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1988 (10) TMI 61 - ITAT BANGALORE
Assessment Year, Capital Gains, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... an be distinguished from that of the Andhra Pradesh case. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. B.C. Srinivasa Setty 1981 128 ITR 294 has not given a total carte-blanche exemption from capital gains in respect of assets where the cost cannot be found out. At page 300 they have observed What is contemplated is an asset in the acquisition of which it is possible to envisage a cost. The intent goes to the nature and character of the asset, that it is an asset which possesses the inherent quality of being available on the expenditure of money to a person seeking to acquire it. If the above principles are applied it will be seen that even in respect of calves born in the dairy, capital gains can be levied. It is an asset which possesses the inherent quality of being available on the expenditure of money to a person seeking to acquire it. Therefore, we hold that the assessee is not entitled to any relief on this point also. 13. In the result, the appeal stands dismissed.
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1988 (10) TMI 60 - ITAT BANGALORE
Assessment Year ... ... ... ... ..... received by a sportsman who is not a professional will not be liable to tax. As we have pointed out, cricket was not the profession of the assessee, but only a vocation. 9. It may be apposite to refer to the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. M. Balamuralikrishna 1988 171 ITR 447 wherein it is held that amounts received from admirers and fans of a musician in appreciation of his services rendered as a musician are not his taxable income. It has been held that the payment has no nexus to the profession. Here, the assessee was a professional musician. 10. The case of the assessee before us is on a better footing. He is not a professional cricketer. The amounts were given to him by the admirers or lovers of cricket in token of their appreciation of the qualities possessed by the assessee as a cricketer. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the amount of Rs. 4,75,000 received abroad is not includible in the taxable income. 11. The appeal is allowed.
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1988 (10) TMI 59 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
... ... ... ... ..... the opinion of my learned brother. However, I would like to add a few words. 26. The affidavits merely express certain opinions and do not assert any particular fact which they are expected to do. Secondly they refer specifically to the situation of the shops which implies reference to salami and not to goodwill . Thirdly the deponents are laymen who do not draw a distinction between goodwill of the business and salami of the shop and, therefore, their use of the term goodwill only means salami in this case. Fourthly the affidavits are of the year 1984 and, therefore, at best they speak of the price of the shop in the year 1984 and not in 1980 when the sale took place. 27. Lastly, most important of all, the agreements are between the parties concerned. Their language shows that they have been drafted by lawyers. They must be taken to express fully the intention of the parties and, therefore, no external evidence for adding to the contents of the agreements can be considered.
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1988 (10) TMI 58 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
... ... ... ... ..... e position in the present case, then certainly he may reject the explanation offered by the assessee on the ground of the same failing to come upto his satisfaction. 6.15. On the discussion made above we are led to conclude that the ITO had successfully discharged the burden shifted to him under s. 68 of the Act. The explanation offered by the assessee about the nature and source of the two cash credits was not at all satisfactory and has been rightly rejected by the authorities below. 7. Interest under s. 217 of the Act The assessee alleged to have challenged the charge of interest under s. 217 amounting to Rs. 980. The order under appeal does not refer to this point and thus this issue does not arise out of the order under appeal. This ground is therefore, rejected leaving an option to the assessee to reagitate the same before the CIT(A) under s. 154, if so advised. 8. In the result this appeal partly succeeds and is allowed accordingly to the extent indicated hereinabove.
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1988 (10) TMI 57 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
... ... ... ... ..... h/Cheque No. 0335554 dt. 7th Oct., 1983 drawn on Bank of India, New Cloth Market, Ahmedabad, as Donation to the Gujarat Cricket Association. It is absolutely clear that the payment in question is a donation to the Gujarat Cricket Association for the purposes of constructing the Cricket Stadium at Motera. The ITO has very fairly allowed the necessary deduction under s. 80G of the IT Act, 1961. The assessee on the other hand has tried to claim the entire amount of expenditure as a deduction under the guise of staff welfare . The relevant documents on the paper book to which we have referred do not help the assessee to camouflage the actual nature of the payment which is a donation and nothing else. It accordingly cannot be considered for deduction under s. 37. 14. In the view that we have taken we do not consider it necessary to discuss the various authorities cited at the Bar. In the final analysis we confirm the order of the CIT(A). 15. In the result the appeal is dismissed.
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1988 (10) TMI 56 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
... ... ... ... ..... would, however, give a reasonable opportunity to both the parties before doing so. 18. In respect of asst. yr. 1982-83, the only ground which has been raised is whether the receipts on account of the Leproscopic instrument amounting to Rs. 46,557 are taxable in the hands of the HUF on a substantive basis. The AAC following his decision for asst. yr. 1981-82, held that the protective assessment became a substantive one. In view of the detailed reasons recorded by us in the appeal pertaining to asst. yr. 1982-83, we confirm the order of the AAC. Before we part with this appeal, we would like to mention that the AAC allowed the assessee s claim on account of revenue expenditure to the tune of Rs. 19,805. The Revenue has not come up in appeal against this action of the AAC although it chose to do so in asst. yr. 1981-82. 19. In the result, the appeal for asst. yr. 1981-82 is treated as partly allowed for statistical purposes whereas the appeal for asst. yr. 1982-83 is dismissed.
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1988 (10) TMI 55 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
... ... ... ... ..... port facilities at Visnagar. This shows that lack of knowledge on the part of the ITO. Visnagar is a town connected by Railway and Roads on all sides. Hence addition of Rs. 10,000 may be deleted. In my view, the personal user cannot be totally eleminated. The ITO, should, therefore, disallow 1/4th of the Jeep Car expenses for personal use of the partners. This ground of appeal is partly allowed. 20. After hearing the partners we do not find any good ground to interfere with the decision of the CIT(A). There is no doubt that the disallowance in the past had been effect at 1/3rd of the total claim but the CIT(A) in restricting the same to 1/4th has recorded detailed and cogent reasons entailing a departure from the past. There have been no appreciable arguments advanced on behalf of the Revenue other than supporting the order of the ITO to enable us to take a different view. The second ground in the Revenue s appeal is also rejected. 21. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1988 (10) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Writ jurisdiction - Availability of alternate remedy ... ... ... ... ..... oes not mean that we must confirm it, ignoring all the above aspects of the matter. 7. Coming to the merits as well, as rightly pointed out by the learned single Judge in W. P. No. 6738 of 1981, under similar circumstances, the levy of penalty was upheld. No doubt, the said judgment is under appeal. Nevertheless, that is a prima facie ground to vacate the interim injunction. Again in Everest (I) Pvt. Ltd. v.Assistant Collector (Col.) -1986 (24) E.L.T. 469 (Cal.) 1986 Excise and Customs Cases, Vol. 9 131 , the learned Single Judge upheld the validity of levy of penalty under Section 116 of the Act. For all these reasons, we vacate the interim injunction. 8. After we dictated the order, an oral prayer was made for leave to appeal to Supreme Court. We do not think this is a fit case, involving any substantial question of law, for grant of leave, because we have merely relied on the provisions of the Customs Act. 9. In the result, C.M.P. No. 15166 of 1987 is dismissed. No costs.
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1988 (10) TMI 53 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Appeal - Writ jurisdiction - Prima facie case made out - Adjudication - Jurisdiction - Evasion of excise duty - Issuance of show cause notice - Demand - Short-levy
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1988 (10) TMI 52 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Writ Petition - Exemption to paper if used for educational purposes - Adjudication - Demand - Estoppel
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1988 (10) TMI 51 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Additional duty of Customs - Not in the nature of countervailing duty - Interpretation of fiscal law
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1988 (10) TMI 50 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Legislation - Drug trafficking - Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... who has no territorial roots in the State of Maharashtra is never to be accepted as a surety. But one has to be very careful before doing so because in the event of the accused persons jumping bail, it is rather difficult to recover large amount of money as arrears of land revenue from a person whose wealth lies outside the State of Maharashtra. Therefore, technically speaking, there is nothing wrong or illegal in accepting a person from outside the State of Maharashtra as a surety for an accused person in Bombay but prudence, propriety and the reality of judicial life do indicate that it is rather unsafe, risky and unwise to do so. Therefore, I do not think that the order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate accepting Mukesh Chhotalal Shah as a surety for the two accused persons in sum of rupees four lakhs was proper, although it may be legal. 19. Atul and Kirti are already out on bail. I am told that they are present in this Court. They are ordered to be taken in custody.
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1988 (10) TMI 49 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Promissory estoppel - Doctrine of ... ... ... ... ..... the other does not on them - he will not be allowed to go back on what he has said or done when it would be unjust or inequitable for him to do so.. 16. Viewed from any angle the order of the learned single Judge cannot be assailed. We are not able to support and appreciate the arguments of the learned counsel for appellants that the principle of promissory estoppel will not apply to the facts of this case, because the notification issued under Rule 8 itself has to be taken as a piece of legislation in other words a legislative action. 17. It may be seen the judgment of Supreme Court in Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Limited (A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 806) also arose out of a notification issued under Rule 8 under the Central Excises and Salt Act the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applied to the facts of that case. 18. For the reasons stated above, we dismissed the appeal, affirming the order of a single Judge. However, there will be no order as to costs. Leave refused.
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1988 (10) TMI 48 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Writ jurisdiction - Peanuts ... ... ... ... ..... r the order of this Court in W.M.P. No. 4686 to 4689 of 1984, the amounts of export duty collected from the petitioners have been directed to be refunded to them subject to the condition that the petitioner in each of the writ petitions furnishes bank guarantee for 60 of the amount to be refunded and for the balance of 40 on the petitioner in each of the petitions executing a personal bond to the satisfaction of the second respondent - Assistant Collector of Customs. The petitioners have accordingly given bank guarantees, executed personal bonds and got back the amounts of export duty paid by them. Hence these bank guarantees and personal bonds have to be cancelled. 11. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed the impugned orders dated 30-1-1982,29-10-1983,7-12-1982 and 18-12-1982 respectively are quashed and the bank guarantees and personal bonds executed by the petitioners in all these writ petitions shall stand cancelled. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1988 (10) TMI 47 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Writ jurisdiction - Reward/Award Scheme ... ... ... ... ..... oner referred to various decisions to contend, with his characteristic eloquence and emphasis, that this Court could interfere with the notice Ext. P 31 and the proceedings initialed thereunder in these proceedings under Article 226.I cannot and I do not demur to the proposition - that this Court s powers under Article 226 are wide enough to quash Ext P 31 if grounds exist. But the question whether such grounds do exist is a matter which requires investigation into questions of fact which is best done by a fact finding authority like the first respondent. It is not as if the petitioner is on a fortiori case where the facts slated at once lead to an inference of mala fides or lack of jurisdiction or such like grounds. 8. Therefore, I decline to entertain this original petition. I leave open the various questions raised by the petitioner for being agitated before the first respondent. The Original Petition is dismissed in limine. Order on C.M.P. No. 23321 of 1988. - Dismissed.
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1988 (10) TMI 46 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Recovery - Attachment of goods ... ... ... ... ..... ral Excise finding the demand to be standing against the petitioner went on to execute the assessment memorandum and thereby caused the attachment. 3. Mrs. Archana Wadhwa, advocate appearing for the petitioner has contended that the amount sought to be recovered under notice Annexure P-3 is the same amount which has been sought to be adjudicated upon vide Annexure P-1. Even if it is so, as long as the assessment memorandum stays, the respondents are entitled to recover the amount in question from the petitioner. As we read the notices, the question of penalty is of a paramount importance in notice Annexure P-1 and it had to be based on the suggested evasion of duty. In any case, this matter can be properly thrashed upon before the Customs and Central Excise authorities. We at our end find the attachment as proper. 4. For the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss the petition at this stage itself. The petitioner shall pay the costs to the respondents which are assessed at Rs. 2.000/-.
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1988 (10) TMI 45 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
'Goods manufactured or produced' ... ... ... ... ..... ...... , and it is now well accepted that excise duty is an indirect tax, in which the burden of the imposition is passed on to the ultimate consumer. In that context, the expression goods manufactured or produced must refer to articles which are capable of being sold to a consumer. In Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills - 1963 Supp. 1 S.C.R. 586 1977 E.L.T. (J 199), this Court considered the meaning of the expression goods for the purposes of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and observed that to become goods an article must be something which can ordinarily come to the market to be brought and sold , a definition which was reiterated by this Court in South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd., etc. v. Union of India and Ors. - (1968) 3 S.C.R. 21 1978 E.L.T. J 336 (S.C.). 3. In the light of the above, the learned single Judge was, by his judgment and order dated 30th July, 1988, perfectly correct in allowing the writ petition and making the Rule absolute. 4. Appeal dismissed
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1988 (10) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Manufacture - Branding & labelling of biris ... ... ... ... ..... as may be specified. 17. Though much might be said in favour of the respondents, on the two technical objections raised by them, namely, that the petitioner is guilty of laches and if refund is ordered at this distance of time, it would result in unjust enrichment of the petitioner, it is not necessary to go into the details of these two contentions since it has already been held that the petitioner s contentions that no manufacturing process is involved in affixing the brand labels to the biris or to the wrapper within which biris are bundled as well as the contention of the validity of the proviso to Notification Nos. 19/75 and 32/79 are held not acceptable for the reasons already stated above. 18. Consequently W.P. Nos. 3863 of 1982, 6912 of 1982, 6929 of 1982, 6930 of 1982,6931 of 1982 and 7834 of 1983 are dismissed. No costs. 19. W.P. Nos. 1504 and 1706 of 1982 The learned Counsel for the Petitioner is not pressing these petitions and they are also dismissed. No costs.
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1988 (10) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
Whether rectangular products of thickness less than 3.0 mm and of width less than 75 mm conform to the definition of Hoops and merit classification under item (ii) of Tariff Item 26AA attracting effective rate of duty of ₹ 450/- per MT less the reduction provided for under Notification No. 55/80, dated 13th May, 1980.?
Held that:- The Tribunal was correct in allowing the appeals and held that the flat product of thickness less than 3.00 mm and a width of less than 75 mm is classifiable as bars as claimed by the respondents herein and not as hoops as held by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise and upheld by the Appellate Collector of Central Excise. In allowing the appeals, the Tribunal referred to U.S. Steel Publications (The shaping and treating of Steel) & came to the conclusion that it will be more appropriate to assess them under Section 26AA(ia) than Section 26AA(ii). Appeal dismissed.
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1988 (10) TMI 42 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR
Appellate Order ... ... ... ... ..... pplication for refund of the amount was made in the year 1984. The aforesaid amount was not refunded. As such the petitioner has suffered loss of interest. 4. In this connection, in our opinion, it would be proper to award interest from the date of filing of the writ petition 12 per annum. 5. This writ petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to refund the amount of Excise Duty amounting to Rs. 20,39,139.48 together with interest thereon 12 per annum with effect from 5-10-1987. The petitioner is further agreeable to furnish Bank Guarantee. Accordingly, it is further ordered that the aforesaid amount shall be paid to the petitioner on its furnishing a Bank Guarantee in respect of the amount and in case, the respondents succeed in appeal before the Tribunal, payment of the aforesaid amount of guarantee shall be made immediately. Two months time is granted to the respondents for making payment to the petitioner as above. 6. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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