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Showing 61 to 80 of 773 Records
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2009 (12) TMI 1003 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lds that the sale in favour of the petitioners is valid and the same cannot be sold by respondents 1 and 2. 20. In fine this Court holds that 1) Sale Tax arrears under the provisions of TNGST Act would prevail upon the claim of the secured creditor like third respondent Bank. 2) Petitioners are bona fide purchasers of the property for valuable sale consideration without notice in a valid sale under the provisions of SARFAESI Act. 3) Petitioners property cannot be auctioned by the first respondent for tax dues of the borrowing company. 21. In view of the above reasonings and on equitable consideration also, the auction notice dated 24.4.2009 issued by the first and second respondent to sell the property at No. 300, Poonamallee High Road, Maduravoyal, Chennai-600 095 for recovery of tax arrears of Pioneer Cashew Industries Limited is not sustainable and the same is quashed. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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2009 (12) TMI 1002 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... om public through bonds issued and when they were ready with the fund to deploy for infrastructure projects which is the business of the respondent. Therefore, in our view, deposit of funds in Banks and Treasury is nothing but an activity done in the course of business and, consequently, interest earned is income from business. Since the assessee is a financing company, the interest earned by it on the funds raised through public borrowings cannot be compared to the interest earned on business like manufacturing industries and, therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court relied on by the department is not applicable to the facts of this case. Therefore, the first appellate authority as well as the Tribunal have rightly held that the assessee is entitled to all the deductions available in the computation of business income. We, therefore, uphold the orders of the Tribunal confirming the order of the first appellate authority. Consequently, departmental appeals are dismissed.
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2009 (12) TMI 1001 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... Parasaran, ASG., Mr. Tapesh Kumar Singh, Adv., Mrs. Lakshmi Iyengar, Adv., Mr. B.V. Balaram Das,Adv. O R D E R Delay condoned. Dismissed.
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2009 (12) TMI 1000 - ITAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... is placed on record. 4.2 It is pointed out by the learned AR that this issue is covered in assessee's own case for the asst. year 2001-02 (ITA No.2291/Bang/2004 dated 11th August, 2006) wherein the Tribunal followed its earlier orders in the case of M/s Infosys Technologies Ltd. (ITA Nos.50,793 to 795, 742 & 732 to 734 dated 31.3.2005). 4.3 The learned DR did not controvert the submission made by the assessee's counsel. 4.4 On the second issue, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the assessee, the matter stands covered by the decision of the Tribunal in assessee's own case (ITA No.2291/04 dt.11.8.2006 and ITA Nos.391 & 392/07 dated 30.10.2007). The facts in asst. year 2001-02 being identical for the asst. year under consideration, we are inclined to follow the coordinate bench of the Tribunal and uphold the order of the CIT(A). 5. In the result, the appeals filed by revenue are dismissed. Pronounced in the open court on 18th December, 2009.
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2009 (12) TMI 999 - CESTAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... s it provided that the specified goods must be the same or similar to the goods for which the brand name or trade name is registered. The Tribunal has in adopting the above reasoning effectively added to the Notification words to the effect “brand name or trade name in respect of the same goods”. This is clearly impermissible. It is to be seen that there may be an unregistered brand name or an unregistered trade name. These might not be in respect of any particular goods. Even if an unregistered brand name or trade name is used the exemption is lost. This makes it very clear that the exemption would be lost so long as the brand name or trade name is used irrespective of whether the use is on same goods as those for which the mark is registered.“ 5. We find that the impugned orders are consistent with the above ratio laid down by the Apex Court. Accordingly we sustain the impugned orders and dismiss these appeals. (Pronounced in the Court on 23-12-2009)
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2009 (12) TMI 998 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for a reassessment to be made, the report of the Departmental Valuation Officer cannot be a basis because the valuation cannot be an arithmetical appreciation of the materials used for the construction nor the expenses incurred by the assessee in that regard, as variations are bound to be there." 10. Further in the case of V.T. Rajendran’s case (supra), it was observed that- "the report of the Departmental Valuation Officer could not be the basis for reassessment because the valuation cannot be an arithmetical appreciation of the materials used for the construction or the expenses incurred by the assessee in that regard. The Tribunal was right and the reassessment was not valid." 11. In the light of above settled legal position, we set aside the impugned notice issued by the department under section 148 of the Income-tax Act as the same was issued solely based on the DVO’s report. 12. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. No order to costs.
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2009 (12) TMI 997 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... ction 22 read with section 27 (iiib) and 269 UA (f) (i) of the Income Tax Act. The facts of this case are therefore, distinguishable from the facts of the present assessee. Considering the facts and circumstances noted above, we are of the view that there is no infirmity in the orders of the authorities below in denying the claim of the assessee to become deemed owner of the property so as to qualify for deduction u/s 24 of the Income Tax Act. The income is, therefore, liable to be treated as income from other sources and deduction was also rightly disallowed. 11. As a result, we do not find any merit in the appeal of the assessee. The same is accordingly dismissed. 12. The facts of these appeals are identical as considered in ITA No.2387/A/2009. By following the same, we dismiss both these appeals of the assessee. 13. As a result, both the appeals of the assessee are dismissed. 14. In the result, the appeals of the assessees are dismissed. Order pronounced on 18th Dec, 2009
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2009 (12) TMI 996 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... On the joint motion made by learned counsel for the parties, appeal stands disposed of in terms of the minutes of order dated 16th December, 2009 marked as Exh. X’ for identification. No order as to costs.
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2009 (12) TMI 995 - SUPREME COURT
Advertisement for sale of manufacturing units - Non-existence of the independent approach road - Refund of the Earnest money illegally forfeited along with interest - subsequently during negotiations enhanced to ₹ 50,00,000 - deposited an amount of ₹ 2.5 lakhs by way of earnest money - appellants/Corporation called the respondent for negotiations - resulted in enhancement of the bid from ₹ 25 lakhs to ₹ 50 lakhs.
The respondent, however, again raised the issue regarding the passage at the open house held by the appellants/Corporation. According to the appellants/ Corporation, as per the revenue record and the demarcation report of the revenue officials dated 27.6.1998, therein 16.5 ft. rasta is provided in the west of the Unit. However, not satisfied, the respondent did not pay the balance amount. Therefore the appellants/Corporation invited fresh tenders for sale of land. On 30.9.1998 the appellants/Corporation forfeited the sum of ₹ 2.5 lakhs which had been deposited by the respondent as earnest money.
HELD THAT:- We see no reason to take any different view. We are also of the opinion that the Division Bench was justified in further concluding that in law the appellants/Corporation undoubtedly has the power to forfeit the earnest money provided there was a failure on the part of the respondent to make the deposit. The Division Bench, however, observed that the respondent was dealing with an instrumentality of state. He was entitled to legitimately proceed on the assumption that the appellants, a Statutory Corporation, an instrumentality of the State, shall act fairly. The respondent could not have suspected that he would be called upon to pay the amount of ₹ 50 lakhs without being given even a proper passage to the Unit that he was buying.
We are of considered opinion that the respondent had deposited the sum of ₹ 2.5 lakhs on the clear understanding that there would be an independent approach road to the Unit. This is understandable. Without any independent passage the plot of land would be not more than an agricultural plot, not suitable for development as a manufacturing unit. We therefore don't find any substance in the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants/Corporation.
The appellants cannot be given the benefit of Clause 5 of the advertisement. The appellants /Corporation cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own wrong. Clause 5 undoubtedly permits the forfeiture of the earnest money deposited. But this can only be, if the auction purchaser fails to comply with the conditions of sale. In our opinion the respondent has not failed to comply with the conditions of sale. Rather, it is the appellants/Corporation which has acted unfairly, and is trying to take advantage of its own wrong.
The reliance on Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 is wholly misplaced. The aforesaid Section pertains to action which the Corporation can take against the Unit which had defaulted in payment of loan. In such circumstances the Corporation has the power to sell the property that has been hypothecated or mortgaged with the Corporation. Respondent herein is an auction purchaser and therefore cannot be confused with the defaulting unit. We are also of the considered opinion that the reliance placed on the judgment of this Court by the counsel for the appellants in the case of Union Bank of India vs. Official Liquidator and Ors.[1993 (10) TMI 231 - SUPREME COURT] is wholly misconceived. The judgment clearly goes on to further hold as follows:
"The case of the Official Liquidator selling the property of a company in liquidation under the orders of the Court is altogether different from the case of an individual selling immovable property belonging to himself."
The aforesaid observation would be clearly applicable to the Corporation as it is exercising the rights of an owner in selling the property. The appellants/Corporation is not selling the property as an official liquidator.
It was also the duty of the appellants/Corporation to inform the respondent that the passage mentioned in the revenue record was not fit for movement of vehicles. The appellant also failed to produce to the buyer the entire documentation as required by Section 51 (1) (b) of the aforesaid Section. We are therefore satisfied that the appellants/Corporation cannot seek to rely on the aforesaid provision of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
In our opinion, the reliance on Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 is wholly misplaced. The aforesaid Section pertains to action which the Corporation can take against the Unit which had defaulted in payment of loan. In such circumstances the Corporation has the power to sell the property that has been hypothecated or mortgaged with the Corporation. Respondent herein is an auction purchaser and therefore cannot be confused with the defaulting unit.
It appears that the judgment of the High Court had been stayed by this Court on 2.9.2002. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, we direct that the forfeited amount be refunded to the respondent with 12 per cent interest w.e.f. 1.2.1998 till payment. The amount be paid to the respondent within a period of two months of producing the certificate copy of this order. We also direct that in the event the aforesaid amount is not paid within the stipulated period the respondent shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum till payment. We also direct the respondent shall be entitled to costs which are assessed as ₹ 50,000/-.
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2009 (12) TMI 994 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... in the nature of cost of any land or building on in-house research and development facility as approved by the prescribed authority, then deduction of a sum equal to 1½ time of the expenditure so incurred shall be allowed. Thus, it can be seen that the exception to the claim of deduction of the expenditure incurred on cost of any land or building is provided for only under sub-sec. 2AB of sec.35 and not under clause iv of subsec. 1 of sec.35 of the Act. The assessee’s claim is undisputedly u/s.35 1 iv of the Act and as rightly held by the Ld. CIT A 100 of the capital expenditure on scientific research relating to the business carried on by the assessee is admissible as provided under sub-sec 2 10 thereof. In view of the same, we do not see any reason to interfere with the order of the CIT A and the revenue’s appeal is dismissed. 20. In the result, revenue’s appeal in I.T.A.No.4782/M/07 is dismissed. Order pronounced on this 7th day of December, 2009.
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2009 (12) TMI 993 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ensure the compliance of the provisions of the Act and not with a view to punish. Where there is no loss of revenue in the sense that the tax deducted at source has been deposited within stipulated period, mere late filing of the return by itself is not sufficient to levy penalty. In such matters, penalty should not be levied for late filing of the return. This aspect of the matter was not appreciated by the Tribunal. The Tribunal ought to have considered as to whether there is material on record to show that there was sufficient cause for not filing the return within the stipulated period. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that in the present case there was no justification for passing a penalty order for late filing of the return with respect to the tax deducted at source and deposited within stipulated period. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in negative i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the department. No order as to costs.
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2009 (12) TMI 992 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... of unexplained purchased should have been deleted by the authorities below. We, accordingly set aside the orders of the authorities below and delete the addition of ₹ 3,97,63,022/- on account of bogus purchases and direct the AO to make addition of ₹ 4,79,518/- on account of profit earned by the assessee on rejection of book results. The above income would meet the ends of justice because when in the preceding assessment year 1.50 gross profit rate is applied as against 0.79 , the same rate would be proper and reasonable as against 0.49 shown by the assessee in the assessment year under appeal. It would also meet the arguments of the learned DR that higher gross profit rate may be applied in such circumstances. 7. In view of the above discussions, we set aside the orders of the authorities below and direct the AO to restrict the addition to ₹ 4,79,518/- in all. 8. As a result, the appeal of the assessee is partly allowed. Order pronounced on 18th Dec, 2009
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2009 (12) TMI 991 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ention of the parties. In my opinion, it would meet the ends of justice if the goods are allowed to be released upon furnishing security equal to the amount of tax that may be leviable on the goods which is said to be in the nature of drugs. Sri Agrawal, learned counsel further submits that drugs have been classified to be taxed 4 as per notification no.102 dated 15.01.2009. Under these circumstances, it is directed that the goods shall be released upon furnishing of security equal to the amount of tax leviable on the goods and since the order of export has been cancelled which is stated on affidavit which has been filed today as supplementary affidavit, the applicant will ge allowed to carry the goods back to its Unit in Haridwar. It is made clear that if any penalty proceeding is sought to be initiated against the dealer, any observation or comment made in the present order will not in any manner affect the same. Subject to the aforesaid observations, the revision allowed.
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2009 (12) TMI 990 - ITAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... sal of the bank statement of Axis Bank, it was found that the assessee deposited cash of ₹ 25,47,000/- in Axis bank on various dates. Similarly, with regards to bank statement it was found that the assessee did not open bank account till 1996-97 and the cash balance from agricultural produce carried forward from FY 1997- 98 was ₹ 20,30,000/-and it was substantiated from the cash flow statement that the assessee had cash in hand and deposited the same in above mentioned bank. The mutual fund investments have been drawn from said bank accounts which was not disputed by the AO. Thus, the main source of mutual fund investment stood explained as mentioned above. So, the AO was not justified to disbelieve the same. In view of the above, AO was rightly directed to delete the same by the CIT(A) after calling for remand report on the issue. We uphold the same. 5. In the result, the appeal filed by the revenue is dismissed. Order pronounced in the open court on 30-12-2009.
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2009 (12) TMI 989 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ods cleared to any place in India is excise duty, the question of dissecting the said duty into different components of basic customs duty, auxiliary duty, additional duty of Customs or any other customs duty does not arise. The proforma of AR-1A on which the reliance was placed by the learned D.R., cannot change the legal position that the duty levied on 100 E.O.U. is a duty of excise and not customs duty . 7. Learned DR has also stated that the reference which was made based on the decision of the Larger Bench to the Bombay High Court has been withdrawn vide order dated 7.4.2005 passed by the Bombay High Court in Central Excise Application No. 27 of 2001. Admittedly, the department has not challenged the decision of the Larger Bench in Vikram Ispat case and obviously the same is binding. As the impugned order has been passed entirely on the basis of the decision in Vikram Ispat case, we find no case for interference therein. Appeal therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed.
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2009 (12) TMI 988 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uthiala, learned counsel for the revenue, this observation is only obiter dicta and is not the ratio of the decision and the question whether an activity amounts to manufacture or not is to be decided in the facts of each case. As far as conversion of limestone into limestone powder is concerned, The Apex Court has clearly held that the conversion into lime and lime dust or concrete by stone crushers can legitimately be considered to be a manufacturing process while the mere mining of limestone and marble and cutting the same would not be so considered. The observation of the Supreme Court cannot be termed to be 'obiter dicta' since the Supreme Court has held that the process of conversion of limestone into lime and lime dust is a manufacturing process. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention of the revenue. Accordingly, both the questions are answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs.
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2009 (12) TMI 987 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
Block assessment proceedings u/s 158BD - period of limitation - Undisclosed income of another person u/s 158BD - HELD THAT:- The time limit set in sec. 158BE automatically applies for invoking the provisions of sec. 158BD. Legislature did not find it necessary to specify the separate time limit for the same, as the enactment itself shows that both section 158BC and 158BD are inter-linked, inter-laced, interwined and both form part and parcel of the same Chapter.
Respectfully following the decision of Manoj Agarwal’s case[2008 (7) TMI 446 - ITAT DELHI-A], we hold that the notice dated 19.4.2004 issued u/s 158BD is time barred and, therefore, the assessment framed on 27.2.2006 u/s 158BD read with sec. 158BC is without jurisdiction and void ab initio. Accordingly, we quash the assessment order dated 27.2.2006 framed u/s 158BD read with section 158BC.
Where material found in search is glaringly apparent that it belongs to a third person other then the person searched, then no specific satisfaction is required to be recorded and therefore, it is not necessary to issue notice under section 158BD before the closure of the assessment of the person searched.
It is for the AO to decide while examining the ceased material that it belongs to the person searched or to a third person. Whether such distinction is glaring or not is not material as legal requirement is that of satisfaction of the AO which cannot be done away with.
Accordingly, the principles laid down in the two cases i.e. Manish Maheshwari’s case [2007 (2) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT] and Manoj Agarwal’s case would have to be followed. All the points raised by the ld. DR have been considered in Manoj Agarwal’s case and therefore are not required to be separately considered. Thus, respectfully following the decision in Manoj Agarwal’s case [2008 (7) TMI 446 - ITAT DELHI-A] as well as Kuntesh Bhupatrai Desai’s case, we cancel the assessment and allow the appeal of the assessee.
Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2009 (12) TMI 986 - ITAT INDORE
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... ... ..... sent case, the Ld. CIT(A) held that there was no nexus between the interest paid and interest received. Hence, no netting was allowable. 45. We have considered the submissions made by both the sides, material on record and the orders of the authorities below. 46. It is noted that the aspect of nexus between the interest received and interest paid has not been examined by the Assessing Officer at all as evident from the assessment order. The Ld. CIT(A) has also not examined this issue in detail. Thus, in our view, the interests of justice would be served, if this issue is also restored to the file of A.O. for decision thereon afresh as per law and having regard to our directions given in I.T.A.No. 757/Ind/2006. Thus, this ground of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes. 47. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee stands partly allowed. 48. To sum up, all the appeals are partly allowed. This order has been pronounced in the open court on 15th December, 2009.
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2009 (12) TMI 985 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... he case of property which is not let out, municipal value would be a proper yardstick for determining the annual value. Municipal valuation should be the basis of determining annual value in the present case. Action of the Revenue authorities in adopting annual value on the basis of inquiries conducted regarding market rent in the vicinity of the property is not in accordance with law. We, therefore, following the decision of ITAT Mumbai ‘D’ Bench (supra) direct the Assessing Officer to adopt the municipal valuation of all the properties in all the Assessment years under appeal. For this purpose the assessee shall furnish necessary evidence, the Assessing Officer will examine the same and recomputed the income of house properties keeping in view the decision of ITAT Mumbai “D” Bench in the case of Parkpaper Industries (P) Ltd. (supra). 7. In the result, for statistical purposes, all the appeals are allowed. Order pronounced in Open Court on 18/12/2009
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2009 (12) TMI 984 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... Ltd. (2008) 113 ITD 719 (Del) (SB) wherein it was held that Sec. 234D inserted in the IT Act, 1961, by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003, w.e.f. 1st June, 2003, being substantive in nature, has no retrospective effect, hence applicable from asst. yr. 2004-05 only; interest under s. 234D is chargeable from asst. yr. 2004-05 only and it could not be charged for earlier assessment years even though regular assessments for such earlier assessment years are framed after 1st June, 2003 or refund is granted for those years after the said date. Hence, respectfully following the decision of Special Bench of the Tribunal, we delete the interest of ₹ 1,88,072/-charged under section 234D of the Act and allow this ground of appeal of the assessee. 38. In the result, the appeal of revenue as well as that of the assessee both are partly allowed in the manner indicated above. Order pronounced in the Court at the close of the hearing in the presence of the parties on 10/12/2009.
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