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Showing 81 to 100 of 6337 Records
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2003 (12) TMI 604 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , the form should be issued. Hence, the stand of the assessing authority appears to be justified that form III-C(2) can be issued only on verification. In case the claim of the petitioner is found to be correct that tax on the whole dal is paid, the necessary form should be issued by the assessing officer as required by the petitioner for further issuance to its purchaser. In the circumstances, no mandamus can be issued for the issuance of form III-C(2) without verification. The petitioner may apply to the assessing authority and endeavour to satisfy it that tax has been paid on the purchases, and if it does so, the assessing authority may issue form III-C(2). If the assessing authority is of the view that the form should not be issued the assessing authority should give reasons for the same, so that the petitioner may contest the matter in appeal/revision. 11.. With the above observation this petition is dismissed. Interim order, if any, is vacated. Writ petition dismissed.
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2003 (12) TMI 603 - TAMIL NADU TAXATION SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... furnished in respect of 29 vehicles, the respondent found that what was purchased was chassis and what was sold was tanker lorries. Since the tanker lorry being a different commodity to that of chassis, having not suffered tax within the State, the respondent has treated the sale of tanker lorries as first sales within the State and levied tax at 12 per cent. The respondent has passed the impugned order stating reasons for arriving at the above conclusion. I do not find any violation of the principles of natural justice or non-application of mind. In such circumstances, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. 4.. In the result, the original petition and the miscellaneous petition therein for stay are dismissed. 5.. And this tribunal doth further order that this order on being produced be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned. 6.. Issued under my hand and the seal of this Tribunal on the 23rd day of December, 2003. Petitions dismissed.
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2003 (12) TMI 602 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e original record. Action under section 21 can be taken on the basis of material already on record at the time of the original assessment, if the escapement of assessment to tax was a result of lack of care or inadvertence on the part of the assessing officer. 20.. In the present case we are of the opinion that there was material before the respondent-authorities prima facie showing that there was both concealment by the petitioner as well as negligence and ignorance on the part of the assessing officer, as already discussed above. 21.. In the present case there was certainly lack of care on the part of the assessing officer who framed the original assessment as he did not verify the purchases made by the petitioner and he did not look into the contract document and appears to have wrongly granted exemption. Hence there is no illegality in the impugned order and notice. 22.. For the reasons given above we find no merit in this petition and it is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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2003 (12) TMI 601 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eizure and it has been submitted that the same being illegal was liable to be quashed. 7.. We are, therefore, satisfied that the petitioners had been pursuing their remedy relating to the seizure of the goods in question before the departmental authority which had no jurisdiction to consider the same and the learned Tribunal ought to have taken the matter into consideration while dealing with the petitioners application for condonation of delay in filing the main application challenging the seizure proceedings. 8.. We, accordingly, set aside the order passed by the learned Tribunal rejecting the petitioners application for condonation of delay as also the main application challenging the seizure proceedings and direct that the main application be taken up for hearing upon condonation of the delay in filing the same. 9.. There will be no order as to costs. 10.. Parties shall act on xeroxed signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertakings. Writ application allowed.
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2003 (12) TMI 600 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... asion by the petitioner does not arise and that the seizing officer went beyond his jurisdiction by seizing documents and accounts of the petitioner. The seizure as such has been unlawful. The ground of attempt by the petitioner to evade payment of tax as made cannot be lawfully made in respect of the petitioner-unregistered dealer as a ground of seizure made under Section 66 of the Act. 7.. We accordingly hold that the application must succeed. The application therefore is allowed. We hold that the seizure dated January 17, 2001 of the books of account and documents by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bureau of Investigation is bad in law. The respondent-authority however is not debarred from taking appropriate step, under section 30(3) of the Act of 1994 if any, under the law on the basis of the materials disclosed by the documents and records seized. There will be no order as to costs. 8.. S.S. CHATTOPADHYAY (Technical Member).-I agree. Application allowed.
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2003 (12) TMI 599 - UTTARAKHAND HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bove matters in this Court, the petitioners have deposited amounts/given bank guarantee to the department. These amounts have been deposited and the bank guarantees have been given subject to the result of the present cases. Since the petitioner has succeeded the amounts deposited will be returned to the petitioner without interest so also the bank guarantee shall be returned to the petitioner duly discharged. However, it is made clear that the matters are remanded back to the assessing authority. The assessing authority will decide the matters de novo in accordance with law within three months from the date of the receipt of this order. The assessing authority will hear the petitioner and thereafter give reasons while deciding the matter in accordance with law. 7.. Accordingly, Writ Petition No. 792 of 2003 with T.T.R. No. 411 of 2001 with T.T.R. No. 412 of 2001 with T.T.R. No. 413 of 2001 shall stand disposed of with no order as to costs. Petitions disposed of accordingly.
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2003 (12) TMI 598 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ation or orders issued by the Government are neither illegal nor against public policy. Inspiration can be drawn from this apex Court ruling to show that consumer interest also is a factor that requires consideration by the authorities who are empowered to provide concession for better economic growth. It is hoped that the respondent State would take care of the consumer interest also at least in future so that the benefit may flow to the consumer as well. 14.. In the result, these petitions are allowed. Impugned orders and the consequential demands are set aside for want of jurisdiction. Liberty is reserved in terms of this order to the State. No arguments are advanced with regard to freight in terms of rule 6(4) of the KST Rules. No opinion is expressed with regard to that issue in this petition. Liberty is reserved to the petitioner to workout his remedy in a manner known to law in so far as freight is concerned. 15.. Ordered accordingly. No costs. Writ petitions allowed.
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2003 (12) TMI 597 - TAMIL NADU TAXATION SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ply the said decision to the present cases also. Therefore, following the decision in Udaipur Reported at page 365 supra. Distillery Co. Ltd. v. Rajasthan Taxation Tribunal 2003 132 STC 489, I hold that the observations and classification of the product, paper cones and tubes in the order under review, as falling under the caption any goods used in connection with manufacture under section 3(3) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, shall be ignored and the paper cones and tubes shall be treated as packing material only. I make it clear that this order shall be deemed to have been made in the above original petitions with full knowledge of the parties. In this view of the matter, the review petitions are ordered as above. And this Tribunal doth further order that this order on being produced be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned. Issued under my hand and the seal of this Tribunal on the 17th day of December, 2003. Review petition allowed.
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2003 (12) TMI 596 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... sional order in each case and the scope of statutory provisions conferring the appellate or revisional jurisdiction . 15.. It was also held by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh that the appellate authority had jurisdiction to consider and decide even that part of the order of the assessing authority against which no appeal was preferred. But, when the appellate authority did not touch any part of the order of the assessing authority to that extent could not be held to merge in the order of the appellate authority. Therefore, we find that the instant notice was issued violating also the doctrine of merger settled by several judicial pronouncement. 16.. For the reasons discussed above, the application is allowed by setting aside the impugned notice dated January 3, 2000 issued under Memo No. 7736/CD. The respondents are restrained from given effect to the said notice dated January 3, 2000. No order as to costs. S.S. CHATTOPADHYAY (Technical Member).-I agree. Application allowed.
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2003 (12) TMI 595 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cases had committed any default in acting on the circulars issued by the Government vide exhibits P7 and P8. They had not collected tax. They cannot now be burdened with the additional liability. 30.. No other point was raised. 31.. In view of the above, we hold that (i) The circular dated May 28, 1998 is still in force. It is binding on the Revenue. (ii) The circular is not illegal or contrary to the provisions of the Act. (iii) The decision in Supersonics case 2003 130 STC 69 (Ker), does not embody the correct enunciation of law. (iv) A taxing entry has to be strictly construed. Even if two views are possible, the benefit has to be given to the assessee. For interpreting the entry, only the plain words of the statute have to be seen. In view of the above, the writ petitions are allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Orders on C.M.P. No. 21176 of 2003 in O.P. No. 12376 of 2003 (W) dismissed. Writ petitions allowed.
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2003 (12) TMI 594 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ith the contention that power to review cannot be exercised in view of the Agreement. 9. emsp Secondly, learned counsel submitted that where decision is required to be taken in a judicial or quasi-judicial manner, then opportunity is required to be given. According to learned counsel it should be done in the manner, which is prescribed. It may be noted that so far as hearing is concerned, during the inquiry hearing is required to be given and that hearing has been given to the petitioner and after giving hearing recommendation is made and it is that recommendation, which was required to be taken into consideration by the Board and that exercise cannot be said to be quasi-judicial. Therefore, we find no substance in this contention. 10. emsp Thirdly, learned counsel submitted that it is not a system for generating the revenue but it is meant for safeguard of the units or providing relief. If that is so, it would not affect the decision taken finally. 11. emsp Appeal dismissed.
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2003 (12) TMI 593 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the proceedings in which an impugned award has come to be made, are governed by the 1940 Act or the 1996 Act ?
Whether the appropriate court for the purpose of challenging the said award or seeking modification of the said award is this Court, being the court which appointed the arbitrator or an appropriate court as contemplated under Section 34 of the 1996 Act read with section 2(e) of the said Act which contemplates said court to be the principal civil court of original jurisdiction?
Held that:- As noticed from the mandatory language of section 34 of the 1996 Act, that an award, when challenged under section 34 within the time stipulated therein, becomes unexecutable. There is no discretion left with the court to pass any interlocutory order in regard to the said award except to adjudicate on the correctness of the claim made by the applicant therein. Therefore, that being the legislative intent, any direction from us contrary to that, also becomes impermissible. On facts of this case, there being no exceptional situation which would compel us to ignore such statutory provision, and to use our jurisdiction under Article 142, we restrain ourselves from passing any such order, as prayed for by the applicant.
However, we do notice that this automatic suspension of the execution of the award, the moment an application challenging the said award is filed under section 34 of the Act leaving no discretion in the court to put the parties on terms, in our opinion, defeats the very objective of the alternate dispute resolution system to which arbitration belongs. We do find that there is a recommendation made by the concerned Ministry to the Parliament to amend section 34 with a proposal to empower the civil court to pass suitable interim orders in such cases. In view of the urgency of such amendment, we sincerely hope that necessary steps would be taken by the authorities concerned at the earliest to bring about the required change in law.
Thus this application fails and the same is dismissed with a direction to the applicant to file its objections to the award before the court concerned and if the same are filed within 30 days from today, the delay in regard to the filing of the objections as contemplated under section 34 of the 1996 Act shall be condoned by the said court since the time consumed was in bona fide prosecution of the application in a wrong forum.
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2003 (12) TMI 592 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim an amount of interest on the amount of earnest money that was refunded by the defendant?
Held that:- In substance, it is, therefore, really a deposit or payment of advance as well and for that matter actually part payment of purchase price, only. In the teeth of the further fact situation that the sale could not be completed by execution of the sale deed in this case only due to lapses and inabilities on the part of the respondents irrespective of bonafides or otherwise involved in such delay and lapses, the amount of rupees 38 lakhs becomes refundable by the Vendors to the purchasers as of the prepaid purchase price deposited with the Vendors. Consequently, the sum of rupees 38 lakhs to be refunded would attract the first limb or part of Section 55(6)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act itself and therefore necessarily, as held by the learned Single Judge, the defendants prima facie became liable to refund the same with interest due thereon, in terms of Clause 2.3 of the agreement. Therefore, the statutory charge envisaged therein would get attracted to and encompass the whole of the sum of rupees 38 lakhs and the interest due thereon. In the light of the above, in our view, the learned Single Judge on the original side was right in passing the order dated 23.10.2001 and the order of the Division Bench, taking a contrary view in the order under challenge, is contrary to law and the reasons assigned therefor cannot be countenanced. Hence, the same is hereby set aside and the order of the learned Single Judge shall stand restored who entitled to a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from disposing of the land during the pendency of the suit.
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2003 (12) TMI 591 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... les effected thereafter. If the additional sales had not been effected by reason of the additional capacity having been installed, it is very likely that the total sales for the year would have been very much less than Rs.300 crores. The additional liability which is incurred by way of having to pay additional sales tax at a higher rate was a consequence of the additional sales effected by it from the new capacity which it had created. 11. The object of the deferral scheme is to enable the assessee to retain with it the extent of the tax which would otherwise have become payable in terms of the sales tax, additional sales tax, surcharge etc., so that those monies could be used as working capital for the newly created capacity. 12. The Tribunal was in error in upholding the demand that had been raised by the assessing officer for payment of additional amounts ignoring the provisions of the agreement. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside and the writ petition is allowed.
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2003 (12) TMI 590 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... id recourse has not been followed by the respondent before passing the impugned order. 6. In this regard, it is also useful to refer the Division Bench decision of this Court referred to above 125 STC 496 (cited supra). It is seen that while considering similar provision, the Division Bench, after setting aside the order of cancellation, canceling the certificate of registration of the assessee, liberty is given to the Revenue to issue show cause notice to the assessee with a direction to give him time to seek renewal and thereafter pass appropriate order. In the light of the above referred statutory provision, the impugned order of the respondent is quashed and direction is issued to the respondent to receive the application for renewal along with fee and pass orders in accordance with law. The petitioner is granted two weeks from today for submitting his application for the above said purpose. The writ petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected WPMP., is closed.
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2003 (12) TMI 589 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the requirements of Section 50 have been met?
Held that:- The use of the expression 'substantial compliance' was made in the background that the searching officer had Section 50 in mind and it was unaided by the interpretation placed on it by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh's case (1999 (7) TMI 630 - SUPREME COURT). A line or a word in a judgment cannot be read in isolation or as if interpreting a statutory provision, to impute a different meaning to the observations.
Above being the position, we find no substance in the plea that there was non-compliance with the requirements of Section 50 of the Act.
It was pleaded that the requirements of Section 57 have not been complied with. There was no material placed either before the trial Court or the High Court to substantiate such a plea. The grievance in this regard does not merit any consideration, leave alone the impact of it on the guilt and conviction of the accused.
Additionally, it may also be noticed that while giving statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the accused did not say that he was unaware of his rights or that he was misled on that account in any manner. On the contrary, in general and vague manner it was only said that he did not know or he had no idea of the allegations. Though that by itself is not sufficient to convict accused, in view of the procedural safeguards required to be observed by compliance with the requirements of Section 50, yet that is of some relevance in appreciating the grievance, now sought to be ventilated. There is no infirmity in the impugned judgment to warrant interference.
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2003 (12) TMI 588 - SUPREME COURT
Power of resumption of land/building of the first respondent in favour of the appellants under the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 read with the Chandigarh Lease Hold of Sites and Buildings Rules, 1973 and the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971?
Held that:- We cannot but deprecate the conduct of the appellants in not making an endeavour to pay the instalments within a reasonable period. They, thus, did not pay the entire amount of the first instalment within the stipulated period; only a part payment was made in the year 1990 and 1992 by that time even the second instalment became due. They did not make any payment before the revisional authority despite the order passed by the appellate authority. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the appellant in C.A. No. 49 of 1999 should deposit a further sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Rupees fifteen lacs) with the Estate Officer, Chandigarh within a period of ten weeks from date of receipt of a copy of this order, which, in our opinion would meet the ends of justice. However, so far as the other matters are concerned, having regard to the facts and circumstances obtaining in their cases, we do not intend to direct levy of any penalty on them.
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2003 (12) TMI 587 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the detenu or any one on his behalf is entitled to challenge the detention order without the detenu submitting or surrendering to it?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed.In view of the legal and factual positions highlighted above, this is not a fit case where any interference is called for, before execution of the order of detention. The appellant, if so advised, may first surrender pursuant to the order of detention and thereafter have his grievances examined on merits.
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2003 (12) TMI 586 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... pted by the Department by not filing any further appeal in that year. I have already mentioned hereinabove that the rule of consistency will apply on the facts of the present case justifying deletion of the said addition in the year under consideration. I have carefully gone through the order proposed by the then learned Vice-President. He has given elaborate and convincing reasons in support of his conclusion that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has rightly deleted the addition of Rs. 96,09,720. The facts and discussions made hereinbefore fully support the view taken by the then learned Vice President. After giving a very deep and thoughtful consideration to the entire relevant material, I am inclined to agree with the view taken by the then learned Vice-President holding that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has rightly deleted the said addition of Rs. 96,09,720. The matter will now go before the regular Bench for decision according to the majority opinion.
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2003 (12) TMI 585 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a super board, or with the zeal of a pedantic school master substituting its judgment for that of the administrator. 70. In our opinion there should be judicial restraint in fiscal and economic regulatory measures. The State should not be hampered by the court in such measures unless they are clearly illegal or unconstitutional. All administrative decisions in the economic and social spheres are essentially ad hoc and experimental. Since economic matters are extremely complicated, this inevitably entails special treatment for distinct social phenomena. The State must therefore be left with wide latitude in devising ways and means of imposing fiscal regulatory measures, and the court should not, unless compelled by the statute or by the Constitution, encroach into this field. December 5, 2003 Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.1329 of 2003 For the reason given in W.P. No.2529 of 2002, M/s. K.B. Hides v. State of U.P. and Others decided on 1-12-2003, this writ petition is dismissed.
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