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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 1036 Records
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2011 (1) TMI 1528
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... ... ..... e relating to the admission of additional evidence without passing any speaking order or without allowing any opportunity to the A.O. to examine the same has been decided by the ld. CIT(A) against the Revenue and as a respondent, the Revenue is at liberty to raise the said issue as per Rule 27 of Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. Even otherwise, if the order of the ld. CIT(A) is found to be passed in violation of mandatory Rule 46-A, the Tribunal, in our opinion, is duly empowered to set aside the same with a direction to the ld. CIT(A) to make the same afresh in accordance with law after complying with the said Rule. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the ld. CIT(A) and restore the matter to his file with a direction to dispose of the appeal of the assessee afresh in accordance with law after complying with the requirements of Rule 46-A. 13. In the result, appeal of the assessee is treated as allowed for statistical purpose. Order pronounced on 14th January, 2011.
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2011 (1) TMI 1527
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... ... ..... aside inasmuch as it is not possible to say that the award did not relate to Claim I. This is a sufficient reason for setting aside the award and remitting the matter back to the arbitrator. 24. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgment as also judgment dated 25.11.2004 of the trial Court are set aside and the award of the Arbitrator is quashed. The Arbitrator shall now decide the dispute afresh after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties which shall necessarily include an opportunity to adduce oral and documentary evidence. 25. If the Arbitrator who passed award dated 17.11.1989 is not available, then the parties may move the trial Court, which shall give an opportunity to them to nominate their respective arbitrators within a specified time. If the parties fail to nominate their arbitrators, then the Court may appoint an arbitrator who shall pass an award after giving opportunity to the parties in terms of the preceding paragraph.
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2011 (1) TMI 1526
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... ... ..... ion 36(1) (va) of the Act and accordingly made additions. The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the addition of ₹ 13,10,791, against ₹ 17,94,042 made by the Assessing Officer on the ground that certain payments were made within the prescribed time. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal. On appeal Held, dismissing the appeal, that the view taken by the Tribunal deserved to be sustained as it was no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Supreme Court. The assessee was entitled to claim the benefit under section 43B for the period particularly in view of the fact that it had contributed to provident fund before filing the return.” The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinay Cement Ltd. 213 CTR 268, also support the above view. This ground is dismissed. 10. No other point is involved in the departmental appeal. 11. In the result, the departmental appeal is dismissed. Order pronounced in the open Court on 07-01-2011
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2011 (1) TMI 1524
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... ... ..... o any assessment or other proceedings. In other words, penalty levied under Section 271D was only for violation of Section 269SS i.e. for receiving cash payments in excess of the limit provided therein which is a violation of the said provision. Therefore, the provision on limitation for penalty applicable is Section 275(1)(c) under which the maximum period for completion of penalty proceedings is six months from the end of the month in which action for imposition of penalty is initiated. In this case admittedly the order was passed beyond the period provided under Section 275(1)(c). Consequently we do not find any merit in the appeal filed by the Revenue and the same is, therefore, dismissed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1523
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... ... ..... ehicles owned by the company and used for its business, even though it was registered in the names of the Directors of the company. In view of the above discussion it is held that the depreciation was allowable to the appellant in respect of the motor cars purchased by it and used for the purpose of its business, though registered in the name of the Managing Director. Ground Nos. 1 and 2 are, therefore, allowed.” The Pune Bench of the Tribunal in its recent decision in the case of Smash Electricals Pvt. Ltd., v/s. CIT, ITA No. 1394/PN/2006 (A.Y. 2003-04, order dt. 29th August 2008) has also decided the issue in favour of the assessee. We thus do not find reason to interfere with the first appellate order in this regard. The same is upheld. Issue raised in the present appeal is thus decided in favour of the assessee. The Grounds involving the issue are thus rejected. 6. In the result, appeals are dismissed. The Order is pronounced in the open Court on 31st January, 2011
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2011 (1) TMI 1522
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... ... ..... uce further investments in MPL through a co-promoter/capitalist/co-share-holder or any other agency. (x) The IL&FS group shall be entitled to undertake and permit the aforesaid co-promoter/investor/venture capitalist and share-holders to nominate its Directors on the Board of MPL in such a way that Management control of MPL is retained by IL&FS group for not less than three years. The new Directors so appointed in MPL shall not render themselves liable for any action in respect of the acts of commission or omission by the past promoters, without the prior approval of the CLB . (xi) The MPL shall submit a quarterly report to the CLB and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs regarding the status of Mytas Hill County Residential Project Phase-I, and (xii) All government agencies, banks, etc, shall cooperate in the implementation of this Order. 8. CA N024/2011 is accordingly disposed of. 9. CP No.4 shall now come up for hearing on 5th April , 2011 at 3PM instead of 1.2.2011.
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2011 (1) TMI 1521
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... ... ..... on-petitioner rebutted the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. I have perused the impugned judgment as well as the judgment of learned trial court and the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. as the complaint was registered as a private complaint under the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act and the learned trial court acquitted the present petitioner Manju for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable instrument Act against which complainant Ghyanshyam preferred the appeal which was accepted by the Addl. Sessions Judge No. 1, Udaipur who was having no jurisdiction to entertain such appeals in view of the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., therefore, the order dated 12.10.2010 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge No. 1, Udaipur cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the revision petition filed by the present petitioner is allowed and the impugned order dated 12.10.2010 is set aside.
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2011 (1) TMI 1520
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... ... ..... to consider whether there is concealment within the meaning of Section 271(1)(c) in respect of each and every component of the assessed income. Since we are dissatisfied with the order issued by the Tribunal, we have to necessarily conclude the Tribunal did not exercise the jurisdiction fairly or properly. We, therefore, allow the appeal by setting aside the order of the Tribunal and restore the appeal back to the Tribunal for deciding the matter afresh, particularly with specific reference to the facts and the provisions of Section 271(1)(c) after giving opportunity to both sides. The Tribunal is directed to repost and decide the matter afresh within a period of three months from the date of production of copy of this judgment. Even though we have restored the appeal by which the CIT (Appeal)'s order revives, we direct the Revenue not to proceed with recovery until disposal of the appeal by the Tribunal and thereafter recovery should be based on orders of the Tribunal.
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2011 (1) TMI 1519
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... ... ..... o the date of notification in the relevant previous year, are to be treated as covered by the exclusion clause set out in Section 43(5)(d). The assessee gets the relief accordingly.” 8.1 Keeping in view of the fact that the Ld. D.R. could not bring any contrary decision than that of the one relied on by the Ld. Counsel for the Assessee and the facts of the present case are undisputedly akin to the one decided by the Mumbai Bench of the ITAT, respectfully following the same, we set aside the orders of the revenue authorities and direct the AO to treat the loss as speculative loss. 8.2 Regarding the charging of interest under section 234B of the Act, as we have allowed the plea of the assessee, this is only consequential in nature, the AO is directed to re-compute the interest under section 234B of the Act, after giving relief to the assessee, as indicated above. 9. In the result, the appeal of the Assessee is allowed. ORDER IS PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 07/01/2011.
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2011 (1) TMI 1518
Benami Transactions - Suit for recovery of House Property - Whether the suit of the first Appellant for the recovery of her house property filed prior to the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 coming into force could be considered to be prohibited by Section 4 of that Act?
HELD THAT:- In the present case it has already been established that the Appellant had purchased the property out of her own funds. Therefore, it could certainly be expected that when she came to know about the clandestine sale of her property to Respondent No. 1, she would send him a notice, which she sent on 8.4.1987. As noted earlier, the notice is sent from one house on the College Road to another house on the same road in the city of Pathankot. The agreement of purchase is signed by the Defendant No. 3 five days thereafter i.e. 13.4.1987. The Appellant had produced a copy of the notice along with postal certificate in evidence. There was no allegation that the postal certificate was procured. In the circumstances, it could certainly be presumed that the notice was duly served on Respondent No. 1 before 13.4.1987. The High Court, therefore, erred in interfering in the finding rendered by the Additional District Judge that Respondent No. 1 did receive the notice and, therefore, was not a bona fide purchaser for value without a notice.
The judgment of the High Court, therefore, deserves to be set aside. The Appellants through their counsel have, however, in all fairness offered to compensate the first Respondent herein by paying him the amount of ₹ 30,000/- with appropriate interest. The first Respondent did not evince any interest in this suggestion. Yet, the end of justice will be met, if this amount of ₹ 30,000/- is returned by the Appellants to him as offered by them with simple interest at the rate of 10%.
The judgment and order passed by the High court are set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1517
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... ... ..... . Dave, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2011 (1) TMI 1516
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... ... ..... Supreme Court and other High Courts, we hold that even in view of consistency there is no infirmity in the findings of the ld CIT(A), who has also taken into consideration the past history of the case. Accordingly, we confirm the order of the ld CIT(A) for these two years. 18 The facts in the remaining years are identical, therefore, in view of the reasoning discussed above, we confirm the orders of the ld CIT(A) for the remaining years also.” 4. Since the decision of the CIT(A) is in accord with the order of the Tribunal in the assessee’s own case for earlier years (supra), we find no justification to interfere. 5. The appeal of the Revenue is accordingly dismissed. Respectfully following the decisions of the Coordinate Benches in earlier years, we reject the ground of the Revenue. 8. In the result, the assessee’s appeal is allowed for statistical purposes and Revenue’s appeal is dismissed. 9. Order pronounced in the open court on 28th January 2011.
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2011 (1) TMI 1515
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... ... ..... Conciliation Act, 1996, provides that the mandate of the Arbitrator shall terminate if he withdraws from his office or he becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform the functions or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay. Sub-section (2) of Section 15 provides that where the mandate of an arbitrator is terminated, a substitute Arbitrator shall be appointed according to the Rules that were applicable to the appointment of the Arbitrator being replaced. In the circumstances, there is no merit in this ground of defense that is urged on behalf of the Respondent. 19. For the reasons indicated earlier, and having regard to the serious triable issues that would arise as between the parties on the allegations of fraud which have been leveled in the suit, it is not possible to accept the prayer that is made before the Court in the Application under Section 11. The Arbitration Application shall, in the circumstances, stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2011 (1) TMI 1514
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... ... ..... ithin any of the several heads of exemption. If it fell within any one head of exemption, it would be free from tax notwithstanding that the conditions of another head of exemption are not satisfied and such income is not free from tax under that head of exemption.” Emphasis supplied 9.It can be seen from the above reproduced ratio of the Hon ble High Court, each limb of the definition can be considered as independent eligible for exemption. If that be so, in the factual matrix of this case, as narrated hereinabove, as the said services were, directly or indirectly, used for the purpose of their business, credit cannot be denied. Accordingly, impugned order is set aside and appeal is allowed with consequential relief. 10.Since I decided the issue on merits, I am not recording any finding on the submissions made by the appellant as the lower authorities have decided the issue beyond the allegations raised in the show-cause notice. (Pronounced and dictated in open court)
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2011 (1) TMI 1513
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... ... ..... which are not binding contracts, if the injunction was not granted. Here too, denial of relief would prejudice the Plaintiff in a similar manner, because the trustee Defendants, who have no discernable interest in the properties can secure orders for its ostensible administration or preservation, and charge the estate with costs that can be crippling on it, and effectively dissipate it. Further, the Plaintiff's interest in the estate will also be jeopardized since the trustee Defendants wish to use the assets of the estate of which he is a beneficiary, to cover their costs of litigation. 33. In view of the above, this Court is of opinion that these issues are to be answered in favour of the Plaintiff, and against the Defendants. Accordingly, the suit has to succeed, in terms of the reliefs claimed, the permanent injunctions sought by the Plaintiff shall therefore, issue against the Defendants. The suit is decreed in such terms, with costs payable by the ninth Defendant.
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2011 (1) TMI 1512
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... ... ..... rightly held that sec. 41(1) could not be applied. 16. We have carefully considered the rival submissions in the light of material placed before us. The AO has added the said sum to the income of the assessee only on the ground that the said liability was outstanding in the books of the assessee for more than three years. These creditors have not been written off in the books of the assessee. It has not been shown by the revenue that whether there was any remission or cessation of the liability or any benefit has accrued to the assessee on account of these creditors. Therefore, we are of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the order of CIT(A), vide which the impugned addition has been deleted. These grounds of the revenue are dismissed. 17. In the result, appeal of the revenue for A.Y. 2006-07 is allowed for statistical purposes and appeal for A.Y. 2007-08 is partly allowed for statistical purposes in the manner aforesaid. Order pronounced in the Open Court on 14.1.11.
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2011 (1) TMI 1511
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... ... ..... ules are unconstitutional. Therefore, the argument advanced by the petitioner fails. The argument advanced by the learned Standing Counsel for Revenue is well founded and the same is accepted. If there are frequent tax audits and arbitrary action by the subordinate officers with a view to harass the individual dealers or class or dealer, the same should be brought to the notice of the Commissioner. 8. In view of the contention raised by the learned Standing Counsel for Revenue, Annexure-1 is liable to be quashed. 9. In the fact and circumstances of the case, we direct to conduct assessment proceeding by issuing fresh notice of hearing. The assessment notice may be issued by the officer who has not conducted the tax audit. 10. All other factual aspects are open for the petitioner-dealer to reflect in the reply to the show cause, which shall be considered by the assessing authority. Free copy of this order be supplied to the learned Standing Counsel. Writ petition disposed of.
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2011 (1) TMI 1510
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... ... ..... ght to tax once again in the block assessment. We have already held that the addition in the regular assessment cannot be called a protective addition. When once an amount is assessed in a regular assessment u/s 143(3)/144, no addition can be made of the same amount in the block assessment. Thus we agree with the contention of the assessee and delete the addition made, on the issue of accommodation bills of advertisements, in the block assessment. 29. In the result, the appeal of the assessee in IT(SS)A.No. 24/Mum/2009 is allowed. 30. Now coming to ITA No. 5102/Mum/2006 which is a regular assessment for the assessment year 2002-03, in view of the statement made by the assessee’s counsel at the bar, we confirm the addition of R.80,73,120/- in the regular assessment for the assessment year 2002-03 and dismiss this appeal. 31. In the result, IT(SS)A.No. 24/Mum/2009 is allowed and ITA No. 5102/Mum/2006 stands dismissed. Order pronounced in the open court on 7th Jan., 2011.
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2011 (1) TMI 1509
Maintainability of LPA against a judgment or order passed in exercise of “criminal jurisdiction” - Held that:- Both the sides are ad idem that when the writ petition is filed invoking original jurisdiction of this Court, LPA would be maintainable against the order passed by the Single Judge in such a writ petition. However, the parties have joined issues on the question as to whether writ petition filed for quashing the FIR should be treated as invoking criminal jurisdiction of this Court. Whereas Ajay Fotedar (2005 (7) TMI 688 - DELHI HIGH COURT ) suggests that such writ petition would be treated as invoking the criminal jurisdiction and LPA would not be maintainable, some of the observations made in Harwinder Singh (1994 (3) TMI 391 - DELHI HIGH COURT ) suggests otherwise. In view of this, we are of the opinion that the matter needs to be referred to the Full Bench to resolve this issue.
Accordingly, we make following reference for consideration by the Full Bench:-
“Whether the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing a FIR amount to invoking “original jurisdiction” or these proceedings are to be treated as invoking “criminal jurisdiction?”
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2011 (1) TMI 1508
Refund claim - deemed exports/physical exports - Held that:- There is no merit in the petition - the special leave petition is dismissed.
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