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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 692 Records
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2006 (7) TMI 725 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... next ground relates to deleting the addition of ₹ 86,15,370 on account of excess stock pertaining to M/s. Acryplast Pvt. Ltd. At the time of hearing, the counsel of the assessee stated that this ground can be allowed. It was submitted that in case sister concern of the assessee firm; the Tribunal has deleted the addition and has held that the addition to this extent has to be added in the hands of the assessee. 30. In view of these facts, we allow this ground of the department and confirm the order of the Assessing Officer in this regard. 31. Remaining issue relates to the direction of Ld. CIT(A) not to levy surcharge. This issue is covered by the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Merit Enterprises v. Dy. CIT 2006 101 ITD 1 (Hyd.) wherein it has been held that in case of search no surcharge can be levied. Therefore this ground of the department fails. In the result, both the appeals i.e. appeal of the assessee and appeal of the department are allowed in part.
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2006 (7) TMI 724 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... .C., and can be taken back with permission of the Court to be produced as and when required. Alternatively, the zerox copies can be filed along with a certificate that they can be compared with the originals, as and when so directed by the Court. A residuary plea was taken by Mr. D.K. Garg, learned counsel for the appellant that the bail was granted on 11.2.2005 and was cancelled on 10.11.2005. It is stated that there is no allegation against that the appellant had misused the liberty of bail from the date of grant of bail upto the date of cancellation or thereafter as the order of cancellation has been stayed. At the stage of consideration of the bail application in terms of Section 167(2) there was no consideration on the merits of the case. Let the appellants surrender forthwith to custody. It is, however, open to them to move for bail which shall be considered in its own perspective. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on merits. The appeal is allowed.
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2006 (7) TMI 723 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... investigation. 125. In this view of the matter I concur with the answer given by Brother Chauhan J to the first question that Satyapal's case has laid down the correct law on when arrests may be stayed during investigation and that the observations in Joginder Kumar's case has no relevance on the matter, However so far as the second question posed by the referring Division bench is concerned, my answer is that the Full Bench in Satyapal's case was right in holding that Joginder Kumar's case was delivered on its own peculiar facts and does not lay down any legal principles relating to the power of arrest and the power of staying of arrest by this Court, and I affirm the view taken by the Full Bench in Satyapal's case also on this point. 126. I agree with Brother Chauhan J that the petition needs to be dismissed both on merits, resulting in the rejection of the reference, and because the petition has become infructuous due to submission of the charge sheet.
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2006 (7) TMI 722 - CUSTOMS, EXCISE AND GOLD TRIBUNAL, DELHI
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... ... ..... goods imported in absence of any material/evidence, we hold that the amount paid for technical know-how is not to be included in the price of the imported goods. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal. Since the Revenue has not been able to establish any nexus between the licence fees and the imported goods by showing that the buyer was required to pay, directly or indirectly as a condition of the sale of the goods being valued, the licence fees, the Commissioner (Appeals) was not justified in including the amount payable under the know-how Agreement in the price of the goods in question. We do not find any valid reason to take a different view of the matter than the one taken earlier by the Tribunal in the appellant's own case. The impugned order of the Commissioner (Appeals) upholding the order-in-original to the aforesaid extent is hereby set aside and the appeal is accordingly allowed. (Dictated and pronounced in the open Court on 19.7.2006)
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2006 (7) TMI 721 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... on their own and was not on the insistences of the revenue. This in itself can be considered as a self-assessment done by the appellant. 6. Identical issue of refund of the amount of service tax paid by the assessee on self-assessment was before the Division Bench in the case of J.K. Industries Limited (Supra). The Division Bench in that case held at paragraph ‘9’ held as under - “The service tax paid on the basis of self-assessment as per the statutory provision was a valid collection of tax by the government and therefore, it was in no way refundable to the appellant who was liable to pay the same under the amended provisions.” 7. I find that the issue involved in this case is squarely covered by the decision of the Division Bench. 8. Accordingly, respectfully following the decision of the Division Bench, I do not find any merit in the appeal filed by the appellant. The appeal is dismissed. (Dictated and pronounced in the open court)
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2006 (7) TMI 720 - CESTAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... der-in-Original by the Assistant Commissioner, whereas the Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Nashik in exercise of revisional Power under Section 84 of the Finance Act, 1994 enhanced the penalty amount as stated supra in the impugned order, which is assailed before the Tribunal by the assessee. 5. This Tribunal had to consider the similar issue in its order No. A/330 to 332/III/SMC/WZB/06 dated 6-2-2006 2006 (3) S.T.R. 509 and some other cases. In all these cases, the revision order passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, Nashik was set aside holding that there was no sufficient reason for enhancing the penalty amount. Following the same principle and further as there appear no mala fide intention or delayed tactics on the part of the appellants, I find this is not a case where the penalty is to be enhanced. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside. The appeal is allowed. Stay application is disposed of accordingly. (Pronounced in Court)
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2006 (7) TMI 719 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 01. He had to suffer the ignominy of working under a junior for a long time. The fact that the 3rd respondent would retire in May, 2007 is again wholly immaterial. It is of not much relevance. It is also not correct to contend that the selection was on merit basis. If the post was not reserved, in no way the 3rd respondent could have been promoted. He might not have come within the purview of zone of consideration. This case points out how the illegalities are committed by the State causing deprivation of legitimate right of promotion of more meritorious and senior candidates. It is not a case, where we should refrain ourselves from exercising our discretionary jurisdiction. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The respondents shall bear the costs of the appellant throughout. Such costs would be borne by the State as also the 3rd respondent equally, which is assessed at ₹ 50,000/-.
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2006 (7) TMI 718 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... circumstances of the case and that there can be an exception as in the present case and, therefore, it cannot be said that the directions issued by the High Court are not correct or that they are contrary to the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court, in our opinion, while disposing off the writ petition filed by the Union has taken a just, pragmatic, fair and judicious view after considering all the equities and facts and circumstances of the case. Extreme hardship might have been caused to both the employer as well as the employee since no medical facilities have been availed by the workmen from ESIC and the employer had provided medical facilities to the workmen as per the Court orders and also had paid medical allowances. In the result, all the three appeals are dismissed and the judgments passed by the High Court are affirmed. However, there will be no order as to costs. The question of law is left open to be decided in an appropriate case.
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2006 (7) TMI 717 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ondoned. Heard. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
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2006 (7) TMI 716 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ai address. There is also no dispute that the service is in regard to appellant’s project in India. 4. The address of the service provider would appear to be not relevant for the purpose of tax credit. If the tax has been paid, the credit would follow. In that view of the matter, prima facie, the appellant’s claim was well-founded. 5. In the result, the stay application is allowed and recovery stayed till the disposal of the appeal. Order dictated in the open Court on 25-7-2006.
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2006 (7) TMI 715 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... .2006 and since the Arbitrator appointed has recused, vacancy has to be filled up. The application accordingly stands disposed of appointing Justice R.C.Chopra (Retd.) a former Judge of this Court as an Arbitrator in place of Justice Jaspal Singh (Retd.). Fee of the Arbitrator would be in terms of para 16 of the order dated 27th March, 2006. 4. Parties are directed to appear before the newly appointed Arbitrator on 21st August, 2006 at 5.00 PM. Place of arbitration for the purposes of first hearing would be the residence of Justice R.c.Chopra (retd.). The address is as under - A-134, Sector-55, Noida, Tel 93554242 9818097777 (M). 5. Application stands disposed of.
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2006 (7) TMI 714 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ssue was taken up by the photographic service providers to Hon’ble Supreme Court and was settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of C.K. Jidhesh v. Union of India 27-10-2005 - 2006 (1) S.T.R. 3 (S.C.) (2005) 149 Taxman 446 (SC). Subsequently, following the same decision, the Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal of the appellants as regards reduction of the cost of material from the service tax liability and the appellants have admitted that and deposited the amount of service tax and interest on 19-12-2005. 6. Since there was the confusion in respect of the eligibility to the benefit of Notification No. 12/2003, to my mind, the imposition of penalty is unwarranted. Hence, the penalty on the appellant is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the order in appeal which confirms the amount of penalty imposed on the appellant is set aside. The appeal of the appellant is allowed in respect of penalty only. (Dictated and pronounced in the open Court)
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2006 (7) TMI 713 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ions are having the force of law. Thus, by a valid legislation, the Corporation has withdrawn the benefit of free power supply to the future employees of the Corporation. Therefore the amended regulations are not violative of Section 18(3) of the I.D. Act. 15. The contention of the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner - Union that continuing the benefit of free power supply to the existing employees and denying the same benefit to the future employees is discriminative and violative of Article 14, of the Constitution is unacceptable to me. The existing employees of the Corporation are different from future employees. The existing employees and future employees are not equals and are not similar. Therefore, the impugned amended regulation denying free power supply to the future employees is neither discriminatory nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 16. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is rejected with no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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2006 (7) TMI 712 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... considered view that in the facts and circumstances of the case Ld. CIT(A) has erred in exercising his revisional powers in this case as the requirement of the aforesaid section are not satisfied. The Supreme Court in the case of Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. (supra) has held that every loss of revenue as a consequence of order of the Assessing Officer cannot be treated as prejudicial in the interest of revenue, e.g., when a Income-tax Officer adopted one of the courses permissible in law and it has resulted in loss of revenue or where two views are possible and the Income-tax Officer has taken one view with which the CIT does not agree, it cannot be treated as an erroneous order prejudicial to the interest of revenue unless the view taken by the Income-tax Officer is unsustainable in law. 11. The assessee’s appeal, therefore, succeed on both the grounds. The order dated 29-3-2004 of Ld. CIT, Delhi is set aside. 12. In the result, the assessee’s appeal in allowed.
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2006 (7) TMI 711 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Sudarshan Chemicals Industries Ltd., (2000) 245 ITR 769 (Bom) in favour of the assessee. Accordingly, the question raised in this appeal is answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Appeal stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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2006 (7) TMI 710 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not be levied if the returned income is loss in the cases prior to the amendment in the year 2002?” The admitted facts are that the income disclosed and the income assessed is in negative. No case is made out for attraction of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. No interference is called for. The Appeal stands dismissed at the admission stage.
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2006 (7) TMI 709 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ondoned. Heard. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
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2006 (7) TMI 708 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... td. v. IAC 1994 49 ITD 56 (Delhi) (SB). The decision of the Tribunal in Indian Communication Network (P.) Ltd.’s case (supra ) was followed by a Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of the assessee itself. The decision in the case of the Assessee is reported in ITO v. Food Specialities Ltd. 1994 49 ITD 21 (Delhi) (SB). 8. Learned counsel for the assessee brought to our notice that in the decision of the Supreme Court in Berger Paints India Ltd. v. CIT 2004 2661 ITR 991 the Supreme Court has noted at page 104 that the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in Indian Communication Network (P.) Ltd.’s case has not been challenged by the revenue and this fact is not disputed by the revenue. 9. Under the circumstances, since the revenue has already accepted the decision which is the foundation of the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal in the present case, we are of the view that no substantial question of law arises for our consideration. 10. Dismissed.
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2006 (7) TMI 707 - SUPREME COURT
Suit against the tenant for possession - Recovery of the possession of the suit property - Let out the suit property with the fittings and fixtures - tenancy continued after the lease term of three years - Rule 3 of Order 23 of CPC - agreement or compromise between the parties - HELD THAT:- In this case, under the settlement, the tenant undertook to vacate the suit property on a future date (that is 22.1.2002) and pay the agreed rent till then. The decree in pursuance of such settlement was an 'executable' decree. Therefore the settlement did not fall under the second part, but under the first part of Rule 3. The High Court obviously committed an error in holding that the case fell under the second part of Rule 3.
If the terms of a compromise written on a paper in the form of an application or petition is considered as a compromise in writing, can it be said that the specific and categorical statements on oath recorded in writing by the court and duly read over and accepted to be correct by the person making the statement and signed by him, can be said to be not in writing? Obviously, no. We may also in this behalf refer to Section 3 of the Evidence Act which defines a document as any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one of those means intended to be used or which may be used for the purpose of recording the matter. The statements recorded by the court will, therefore, amount to a compromise in writing.
Consequently, the statements of the parties or their counsel, recorded by the court and duly signed by the persons making the statements, would be 'statement in writing signed by the parties'. The court, however, has to satisfy itself that the terms of the compromise are lawful. In this case we find from the trial court records that the second defendant had executed a vakalatnama empowering her counsel Sri Dinesh Garg to act for her in respect of the suit and also to enter into any compromise. Hence there can be no doubt that Sri Dinesh Garg was authorized by the second defendant to enter into a compromise. We also find that the counsel for the plaintiffs and counsel for the defendants made solemn statements on oath before the trial court specifying the terms of compromise, which were duly recorded in writing and signed by them. The requirements of the first part of Rule 3 of Order XXIII are fully satisfied in this case.
The suit was a simple suit for possession by a landlord against a tenant filed in the year 1993. Plaintiff's evidence was closed in 1998. The contesting defendant (defendant No.2) did not lead any evidence, and her evidence was treated as closed. The matter was dragged on for 3 years for defendant's evidence after the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence. It was noted on 19.5.2001 that no further adjournment will be granted for the evidence of defendants 4 and 5 (who are not contesting the matter), on the next date of hearing (23.5.2001). When the matter finally came up on 23.5.2001, no evidence was tendered. On the other hand, a statement was made agreeing to vacate the premises by 22.1.2002. The trial court took care to ensure that the statements of both counsel were recorded on oath and signed. Thereafter, it passed a consent decree. The attempts of tenants in such matters to protract the litigation indefinitely by raising frivolous and vexatious contentions regarding the compromise and going back on the solemn undertaking given to court, should be deprecated.
Neither the second defendant nor her legal representative has attributed any improper motive to second defendant's counsel. The facts go to show nothing further could have been done for the defendants-tenants. All that the counsel for defendants had done was to get the maximum advantage to his clients in the circumstances after dragging on the matter to the extent possible.
This appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed as being devoid of merit. The consent decree is upheld, though for reasons different from those which weighed with the High Court. The landlords (respondents) will be entitled to seek mesne profits for the period from 22.1.2002 to date of delivery of possession in accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. The costs payable by the appellant are quantified at ₹ 25,000/-.
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2006 (7) TMI 706 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r the same. 24. The order of the court should not prejudice the interest of the parties. The well established maxim of law is that "actus curiae neminem gravabit". As stated above, the auction purchaser was a successful bidder for a sum of ₹ 15.08 crores and he paid the entire amount as per the sale notification. Because of the litigation, he was allowed to withdraw a major portion of the amount on condition that he should repay within 7 days on conclusion of the writ proceedings. Now, it is for the auction purchasers to comply with the undertaking and if the undertaking is so complied with, it is open to the Recovery Officer to proceed further in terms of the auction conducted on August 30, 2004. 25. In the result, all the writ petitions are dismissed with the observations made above. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed and W.V.M. Rs. are allowed by vacating the interim orders granted in favour of the petitioners.
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