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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 385 Records
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1991 (1) TMI 446 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion would not be furnishing a complete copy, and in that event, merely because the returned candidate made an endorsement that it was a true copy, it cannot be regarded as a true copy. Considering the purpose that is to be served, I do not think that the lapse can be regarded as inconsequential." Having regard to the above facts, the absence of endorsement of the Notary "Affirmed and signed before me", his designation and the stamped endorsement regarding the affirmation, cannot be regarded as inconsequential. It is an omission of a vital nature which is likely to prejudice the returned candidate. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that there has been substantial compliance of the provisions of S. 81(3) of the Act, as contended by the petitioner. The preliminary objection, therefore, deserves to be upheld and the petition deserves to be dismissed on that ground alone. 13. In the result, the election petition is dismissed with costs. 14. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (1) TMI 445 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... Sahai, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (1) TMI 444 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the representation without assigning any reasons whatsoever and communicated to the petitioner at Hyderabad amounted to deprivation of a valuable right under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. This Court has, therefore, undoubted jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition as part of cause of action arose at Hyderabad. 18. In this view it is unnecessary for us to advert to the other submission made by Sri S. Kumar that this Court has undoubted jurisdiction to entertain the petition as the order of detention deprived the detenu of his freedom of movement throughout the territory of India including the State of Andhra Pradesh as enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. 19. From the above discussion it follows that the impugned order of detention is liable to be quashed and is accordingly quashed. A direction shall issue to the Superintendent, Central Prison, Madras to release the detenu forthwith. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. 20. Petition allowed.
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1991 (1) TMI 443 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it appropriate that I quantify costs to be paid to the defendant at this interim stage, which I quantify at ₹ 3,000.00 . This should for the time being "make fine" the lapse of the plaintiff This amount be paid to the defendant within one month from today. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not think that the plaintiff should be penalised by refusal of the injunction. (60) In the aforesaid circumstances, I reject I.A. No. 8171 of 1990 filed by the defendant under Order 39 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ad interim ex parte order of injunction dated 3.8.1990. I allow I.A. No. 5958 of 1990 and confirm the said interim injunction. (61) Needless to add that the opinion expressed herein, is prima facie and what is stated herein should not be so construed as to prejudice a final determination of the rights of the parties inter se after the trial of the matter. (62) I.A. Nos. 5958 of 1990 and 8171 of 1990 stand disposed of.
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1991 (1) TMI 442 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the award Part III dated July 31, 1987 produced at Annexure 'D' to the petition. The petitioners are entitled to claim benefits of revised pay-scales and all other benefits pursuant to the award with effect from January 1, 1986 as directed in the award. It is further directed that since the award is dated July 31, 1987 the amount of monetary benefits flowing from the award together with interest at the rate of 15 per annum shall be paid to the petitioners. Interest shall be calculated from August 15, 1987 onwards till the date of actual payment. On the amount of difference in salary, interest at the rate of 15 shall be paid. As the amount of difference in wages would have been paid periodically the amount of interest shall be calculated from eighth day of every month on the amount which might have fallen due for the preceding month. Interest shall be calculated accordingly till the monetary benefits flowing from the award are paid. Rule made absolute accordingly.
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1991 (1) TMI 441 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ubmission of the petitioners to the contrary cannot be sustained. 10. In some of the Writ Petitions a specific contention has been urged that before the imposition of the stamp duty, they were not heard. Having regard to the scope of Sections 9, 19 and 46A of the Act, I am of the opinion, that it is left to the wisdom of the State Government to extend the benefit of exemption to persons like the petitioners. I do not think that the petitioners are entitled to be given an opportunity of being heard personally, inasmuch as such right is not vested with them. Therefore, they cannot urge the contention. The further contention urged in common is that cyclostyled form is used while sending endorsement to the petitioners. Common order having been made by the first respondent, he sent up the order in cyclostyled form to all the petitioners. The petitioners cannot find fault with it. Therefore, this contention is one without any force. In the result, the Writ Petitions are dismissed.
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1991 (1) TMI 440 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed was that in a case where option is exercised for payment of sales tax in a lump sum under Section 7-D, the demand is not based on the turnover but on the agreement to pay the tax in a lump sum i. e., the demand is not relatable to the actual turnover. We reiterate the opinion expressed in this decision. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, made an attempt to submit that the petitioner's offer was not accepted by the Commissioner within the Uine or date mentioned in the proposal, a true copy whereof has been annexed to the rejoinder affidavit as Annexure-1, and that being so, no concluded agreement or contract came into existence. This submission is founded on an assertion which has been stated in the rejoinder affidavit and is one which can be more appropriately examined in a civil suit and not in these proceedings as it involves investigation of facts. Thus in either view, no ground for interferance has been made out. 2. The petition in accordingly dismissed.
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1991 (1) TMI 439 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, an appeal did lie but when the Tribunal holds, as it is done in the present case, there is no challenge to the liability to pay interest, we are afraid that we are bound by the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court which states that in the absence of challenge to the liability no appeal is maintainable. Before concluding we may note that the learned counsel has cited before us a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of CIT v. Mahabir Parshad & Sons 1980 125 ITR 165 in which case it was held that challenge to the liability and the quantum of interest could be made in an appeal filed under section 246(c) of the Act. We are afraid that in view of the aforesaid later decision of the Supreme Court, the observations of this Court, with regard to maintainability of an appeal on the ground of quantum alone no longer holds good. 4. For the aforesaid reasons, petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1991 (1) TMI 438 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... enquiry no charges were framed against the respondent, no officer was appointed for holding the departmental inquiry instead the competent authority chose to terminate the respondent's services in exercise of its power under the terms of contract as well as under the relevant rules applicable to a temporary Govt. servant. It never intended to dismiss the respondent from service. Holding of preliminary inquiry does not affect the nature of the termination order. The allegations made against the respondent contained in the counter-affidavit by way of a defence filed on behalf of the appellants also do not change the nature and character of the order of termination. The High Court failed to consider the question in proper perspective and it interfered with the order of termination in a casual manner. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and dismiss the respondent's Writ Petition. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1991 (1) TMI 437 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the BSF Rules deals with petitions filed under Section 117 of the Act. Even in them there is nothing to indicate that a hearing has to be given before disposal of a petition. As noted above, under Section 117(2) the respondent in only entitled to file a petition but the disposal of such a petition does not attract principles of natural justice. The respondent has been tried by observing the due process of law and the verdict of the Security Force Court was confirmed and it is only a post-confirmation petition that was filed under Section 117(2) of the Act and authority which disposed of the same is not a court any every order passed administratively cannot be subjected to the rigours of principles of natural justice. For the aforesaid reasons, the order of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the High Court for disposal on merits. The appeal is accordingly allowed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1991 (1) TMI 436 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessee to explain. However, on 24th march, 1979 the assessee appeared before the Assessing officer, even though the case was fixed for the 26th March, 1979. The assessee was as such afforded full opportunity to explain and in that connection the case was adjourned several times on his request. The Assessing Officer, CIT(A) and the Appellate Tribunal were fully justified to hold that the assessee was given full opportunity but he avoided giving full and correct explanation. The submission of the learned counsel for the assessee that the assessee was not given reasonable opportunity of being heard by the Assessing Officer does not appear to be justified in view of the facts and circumstances of this case. 6. Our answer to the 1st question is in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee; but our answer to the 2nd question is in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Department. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs.
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1991 (1) TMI 435 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d Counsel for the respondent made a prayer that since the respondent is carrying on business in the shops in dispute some reasonable time may be granted to him to vacate the premises. These shops were let out to the respondent in the year 1960 and the rent payable by him, we are informed, is ₹ 311/- per month. The respondent is granted time till 31st January, 1993 to vacate the shops in question subject to the condition that he pays a sum of ₹ 500/- per month as rent with effect from 1st February, 1991 and furnishes an undertaking in this Court within one month containing the usual terms including the terms that he would pay rent at the rate of ₹ 500/- per month with effect from 1st February, 1991 and would vacate the premises on or before 31st January, 1993 and deliver vacant possession to the appellants. In case of failure to furnish the said undertaking, the decree for eviction shall become executable immediately after the expiry of one month from today.
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1991 (1) TMI 434 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was right. As pledgees, the banks, acting under section 176 of the Contract Act, had a right to sell the goods. Their sale was but an exercise of the statutory power and not as agents. But the sales were nevertheless on behalf of the pledger, for, the pawn or pledge by itself did not make the pawnee or pledgee the owner of the goods. The very concept of a pledge carries with it the elements of custody and a power to sell the goods in default of payment. This is evident in this case by the fact that after crediting towards the debts due from the pawner, the balance of the sale proceeds were paid over to him. We are also unable to accept the other view of the Tribunal that even assuming that the banks acted as agents, they would be dealers and they alone would be liable to pay the tax under section 8 or section 14(a). 4.. Consequently, this revision petition succeeds. The application for the refund of the abovesaid amount is allowed with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1991 (1) TMI 433 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ourt State of Gujarat v. Sakarwala Brothers 1967 19 STC 24, it was held that sugar includes all forms of sugar irrespective of its density. If these decisions are taken as a guidance, there can be no doubt that coal ash, though has a lesser degree of combustible nature from the parent coal, also would be a variety of coal its fuel potency may be lower. The court is not concerned with the subtle distinction from a scientific or technological point of view. The Legislature has clearly excepted charcoal from coal and similarly, if coal ash was to be excluded, such an exclusion would have been stated. This clearly indicates that the word coal was used in a generic sense. 10.. For the reasons stated above, these writ petitions are to be allowed. The demands made against the petitioners treating coal ash as different from coal are set aside. 11.. Accordingly all writ petitions are allowed, without any order as to costs. Rule made absolute in all these petitions. Petitions allowed.
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1991 (1) TMI 432 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal ignored the other explanations of the petitioner on the ground that manufacturing account as per rule 26 was not maintained by him. The basis of best judgment adopted by the assessing authority was not actually disclosed to the petitioner and the appellate authorities applied different tests to uphold the assessment order. The petitioner s explanation as to the quantity of the bricks manufactured by him was not referred to and considered by anyone. It was not established that bricks of very low quality would have fetched higher rate than the one charged by the petitioner. His bills were by-passed on the assumption that they were in the name of half a dozen persons only, ignoring the real facts showing that bills stood in the name of several persons. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the best judgment assessment, in the instant case, cannot be justified. The revision petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1991 (1) TMI 431 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or the Board to interfere with the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Such interference is likely to simplify the appellate power. That indicates that the suo motu revisional power should be used sparingly and only when it is found that without such interference interest of Revenue will suffer. That no interest of Revenue was likely to suffer is clear by the fact that in case of any order against the Revenue by the assessing authority, the Revenue is safeguarded by suo motu revisions provided under sections 32 and 34. We are satisfied that in the instant case the Board has acted illegally and wrongly exercised its jurisdiction. The order of the Board for the said reason is fit to be set aside. 5.. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of the Board dated November 29, 1980, in Ref. Q4/F2/909/78 is set aside. The order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is restored. The case now will be deemed to be remitted to the assessing authority. Appeal allowed.
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1991 (1) TMI 430 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not deny to the assessee a hearing on the validity or otherwise of the assessment order. 6.. Since we have found that the assessee was not given an adequate hearing on the validity or otherwise of the order of assessment by the Joint Commissioner, we are inclined to interfere with the impugned order with a view to remand the case back to him for a rehearing in accordance with law. The Joint Commissioner shall give to the assessee/appellants full opportunity to address him on the question of validity of the assessment order. The Joint Commissioner shall consider the objections and the contentions of the assessee/ appellants with respect to the validity of the assessment order and dispose each one of them off in accordance with law. 7.. In the result, the tax cases are allowed. The impugned orders are quashed. The cases are remitted to the Joint Commissioner II (Commercial Taxes), Chepauk, Madras 5 for a rehearing and disposal in accordance with law. No costs. Appeals allowed.
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1991 (1) TMI 429 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... and the revisional order dated July 16, 1990 passed by the learned Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, West Bengal are set aside. The application of the dealer dated January 4, 1989 for grant of eligibility certificate is sent back on remand to the learned Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bally Circle for disposal in accordance with law, within three months after production of challan by the applicants showing deposit of the cost of Rs. 250 by them, as stated above. In case a sum of Rs. 250 as costs is not deposited by the applicants in accordance with this order and no evidence is produced by the applicants within three weeks from this date before the learned Assistant Commissioner about deposit of the sum of Rs. 250 by the applicants, the order of rejection for grant of eligibility certificate on July 18, 1989 as well as the revisional order passed on July 16, 1990 shall stand. The case is, accordingly, disposed of. Application disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (1) TMI 428 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts view its earlier order disclosed an error. The power to correct errors on merits is not an inherent power and cannot be exercised unless specifically conferred by statute. Even if, therefore, the Divisional Level Committee felt that its earlier order suffered from error, it could not modify the order passed by it in favour of the petitioner. Such a power has been conferred only on the Commissioner under section 4A(3) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The impugned orders hence cannot be sustained. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders dated September 10, 1987 and December 29, 1987 marked respectively as annexures 2 and 4 to the petition are quashed. We further direct that the tax determined under the impugned orders of assessment vide annexures 5, 6 and 8 to the petition shall not be realised from the petitioner until the eligibility certificate granted to the petitioner on November 12, 1984, is modified in accordance with law. Petition allowed.
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1991 (1) TMI 427 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the explanation of the assessee in regard thereto but it has arrived at its independent finding in regard to concealment in the penalty proceedings itself and has only referred to the findings arrived at in the quantum matter as one of the circumstances in penalty proceedings. In view of the same, the view taken by the Sales Tax Tribunal and the said finding arrived at by the Sales Tax Tribunal being against the record of the case, is vitiated in law and has to be set aside. Thus, as a result of the above discussion, all the three grounds on which the appeal of the assessee has been allowed by the Sales Tax Tribunal vanish and the impugned order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal being against law is liable to be set aside. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed with no order as to costs. The impugned order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal is set aside with direction to rehear and redecide the appeal in question on merits in accordance with law. Petition allowed.
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