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Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 224 Records
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1991 (12) TMI 64 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Refund - Writ Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... e again and it has been decided to reiterate instructions dated 10-8-81. A telex in this connection was already sent on 21-3-90 (F. No. 390/30/88-AU) to all concerned. ....... All pending refund cases may be decided in the light of the above instructions F. No. 210/30/81-CX.6 dated 10-8-81. 22. These instructions are binding on all Central Excise Officers under Section 37B of the Act. 23. Accordingly this writ application is allowed. The impugned order dated 6th March 1991 is set aside insofar as it denies the refund of Rs. 10,70,973.04 to the petitioner. The respondents are directed to forthwith grant the refund of the amount of Rs. 10,70,973.04 to the petitioner by 15th January, 1992. Having regard to the facts of this case the petitioner will be entitled to the costs of this application which are assessed at 25 GMs. 24. Let xerox copy of this judgment be given to the parties upon the undertaking to apply for the certified copy of the judgment and payment of usual charges.
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1991 (12) TMI 63 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA (RANCHI BENCH)
Demand not raisable - Classification list approved ... ... ... ... ..... the proviso appended to Section 11A is not attracted at all. 47. In view of my findings aforementioned, it is not necessary to consider the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that even on merits the classification of unmachined steel castings made by Respondent No. 2 is not in accordance with law, need not be considered as, in my opinion, this Court should not enter into the thicket of a disputed question. 48. In the result, this application is allowed. The impugned order dated 31st of July, 1991 as contained in Annexare-18 is quashed. 49. By our order dated 7-10-1991, the petitioner was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the said amount has been deposited. The aforementioned amount of Rs. 2 lakhs may be adjusted by the petitioner against its current and future dues. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the parties shall also bear their own costs. R.N. Sahay, J. -I agree.
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1991 (12) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Inquiry and Investigation - Writ Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... decisions referred to by Mr. R. Thiyagarajan, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, with regard to the evidentiary value of the affidavit. I am fully satisfied that the present attempt on the part of the petitioners is nothing but an abuse of processes, when cases sought to be made out by the respondents Department on the petitioners giving evidence on the goods imported. However, it is open to the petitioners to appear before the respondents Department and give evidence as required by the officer concerned. There are no merits in both writ petitions and accordingly, they are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. The respondents Department filed applications praying for extension of time for completion of investigation. The time for completion of investigation is extended up to 31-1-1992. If the petitioners want to co-operate with the Department it is well open to the Department to complete the enquiry even before that time set out by this Court.
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1991 (12) TMI 61 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Writ Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... ent. The enforcement of the Bank guarantees shall abide by the decisions and it shall stand postponed until the decisions are communicated to the petitioners and for a period of four weeks thereafter. We have maintained the other direction of the learned Single Judge with regard to the further course of action in respect of Bank guarantees already furnished, and that direction shall continue to be operative until the appropriate applications of the petitioners, if preferred within the extended time are disposed of, and the decisions thereon are communicated to the petitioners and for a period of four weeks thereafter. The petitioners shall keep alive the Bank guarantees already furnished and to be furnished until the appropriate applications are disposed of, the decisions thereon communicated to the petitioners and for a period of four weeks thereafter as above. We dismiss these writ appeals and the dismissal of these writ appeal is subject to the above directions. No costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 60 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Seized goods - Return of if not confiscated ... ... ... ... ..... titioners were compelled to reimburse their customers from whom the ornaments were received. In these circumstances, the respondents are bound to pay the market value of the gold ornaments as prevailing on February 22, 1983 along with interest at the rate of 12 per annum from February 22, 1983 till the date of actual payment. 5. Accordingly, petition succeeds and the respondents are directed to forthwith pay to the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 the market value of the seized gold ornaments of 634.200 grams quantity as shown in the panchanama. The market value of the gold ornaments is to be determined as prevailing on February 22, 1983 when the Additional Collector passed the order. The respondents shall also pay interest on the said amount which will be ascertained with reference to the official market rate prevailing on February 22, 1983 along with interest at the rate of 12 per annum from February 22,1983 till the date of payment. The respondents shall pay costs of the petition.
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1991 (12) TMI 59 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Refund - Strictures on Central Excise and Customs Department ... ... ... ... ..... that Act. This proviso can only apply to applications which have been made before the amendment came into force but was not dealt with and or disposed of in accordance with the law in force at the material time. On or from 20th September, 1991, the applications which were pending, will have to be dealt with in accordance with the amended provisions of law. In my judgment this provision cannot apply to a case where not only an application for refund was made but dealt with and disposed of by a final order. A specific order was passed by the court. The amended provisions of Section 11B of the Central Excise Act does not have the effect of nullifying that order. 5. In that view of the matter, this application must fail and is dismissed. 6. There will be no order as to costs. 7. The department is directed to supply xerox copy of this order to the learned Advocates appearing for the parties on usual charges and on undertaking to apply for and obtain certified copy of this order.
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1991 (12) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the duty referable to that portion which is lost also should get rebate while assessing for excise duty on the pipes and tubes of copper and copper alloys?
Held that:- No doubt that even the manufacturing loss will have to be taken into account in determining the relief to be provided under the said Notification. We are also unable to understand the argument of the Revenue based on the difficulty in arriving at the manufacturing loss. If there is any difficulty it is for the manufacturer who claims the relief to prove the loss. There are also scientific methods of arriving at the loss,
Allow the appeal set aside the order of the High Court and the Revenue Authorities and direct the respondents to give the benefit of exemption of duty in respect of loss in the process of manufacture.
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1991 (12) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the petitioners who have been appointed on part time basis should be continued until the Government makes regular appointments on the recommendations of the Public Service Commission. Meanwhile, the petitioners will get their salary for the period of the vacation?
Held that:- A decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law. The respondents are, therefore, not entitled to rely upon an order of this court which directs a temporary employee to be regularised in his service without assigning reasons. It has to be presumed that on special grounds which must have been available to the temporary employees in those cases, they were entitled to the relief granted. Merely because grounds are not mentioned in a judgment of this court, it cannot be understood to have been passed without an adequate legal basis therefore.
It is true that the High Court is entitled to exercise its judicial discretion in deciding writ petitions or civil revision applications but this discretion has to be confined to declining to entertain petitions and refusing to grant relief asked for by the petitioners, on adequate considerations ; and it does not permit the High Court to grant relief on such a consideration alone.We, therefore, reject the argument addressed on behalf of the respondents that the High Court was entitled to pass any order which it thought fit in the interests of justice. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal.
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1991 (12) TMI 56 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance, Income From Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... deration matters which are irrelevant to the matter that he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said and often is said, to be acting unreasonably . (Per Lord Greene M. R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation 1947 2 All ER 680, 682 (CA-)). The above English principle of public law was accepted by our Supreme Court in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. D. Agarwal 1969 39 Comp Cas 781 AIR 1969 SC 707. For these reasons, we hold that all the three revised returns filed by the petitioner must be construed to be voluntary returns within the meaning of section 273A(1) of the Income-tax Act, and accordingly, we set aside the impugned order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax dated October 5, 1989, allow the writ petition and remit the matter to that authority to consider the case of the petitioner afresh in the light of this judgment and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 55 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion of penalty under section 271(1)(c) ? On appreciation of the facts on record, we come to the conclusion that the explanation offered by the assessee as to the investment of Rs. 33,400 was not found to be false, and it was plausible, though not believed in the assessment proceedings. It has been further held that, under these circumstances, no presumption as to concealment of income could be drawn. In the result, the penalty was deleted. There could be no quarrel with the proposition as argued by learned counsel that perversity of the order does not raise a question of law but, in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal has categorically found that there was no concealment of income. The explanation offered by the assessee was not held to be false. In the assessment proceedings, it was plausible, though not believable. In the instant case, we find no perversity in the order. No referable question of law can be said to arise. The case is, therefore, summarily dismissed.
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1991 (12) TMI 54 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... ions against the assessee, the Tribunal might be right in holding that there was no sufficient material on record, that there shall be a factual investigation and that a comprehensive remand was, therefore, justified. Counsel submits that, in view of the comprehensive remand for more detailed factual investigation, it is not necessary for him to press this court to answer those questions. In view of the above submissions, we do not find it necessary to answer questions Nos. 2 to 6 in R. C. No. 122 of 1985. In the result, we answer the question in R. C. No. 278 of 1982 in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. We answer question No. 1 in R. C. No. 122 of 1985 also in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. We decline to answer the other questions because it is not necessary for us to answer those questions in view of the comprehensive remand and because the facts necessary to answer those questions are not before us. Parties will suffer their respective costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 53 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Clubbing Of Income Of Minor Child ... ... ... ... ..... the Madras High Court. Therefore, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it is held that the interest which the minor earned was not income which, directly or indirectly, arose from his admission to the benefits of the partnership. For these reasons, the findings of the Tribunal that the interest earned by the minors had no connection with the admission of the minors to the benefits of the partnership is/was not perverse. Accordingly, the second part of question No. 2 is also answered in the negative and against the Revenue. For the foregoing reasons, question No. 2 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. With regard to question No. 1, its answer depends on the answer to question No. 2, and, therefore, question No. 2 has been dealt with first. In view of the answer to question No. 2 and discussion above, we answer question No. 1 also in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The reference is disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (12) TMI 52 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Motors v. Union of India 1991 187 ITR 703 (Delhi) and Escorts Ltd. v. Union of India 1991 189 ITR 81 (Delhi). We have already referred to various decisions which support the contention advanced on behalf of the assessees and which are directly on the point and with which we are in full agreement. We, accordingly, hold that rule 1BB only lays down the procedure for valuation of assets and is as such purely procedural. It follows that it has retrospective application. It applies to all the proceedings pending on the date when the rule was brought into force. Our answer to the question posed before us is that there was no error on the part of the Tribunal in holding that rule 1BB of the Wealth-tax Rules could be applied for the valuation of properties Nos. 177, 178 and 179, Rajpur Road, Dehradun and 23, Darya Ganj, Delhi, for the assessment years prior to April 1, 1979, when the said rule was enforced. The reference is answered accordingly. There will be no orders as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 51 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... e benefit is confined to tribal people residing in specified areas and that too is available only in respect of income accruing or arising to them from any source in such areas. Thus, whatever limitation the Legislature wanted to put, it has specifically incorporated in the clause itself. No more condition or restriction can be added, nor can such beneficial provision be given too narrow a meaning which may result in disentitling the members of the Khasi tribe from the benefit conferred by this clause. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the clear opinion that the benefit of exemption under section 10(26) of the Act will be available even in cases where the income accrues not to an individual member of Khasi Tribe, but to a family comprising such members. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. D. N. BARUAH J.-I agree.
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1991 (12) TMI 50 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... tion of grant of exemption of interest after taking into consideration all the factors including the conditions of the loan or debt and the terms of repayment because no reasons whatsoever have been given in the said order. Respondent No. has also not indicated the guidelines on which they have relied. Whether the respondents will ultimately pass any order under section 195 of the Income-tax Act or not is not for consideration before us today. However, certainly if the petitioner is entitled to exemption he must get an order now and if he has to be denied that exemption then respondent No. must give reasons for the same. In the circumstances, we set aside the order dated October 30, 1986, and direct respondent No. 1 to reconsider the matter in the light of section 10(15)(iv)(c) of the Income-tax Act by giving a reasoned order and, if necessary, by affording a personal hearing to the petitioner. The petition stands disposed of in the above terms. There is no order as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 49 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... revenue receipt. Therefore, considering the use of the word include in section 2(24), the word income shall be construed as comprehending not only those which section 2(24) declares that they shall include but also such things as it signifies according to its natural import. Since section 2(24) has not declared that such a granting-aid shall include, the word revenue shall be construed as comprehending what it signifies according to its natural import. In relation to business undertaking, the word revenue connotes incomings of the undertaking which are products of the normal working of the undertaking. The giving of financial aid or subsidy is at the discretion of the Government. The grant-in-aid in question was not a product of the normal business activities. Therefore, such a grant-in-aid is not a revenue receipt so as to form part of the total income. Accordingly, we answer the question in the negative, against the Department and in favour of the assessee firm. No costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 48 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t potentialities of the building could not be ignored in determining its market value. This judgment cannot be an authority to support the contention advanced on behalf of the Revenue that the reversionary value of the land ought to be included in computing its value for purposes of wealth-tax. Unlike the case before us, in this case, the property was being developed into a multi-storeyed building. There was no question of its being in existence and occupied by tenants nor was there any question of applicability of rent control legislation. The court did not consider the effect of such factors. The facts in this Case were totally different and it does not serve as any guide for the problem in hand before us. We are of the view that the Tribunal was correct in upholding the order of the Commissioner of Wealth-tax (Appeals) deleting the addition of the amount on account of the reversionary value of land. We answer the reference accordingly. There will be no orders as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 47 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Immovable Property ... ... ... ... ..... stwhile buyers was less than Rs. 10 lakhs per flat. In the very nature of things, Chapter XX-C was not applicable to the sale of immovable property of value less than Rs. 10 lakhs. Therefore, there would be no occasion at that point of time for any application of rule 48L. The price was increased to beyond Rs. 10 lakhs only in 1990. Lastly, the said rule 48L has no retrospective operation and would not apply to an agreement entered into prior to October 1, 1986, specially to such cases where the provisions of Chapter XX-A were applicable like in the present case. For the aforesaid reasons, this writ petition is allowed. We issue writ of mandamus quashing the impugned order dated December 20, 1990, passed under section 269UD(1) and further issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to grant permission in Form No. 37-I to the petitioner and other flat owners in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinabove. There will be no order as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 46 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Carry Forward, Loss ... ... ... ... ..... should be carried forward under section 72(1) or 73(2) or 74(l) or 74A(3), he may furnish within the time allowed under sub-section (1) or within such further time which, on an application made in the prescribed manner, the Income-tax Officer, in his discretion, allow, a return of loss in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and containing such other particulars as may be prescribed, and all the provisions of the Act shall apply as if it were a return under section 139(1). We are in agreement with the view expressed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Co-operative Marketing Society s case 1983 143 ITR 99, by the Calcutta High Court in Presidency Medical Centre s case 1977 108 ITR 838 and the Bombay High Court in Telster Advertising Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT 1979 116 ITR 610. In that view of the matter, there is no necessity to direct the Tribunal to refer the question to this court. The application is, accordingly, disposed of. No costs. S. K. MOHANTY J. -I agree.
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1991 (12) TMI 45 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Company, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... of the extra subscription money received by it to six persons in respect of whom the deemed seizure has been ordered. In our opinion, the deemed seizure would absolve the petitioner of any liability which might be attached to the petitioner under the provisions of laws other than the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the non-refund of the amounts so seized cannot be a ground for taking any action by any authority against the petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner states that over 7.5 lakh applications were received and the initial orders under section 132(3) pertain to about 18,000 applications and though, most probably, the said order has been strictly complied with but if in a few of such cases, by oversight, refunds have been made, then no penal action should be taken against the petitioners. Mr. Rajendra, very fairly, submits that, in such cases of bona fide omission or mistake, no penal action as contended will be taken. With these observations, the petition stands disposed of.
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