Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 169 Records
-
1979 (10) TMI 29 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... l income, as it had substantially brought out the true income. The misfortune of the death of one of the partners before the filing of the return has also been taken note of. Considering these circumstances, I am inclined to concur with the final conclusion that the penalty be quashed. Before concluding I may add that so far as the Explanation added to s. 271(1)(c) of the Act with effect from April 1, 1964, is concerned, the same on its own did not create any independent offence. This Explanation only embodies a rule of evidence and places the onus on the assessee of proving that the understatement of income in the return, where such income falls short of 80 per cent. of the assessed income, was not on account of any fraud or any gross or wilful neglect on his part. This burden, however, is not of the same nature which rests on the prosecution in a criminal case. It is a burden akin to that in a civil case, where the determination is made on the preponderance of probability.
-
1979 (10) TMI 28 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... age. The assessee would have to forgo the allowance if there is a failure to create the requisite reserve, so that with the allowance of development rebate the income assessable is reduced to nil. Understood in this light in the present case, the assessee would lose the benefit to carry forward the unabsorbed development rebate only to the extent of Rs. 1,06,501. To deny the benefit to a larger extent is not warranted by the statute. The assessee cannot be penalised or made to suffer for what he is not expected to do. The result is that the question referred to us is answered as follows, The assessee is disentitled from carrying forward the development rebate only to the extent of Rs. 1,06,501. A sum of Rs. 1,06,773 is mentioned as the development rebate in the order of the Tribunal, perhaps by mistake. Anyway, the Tribunal will examine the figures and arrive at the correct amount to be carried forward. The reference is answered accordingly with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
-
1979 (10) TMI 27 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... apital expenditure. The decision in India Cements Ltd. v. CIT 1966 60 ITR 52 (SC) is clearly to show that the expenditure incurred in issuing debentures was a revenue expenditure as by such an expenditure no asset was brought into existence. It is clear from the pronouncement of the Supreme Court that it is the nature or character of the expenditure that determines the allowability. just as the expenditure on money borrowed for a capital purpose did not affect the allowance, similarly, the fact that the expenditure contributed to the increase in capital should not make a difference to its allowability, if it was otherwise not capital expenditure. It has to be held on the facts here that the sum was spent only for the purpose of business and that there is no capital element in the expenditure. In the result, the third question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. As neither party has succeeded wholly in the reference there will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... re penalty is imposed for concealment of particulars of income, it is the law ruling on the date when the act of concealment takes place which is relevent. It is wholly immaterial that the income concealed was to be assessed in relation to an assessment year in the past. The Supreme Court, therefore, was of the opinion that as the return was filed after 1st April, 1968, the law as amended by the Finance Act, 1968, would govern the levy of penalty. Thus, the view of the Supreme Court is that the penalty has, to be levied with reference to the law in force on the date when the default occurred. In the present case., the default occurred immediately on the day following the day on which the return was due. Taking into account the date of default, the penalty as reduced by the Tribunal was proper and legal. Therefore, there is no referable question of law that can be said, to arise out of the Tribunal s order. The petitions are rejected with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250 one set.
-
1979 (10) TMI 25 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessment, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... cation of profits of the firm was due to a mistake, had been repelled by the Tribunal on the ground that the explanation was an after-thought. In the present case this is not so. The assessee s explanation that the error in the allocation of profits was due to a mistake and was corrected as soon as it was discovered has been accepted by the Tribunal. In such a situation, the decision of this court in the case of CIT v. Hari Ram Khanna 1979 116 ITR 886 (All) applies. There it was held that registration cannot be refused or cancelled on the ground of improper allocation if it had been made due to an omission or inadvertence or mistake. In the present case this is precisely what the Tribunal has found. The Tribunal was, thus, right in directing the ITO to make two assessments in the status of a registered firm. We, accordingly, answer this question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 24 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Jewellery, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... v. His Highness Maharaja Vibhuti Narain Singh 1979 117 ITR 246. It was held that the word jewellery , as commonly understood, includes ornaments made of precious stones (it should be precious metals ) and the Explanation only makes explicit, what was implicit in the provision from its inception. We are respectfully in agreement with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in CWT v. Jayantilal Amratlal 1976 102 ITR 105. In the view we have taken that the word jewellery includes ornaments of gold and other precious metals, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in including the gold ornaments belonging to the assessee in computing his net wealth and the question of giving retrospective effect to Expl. 1 to s. 5(1)(viii) of the Act does not arise. In the light of the discussion aforesaid, our answers to the questions referred to us are in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs of this reference.
-
1979 (10) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Diversion By Overriding Title, Income ... ... ... ... ..... s referable to the minors, which was first set apart and, thereafter, alone the balance was subject to division among the partners, it was held that there was to that extent an overriding title in respect of the shares of the minors. The overriding title had arisen by virtue of the manner in which the partnership came into existence. That is not the position here. In the present case, there is no mention in the deed of partnership of any person other than the assessee being entitled to the income from the partnership. In these circumstances, it is not possible to apply the decision of this court in CIT v. Smt. Shajathi 1977 110 ITR 738, to the facts of the present case. The result is that the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. We make it clear that our answer implies that the assessee will have to be assessed with reference to her entire share income. The Commissioner will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500. One set.
-
1979 (10) TMI 22 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Held By Assessee, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... s, the Agrl. ITO could not have clubbed the 18 36 acres owned by the assessee with the 17.73 acres held by her as a trustee. Even in the case of the disposal of a compounding application, as in the case of an assessment, there is a duty to examine if the assessee is the owner of the lands, especially in a case where the application itself shows that there are some aspects which require examination. The Agrl. ITO, even when disposing of an application for compounding, is not like a sub-Registrar functioning under the Indian Registration Act, who has generally to register a document so long as it is duly stamped and there is an admission of execution, supported by the requisite identifying witnesses. To accept the contrary proposition would result in such composition proceedings being left to be used with ulterior motives. The result is that the assessee would be entitled to the refund as prayed for. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Company, Reserves, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... nciple of this decision would also show that even if there had been any crediting of any amount representing the difference between the incometax written down value and the book value, there would have to be deduction corresponding to the difference between the depreciation in the income-tax assessment and the book figures. Thus, considered from any angle, the assessee could not have got the allowance on the basis of the revised return. The second question as framed does not appear to be to bring out the real controversy. We consider it necessary to reframe the question as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the difference between the depreciation allowed in the income-tax assessment and the depreciation provided in the books can be taken to be a reserve for the purposes of the Surtax Act? So, the second question is also answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... the I.T. Act has given rise to the present reference. The wealth-tax matter came up for reference in T.C. Nos. 592 and 593 of 1975 (CWT v. T. Saraswathi Achi 1980 125 ITR 186). By judgment dated 16th October, 1979, it was held that there was no transfer of any assets by the assessee in favour of her minor daughter so as to justify the application of s. 4(1)(a) of the W.T. Act. Section 64(iv) of the I.T. Act, 1961, is also applicable only when there is a transfer directly or indirectly of assets to a minor child and, in such a case, it applies to tax the income arising from such asset on the transferor. In the case of bonus shares, the assessee never had any interest or right at all and could effect no transfer. The question of inclusion of the income from the bonus shares which were never hers so as to be transferred did not arise. The result is that the questions referred to us are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 19 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income, Income Tax, Liability To Tax, Tax Liability ... ... ... ... ..... larified at this stage. On the earlier occasion, when the matter came before this court in writ petitions the present question as to whether there could be any liability under the law was not canvassed, and, therefore, this court considered that the matter which was raised before it, could be taken before the Commissioner of Agrl. I.T. under revision. As the point has now been raised, we have to decide it in the present writ petitions. Thus, in the absence of anything to show that there was any agricultural income derived from the lands in question, there is absolutely no scope for compounding any tax liability. The result is that though the compounding as originally made is not to be disturbed, the subsequent revision of the compounding by any Agrl. ITO, as modified by the Commissioner, will have to be Set aside. The writ petitions are, accordingly, allowed and rule nisi will issue in terms of the prayers contained in these writ petitions. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 18 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Revision By Commissioner, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... ropriate case if it is shown that a party not at fault may suffer hardship on account of the dismissal of a petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy by lapse of time, the court may in its discretion give relief to the petitioner in spite of the fact that an alternative remedy was available to him and may not dismiss the petition at the final hearing only on that ground. But such is not the case on hand. As stated above, on the materials placed on record when this petition was filed, an application under s. 256(1) of the Act probably was already barred by limitation. Moreover, the petitioner falsely stated in the petition that no alternative remedy was available to the petitioner. In the circumstances, we see no valid reason why this petition should not be dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, this petition has no substance and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 200, if certified.
-
1979 (10) TMI 17 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Payments In Cash ... ... ... ... ..... ressed. For the reasons recorded above, we are clearly of the opinion that the provisions of s. 40A(3) of the Act are not ultra vires. As regards the notice dated March 7, 1974 (annex. P-2), it is for the assessee to go and satisfy the authority concerned that he is entitled to claim any of the exceptions as provided for in r. 6DD of the Rules, referred to above. It, of course, goes without saying that the assesses will be afforded an opportunity as has also been stated in the notice to satisfy the authority concerned that he is entitled to the deduction of the expenditure claimed in view of the provisions of the rule referred to above. The concerned authority being satisfied, the assessee will be entitled to the relief. For the reasons recorded above, there is no merit in this petition and the same is hereby dismissed. The authority concerned shall proceed further to process the case in accordance with law. However, there will be no order as to costs. S. S. DEWAN J.-I agree.
-
1979 (10) TMI 16 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... h respondent No. 1 to take action against him. The explanation put forward by Sri Chatterjee does not appear to be correct. The record produced, before us clearly indicates that there was reliable information with the department regarding petitioner No. 1 even before the first search was conducted on 22nd December, 1974. What prevailed upon the department to postpone the search at the residence of petitioner No. 1 to a later date, however, is not clear. In any view of the matter, the search would not become illegal merely because it was not done when the searches were made at the premises of the firms and the persons connected with petitioner No. 1, but was done later on. Further, these petitions appear to have become substantially infructuous as the jewellery seized in these cases has been returned to the petitioners in pursuance of the orders passed under s. 132(12) of the Act. In our opinion, the petitions are devoid of any merit. They are accordingly dismissed with costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 15 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ot an assessee has concealed its income is a question to be decide on the facts of a case, and in the present case, the decision is based on the respondent s agreement with D.J.C. which the Tribunal accepted as true. That being so, no question of law really arises from the order of the Tribunal and the order dismissing the application under section 66(2) cannot be said to be wrong. Herein, beside the addition of Rs. 20,000 under the circumstances mentioned above, there was no other material in the penalty proceedings to justify a levy of penalty on the ground of concealment. Under the circumstances, once the Tribunal found that there was in fact no concealment because it was not conclusively established that the assessee had actually earned the income of Rs. 20,000 in the relevant year, no question of law arises which required to be referred to this court. For the foregoing reasons, we discharge the rule. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the application to the assessee.
-
1979 (10) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Income Tax Clearence Certificate ... ... ... ... ..... herefore, I am of opinion, that the I.T. Dept. has wrongly declined to issue a certificate under s. 230A of the Act in respect of the third respondent in favour of the petitioner. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I find that this is a fit case where the first respondent has to be directed to register the document without insisting upon the production of the certificate under s. 230A of the I.T. Act, 1961. For the reasons stated above, W.P. No. 623 of 1976 is dismissed without costs and W.P No. 832 of 1976 is allowed directing the first respondent to register the document dated March 3, 1974, presented by the petitioner for compulsory registration without insisting upon production of the I.T. Clearance Certificate under s. 230A of the I.T. Act, 1961. The petitioner will have her costs in the writ petition payable by the fifth respondent, the CIT, III Circle, Madras, and the sixth respondent, the 9th ITO, City Circle II, Madras. Advocate s fee Rs. 150.
-
1979 (10) TMI 13 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Offences, Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... Court as well. Since 1974, he is standing in the proceedings in this complaint. The proceedings against the respondent have been extremely long-drawn, in which he had to face varied litigation before the tax authorities and the courts. In this situation, we think it appropriate not to sentence the respondent to any term of imprisonment, as he had already been subjected to long-drawn litigation. Convicting him for the aforesaid offence, we direct that he shall be released on probation for a period of two years on his furnishing surety bond, with two sureties, and a personal bond in the amount of Rs. 5,000 to the satisfaction of the Chief judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana, to be furnished within two months from today, with an undertaking that he shall keep peace and be of good behaviour during this period. In case of non-furnishing of this bond or the breach of any condition of the bond, Vidya Sagar, respondent, shall be called upon to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months.
-
1979 (10) TMI 12 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... butable to the return filed in the original assessment proceedings or that the said default will relate back to the assessment year for which the return was filed. In the present case, as the wrongful act of concealing the income was committed on April 20, 1968, the IAC was fully justified in imposing the penalty under the provisions of s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, as amended by the Finance Act of 1968, and the Tribunal erred in law in holding that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the imposing of penalty under the amended s. 271(1)(c) of the Act would be giving retrospective effect to it. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative and against the assessee. We also make it clear that in the present case no restrospective operation was given by the IAC to the provisions of the amended s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs of this reference.
-
1979 (10) TMI 11 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... lued. But on the view expressed earlier that the net wealth of the firm has to be calculated not in accordance with the Act or Rules, but on the principles of commercial accountancy, the belief which the WTO entertained that the net wealth has escaped assessment was based on no relevant material and was arbitrary, as the shares had been correctly valued and the earlier order determining the valuation of the assessee s interest in the firm was correct. The notice as such has to be quashed. On this view, it is not necessary to consider the other contentions raised on behalf of the assessee and the Department. The petition is, accordingly, allowed. The notice issued under s. 17 of the Act is quashed, and the respondent is restrained from taking proceedings against the petitioner in pursuance of the notice. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. The judgment shall govern Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 691 to 703 of 1975, 707 to 715 of 1975, 749 and 759 of 1975 and 825 to 826 of 1975.
-
1979 (10) TMI 10 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ion. Mr. Jayaraman, learned counsel for the Commissioner, contended that the assessment is on the donor and that what the donee could realise cannot be the criterion. This argument runs counter to s. 6 and does not give effect to a part of the gift deed. The tax cannot be levied by choosing to ignore a part of the document and by valuing the properties shutting one s eyes to the deed and its terms. Therefore, considered from any angle, the conclusion drawn by the AAC and affirmed by the Tribunal does not suffer from any legal infirmity. We would add that the Tribunal appears to conceive a fiduciary or contractual obligation. It may be contractual in the sense that there was an acceptance of the condition. But this is clearly a case of a conditional gift and the value of the property has to be arrived at on this basis. The result is that the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
....
|