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Showing 141 to 160 of 187 Records
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1988 (6) TMI 47 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Customs - Imports - Confiscation ... ... ... ... ..... ct the goods are identifiable and are separately packed. Otherwise adjudication order could not have been passed holding that a part of the subject goods had not been validly imported. 38. In my view the refusal on the part of the Customs authorities to release non-offending goods is arbitrary and without any authority of law. 39. For the reasons aforesaid this application is allowed. The order dated 21st December, 1987 of the Assistant Collector of Customs for Appraisement is set aside. The respondents are directed to release PVC Leather lining forthwith upon payment of duty and other charges irrespective of the fact whether the petitioners take delivery of the confiscated goods, upon payments of redemption fine or not. 40. Let the assessment be made and the goods be released within a week from the date of communication of this order. Let open delivery be effected. 41. All parties shall act on the signed copy of the minutes of this operative part of this order and judgment.
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1988 (6) TMI 46 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... re granted subsidy for the specific purpose of meeting a portion of the cost of the unit. Under the scheme, the cash subsidy is quantified by determining the same at specified percentage of the fixed capital cost. The specified percentage of the fixed capital cost taken as the basis for determining the subsidy is only a measure adopted under the scheme for quantifying the subsidy. The subsidy is granted more as recompense for the hardships and inconveniences which the entrepreneurs may encounter while setting up industries in backward areas, which lack infrastructure. The subsidy, therefore, cannot be deducted from the actual cost of the assets to the assessee and depreciation should be allowed without reducing the same by the amount of subsidy granted. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In that view of the matter, the question of law referred is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee.
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1988 (6) TMI 45 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Property Tax ... ... ... ... ..... serai or a shed used as a place of assembly and observed that caravanserai is a place of rest for travellers and a modern lodging house is not caravanserai. It was observed that the instant building is not merely lodging house but also a commercial complex and such a building is not exempt from property tax under section 101 of the Act. We concur with the said view of the learned single judge. We are of the view that the word choultry occurring in section 101(1)(c) of the Municipalities Act should be construed as understood in common parlance and so considered, it can only mean a satram . It is a matter of common knowledge that in these parts, a choultry or satram is understood as a building ordinarily given free of rent or let on a very moderate rent and such building will never be of the character of a shopping complex-cum-lodging house. In this view of the matter, we affirm the judgment of the learned single judge. This appeal is without merit. It is dismissed with costs.
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1988 (6) TMI 44 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Loss, Return ... ... ... ... ..... . It is a matter of regret that very often persons in charge of such public undertakings have no sense of discipline or commitment necessary for running such enterprises. They also appear to be unaccountable to anyone. This is probably one of the main reasons why the public sector in this country is losing hundreds of crores of rupees every year, notwithstanding monopolistic conditions in several sectors. In our opinion, this is a matter which the concerned authorities must enquire into and determine the persons responsible for this state of affairs and deal with them appropriately . It is merely fortuitous that, notwithstanding the said default, the company is saved because of the language of section 80, as it then stood. Today it may not be saved in similar circumstances. A copy of this order may be communicated to the Secretary, Ministry of Industries, Government of India, New Delhi, and also to the Secretary Ministry of Industries, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.
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1988 (6) TMI 43 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Redemption Reserve, Chargeable Profits, Company, Deduction, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... Income-tax Act, are excluded by virtue of rule 1 in the First Schedule. Probably, the idea is to tax the true or real profits as exceed the prescribed limit. It is but appropriate in this context that 50 of the amount actually donated for the purposes mentioned in subsection (2) of section 80G-all of which are undoubtedly of a charitable, religious or public nature--should be allowed. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the amount to be excluded under clause (vii) of rule I in the First Schedule is 50 of the amount actually donated for the purposes mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 80G, that is, 50 of the aggregate amount referred to in subsection (1) of section 80G. Accordingly, we answer the third question saying that, while computing the chargeable profits, 50 of the actual donations (50 of Rs. 5,38,675) should be excluded under clause (vii) of rule 1 in the First Schedule to the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964. Answered accordingly. No costs.
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1988 (6) TMI 42 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Assessment, Penalty, Revision ... ... ... ... ..... order his satisfaction or the lack of it in regard to the leviability of penalty cannot be said to be a factor vitiating the assessment order in any respect. An assessment cannot be said to be erroneous or prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue because of the failure of the Income-tax Officer to record his opinion about the leviability of penalty in the case. We, therefore, answer the first question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached by the Delhi High Court. We may add that when S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 11391-11392 of 1981 were filed against the order in CIT v. J. K. D Costa 1982 133 ITR 7, leave was rejected on March 2, 1984. We thus answer the second question in the affirmative and hold that the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax was not justified in setting aside the assessment order. The answer is recorded in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1988 (6) TMI 41 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Company, Mens Rea, Offence, Registered Society, Wilful Attempt To Evade Tax ... ... ... ... ..... isputed or challenged, it may be mentioned in the order that the Magistrate concerned shall grant exemption from personal appearance to these petitioners during the trial. It is not necessary for this court to give any such directions. However, may mention that the Magistrate, if approached by any of the accused seeking personal exemption, shall consider the said request obviously in the light of the law applicable and particularly to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Chandu Lal Chandraker v. Puran Mal 1988 JT (1) SC 14. In that judgment, even the personal presence of the accused was not considered to be necessary for recording a statement under section 313 of the Cr. P.C., where the accused is not interested in answering questions under section 313 of the Cr. P. C. and gives an undertaking that he would not raise the question of prejudice later on. In view of the above discussion, I find no merit in this petition which I hereby dismiss with no order as to costs.
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1988 (6) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Deduction U/S 80J, New Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... where, in respect of an asset acquired in the computation period, the written down value is defined to be the actual cost to the assessee. Thus, the Act itself contemplates the actual cost being considered as the written down value for the purpose of computation of capital employed. The position stated above by this court has not been changed by the introduction of sub-section (1A) to section 80J. It may be noted that the decision of this court in CIT v. Madras Wire Products 1980 123 ITR 722 has been followed by this court in CIT v. Sundaram Industries Ltd. 1987 166 ITR 35. See also CIT v. Alcock Ashdown and Co. Ltd. 1979 119 ITR 164 (Bom) and CIT v. Mohan Meakin Breweries Ltd. 1980 122 ITR 203 (HP). We, accordingly, hold that the decision of this court in CIT v. Madras Wire Products 1980 123 ITR 722 would govern this case as well. We answer the question of law referred to this court in the affirmative and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs in this case.
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1988 (6) TMI 39 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Co-operative Society, Income ... ... ... ... ..... the profits, but creates a liability to pay with reference to, or in relation to, profits. Therefore, there is a charge even at the source on receipt to the co-operative societies. Hence, the decision of the Madras High Court is distinguishable. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that the payment to the reserve fund was only an obligation created under the statute and the society was under an obligation to invest or utilise the same at the instance of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Applying the ratio of the Madhya Pradesh High Court decision and the decisions referred to earlier of the Supreme Court, we hold that the payment or contribution by the co-operative society in the present case is a diversion of profits at source on account of overriding charge created under the Act which is a statutory obligation on the society. Hence, such payment is liable for deduction. Therefore, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department.
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1988 (6) TMI 38 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Income Tax, Legal Representative ... ... ... ... ..... ions was long since over. Therefore, they cannot be allowed to reagitate the objections regarding the liability of the certificate-debtor and the executability of the certificate. Such an interpretation, in our view, would be contrary to the scheme of the Act and would reopen many controversies. It may well be that if the Certificate Officer, after the substitution of the legal heirs, proceeds against some properties which were not originally contemplated and with respect to which the substituted heirs might have a positive claim against the liability of the properties for being proceeded against in the certificate case, then they can take recourse to the provisions under section 20 of the Act making a claim or objection to the attachment or sale of the property in execution of the certificate in question on the ground that it is not liable as such. The writ application, therefore, being entirely misconceived, is dismissed. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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1988 (6) TMI 37 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Net Wealth, Reference, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... subject to the restrictions if he wishes to dispose of it. According to learned counsel, the words in the open market also envisage a hypothetical sale and not in a restricted market. But, in the present case, learned counsel for the Department was unable to convince us that the assessee, in the facts and circumstances of the case, could part with such a right of personal residence during her lifetime and there could be any such independent buyer to purchase that personal right of residence for any consideration or otherwise. Therefore, in our opinion, the view taken by the learned Tribunal, which does not suffer from any legal infirmity, is that in the present case, no such question of law arises which requires to be referred to this court for its opinion as proposed by the Department. In the result, we decline to call upon the Tribunal to refer the proposed question of law to this court for its opinion. Consequently, the application is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1988 (6) TMI 36 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Profession Tax ... ... ... ... ..... etition is not concerned with any matter of public interest, but with the individual interests of the assessees who happen to be members of the association. Each assessee is entitled to approach this court under article 226 of the Constitution of India. But he must himself do so, or by duly authorised power of attorney holder, which the petitioner admittedly is not, and pay the requisite court fee which admittedly has not been paid. It is nowhere stated in this petition that the secretary of the association is himself an assessee. The petitioner is, therefore, not shown to be an aggrieved person. In the circumstances, while the first respondent acted without the authority of law, the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the impugned orders, and the petition, therefore, fails. The fate of this petition does not, however, enable the panchayat to act outside the law. Any such action is a fraud on its constitution. The original petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1988 (6) TMI 35 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Gratuity, Provision ... ... ... ... ..... be given effect to. We may, however, refer to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in CIT v. New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmedabad Ltd. 1984 147 ITR 163, the relevant observations wherein are referred to, with approval, by the Supreme Court in Shree Sajjan Mills case 1985 156 ITR 585. It has been held by the Calcutta High Court that the assessee was not entitled to claim any deduction on account of its liability to pay gratuity estimated on an actuarial basis, merely because it was following the mercantile system of accounting. It was held that the assessee must fulfil the conditions in section 40A(7)(b) to claim the deduction, which means that it must necessarily make a provision for that liability it must necessarily follow the procedure prescribed by the said provision and fulfil the conditions laid down by it. For the above reasons, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Answered accordingly. No costs.
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1988 (6) TMI 34 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Transfer To Minor Children ... ... ... ... ..... or the benefit of his daughter, Kunti, till she attains the age of 18 years, it was held that clubbing cannot take place since there is no benefit which accrued to the minor child, and proceeded further to enunciate that deferred benefit here means that the benefit is deferred to a period subsequent to the accounting year in which the income is taxable, so long as it is not deferred beyond the minority of the child, the reason being that the section required the income to be for the benefit of the minor child. What is beneficial should go to the child now or later, but during minority. The Andhra Pradesh High Court and Gujarat High Court have merely followed the reasoning of the Bombay High Court. In the light of the enunciation of law made by the Supreme Court, we have no option but to fall in line with the decisions rendered by the Bombay, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh High Courts. Hence, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
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1988 (6) TMI 33 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... n, the requirements of the law should be satisfied. The live link or close nexus which should be there between the material before the Income-tax Officer ...... Narayanappa v. CIT 1967 63 ITR 219, 223 (SC), another case which is cited, emphasised the subject with reference to the procedure to be followed. But, before issuing the notice, the proviso requires that the officer should record his reasons for initiating action under section 34 (the earlier provision under 1922 Act) and obtain the sanction of the Commissioner who must be satisfied that the action under section 34 was justified. We experience no difficulty in holding that the assessee can approach the High Court for relief but on consideration of the facts, we hold that no case is made out in the instant two cases for interference by the court. No other point has been argued. For the aforesaid reasons, the civil rules are dismissed with costs. The costs are fixed at Rs. 250 in each case. S. P. RAJKHOWA J. - I agree.
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1988 (6) TMI 32 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Question Of Law, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... ed as a deductible business expenditure. The Tribunal, however, held that the legitimate expenditure incurred by Ganesh Sales Agency deserved to be allowed. The Tribunal, therefore , remanded the case for ascertaining that amount. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal, the Revenue sought a reference, but as the application for making a reference was rejected, the Revenue has filed this application. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we have come to the conclusion that the following question of law does arise out of the order passed by the Tribunal Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the expenditure incurred by Ganesh Sales Agency was allowable as business expenditure incurred by the assessee ? The application is, therefore, allowed. The Tribunal is directed to state the case and to refer the aforesaid question of law to this court. The parties shall bear their own costs of this application.
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1988 (6) TMI 31 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains, Land Whether Agricultural, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... ant Commissioner, when he inspected the land, could not have seen the land as under cultivation, as, by that time, a road perhaps was laid and therefore, the land was held as agricultural land within the meaning of section 2 (4A) of the Act. We see that a finding is recorded with reference to the village records, or Jamabandi records. The finding reached by the Tribunal, it is needless to mention, is a finding of fact and cannot be disturbed by this court by going into the finding that has been recorded. If authority is needed, it is M. M. Ipoh v. CIT 1968 67 ITR 106, 119 (SC) . . , the High Court, in a reference under section 66 of the Income-tax Act, was incompetent to disturb what was essentially a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal and arrive at another finding . On the question that is referred, we hold in the affirmative, that the land in question is a capital asset within the meaning of section 2 (4A), in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1988 (6) TMI 30 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... stified in cancelling the penalties levied under section 271(1)(a) ? In that case, the High Court held that the presumption is that judicial or quasi-judicial duty must be presumed to have been discharged in a proper and bona fide manner. But the Supreme Court s answer was (at p. 439) No attempt was made by the Revenue to show that the Income-tax Officer acted arbitrarily and contrary to the procedure envisaged by the statute . The purpose of making a reference is to see whether the procedure is followed and whether the order was arbitrary. The test is not that of proper and bona fide . The discussion in the above Supreme Court case commencing at page 439 shows that once interest is charged, penalty cannot be charged. The answer to the first question is therefore in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In view of our answer to question No. (1), questions Nos. (2) and (3) do not call for an answer. The reference is disposed of accordingly. No costs.
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1988 (6) TMI 29 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... se, it is argued on behalf of the Revenue that once the account books were not available there was nothing further which the assessee could have represented and therefore, the assessment was completed without notice under sub-section (2) of section 143 and in doing so the order suffered from no vice whatever. In arguing in that strain what is missed is that the assessee could show that his return was correct and that he could show only if he was heard. He would have or might have adduced evidence to support the return and, therefore, the contention that the Income-tax Officer could have concluded the assessment without notice under section 143 cannot be countenanced. For all the aforesaid reasons, the first question referred is answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In view of our finding on the first question, the, second question does not call for an answer. The questions are answered as indicated with costs of Rs. 250 to the assessee.
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1988 (6) TMI 28 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Representative Assessee, Trustee ... ... ... ... ..... for purposes of education, etc., of the minor, in clause 6 to spend certain amounts at the time of betrothal and marriage ceremonies of the minor and in clause 7 to transfer the trust funds to the minor on his attaining 21 years. The Tribunal also found that no part of the income was utilised as provided in clause 5 or clause 6. The Bombay High Court, therefore, found the Tribunal to be right in taking the view that in none of the assessment years, the income of the trust could be added on to the income of the assessee under section 16(3)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The facts, as seen therein, are entirely different from those on hand and, therefore, that decision is of no assistance to the assessees. We, therefore, hold that apart from Rs. 18,000 per year, the amount received by the beneficiary in each of the assessment years is also liable to be assessed to tax under section 160(1)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The reference is accordingly answered. No costs.
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