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Showing 161 to 180 of 219 Records
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1990 (6) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... (a) for the assessment year 1979-80. The Department s case for the assessment year 1980-81 is much worse. The assessment for that year was completed originally under section 143(3) on an income of Rs. 64,099 as against Rs. 7,087. Except for referring to the D. D. I. s letter to the Commissioners of Income-tax, there is no indication of any material whatsoever in the reasons recorded. The fact that the D. D. I. s letter was addressed not to the particular Income-tax Officer or the Commissioner but was addressed to all the Commissioners of Income-tax indicates that it was a sort of a circular. It is not shown to the court as to what that letter contained. In the circumstances, it has to be held that there was no material whatsoever for the formation of belief that income had escaped assessment for the assessment year 1980-81. In the above view of the matter, the notices issued under section 148 are struck down. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). No order as to costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 58 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Bonus, Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... th these cases by the Appellate Tribunal when it allowed the payment of amounts in excess of the amount payable under the Payment of Bonus Act as a permissible deduction. We are of the view that the Appellate Tribunal has failed to act in accordance with law and has also further failed to apply section 36(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, as interpreted by this court in P. Alikunju s case 1987 166 ITR 611. Therefore, we decline to answer the questions referred to us, in both the cases. But we direct the Appellate Tribunal to restore the appeals to file and dispose of them in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained hereinabove. It is open to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to order a remit of the matter to the Income-tax Officer, if it deems it necessary. The references are disposed of as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (6) TMI 57 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Deduction, Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... on which estate duty is leviable under the Act, and from that duty which is leviable, the amount which is equal to the court-fees so paid in respect of the share of the property of the deceased has to be deducted. Thus, the word leviable is used in relation to that which is leviable, had there not been any provision for deduction. It is only after the various variations and deductions that are permissible that estate duty could be levied and till then it can only be described as leviable. We think that the provisions of section 50 do not admit of any doubt and the view taken by the estate duty authorities is clearly warranted. Having regard to the discussion above, we are in agreement with the Tribunal that the deduction under section 50 of the Estate Duty Act was allowable in respect of probate court-fee in full. Accordingly, we answer the referred question in paragraph 2 thus The entire court-fee was allowable as deduction from the estate duty payable. No order as to costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 56 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... ons were raised at the instance of one party, it was open to the respondents also to raise questions which could be referred to the court. Hence, in a number of references which were filed prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in the above case, there are questions which are raised not merely at the instance of the applicant but also at the instance of the respondents. The latter did not consider it necessary to file separate references. In such cases, the principle of prospective overruling should be applied and questions raised by the respondents in such references made prior to the above Supreme Court judgment should also be answered. The Supreme Court, however, has held that a reference in respect of such questions is void. These observations are binding on us. Looking to this decision of the Supreme Court, questions Nos. 3 and 4 cannot be raised in the present reference. We, therefore, decline to answer them. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Debt Due, Deduction, Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... erson can claim deduction of half the amount from the value of the estate of the deceased. Question No. (1) is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the accountable person. In respect of question No. (2), Mr. Jetley contends that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. V. Damodaran 1980 121 ITR 572 it is not open to the assessee to raise this question. Mr. Dastur, however, contends that, as a result of the Tribunal s order, the accountable person has no estate duty liability and hence he could not have filed reference before this court in respect of that question. We need not examine this contention. In view of the answer which we have given to question No. (1), it is not necessary for us, in any event, to answer question No. (2) because, on account of our answer to question No. (1), no estate duty is payable by the accountable person. We, therefore, decline to answer question No. (2). In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 54 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... or children. Under this decree, no part of the estate of Maharani Bala Kumari Devi comes to the share of Rani Urmila Devi and/or her executors. In these circumstances, the following two questions which have been referred to us for decision under section 64(1) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, are answered as follows (i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the deceased Rani Urmila Devi had or acquired any share or interest in the property left by Maharani Bala Kumari Devi who died on February 3, 1952 ? (ii) If so, whether the alleged one-sixth share of the deceased in the estate of the late Maharani Bala Kumari Devi could be included in the principal value of the estate of the late Rani Urmila Devi at the time of her death ? Question No. (i) is answered in the negative and in favour of the accountable person. In view of the answer to question No. (i) above, question No. (ii) does not arise. The applicant to pay to the respondent the costs of the reference.
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1990 (6) TMI 53 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... r for the assessment year 1968-69 on March 20, 1973, on the deceased, Shri Ismail Ibrahim Amliwala, and not on his legal representative, Mohomed Ismail Amliwala, who had filed the return. Observing that the penalty was imposed on a dead person, following this court s decision in Ellis C. Reid v. CIT 1930 5 ITC 100, the Tribunal held that the penalty imposed under section 18(1)(a) was bad and illegal. Shri Jetley, learned counsel for the Department, has not been able to satisfy us that the penalty was not imposed on a dead person. That being so, it must follow that the imposition of penalty was bad and illegal. Accordingly, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 52 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Property Deemed To Pass ... ... ... ... ..... sfer must have been made within two years of the death, and (ii) the transfer must not be bona fide. The Tribunal has, in paragraph 8 of its judgment, admittedly, given a finding that the transfer was bona fide. No question was raised to dispute the said finding of fact nor has such a question been referred to us by the Tribunal. Under the circumstances, the case has to proceed on the basis that the transfer was bona fide. That being so, we have no difficulty in holding that section 9 of the Estate Duty Act is not applicable in this case. If section 9 is not applicable, it must necessarily follow that the share of the deceased as on the death, i.e., 25 per cent., both in the goodwill and in the development rebate reserve, could alone be included in the computation of the principal value of the estate. In the above view of the matter, the question reframed by us in the first paragraph is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the accountable person. No order as to costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 51 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... graph 7 of his judgment, postulated the question whether the conditions for waiver are satisfied in this case and he came to the conclusion that it is for the fact-finding authorities to determine that question and it is not for this court to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the statutory authorities. Considering the facts of this case, it is quite clear that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The imposition of penalty and interest are perfectly justified. This is a clear case where the party never made any voluntary disclosure on the other hand, it did everything to suppress the real situation and the real income. On his own admission, the petitioner was forced to file the revised return. There is no question of any voluntary disclosure. There are no merits in this writ appeal. The appellant is not entitled to any relief at the hands of this court under article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the result, the writ appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 50 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Deemed Dividend, Dividends, HUF ... ... ... ... ..... 17, 1984, as also the statement of the case dated April 27, 1985, forwarded to this court. As a final fact-finding authority, the Appellate Tribunal has found that the shareholder of the company in the instant case was the Hindu undivided family-the assessee. The Hindu undivided family applied for allotment of shares and obtained dividends distributed by the company. For all intents and purposes, the shareholder was the Hindu undivided family. The loans and advances were made to the Hindu undivided family. The Hindu undivided family is the assessee. On these facts, section 2(6A)(e) was clearly attracted. The Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding so. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. The income-tax reference is answered as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (6) TMI 49 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Perquisite ... ... ... ... ..... nd without considering the objects of the two provisions-the one contained in the Act and the other contained in the Rules. The perspective with which the provisions of the Act and the provisions in the Rules should be viewed are different. These are matters for a detailed and in-depth consideration, as a result of which alone, proper conclusion can be arrived at. It has not been done in this case. The conclusion arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal is, in the circumstances, totally unsatisfactory and perfunctory. In this view, we decline to answer the questions referred to us. But, at the same time, we direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to restore the appeal to the file and decide the matter afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained herein. The reference is disposed of as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (6) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assets, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... Wealth-tax Officer. The submission, in our view, is reasonable. It may be mentioned that the alternative claim before the Wealth-tax Officer was as regards income-tax liability in respect of outstanding professional fees and the likelihood of 50 of the outstanding fees being bad debts. So far as income-tax liability is concerned, we have already held in our order that there was no income-tax liability attached to the outstanding fees on the valuation date as in the case of an assessee maintaining books on cash basis outstanding fees become taxable only on receipt and not on accrual. However, the claim that outstanding professional fees are not received in full and a part thereof has to be written off as a bad debt will have to be looked into on the basis of material already on record or such material as may be allowed to be placed before the Tribunal. The question of law is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee with the direction as above. No order as to costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assets, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... hin the meaning of section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act. The third question is, accordingly, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. This takes us to the first question, namely, whether the case of an assessee carrying on a profession as distinct from a business, is covered by section 7(2)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. In view of the categorical observations of the Supreme Court in CWT v. Vysyaraju Badreenarayana Moorthy Raju 1985 152 ITR 454, which has been followed by this court in CWT v. V. M. Shah 1988 170 ITR 17, it is not disputed that outstanding fees of a person carrying on a profession represent assets includible in the net wealth irrespective of the method of accounting followed. That being so, the answer to this question either way, in our opinion, is not going to make any difference in the situation. The question is, thus, academic. Therefore, even though arguments were advanced at length, we decline to answer the question. No order as to costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Reference, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... nd (iii) payment of estate duty out of the proceeds of transfer. If all these conditions are satisfied, estate duty is reduced by a sum which bears to the total amount of tax on capital gains so arising the same proportion as the amount paid towards estate duty out of proceeds of the transfer. On the face of it, refund under section 50B of the Estate Duty Act, thus, would crystallise on the passing of the order of refund only. That apart, there is no material on record to indicate as to when was the property sold, what was the capital gains thereon, when and how much income-tax was paid on capital gains arising therefrom and when was the application for refund under section 50B made, etc. In the circumstances, it is not even otherwise possible to determine the date when the accountable persons became entitled to the refund of estate duty. If determination of this date is not possible, the question cannot obviously be answered. Accordingly, the question is returned unanswered.
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1990 (6) TMI 45 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Interest, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... e-tax department before which the insurer failed to raise certain objections. This decision cannot, therefore, help the petitioner. Nextly, Redihot Electricals v. Union of India 1990 185 ITR 664 (Delhi), related to a case under section 11B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and cannot be of any help. It is true that, in Hirachand Kothari v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1985 SC 998, the Supreme Court observed that interest is payable sometimes on equitable grounds. This decision cannot be of any help unless the petitioner, as stated earlier, establishes or proves that the case is one where equitable circumstances (some of which are enumerated in section 4(2), Interest Act, 1978) exist. Therefore, all these decisions do not also apply. We hold, therefore, alternatively, that interest is not payable under the common law or in equity or under section 4(1) of the Interest Act, 1978. For the aforesaid reasons, this writ petition is dismissed, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 44 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in WTO v. Madhavan Nambiar 1988 169 ITR 810, a Bench of this court held that, by the passing of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975, there is a total extinction of undivided Hindu family in the State with effect from December 1, 1976. It was held that there was a statutory extinction of Hindu undivided family. The above Bench decision was followed in subsequent decisions in Shantilal C. Shah v. CIT 1988 169 ITR 805 (Ker) and P. G. Narayanaswamy v. CIT 1988 169 ITR 813 (Ker). In the light of the aforesaid Bench decisions of this court, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessment could not be validly made on the assessee in the status of a Hindu undivided family. We answer the question of law referred to us in the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (6) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Estate Duty, HUF ... ... ... ... ..... sted two High Court decisions, one upholding the Validity of section 34(1)(c) and the other striking it down. That being so, neither of the two decisions was binding on the Tribunal as such. The settled law in view of the Supreme Court decision in K. S. Venkataraman and Co. (P.) Ltd. v. State of Madras 1966 60 ITR 112 being that the Tribunal cannot consider the vires of the provisions of the Act under which it is constituted, the Tribunal could not have considered the question, far less ignored the provisions. Strictly speaking, this court cannot also go into this question in its reference jurisdiction, though, as rightly pointed out by Shri Jetley, several other High Courts have upheld the validity of the provisions of section 34(1)(c). Accordingly, we hold that the Tribunal was not justified in ignoring the provisions of section 34 (1) (c). In the above view of the matter, the question of law is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Gift ... ... ... ... ..... ered from a mistake apparent on the face of the record. The admitted position being that, in view of the two Supreme Court decisions referred to above, the amounts gifted by the deceased and subsequently deposited with G. T. Badamia and Sons could not be said to be hit by the provisions of section 10 of the Estate Duty Act by reason of the mere fact that, after the gifts were received, the amounts gifted were deposited by the donees in a concern of which the deceased was a proprietor or a partner up to his death, it had to be held that the appellate order passed by the Tribunal originally taking contrary view suffered from a mistake apparent on the face of the record. This being so, we have to further hold that the Tribunal was justified in rectifying the order so as to bring it in conformity with the Supreme Court decisions. The second part of the question is only consequential. The question of law is answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 41 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Supreme Court, Reference, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... on of consideration by the Tribunal of a fresh application under section 256 to invoke the provisions of section 257 of the said Act as argued before this court. It is open to the petitioner to move the Hon ble Supreme Court to ask for an appropriate order if the special leave petition is admitted. It is needless to come to this writ court for a direction to the Tribunal to refer the matter on the self-same point of law for the subsequent year to the Hon ble Supreme Court. This court does not appreciate the stand taken by the petitioner and does not at all find that the Tribunal has acted irregularly and/or illegally in not invoking the provisions as provided in section 257 of the said Act which is not mandatory. Considering this aspect of the matter, this writ court is not inclined to interfere with the matter and hence the petition is rejected. There will be no order as to costs. All parties concerned to act on a signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking.
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1990 (6) TMI 40 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in this behalf, the value of any asset, other than cash, for the purpose of this Act, shall be estimated to be the price which in the opinion of the Wealth-tax Officer it would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date. In our opinion, the language of the section is clear and gives no scope for deduction of capital gains tax which an assessee might have to pay if and when the property is sold. What the section speaks about is the price which, in the opinion of the Wealth-tax Officer, the asset would fetch, if it had been sold in the open market on the valuation date. It is impossible to say that the price which a property would fetch as on the date of valuation is the price minus capital gains tax. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Madras High Court in the case of T. S. Srinivasa Iyer 1976 104 ITR 625. In the result, we make the following order We answer the question referred in all these cases in the affirmative and against the assessee.
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