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Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 235 Records
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1983 (8) TMI 136 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... the basis of available material nothing prevents the department in coming to right conclusion for the purpose of establishing that the assessee was a benami concern of Jagdamba Textiles. The onus was squarely on the ITO who observed that it was so. Similarly, the onus was squarely on the ITO to prove that the assessee was maintaining duplicate set of accounts books and vouchers. No positive evidence has been brought on record by the authorities below excepts the conjectures and surmises on the basis of certain discrepancies noted in the books of accounts. It is not the case of revenue that the assessee was maintaining vouchers over and above the ones which had already been impounded, which had not been produced with reference to the impounded books. In view, of the above discussion, we hold that the orders of the authorities below are based on conjectures and surmises, and deserve to be cancelled. Orders of the authorities below are therefore annulled. The appeal is allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 134 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... een made. He, therefore, contended that there is no justification for not accepting the partial partition by the authorities below. The ld. departmental representative on the other hand has supported the order of the authorities below and had strongly relied upon the provisions contained in Art. 228A of Mulla rsquo s Hindu Law. No other argument were advanced. 5. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. We are quite in agreement with Shri Ranka that so far as the partial partition of the funds of the bigger HUF is concerned, the same has been made. What character such refund will have in the hands of the recipient is not the subject matter of the present appeal. That issue will be determined in the hands of the recipients whether as individual or small HUF. In such circumstances, we hold that there was partial partition of amount of Rs. 20,000. The orders of the authorities below are, therefore, reversed. The ITO is directed to allow the cliam of partial partition.
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1983 (8) TMI 133 - ITAT JABALPUR
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... ... ..... ound is, therefore, allowed. 3. Closely allied to this ground is ground No. 3, in which it has been alleged that s. 139 (8) is discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 of the constitution of India. However, in view of the fact that we have already allowed the ground on merits, it is no longer necessary to express any opinion on this ground. It may, however, be pointed out that it is not for this Tribunal, which is a creation of the IT Act to strike down any provision of the Act itself. 4. The last ground relates to the assessee rsquo s claim for interest u/s 214. In fact, there is no adjudication on this issue of the assessee rsquo s claim by the authorities below, because the claim for interest u/s 214 was not made before the ITO, nor was it specifically raised in the grounds of appeal before the AAC. Therefore, we do not propose to go into the matter, since the question does not arise from any of the orders of the authorities below. 5. The appeal is partly allowed, as above.
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1983 (8) TMI 132 - ITAT JABALPUR
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... ... ..... ration. Again in ITO vs. Vinod Krishna Som Prakash (1979) 117 ITR 594 (All), it has been held that an order passed by the ITO refusing to condone the delay in an application for renewal of registration of a firm is appealable u/s 246(j), since it amounts to refusal to grant registration. Same is the vast view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CIT vs. Beri Chemical Industries (1980) 14 CTR (P and H) 144 (1980) 121 ITR 87 (P and H). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the AAC was wrong in holding that he could not entertain an appeal against the order of the ITO refusing to grant registration to the assessee. Since the ITO has not expressed any opinion on merits on the assessee rsquo s right to registration, we restore the matter back to his file for a fresh order allowing or refusing registration on the merits of the case, after giving opportunity of being heard to the assessee. 3. For statistical purpose, the appeal shall be deemed to have been allowed as such.
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1983 (8) TMI 131 - ITAT JABALPUR
Penalty For Late Filing Of Return ... ... ... ... ..... Rs. 1,855. Therefore, it was not liable to pay any tax and, consequently, no penalty could be levied. It was held affirming the decision of the Tribunal that section 271(2) was not attracted to the case of the assessee-firm and the levy of penalty on the assessee was not valid. The same view has been taken by the Amritsar Bench of the Tribunal in ITO v. Sethi Industries 1981 11 TTJ 208. It is also borne out by the wordings used in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 271, in which it has been mentioned that the penalty shall be in addition to the amount of tax, if any, payable by him, be calculated at 2 per cent of the assessed tax (sic) and this assessed tax means the tax as reduced by the sum, if any, deducted at source under Chapter XVII-B or paid in advance under Chapter XVII-C. In the present case, the assessee actually got a refund. So, there was no question of any tax payable and no penalty could be levied. Accordingly, we accept the appeal and delete the penalty.
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1983 (8) TMI 130 - ITAT JABALPUR
Minor Child, Share Income ... ... ... ... ..... he benefits of partnership in a firm. If anybody has to be a partner of the firm in his capacity as the karta of the HUF, it would be the major member of the family, who would be nobody else than the assessee herself, inasmuch as the family is said to have consisted of, only the assessee and her two minor sons. In these circumstances, we fail to see as to how the assessee can get out of the provisions of section 64(1)(iii) by merely saying that instead of her being a partner, the minor shall be deemed to be a partner in his capacity as the karta of the HUF, because a karta has to act on behalf of the family and his actions necessarily involve entry into contracts, which the minor legally cannot do. Considering all this position of law, we are of the opinion that the deletion of the share income of profits on the assessment of the present assessee by the AAC was not justified in law. 5. We, accordingly, accept the appeal, quash the order of the AAC and restore that of the ITO.
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1983 (8) TMI 129 - ITAT INDORE
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... ... ..... laid down u/s 80RRA. The only lacuna in this case is that the assessee could not produce the certificate from the prescribed authority. Mere non-production of the certificate, in our opinion, will not disentitle the assessee for claiming deduction u/s 80RRA as that is only procedural. As mentioned by the Author in the 4th Edition Interpretation of Statutes and General Clauses Act, 1965, under the head Rule of Construction , we are of the opinion that the procedure provided in a statute for enforcement of substantive rights conferred thereby should be construed as far as possible so as to give effect to and not to nullify those rights. On appreciation of facts and the material on record, we are of the opinion that the assessee has fulfilled all the requirements laid down in s. 80RRA and the lower authorities are not justified in disallowing the claim of the assessee. The claim made by the assessee is, therefore, allowed. 7. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 128 - ITAT INDORE
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... ... ..... with regard to the amount advanced which fact has not been taken into consideration by the AAC. Further it is seen from the orders of the ITO as well as AAC that the statement of account of Shri Sureshchand Sadashivrao Sakorikar in the books of the assessee, giving the details of payment of interest to the creditor, has not at all been considered by the lower authorities. From the aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that the test laid down by the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Shankar Industries vs. CIT (1978) 114 ITR 689 (Cal) namely, the identity of the creditor, the capacity of the creditor to advance the money and the genuineness of the transaction, have been fully satisfied. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the addition of Rs. 17,000 was wrongly made by the ITO and sustained by the AAC as income of the assessee from undisclosed sources The aforesaid addition is, therefore, deleted. 8. In the result, he appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 127 - ITAT INDORE
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... ... ..... essee must be taken to be the standard rent of the house determinable under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. In the cases under consideration before us, from the orders of the AAC it is quite clear that the AAC has determined the value of the perquisite on the basis of the actual rent and not with reference to the standard rent. If we apply the proposition of law laid down in the aforesaid cases of the Supreme Court, the value of the building should be arrived at on the basis of Annual Letting Value given in the Municipal Records at Rs. 19,440. If that be the value the portion of the building occupied by P.S. Kalani and B.N. Kalani will be much less than the value given by them in their returns. We, therefore, respectfully following the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court allow the claim of the assessee rsquo s and the appeals filed by the assessee rsquo s on this accounts are, therefore, allowed. 14. In the result, the appeals of the assessee rsquo s are allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 126 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
Best Judgment Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... iated or that there was no valid proceeding pending before the ITO. Hence, perusal of these citations on behalf of the assessee shows that none of these decisions are of any assistance to the taxpayers in this case as they rest on facts which are clearly distinguishable. In fact, these decisions merely serve to buttres our conclusion that there could be no bar against a direction to make a fresh assessment in a case where the ITO had validly assumed jurisdiction. 5. It is under these circumstances that even after hearing the learned counsel for the taxpayers at great length, we are not convinced that there was anything wrong with the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) in setting the assessments which were illegal with a direction to make a fresh assessment, which as stated earlier, has to be in accordance with law. We are not prepared to presume that such assessment, if made, will be made contrary to law at this stage. 6. Under these circumstances, the appeals are dismissed.
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1983 (8) TMI 125 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
Partnership Deed ... ... ... ... ..... e ITO had failed to issue notice to the assessee before refusal of registration under section 185(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. This sub-section clearly contemplates an opportunity to the taxpayer to remedy any defect in the declaration or the claim. Even if we had agreed with the contention of the authorities, we would have still felt that the ITO should have given an opportunity to the taxpayer so that the assessee could make appropriate entries closing accounts a day earlier so as to satisfy the requirement of the ITO. Since we do not find violation to be material, we are not remitting the matter back to the ITO. Since the genuineness of the firm is not doubted and the firm has been registered for a subsequent assessment year, there is no justification on the part of the authorities below in refusing to grant registration for the year under consideration. 4. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the ITO is directed to register the firm for the assessment year 1979-80.
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1983 (8) TMI 124 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
In Part, Net Wealth, Share In Firm ... ... ... ... ..... out branding. But even these much less than formerly (sic). Before industrialisation, there were, of course, instances of traders or trader-groups who deployed marks of various kinds to distinguish their products. The hallmarks of goldsmiths and silversmiths and the marks of Sheffield cutters, are English examples which have survived as distinct systems. But the demand for general legal protection against unfair imitation of marks and names is a product of the commercial revolution that followed upon factory production and the growth of canals and railways. That demand has swelled immensely with the development of modern advertising and large scale retailing. Most advertising teaches the consumer to buy bye-product mark or house name and it keeps reiterating its message in the hope of stopping buyers from defecting to rivals. Trade marks and names have become nothing more nor less than the fundament of most market place competition. 19. The result is, the appeals are allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 123 - ITAT HYDERABAD-A
Industrial Undertaking, Profits And Gains ... ... ... ... ..... he ITO under his orders dated 27-2-1978, the assessee is not entitled to any higher relief. We heard these contentions. 11. It is brought to our notice by the assessee s counsel that the retrospective amendment inserting sub-section (1A) in section 80J is not under challenge before the Supreme Court which also granted stay in several cases. In all such cases, we have been taking the course which has been approved by the Gujarat High Court, viz., to set aside the order of the first appellate authority and restore the matter to his file for a fresh decision regarding unadjusted 80J relief for the assessment years 1968-69 to 1972-73 in accordance with the pronouncement which the Supreme Court may render in the matter. The decision of the Gujarat High Court which we followed in this context is the one rendered in CIT v. Surat District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. IT Application No. 81 of 1982, dated 28-3-1983 . 12. Therefore, in the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 122 - ITAT GAUHATI
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... ... ..... was right in allowing the claim of the accountable person to that extent. The whole of the amount of Rs. 10,750 payable as gift was not deductible under s. 50A, as this section refers to the gift tax paid, and not to gift tax payable in respect of a gift. 9. In the case of CED vs. K. Lingamurti, it was held that the amount of deduction from the estate duty which is allowed in respect of gift tax under s. 50A of the ED Act is the whole of the amount assessed and paid as gift tax under the GT Act and not that amount less 10 for which credit is given to the donor under s. 18 of the GT Act. This authority, in our opinion, does not help the case sought to be made out on behalf of the accountable person. In view of what has been stated above, we are firmly of the opinion that the Appellate CED was not justified in allowing deduction of the whole of the amount of Rs. 10,750. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Appellate CED and restore that of the Asst. CED.
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1983 (8) TMI 121 - ITAT GAUHATI
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... ... ..... was right in allowing the claim of the accountable person to that extent. The whole of the amount of Rs. 10,750 payable as gift was not deductible under s. 50A, as this section refers to the gift tax paid, and not to gift tax payable in respect of a gift. 9. In the case of CED vs. K. Lingamurti, it was held that the amount of deduction from the estate duty which is allowed in respect of gift tax under s. 50A of the ED Act is the whole of the amount assessed and paid as gift tax under the GT Act and not that amount less 10 for which credit is given to the donor under s. 18 of the GT Act. This authority, in our opinion, does not help the case sought to be made out on behalf of the accountable person. In view of what has been stated above, we are firmly of the opinion that the Appellate CED was not justified in allowing deduction of the whole of the amount of Rs. 10,750. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Appellate CED and restore that of the Asst. CED.
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1983 (8) TMI 120 - ITAT GAUHATI
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... ... ..... rters are at Gauhati, but the work site where the contract work had to be executed lay at a distance of 80/100 miles away from Gauhati, and that for this reason compilation of accounts took time. It was also pointed out on behalf of the assessee that notice under/s. 139 (2) was served upon it on 31st Aug. 1976 and that the second application for extension of time was moved within one month of the service of the notice. Having regard to the totality and facts and circumstances of the case, we are clearly of the view that the assessee fully succeeded in making out a reasonable cause for its failure to file its return of income upto 31st March, 1977. As the return was filed on 29th April, 1977 the default was for a period of less than a month. In this view of the matter we conclude that imposition of penalty in this case was wholly unjustified, and therefore, the AAC was right in cancelling the penalty. 8. In the result, we find no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed.
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1983 (8) TMI 119 - ITAT GAUHATI
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... ... ..... of which the assessee was in default within the meaning of s. 221 (1) amounted to only Rs. 148. It cannot therefore, be disputed that the tax imposed by the ITO was in excess of the limit prescribed under s. 221 (1). We, however, do not feel impressed by the arguments advanced on behalf of the assessee that since the penalty imposed by the ITO was in excess of the limit prescribed under s. 221 (1). The whole penalty order was illegal and void. The ITO had the jurisdiction to impose penalty upto the limit prescribed under s. 221 (1), as the assessee was in default in respect of the tax amounting to Rs. 148. The order of penalty passed by the ITO imposing penalty in excess of the limit prescribed under the law no doubt is illegal and liable to be set aside. 7. In our opinion, the ends of justice would be served by restricting the penalty to Rs. 148 upon the assessee. The penalty order passed by the ITO is modified accordingly. 8. In the result, the appeal stands partly allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 118 - ITAT GAUHATI
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... ... ..... to the conclusion that the assessee had a reasonable cause to show in respect of the proposed penalty under s. 2781 (1) (a). It was held that if the delay was explained reasonably, and that could be accepted in respect of one provisions of the Act, the same explanation should hold good for proceedings under other section as will. On this ground the order of the CIT sustaining the levy of interest under/s. 139 (8) was set aside and the matter was remanded to the CIT to examine the case of the assessee for relief in so far as it related to the levy of interest. 10. The facts of the present case are entirely different. No penalty proceeding was initiated against the assessee. It cannot, therefore, by said that any cause was shown by the assessee in connection with the proposed penalty, and that the cause was accepted as reasonable. 11. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the appellate order passed by the AAC, and restore that of the ITO passed under/s. 154.
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1983 (8) TMI 117 - ITAT DELHI-D
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... ... ..... hat the valuation of stock worked out year after year by the appellant on the basis of cost price needs no disturbance. Addition of Rs. 12,022 made by the ITO is uncalled for and is deleted. It is contended before us that the Commissioner (Appeals) was not justified in disturbing the addition. The learned counsel for the assessee, on the other hand, submitted that the closing stock had been properly valued because there was a variety of bricks like first class, second class and third class, and no valuation of the closing stock of different stocks could be made on a uniform basis. 9. After hearing both the parties, we are of the view that the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) calls for no interference because we agree with him on his approach as also the way he has decided because he has taken a very pragmatic view of the matter. The order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is confirmed on this issue. 10. The departmental appeal is dismissed and the assessee s appeal is allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 116 - ITAT DELHI-D
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... ... ..... essee has not been held to be the owner. Therefore, a situation emerges where entire gold was liable to be confiscated the moment it was seized and, therefore, nothing remained with the assessee, the value of which can be included in his wealth-tax assessment. We may also mention here that nothing further has been done nor any material brought on record to take a view different from the one taken by the Collector of customs even though the Tribunal remanded the matter as early as on3-8-1982in the income-tax proceedings. We may also mention that when Collector of customs, who is competent authority to decide the ownership of the property and the same has not been challenged so far, it is proper and fair to accept that finding especially when there is no other evidence except the evidence before the Collector of customs. 7. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we are unable to accept the appeal of the revenue. Accordingly, the order of the AAC is upheld and the appeal is dismissed.
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