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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 6337 Records
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2003 (12) TMI 644 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... luing it as urban land on which construction was to take place and was not sold for the purpose of agriculture. It was in the context of those facts that the court held that notwithstanding the classification of the land as agricultural land, having regard to the manner of its disposal, the purpose for which it is disposed and the short period of time within which the land was put to non- agricultural use by the buyer, the land was required to be regarded as non- agricultural land. Even while rendering that decision, the Supreme Court emphasised the fact that as to whether a piece of land is agricultural land or not is essentially a question of fact. 3. The Tribunal here has set out the factual finding given by the Commissioner which it has accepted and affirmed. It is not necessary to extract that part of the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal's order clearly sets out all the relevant facts which would go to show that the land is agricultural land. Appeal is dismissed.
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2003 (12) TMI 643 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ct. Section 126 prohibits revocation of a validly executed gift except in circumstances mentioned therein. The gift was executed in 1945. It remained in force for about 25 years during which time the donee had attained majority and had not repudiated the same. It was, therefore, not competent for the donor to have cancelled the gift and executed a Will in relation to the property. Consequently, Civil Appeal No.1036 of 2000 filed by the donee succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order of the High Court dated 6.8.1999 passed in Second Appeal No.671 of 1992 and the judgment of the trial court dated 27.9.1989 are set aside. Consequently, the judgment of the first appellate court dated 21.7.1992 is hereby restored. The connected Civil Appeal No.4770 of 2001 having been preferred by respondent K. Kamalam only against certain findings and observations contained in the impugned judgment of the High Court is dismissed. In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs.
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2003 (12) TMI 642 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... or privilege to resign his office and his resignation becomes effective from the date which he, of his own volition, chooses. But where there is a provision empowering the employer not to accept the resignation, on certain circumstances e.g. pendency of disciplinary proceedings, the employer can exercise the power. On the contrary, as noted by this Court in Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam (AIR 1978 SC 17), while the Government reserves its right to compulsorily retire a Government servant, even against his wish, there is a corresponding right of the Government servant to voluntarily retire from service. Voluntary retirement is a condition of service created by statutory provision whereas resignation is an implied term of any employer-employee relationship. Looking from any angle the High Court judgment is indefensible and is set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents-employees stand dismissed. Appeals are allowed. There shall be no orders as to costs.
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2003 (12) TMI 641 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... which is sought to be reviewed. In our view no case has been made out to review the said order. The review petitions are accordingly dismissed.
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2003 (12) TMI 640 - CESTAT, BANGALORE
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... ... ..... , in the absence of a clear finding, it is not possible to arrive at a conclusion that the beams and joists, casings, floor beams and steel structures are essential for supporting structure and actually used in the plant for that purpose or they were used as construction materials. Since a clear finding is not given in both the Orders-in-Appeal, it is necessary to get the correct picture for arriving at a correct conclusion. Therefore, both the impugned orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) are set aside and the matter is remanded to the Original Authority to take a fresh decision on the declaration rejected earlier after factual verification whether the steel structure and casings, floor beams and bracing, beam and joists are actually the supporting materials necessary and essential for the plant or otherwise as per the law after providing an opportunity of hearing to the party. Thus, these two appeals are disposed of in the above terms. Pronounced in the Court on 5.12.2003.
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2003 (12) TMI 639 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... etitioner in this writ petition seeks for declaration that Section 21(2) and the proviso to Section 49(6) and 49(7) of POTA are illegal and ultra vires the Constitution of India. o p /o p Inasmuch as we have upheld the constitutional validity of Section 21(2) and proviso to Section 49(6) and 49(7) of POTA in the judgment pronounced by us in Writ Petition (C) No. 389 of 2002 above, this writ petition is dismissed. o p /o p W.P.(Crl.) 48/2003 o p /o p In this writ petition, apart from challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 1(4), 3 to 9, 14, 18 to 24, 26, 27, 29 to 33, 36 to 53 which has been upheld by us in the judgment pronounced by us in Writ Petition (C) No. 389 of 2002 above, the constitutional validity of Entry 21 of the Schedule to POTA is also challenged. o p /o p On that aspect no specific arguments have been addressed by any of the parties. This matter will have to be heard separately and hence, this writ petition is de-linked from other matters. o p /o p
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2003 (12) TMI 638 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the District Judge dated 5.8.1977, to the extent it has attained finality by its affirmance by order dated 19.1.1979 of the High Court. In so re-determining the ceiling area of the appellant, the nature of land and its categorisation, as irrigated or unirrigated, shall be made In accordance with the order dated 29.3.1996 of the prescribed Authority which we do not intend to disturb to that extent as categorisation of land under Section 4-A of the Act, is essentially a question of fact, to be determined on the basis of evidence led by the parties. After re-determination of the ceiling limit and extent of surplus land, if any of the appellant, a fresh opportunity shall be given to the appellant to exercise his option for surrender of surplus land of his choice in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 14. In the result the appeal succeeds, by remanding the case to the prescribed Authority, with the directions made above. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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2003 (12) TMI 637 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d on the Civil Court and if so, whether the conditions for the exercise of such power are satisfied, has been debated before us. In any case, whether the Commission has the power to reopen the closed complaint and enquire into the same in the absence of new material coming to light has also been debated. These questions need be gone into in view of our conclusion that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction in taking up the enquiry in the face of the bar created by Section 36(2). o p /o p In the result, the order of NHRC dated 12.6.2000 is quashed and the writ petition (civil) No. 42 of 2001 stands allowed. The S.L.P. Nos. 8220 of 2001, 11182 of 2001, 11186 and 14392 of 2001 filed against the interim orders granted by the High Court are dismissed. All the Transfer Petitions are also dismissed with an observation that the High Court of Jharkhand may dispose of the related Writ Petitions/LPA pending on its file with expedition in the light of this judgment. No costs. o p /o p
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2003 (12) TMI 636 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ed. Similarly, the case of Apart Ltd. was also a case where no actual rent was received by the assessee and the Bench was concerned with the application of sub-clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Act. Therefore, both these cases are distinguishable. In the case of R. Dalmia ( supra), the question was whether municipal valuation can be considered as annual letting value of the property, which is not the case in the instant case. 33. Therefore, taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances and the material available on record, we are of the opinion that the revenue authorities cannot take into consideration the notional interest on the interest-free advances received by the assessee while determining the annual letting value of the rented property. We accordingly set aside the orders of the authorities below on this issue. Grounds 1 to 3 of the assessee are allowed. Paras 34. to 39. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues.
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2003 (12) TMI 635 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e is no ban on the transfer of interest in favour of an unborn person. Section 20 permits an interest being created for the benefit of an unborn person who acquires interest upon his birth. No provision has been brought to our notice which stipulates that full interest in a property cannot be created in favour of unborn person. Section 13 has no applicability to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the present case, the donor gifted the property in favour of the appellant, then living, and also stipulated that if other male children are later born to her brother they shall be joint holders with the appellant. Such a stipulation is not hit by Section 13 of the Act. Creation of such a right is permissible under Section 20 of the Act. The respondent, thus, became entitled to the property on his birth. In this view, there is also no substance in the second contention. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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2003 (12) TMI 634 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rder of the High Court of making an exception in favour of the respondent company by issuing directions for grant of sanction for construction of building with height in violation of the amended Building Rules and the resolution of the Corporation passed consequent thereupon. For all the above reasons, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge was right in rejecting the prayer of the respondent company in public interest and the Division Bench of the High Court committed an error in directing grant of sanction for further construction above four floors to the respondent company in clear violation of the existing building rules and the resolution of the Corporation. In the result, the appeal preferred by the Corporation succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the Division bench of the High Court dated 5.9.1997 is hereby quashed and that of the learned Single judge restored. In the circumstance, however, we shall direct the parties to bear their own costs in this appeal.
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2003 (12) TMI 633 - ITAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... and no right of examination or cross-examination was allowed to the assessee. 265. We heard the rival submissions. The contradictions found in the statements of Shri Narayanan and the reasons stated by the Assessing Officer for not accepting the explanation of Shri Narayanan are sound. However, we find that subsequently Revenue has assessed Shri Narayanan on regular basis, and he has availed the benefit under KVSS against the said assessment. Since the assessment on Shri Narayanan has been completed on regular basis and his declaration under KVSS against this assessment has been accepted, it is now not open to Revenue to say that the assessment was done on protective basis. If it was actually done on protective basis, it should have been kept open by not accepting Shri Narayanan’s declaration under KVSS. In view of the above, we are of the view that this addition cannot be retained. Ordered accordingly. 266. In the result, this appeal by the assessee is partly allowed.
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2003 (12) TMI 632 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
Valuation on MRP basis ... ... ... ... ..... f ₹ 9/-. In the appeal memorandum, the appellant has stated that it has sold its product within Varanasi for more than 2,500 shops, dhabas/restaurants and cinema halls. Therefore, reference to the price at the rate of ₹ 10/- per bottle in advertisement board placed in front of three dhabas cannot be generalised. 3. This is matter which has to be examined at the time of final hearing of the appeals. Since an arguable case is made out and also in the light of the submission of the appellants that it has incurred a loss of ₹ 2,000 crores and therefore, it has financial hardship, we exempt the condition from pre-deposit and grant stay of recovery. Appeals are posted for hearing on 11th February, 2004.
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2003 (12) TMI 631 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... manufacturer does not avail of credit of duty paid on any product manufactured in the same factory. This condition does not convey the meaning that the manufacturer should not avail of credit of duty paid on inputs which are used in respect of other products manufactured in the same factory. The condition clearly provides that the manufacturer should not avail of credit of the duty paid on any products manufactured in the same factory.” 5. It has not been disputed by the respondents that demand of duty was not challenged by them before the original Adjudicating Authority and they had also discharged their duty liability even before the issuance of show cause notice. In view of the decision in the case of N.M. Nagpal, the respondents would not have been liable to pay the duty. In view of this, we find substance in the submissions of the learned Advocate for the respondents that no penalty is imposable on them. We, therefore, reject the Appeal filed by the Revenue.
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2003 (12) TMI 630 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ed papers. In our view no case is made out to review our earlier order. The review petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2003 (12) TMI 629 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n missed by the High Court. In Valasla's case (supra) it was not laid down that whenever there is delay in sending the samples, the prosecution version would become vulnerable. What was emphasised related to proper and safe custody of the seized articles. In the background of that particular case, when delay of three months was there and there was no clear evidence as to with whom the articles were lying, the decision was rendered. No evidence was led to show that the contraband articles were in proper custody and in proper form. But the factual situation is different here. That being so the High Court's Judgment does not stand scrutiny and is set aside. The conviction as done by the trial court was proper. We direct restoration of the conviction as directed by the trial court along with the sentence imposed. The accused shall surrender to custody, if he has not served full sentence as imposed by the trial court, to serve remainder of sentence. The appeal is allowed.
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2003 (12) TMI 628 - SUPREME COURT
Legality, desirability and proprietary of reducing sentence after conviction as done by the Rajasthan High Court of the respondent was found guilty of offences punishable under Section 9A/25A and 9A/25A read with Section 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
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2003 (12) TMI 627 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ree or order of a Court of competent jurisdiction under Section 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act. See Shri Angappa Spinning Mills, Madurai v. Regional Commissioner, Employees' Provident Fund, Madras 1986 LAB. I. C. 458 (Madras) . 7. In the case at hand, this cannot be construed to be a transfer by the employer as the petitioner took delivery of possession of the establishment of O.P. No. 4 by entering into an agreement with the OSFC for which the provisions of Section 17B of the EPF Act cannot be applied. Accordingly, refusal to allot a new code number and the order passed in Annexure-1 cannot be sustained in the eye of law. This being the position, O.P. Nos. 1 and 2 cannot fasten the liability on the petitioner to pay the contribution and other charges, which have remained unpaid as against O.P. No. 4. 8. For the reasons stated above, I allow this writ petition and quash the order dated 23.3.2000 passed by O.P. No. 1 (Annexure-1). There shall be no order as to cost.
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2003 (12) TMI 626 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the refusal to grant leave to question acquittal in terms of Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 valid?
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2003 (12) TMI 625 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the employees working with Primary Agricultural Cooperative Banks (in short 'Primary Banks') are entitled to bonus at the same rate at which it was paid to employees working in the Apex Bank (also described as 'State Bank') i.e. The Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank Limited?
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