|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 692 Records
-
2006 (7) TMI 705 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... lfth annual general meeting of the Company, in terms of this order. He is at liberty to take the services of any Practicing Company Secretary of his choice, in discharge of this present assignment. The remuneration for the Chairman and the Practicing Company Secretary fixed in consultation with the Company shall be borne by the latter. V) The Chairman will decide the entire modalities of convening holding and conducting of the twelfth annual general meeting in consultation with the Company. VI) The Board of Directors of the Company shall carry on its business strictly in accordance with the articles and initiate such action in respect of the Investigation Centre, as may be deemed necessary. VII) The Chairman of the meeting will forward a report on the proceedings of the twelfth annual general meeting within a week from the conclusion of the twelfth annual general meeting of the Company. With the above directions, the company petition stands disposed of. No order as to costs.
-
2006 (7) TMI 704 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... cannot be allowed to achieve this objective. The grievances against OARC following from the JV Agreement must be agitated in a civil proceeding but not in a proceeding under section 397 as laid down by the Apex Court in Sangramsinh P.Gaekwad and Ors. v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad (supra). It is observed that the petitioners have already referred the disputes to arbitration, which include the loss of ₹ 740 crores reportedly suffered by the Company on account of non fulfilment of the terms of JVA, wherein OARC is also a party to the said proceedings. The CLB, in my considered view, is not the appropriate forum to enforce the contractual obligations in terms of the J V Agreement against OARC and it would not constitute oppression in the affairs of the Company. For these reasons, the prayer for impleadment of OARC does not satisfy the legal proposition enunciated in the various decisions cited supra and therefore, the application is liable to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
-
2006 (7) TMI 702 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s not lie in the grant of an injunction preventing its employees from resigning and taking up employment with the respondent. Accordingly, this application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is disposed of with the following directions 1) the respondent is restrained during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings from taking out any other or further advertisements or to do anything to solicit, induce or encourage the employees of the petitioner to leave the petitioner's employment and take up employment of the respondent and/or its agents and/or representatives and/or competitors; 2) the employees of the petitioner would, however, be free to take up employment with the respondent even in response to the said advertisement which has prima facie been held to be solicitation, but, the respondent would be liable to compensate the petitioner for such breach of the non-solicitation clause, if so established in the pending arbitration proceedings.
-
2006 (7) TMI 701 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
Buying and selling securities in the derivatives segment - manipulation and synchronization in trading of shares - violation of transparent norms of trading in securities - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the chart would show that on 13/12/2000 one KP entity is buying the shares of DSQ Bio and another entity is selling at the same time and at the same rate and therefore the trades had to match on the screen of the exchange. In some cases the buyer and the seller is the same entity. The aforesaid chart clearly illustrates how circular trading was carried on by the KP entities in a synchronised manner through DKB as a broker. This is only one instance but not the solitary one. Large number of fictitious trades were executed in this manner in the scrips of different companies whereby artificial volumes were created by Ketan Parekh. The Board has in the impugned order referred to quite a few of the transactions executed by these entities and we are in agreement with those findings that these were synchronised trades executed in a circular manner to create artificial volumes. We are not dealing with each and every transaction executed by the appellants only with a view to avoid making this order bulky. It is relevant to mention here that the modus operandi adopted by KP entities in dealing with CSFB and DKB as brokers was similar and circular and fictitious trades were executed to create artificial volumes and market in the scrips. Ketan Parekh also received finance against delivery of shares without waiting for pay out at the exchange and the transactions were given the semblance of sale and purchase of shares. We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that if Ketan Parekh and his entities are allowed to continue with their operations they would pose a serious threat to the integrity of the securities market and endanger the interests of the investors.
Since this right was denied to the appellants the learned senior counsel contends that the principles of natural justice were flagrantly violated and that the order deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. We do not think so. In the two show cause notices issued to Shri Ketan Parekh and his entities, it was clearly pointed out to them that Shri Ketan Parekh was not only associated with the companies but was also controlling them. At no stage of the proceedings before the Board did Ketan Parekh or any of the companies rebutted this allegation. As a matter of fact, when Ketan Parekh appeared before the Board during the course of investigations he admitted that he was connected with the companies in one way or the other. It is on record that in his reply filed to the first show cause notice he did not dispute this fact. He and the companies did not file any reply to the second show cause notice. At the time of final hearing before the Board all the companies were represented by Shri Ketan Parekh and that the proceedings were being adjourned from time to time when Ketan Parekh was in judicial custody of the Calcutta Police. We also have on record identical letters from the companies requesting for an adjournment on account of non-availability of Ketan Parekh who alone, according to them, was in the know of facts. The written submissions filed by all the companies had also been signed by Shri Ketan Parekh. At no stage of the proceedings did any of the companies or Ketan Parekh make a request to the Board that it needed to cross-examine the representatives of the two brokers and, in our view, rightly, because they knew that it was Ketan Parekh who was controlling them. It appears that the plea that the appellants should have been allowed to cross-examine the representatives of the brokers had been raised for the first time by their counsel at the time of final hearing before the Board which, in any case, was not the stage to raise such a plea. It was at that stage that the appellants pleaded for the first time through their counsel that Ketan Parekh was only a director on the board of the companies and that he was not looking after their day to day business and that he was distinct from those entities. In such a situation we are of the view that the Board was justified in not allowing the representatives of the brokers to be cross-examined when it was never the case of any of the appellants including Ketan Parekh himself that he was not controlling the companies. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the contention. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for us to discuss the case law cited by the learned senior counsel in this regard.
Lastly, it was urged that the Board discriminated against the appellants in imposing a high dose of penalty on them whereas lesser penalty was imposed on the two brokers who had played an equally dubious role, if not more, in the execution of the transactions which have been found to be illegal and manipulative in nature. The argument is that CSFB and DKB had both played an equal role in the execution of the transactions which have been dubbed as illegal and their certificates of registration had been suspended for a period of 18 months and two years respectively whereas the appellants have been debarred from accessing the securities market for a period of 14 years from the date of the order. The learned senior counsel referred to the orders passed by the Board in the case of CSFB and DKB in support of his contention. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties on the quantum of penalty we are of the view that the Board was not justified in letting off the two brokers lightly by imposing on them a penalty which was clearly disproportionate to the gravity of the charges proved against them. They should have been given a heavier dose considering the fact that their role in the execution of the transactions was no less than those of the appellants. The Board had committed an error in this regard but that matter is not in appeal before us. This, however, will not justify the appellants to contend that the Board should have committed a similar mistake in their case as well and awarded them a lesser punishment. As noticed earlier the appellants have rigged the market in a big way and the penalty imposed on them in our view is quite reasonable having regard to the gravity of the charges proved. Thus, we find no ground to reduce the period of debarment.
In view of our findings recorded on the second show cause notice upholding the findings of the Board we find no merit in the appeals which stand dismissed with no order as to costs.
-
2006 (7) TMI 700 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ions Court and dated 7.7.2005 rendered by the Magistrate are quashed and set aside. The learned Magistrate shall allow accused no.7 to tender his evidence on affidavit and deal with the same in the light of the observations made in this judgment. It is needless to express that if there is no written application on behalf of the accused seeking permission to give evidence on affidavit, the learned Magistrate shall, before allowing him to tender his evidence on affidavit, take in writing from the accused seeking such permission as contemplated under Section 315 of the Code. (d) Writ Petition No.2192 of 2005 is allowed. The order dated 31.8.2005 passed on the application (Exhibit-18) for de-exhibiting certain documents is set aside and that application is restored to file. The learned Magistrate shall deal with the said application afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment and in paragraph nos.37 to 42 and 45 thereof in particular.
-
2006 (7) TMI 699 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... by precedents. The principles have been crystallized under different heads and though it is permissible for Courts to expound and apply them to different situations, it should only be invoked in clear and incontestable cases of harm to the public. Section 24 provides that if any part of a single consideration for one or more objects, or any one or any part of any one of several considerations for a single object, is unlawful, the agreement is void. In view of the findings recorded by the High Court more particularly mention of all the relevant details relating to Exhibits A-4 and A-5 and the evidence clearly establishing that plaintiff had capacity to pay and was ready and willing to pay the balance amount and the absence of any material to show that the defendant No.2 was not acting in unauthorized manner in view of the clear resolution of the appellant No.1, the judgment of the High Court cannot be faulted. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed without any order as to costs.
-
2006 (7) TMI 698 - ITAT DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... the subsequent impugned order refusing registration is nothing but a nullity. The expression used in the section is ‘shall’. This ‘shall’ cannot be expressed to mean ‘may’. The unequivocal purport of the section is mandatory. There is no escape for the department. Once the limitation period has expired, the Commissioner becomes functus officio as regards the application under consideration before him. At the very moment of expiry of limitation, the application is deemed to have been accepted, in case no order thereon is passed by him. Hence, on that score, the assessee was successful." 5. Respectfully following the decision of the Tribunal we hold that the application filed by the assessee is deemed to have been allowed. We, therefore, direct to allow the application for grant of registration filed by the assessee. 6. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed. 7. The order is pronounced in the open court on 21-7-2006.
-
2006 (7) TMI 697 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... itting the judgment debtors to do something indirectly which they cannot do directly. The judgment debtors did not file any application within the time prescribed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and have lost their right, even if they had one, to petition for setting aside the award under Section 34 of the said Act. If they are not permitted to move an application for having the award set aside under Section 34 then surely they cannot be permitted to raise objections which, if accepted, would have the same effect as that of setting aside the award. This is what I mean when I say that the judgment debtors cannot be permitted to do something indirectly which it is not open for them to do directly. 23. In view of the foregoing discussion the objections preferred by the judgment debtors are not tenable and are rejected. The applications are, therefore, dismissed. 24. A copy of this order be also placed in the file of Execution Petition No. 18/2004.
-
2006 (7) TMI 696 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s and in the circumstances of the case and in view of the provisions of the Incometax Act, the order of the Honourable Tribunal is suffering from nonapplication of mind and, therefore, it is perverse? .” The admitted facts are that the income disclosed in the return and the income assessed is nil. When the income disclosed and the income assessed is nil, no case is made out for levying penalty under Section HC-NIC Page 1 of 2 Created On Thu Mar 23 15 20 12 IST 2017 TAXAP/1798/2005 2/2 ORDER 271(1)(c) of the Incometax Act. No substantial question of law does arise in this appeal. Appeal stands dismissed at the admission stage.
-
2006 (7) TMI 695 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f a Government Counsel and on 19th December, 2003 an application for condonation of delay was handed over to the counsel who filed the application on 27th January, 2004. 6. The applicant is entitled to 180 days for filing a reference application but it has taken additional 215 days to file the reference application. Learned counsel for the respondent has pointed out that the authorities seeking comments and those who furnished the same are in the same building and perhaps in the very next room. 7. Be that as it may, the applicant has left a gap of six months without any explanation. Similar applications for condonation of delay have been considered and rejected by this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise v. Bluemax Sport Wear, 2005 (186) E.L.T. 399 (Del.) and in Commissioner of Central Excise v. Ms. Emm Ess Electricals, CEAC No. 17/2004, decided on 29th May, 2006. 8. Following the aforesaid two decisions, we reject the application for condonation of delay.
-
2006 (7) TMI 694 - CESTAT BANGALORE
... ...
... ... ..... entral Government Department has held to be not a fault on the part of the appellant, hence penalty and interest have been set aside. 4. On a careful consideration, we notice that the issue is covered in the assessee’s favour by the cited judgment rendered in their own case. The President’s Bench by Final Order No. 4/03, dated 2-6-2003 2006 (3) S.T.R. 122 (Tri.) 2003 (160) E.L.T. 318 (Tri.) after due consideration has noted that there was no delay in depositing the amounts by the assessee in the respective account head in terms of their rules. There was a delay in transfer from the Principal Controller of Accounts to the Revenue Department, the same has to be held not a fault on the part of the appellants and hence, the impugned order imposing penalty and interest is set aside. In view of the cited judgment, the imposition of penalty and interest is set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential relief, if any. (Pronounced and dictated in open Court)
-
2006 (7) TMI 693 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ore it. Having said so, this petition can be disposed of by issuing the following directions i. The Tribunal is directed to dispose of the Misc. Application No. 52 of 2005. In the meantime, respondent No. 1 is restrained from taking further steps based on the order of May 30, 2006, pending hearing and final disposal of the Misc. Application No. 52 of 2005. ii. Consequent on the above directions and though the attachment will continue, yet by way of abundant caution, petitioners, their servants and/or agents and/or persons claiming through them are restrained from parting with or creating any third party rights in respect of the subject Flat No. 902, pending the hearing and final disposal of the application. iii. If the order passed on Misc. Application No. 52 of 2005 be adverse to the petitioners, the said order not to be acted upon for a further period of four weeks of passing of the order. 23. Rule made absolute accordingly. However, there shall be no order as to 23 costs.
-
2006 (7) TMI 692 - CESTAT BANGALORE
... ...
... ... ..... activity at least four years prior to the issue of Show Cause Notice. They did not react to appellants’ claim of exemption although they were fully aware of TRU clarification in this regard. The department cannot defend its inaction.” After making the above observations, the learned Commissioner (A) makes a volte face and holds that the bar of limitation is not applicable. We do not agree in view of the settled law in the matter reiterated by Apex Court’s decision in the case of Nizam Sugar Factory v. CCE, A.P. - 2006 (197) E.L.T. 465 (S.C.) wherein it is held that when all relevant facts are in the knowledge of the authorities, suppression cannot be alleged and demands are not sustainable. The ratio of the above case will be squarely applicable to the present case. As the Show Cause Notice has been issued beyond the normal period, the demands are time barred. Therefore, we allow the appeal with consequential relief. (Pronounced in open Court on 26-7-2006)
-
2006 (7) TMI 691 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ue sought to be raised is covered by the decision of this Court in the case of M.V. Sonvala V/s. Commissioner of Income-Tax reported in 177 I.T.R.246. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.
-
2006 (7) TMI 690 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ar 1995-96. Although it appears that the department had filed appeals against the decisions for all these years, the appeal filed in respect of the Assessment Year 1995-96 being ITA No.17/2005 was dismissed by this Court on 12th February, 2006. Following the decision rendered in ITA 17/2005, this appeal is also dismissed.
-
2006 (7) TMI 689 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the above referred I.T.A. Nos.203/96, 864/02, 865/02, 960/03 and 961/03. 6. We may record that the Appellants have filed a further affidavit placing on record that the tax for these 2 years has been fully paid or adjusted. Mr.Dastoor makes a further statement that until all the connected appeals are decided by the Special Bench, the Appellants will not claim any refund. 7. Both these Appeals stand disposed of with the above order. 8. As far as Writ Petition No.3837 of 2006 is concerned, the Petitioners herein had applied for rectification of the above order dated 20th July 2004 under section 256(2) of the Income Tax Act. That application was rejected by the Tribunal by its order dated 20th July 2005. Inasmuch as the order dated 20th July 2004 is set aside and the appeals are restored to the file of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Pune, the order dated 20th July 2005 declining rectification no longer survives. This petition is accordingly disposed of with this observation.
-
2006 (7) TMI 688 - CESTAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... by following the Hon'ble Madras High Court decision in the Varnica Herbs vs. CBEandC reported in 2004 (163) ELT 160 (Mad). 2. We find that the said decision was considered by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai vs. M/s. Urison Cosmetics Ltd. and vide its order M/278/WZB/06/C-I/EB dated 7.2.2006 it has been held that the goods are required to be assessed under Sec. 4. The said decision has subsequently been upheld by the Tribunal in the case of CCEx, Mumbai-VI vs. M/s. Charishma Cosmetics Pvt Ltd. Vide its order A/484/WZB/06/C-IV/EB dated 9.3.06 wherein in respect of identical goods, provisions of Sec. 4 has been held to be applicable. 3. In view of the foregoing, we held that the appellant has a good prima facie case on merit. We accordingly allow stay petition un-conditionally. In as much as the issue is prima facie covered by Larger Bench decision of the Tribunal we fix the appeal also for final disposal on 21.8.2006.
-
2006 (7) TMI 687 - CESTAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... ea of the proprietor that his statement was recorded under threat and coercion and that he retracted his statement at the earliest opportunity has also been dealt with by the Commissioner, who has noted that the proprietor has paid some duty after 28-2-1998, when he is stated to have filed affidavit before the Metropolitan Magistrate. In these circumstances, he holds that no credibility can be attached to the affidavit. 5. The evidence on record amply establishes that the appellants had manufactured and clandestinely cleared processed fabrics during the period above-mentioned. Therefore, we hold that the duty confirmed against the appellants cannot be faulted. 6. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we reduce the penalty to ₹ 8,00,000/- (rupees eight lakhs). The confiscation of processed fabrics seized on 26/27-2-1998 is also upheld. The appeal is, thus, partly allowed in the above terms. (Dictated and pronounced in Court)
-
2006 (7) TMI 686 - CESTAT MUMBAI
MODVAT credit - fraudulent availment of credit on invalid documents - Rule 4 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2002 - waiver of pre-deposit - Held that: - after waiving pre-deposit, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeals filed by the appellants with consequential relief, if any.
-
2006 (7) TMI 685 - CESTAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... ould have reversed the same and issued the Central Excise invoice for the same is not at all negativated. The finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) no way erroneous that the respondents accepted their mistake and reversed the credit along with interest before issue of show cause notice. 4. Department relying upon the several judgments as noted in the grounds of appeal but they are not direct bearing on the issue involved. Therefore, they are not being followed. The Larger Bench decision of the Tribunal in the case of Machino Montell (I) cited supra is direct bearing on the issue involved. Furthermore, there is decision of this Tribunal in the case of Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited v. CCE - 2003 (161) E.L.T. 285 covering the issue in favour of the assessee and the same has oeen confirmed by the Supreme Court reported at 2004 (163) E.L.T. A53 (S.C.). Thus, I find no merits in the appeal filed by the department. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. (Pronounced in the Court)
........
|
