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Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 161 Records
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1976 (3) TMI 41 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Agricultural Land, Capital Asset, Capital Gains, Land Whether Agricultural ... ... ... ... ..... s prepared to pay a high price does not mean that it is not an agricultural land at the relevant date and the factor which has been emphasized by Mr. Kaji about the price realised being out of all proportion to the value of the land as agricultural land is not a factor which would dislodge the presumption flowing from the actual user of this land as agricultural land. The land had undoubtedly potential, non-agricultural value and for that potential non-agricultural value, the purchaser was prepared to pay a large price but such potential non-agricultural value does not detract from the character of the land as agricultural land at the date of the sale. Under these, circumstances, in our opinion, the Tribunal was right in holding that the land in question was agricultural land. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The. Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1976 (3) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Registered Firm, Unregistered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... ing contemplated by section 271(2) only when the tax is assessed in the hands of the registered firm as if it were an unregistered firm, and, on that, the penalty is calculated as provided in section 271(1). Further, section 271(2) would be rendered nugatory if this contention were to be accepted. The very object of section 271(2) is to treat a registered firm on a par with any other assessee, with reference to the penalty, once it commits default, notwithstanding the privilege it enjoys with regard to the quantum of tax payable by it. If the argument of learned counsel on the meaning of section 271(2) is to be accepted, section 271(2) will be really otiose and superfluous, because the result contended for by the learned counsel will flow from section 271(1) itself. In view of this clear and self-evident legal position, there is no need to refer the question for any further decision. Hence, the petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1976 (3) TMI 39 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... supporting material for the stand that the amount had come from the source of the declarant. It is true that at the assessment stage this explanation has not been accepted and there is force in the contention of learned standing counsel that the order of assessment is a piece of evidence while dealing with the penalty matter. We are, however, not in a position to agree with learned standing counsel that the Tribunal can be found fault with for having relied upon the facts stated in the declaration for absolving the assessee from liability of penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. Material aspects have been taken into consideration and the law has been kept in view and the conclusion on a question of fact has been reached. Possibly, another forum of fact may have taken a different view, but it is settled beyond doubt now that such a position does not give rise to a question of law. We, accordingly, reject the application, but make no direction for costs. DAS J.--I agree.
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1976 (3) TMI 38 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Act Of 1961, Capital Gains, Taxable Event ... ... ... ... ..... d until the final dividend is received by the assessee on liquidation of the company. Thus, in our view, the learned judge was right in taking the view that the impugned order of assessment was not justified having regard to the provisions of section 46(2) of the Act. In that view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider the other contentions which have been taken on behalf of the petitioners in the petition for challenging the validity of the assessment order. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Since the impugned assessment order dated March 30, 1967, is set aside by us we direct that the concerned Income-tax Officer should pass a proper assessment order for payment of income-tax having regard to the sum of Rs. 3,87,585 received as deemed dividend and the sum of Rs. 2,39,934 received by way of distribution of capital on September 18, 1961. Liberty to the respondent s attorneys to withdraw the sum of Rs. 500 deposited towards costs of the appeal.
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1976 (3) TMI 37 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Depreciation And Development Rebate, Depreciation And Development Rebate, Original Assessment, Original Assessment, Set Off, Set Off
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1976 (3) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Income Or Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... it is not necessary for us to deal with this point in detail. We may also mention that the assessee had not questioned the view of the Tribunal that he was liable to pay tax on the surplus as capital gains for the assessment year 1961-62. The question whether the sale price disclosed in the document is the correct consideration received or whether there was any under-valuation is also a question of fact. Further, we find, there is no positive evidence to show that there was any undervaluation in the document. In fact, it appears that the department had taken statements from a number of purchasers, but all of them have confirmed that they have paid only the amounts shown in the document and nothing more. We are, therefore, unable to interfere with this finding of the Tribunal also. In the result, all the questions referred in both these tax cases are answered in the affirmative and against the revenue. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 in each.
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1976 (3) TMI 35 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Industrial Undertaking, Original Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ed to claim refund or relief. In the instant case, in view of the findings of facts recorded by the Tribunal, we are helpless and even though if proper materials had been pointed out relief might have been available to the present assessee, since the materials were not pointed out and the Tribunal s findings of fact are what we have stated above, no other conclusion except that there was no error apparent from the record can be reached in the instant case. We, therefore, hold that there was no scope for invoking the provisions of section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in the instant case so far as the assessee is concerned and, therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding that the provisions of section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, could not be invoked in the instant case. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the Commissioner.
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1976 (3) TMI 34 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Company In Liquidation ... ... ... ... ..... hall be chargeable to income-tax under the head capital gains in respect of the monies so received or the market value of the other assets on the date of distribution. It would have been sufficient for the legislature to introduce a special provision in regard to computation of capital gain in any of the succeeding sections. The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. 1973 89 ITR 45 (SC) and this court in T. M. Rangachari v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1976 102 ITR 50 (Mad) referred to section 46(2) as an express provision for charging as capital gains the money or assets received by a shareholder on the liquidation of a company. We are, therefore, of the view that the amount received by the assessee, in this case, is includible in the chargeable income of the assessee under the head capital gains . We, accordingly, answer the reference in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1976 (3) TMI 33 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Appellate Assistant Commissioner ... ... ... ... ..... 139 or section 215 is not appealable if the case falls under the first part of clause (c) of section 246. If the assessee denies his liability to be assessed under the Act, he has a right of appeal and that right of appeal cannot be denied. In the instant case, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has declined to consider the assessee s objections to the levy of interest. He has not stated what the assessee s objections were. The Tribunal has merely affirmed that order. If the assessee s objection was that under the relevant provisions of law, it was not liable to be assessed to penal interest, that objection, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was bound to consider. He was in error in declining to consider the objection on the ground that the appeal was not competent. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question as re-formulated by us in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1976 (3) TMI 32 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Gratuity Fund, Local Authority, Revocable Trust, Road Transport Corporation
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1976 (3) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Business Loss, Capital Gains Tax, Capital Loss, Investment Company, Wholly And Exclusively
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1976 (3) TMI 30 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... been allowed development rebate under section 33(1)(b)(B)(i). This development rebate has been allowed on the basis of the same Schedule. Mr. Banerjee contended that if the assessee was entitled to development rebate for this item in the Schedule there was no reason why the assessee should be deprived of the benefit under section 80E or the Finance Act, 1965, on the identical item in the same Schedule. This particular point was not raised before nor considered by the Tribunal. The questions before us cannot be said to include this aspect. The revenue has not come up against the allowance of development rebate. Full facts in respect of such development rebate are not before us and we cannot go into such question. For the reasons stated above, the revenue succeeds in the instant case. Both the questions referred to us are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not make any order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree.
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1976 (3) TMI 29 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Municipal Taxes, Original Assessment, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... inferences at the time of the original assessment proceedings, the assessee cannot be blamed nor can the case be brought under section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, because of such failure of the Income-tax Officer at the time of the original assessment proceedings. Under the circumstances we hold that the conditions precedent for the exercise of the powers under section 147(a) were not satisfied in the instant case and hence the Tribunal was not correct in law when it held that the provisions of section 147(a) were satisfied and that the assessment under section 147(a) was valid in law and justified. The same position prevails in each of the two assessment years before us and we, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is, the reassessment proceedings were not valid and were not justified in law. The question is answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1976 (3) TMI 28 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business Loss ... ... ... ... ..... any. Under these circumstances, the assessee-company was entitled to have the loss of Rs. 46,970 for assessment year 1965-66 treated as business loss and also to have the loss of Rs. 58,600 incurred by it during the period January 1, 1965, to June 26, 1965, in the previous year relevant to assessment year 1966-67, treated as a business loss. The Tribunal was in error when it overlooked this distinction between the component business activity and the business activity as a whole and the Tribunal was in error in holding that the assessee had not commenced its business prior to June 26, 1965. In the light of the above discussion, our answer to the questions referred to us is as under Question No. 1.--In the negative as to both the parts, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue as to both the parts. Question No. 2.--In the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1976 (3) TMI 27 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Assessment Order, Commissioner To Revise, Revision By Commissioner ... ... ... ... ..... usion was not warranted. We make it clear that it is quite possible that the same appellate authority after scrutinising all the materials in an analytical way may come to the same conclusion and our order would not stand in the way of reaching such a final decision. What we say is that the manner in which it has already been done would not and should not be sustained. We would accordingly answer the question referred to us by saying On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the accounts were flawless, particularly when the objections indicated in the order of the Income-tax Officer had not been answered. Our answering the question in such a way necessarily would lead to a fresh hearing of the appeal and we would commend to the Tribunal to hear the appeal unaffected by what had been said earlier by the Tribunal or any observation made by us while disposing of these references. DAS J.--I agree.
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1976 (3) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Factory Building ... ... ... ... ..... ), Part I, to the Income-tax Rules, 1962. It is admitted that the expression factory building has not been defined either in the Act or in the Rules. Under the circumstances, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as well as the Tribunal having regard to the admitted facts stated above took the ordinary natural dictionary meaning of the word factory and held that the workshop of the assessee herein would constitute a factory building in the context of the business carried on by the assessee as contemplated by the Income-tax Rules, 1962. We are unable to hold that in the absence of any definition of the term factory building in the Act or the Rules, the Tribunal committed an error of law in taking the dictionary meaning of the word and applying the same to the workshop in question. Hence, no question of law arises out of the order of the Tribunal to be referred to this court for decision and accordingly the petitions are dismissed, with costs, one set. Counsel s fee is Rs. 150.
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1976 (3) TMI 25 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Account Books ... ... ... ... ..... holding that the grounds did not permit the rate of profit to be disputed. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are inclined to agree with Mr. Pasayat that the grounds were so framed that they did admit a dispute in relation to the reasonableness of the rate of profit and, therefore, the Tribunal was not correct in rejecting the contention as not tenable. It is conceded by both sides that such a question has not been examined on merits and, therefore, once we answer in favour of the assessee, it would follow that the appeals have to be reheard and disposed of on merits in accordance with law. Our answer to the question, therefore, is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in view of the grounds raised in the memorandum of second appeal, the Tribunal was not justified in saying that the assessee had not raised any specific ground as to the reasonableness of the rate of profit applied to the cases. We make no order as to costs. N. K. DAS J.--I agree.
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1976 (3) TMI 24 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
A Firm, Delay In Filing Return, Income Tax, Levy Of Penalty, Mens Rea, Penalty Notice, Penalty Proceedings
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1976 (3) TMI 23 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Bona Fide, Delay In Filing Return ... ... ... ... ..... the penalty. Burden admittedly lay on the assessee to justify its stand for the delay in filing of the return. We have indicated that the assessee did not respond to the Income-tax Officer and offered a non-sustainable explanation before the first appellate authority. Unfortunately, ignoring this stand, the Tribunal chose to take an overall picture of the matter and chose to find its order on conjectures only. In these circumstances, the only conclusion which any prudent tribunal can reach is that imposition of penalty was justified and the Appellate Tribunal acted in a manner not warranted by law in vacating it. Our answers to the questions, therefore, are (1) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in cancelling the levy of penalty under section 271(1)(a) of the Act and (2) The finding of the Tribunal is vitiated in law. Revenue shall be entitled to costs of the proceeding. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100. N. K. DAS J.--I agree.
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1976 (3) TMI 22 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Loss ... ... ... ... ..... under section 5 of the Estate Duty Act itself. On the question of including the value of the goodwill, we are of the view that on the question as framed we could not go into the question whether there was any goodwill at all. As already stated, the Tribunal gave a finding that the rice-mill had no goodwill at all, in view of the fact that there was no quota right nor was there any peculiar feature attached to the rice-mill. The revenue has not sought a reference specifically on the question whether there was any goodwill at all and the reference before us in our opinion could not include also a question of the existence of the goodwill. If there was no goodwill, the addition of Rs. 9,410 could not be justified. In the result, we answer the question in T.C. No. 272 of 1970 in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue, and the question in T.C. No. 405 of 1971 also in the affirmative but against the revenue. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs in either.
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