of Rs. 2,356 included in question No. 3, and (b) that in respect of the other items of Rs. 66,156, Rs. 18,988 (included in question No. 3) and Rs. 6,64,387 (referred to in question No. 2) the assessee would be eligible for the allowance of such of the amounts or portions thereof as can be established to be attributable to the activities set out in cl. (b) of sub-s. (2) of s. 35B. The result of this answer will be to restore these items to the file of the Tribunal for fresh consideration and disposal in accordance with law after giving such opportunity as the Tribunal may consider appropriate to the assessee and to the Department to put forward their respective contentions. The questions are answered as indicated above. The reference are disposed of accordingly. But as neither party has wholly succeeded, we make no order as to costs.
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1981 (12) TMI 24 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nce similar is the position with regard to precious or semi-precious stones whether set in any furniture, utensil or other article or worked or sewn into any apparel or not. The artificially enlarged meaning as extended by the prospective definition provided for in Expln. I above-mentioned also includes by way of abundant caution the natural meaning of the term. It has apparently been included so that the common parlance meaning should not escape attention. For the reasons outlined above, we decide the question as follows The Tribunal was justified in holding that silver utensils were not jewellery for the relevant assessment years and were exempt under s. 5(1)(viii) of the Act. However, the gold ornaments which were intended for the personal use of the assessee were jewellery and were not exempt under s. 5(1)(viii) of the Act because of the retrospective amendment of the main clause. No one is appearing for the assessee. In these circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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1981 (12) TMI 23 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Annual Value, Income From House Property ... ... ... ... ..... en for cancelling the registration, it has to be established that there is no genuine firm in existence. Then there is s. 187 which states that if there is a change in the constitution of the firm then the firm as constituted at the time of making the assessment has to be assessed. There is no provision in the Act which provides that if the term fixed by the partnership deed has expired then the registration cannot be continued. We, therefore, uphold the decision of the Tribunal. The result will be that we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative to hold that the firm was entitled to a continuation of registration and we answer question No. 2 in the negative by holding that the Addl. Commissioner was not justified in cancelling the ITO s order continuing the registration. As the question has arisen because of the alteration made in the I.T. Act, 1961, as compared with the Act of 1922, we consider that we should leave the parties to bear their own costs. We order accordingly.
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1981 (12) TMI 22 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Limitation, Notice, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... and Practice of Income Tax, Vol. I, p. 916, wherein the learned authors have observed that the view in Abdul Rahman s case 1975 100 ITR 541 (AP) is incorrect. With respect, we are unable to subscribe to the view expressed by the learned authors in the commentary on s. 151. The authors have not taken into consideration sub-s. (2) of s. 149, which interlinks s. 149 with s. 151 of the Act and, therefore, both the sections are subject to s. 150 of the Act. In the light of the discussion above, we hold that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the ITO was not under a legal obligation to obtain the sanction of the Board, prior to the issue of notice under s. 148 of the Act. We also hold that the provisions of s. 150 of the I.T. Act override the provisions of ss. 149 and 151 of the Act and in the circumstances the notice under s. 148 of the Act was validly issued. Both the questions are answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (12) TMI 21 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income, Capital Gains, House Property, Repairs ... ... ... ... ..... Counsel for the parties did not address any arguments on this question. Since Delhi Bench (B) was concerned with a different assessment year, although it was subsequent to the assessment year dealt with by Delhi Bench (C), we do not think that any legal obligation was cast on the former to follow the view expressed by the latter either as a precedent or otherwise. Of course, there can be no doubt that it had persuasive value in the sense that the Bench dealing with the subsequent year should not have ordinarily departed from the view taken earlier. We have already observed that the Delhi Bench (B) has given cogent and sound reasons for taking a different view of the matter. So, the question of want of any propriety or desirability does not arise. To sum up, therefore, both the above-mentioned references are disposed of in terms of the answers given to the various questions as above. Since some of the questions raised are really complicated ones, we make no order as to costs.
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