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Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 235 Records
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1983 (8) TMI 75 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
Unexplained Investments ... ... ... ... ..... the assessment year in question amounted to Rs. 3,591. The ITO considering the fact that the assessee was living in a rented house and that he was maintaining a good standard, estimated the household expenses at Rs. 9,000 and accordingly made an addition of Rs. 5,409. The assessee pointed out before the learned AAC in appeal that he had only returned for the assessment year in question an income of Rs. 7,162 and there was no material to show that the assessee was maintaining a good standard of living. The learned AAC accepted these submissions and deleted the addition. Before us, Shri Gulati additionally pointed out that the assessee s family consisted of himself and his wife. After considering the rival submissions, we are of the view that in view of the above facts and circumstances, there was no justification for the ITO to make any addition. We, therefore, uphold the order of the learned AAC in this regard. 8. In the result, the department s appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1983 (8) TMI 74 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
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... ... ..... ring constructed area of 238 sq. yds. Further, the rent adopted by the Municipality or by a local authority is not binding on the department because the department was not a party so far as the fixation of rent by Municipality or local authority of a particular property is concerned. Even the local authority can determine a rent on the basis of compromise decree between the landlord and tenant. That may sometimes be very low or very high depending upon the circumstances and relations between the landlord and tenant. Therefore, the rent adopted by the Municipality or any local authority is not binding on the revenue. In view of the above fact, we remit the matter back to the ITO with a direction to ascertain the relevant facts and decide the ALV in accordance with the provisions of Rent Control Act. The rent adopted by the Municipality or Small Causes Court is not binding on the department. That has only an evidentiary value. 6. The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
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1983 (8) TMI 73 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
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... ... ..... mpetition and creating new demands, this factor of publicity has prevaded all spheres of human behaviour. Almost all things are done with the in built motive of publicity, even the social sphere is not spared. Hence the inauguration expenses though still has basis of religious faith, the scale at which the ceremony is performed and the cost at which it is performed, makes it evident that usually the same is motivated with the intention of publicity. Besides such expenses also boost morale of employees and add to the fellowship to which great importance is attached by industrial philosophy. Moreover, such expenses were incurred by the business already in existence. Hence there is no reason why the same should not be allowed. The orthodox customs of revenue prevalent with the taxing officials in respect of disallowing muharat and inauguration expenses must give way to healthy trends in the ever changing pattern of commercial expediency. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 72 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
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... ... ..... find that the assessee had made available all the necessary information to the IT authorities and its only fault was that it had not shown income from self occupied property in the returns originally filed, due to inadvertence and bonafide omission. We made this observation as the assessee itself had voluntarily shown the income from the self-occupied property in the returns filed for the asst yr. 1978-79 u/s 139(1) of the Act. It is from this return that the ITO took action to include the income from self occupied property in the years under appeal. This would clearly show that there was no mala fide intention on the part of the assessee not to show income from the self occupied property in the returns originally filed. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that the assessee s case could not be brought within the mischief of section 271(1)(c) of the Act. We would, therefore, cancel the penalty imposed under that section. 6. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 71 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
Deductions, Profits And Gains From Newly Established Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... s itself does not create a debt against the company. 8. We would also like to touch upon section 511 of the Companies Act, 1956 in respect of distribution of property of company on winding up. Under that section the holders of preference shares shall be entitled to repayment of capital first but where the terms of issue of any preference shares provide for payment of arrears of dividend, then only, the preference shareholders can claim from the liquidator not only repayment of the capital but also all arrears of dividend due on the shares. This suggests that even when winding up of the company takes place the arrears of dividend in respect of the preference shares, will be paid only if after the payment of the capital and that too only terms so provide. This would give an idea that arrears of dividend cannot be considered as a liability at the end of each accounting period. We, therefore, uphold the order of Commissioner (Appeals). 9. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1983 (8) TMI 70 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
Minor Child, Share Income ... ... ... ... ..... ents-children relationship which Muslim law recognizes. The above quotations, particularly from Taiyabji s work, show that consanguinity relationship of blood is the only relationship which is recognised under Muslim law, and that is why adoption has no place in it. In other words, the concept of step-children is unknown to Mohammedan law. Section 2(15A) would be applicable only if there can be step-children regarding an individual-assessee. If there cannot be any step-children, that section would not be applicable. Since in this case the minors are not step-children of the assessee, that section would not be applicable to his case. Therefore, now on both the counts (i) that the assessee s case does not come in any way within the purview of section 64 and (ii) that the minors are not the step-children of the assessee, we must hold that, the income of the minors cannot be included in the income of the assessee. 12. In the result, all the appeals of the department are rejected.
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1983 (8) TMI 69 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... g force must be applied after minutely considering ratio laid down, to the changed circumstances and thinking in economic life. The only respect for judgments, in the minds of law-abiding taxpayers shall ever be on increase and deeply rooted. 2.16 The Hon ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd. was concerned with issue of additional equity shares. The Hon ble Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Mohan Meakin Breweries Ltd. was concerned with expenditure for issue of fresh shares. The Hon ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Hindustan Gas and Industries Ltd. was concerned with the expenditure on the issue of prospectus for offering redeemable preference shares to the public. Therefore, all these cases on which the Hon ble Gujarat High Court relied upon while deciding the case of Shree Digvijay Cement Co. Ltd. were in connection with a point different from the one under consideration before us. 3. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part.
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1983 (8) TMI 68 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-A
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... ... ..... him. Their rationale for making the aforesaid addition is based on the inference that the said amount must have remained with the assessee in the form of cash, etc. after paying off the tax of Rs. 2,30,700. No such factual inference however arises, naturally from the aforesaid data given by the assessee in his declaration. It is a pure question of fact, either the assets are there, or they are not there. The assessee denies their existence. The department has no evidence to show that they are there. The income might have been spent, if not saved, or might have been gifted away. There are numerous possibilities with regard to it. What is, however, certain is that they are no corresponding matching assets as per evidence on record. The addition made by the authorities below, therefore, to the extent of Rs. 2,71,300 was based on no factual premises and, therefore, it cannot be sustained. Accordingly, we delete the addition and allow the assessee s appeal. 7. Appeal is allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 67 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Judicial order - Excise duty - Retrospective effect - Matches - Exemption ... ... ... ... ..... nce Act of 1982 cannot be said to be bad. As a matter of fact in M.P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P. (AIR 1979 SC 621) it has clearly been held by the Supreme Court that the plea of estoppel will not apply to the legislature and that the principle of estoppel will not apply to the exercise of power under a statute. Thus the additional point urged by the petitioners in the above writ petitions is also to be rejected. 28.In view of the fact that all the contentions urged by the petitioners have been rejected, all the writ petitions are dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 29.The learned counsel for the petitioners makes an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment just now pronounced. But having regard to the fact that our judgment is mainly and substantially based on certain decisions of the Supreme Court, we do not think that this is a fit case for the grant of leave. Therefore, the oral application for leave is rejected.
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1983 (8) TMI 66 - HIGH COURT AT MADRAS
Validating Acts - Exemption - Matches - Promissory estoppel ... ... ... ... ..... ce Act of 1982 cannot be said to be bad. As a matter of fact in M. P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P. AIR 1979 SC 621 it has clearly been held by the Supreme Court that the plea of estoppel will not apply to the legislature and that the principle of estoppel will not apply to the exercise of power under a statute. Thus the additional point urged by the petitioners in the above writ petitions is also to be rejected. 31. In view of the fact that all the contentions urged by the petitioners have been rejected, all the writ petitions are dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 32. The learned counsel for the petitioners makes an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment just now pronounced. But having regard to the fact that our judgment is mainly and substantially based on certain decisions of the Supreme Court, we do not think that this is a fit case for the grant of leave. Therefore the oral application for leave is rejected.
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1983 (8) TMI 65 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Motor vehicles - Accessory - Connotation and scope of
... ... ... ... ..... best could make the seats more comfortable, but do not serve as aid to the vehicle as a whole and, therefore, they must fall outside the ambit of that entry. 11. There is one other reason in support of our conclusion. The seat covers particularly of motor cars are made of different materials. Some like cloth covers, some want rexine some like leather or velvet and some are fond of coverings with thin layer of foam. There is, therefore, no reason why these different articles should be uniformly charged at 13 per cent under entry No. 73. It would be contrary to the scheme of the Act itself. That was also perhaps the reason behind the clarification made by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in the letter dated March 13, 1974 on which the assessee depended. 12. In the result, the revision petition is allowed the orders of the Tribunal and of the Deputy Commissioner are set aside and that of the assessing authority is restored. 13. The parties will pay and bear their own cost.
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1983 (8) TMI 64 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
Prosecution - Acquittal ... ... ... ... ..... the learned Additional Government Advocate, contended that since this was not urged either before the trying Magistrate or before the appellate court, the accused should not be permitted to urge this point in revision. Grant of sanction goes to the root of the matter, namely, jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence. The accused in this case is not referring to any facts, but argues with regard to the validity of the sanction with reference to the document (exhibit 3). Since the sanction of the Collector is a condition precedent for taking cognizance, I would reject the submission of the learned Additional Government Advocate and hold that the petitioner is entitled to urge this point even in revision. 13. In the result, the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Magistrate and confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge are hereby set aside and the accused is acquitted. His bail bond is cancelled. 14. The criminal revision is accordingly allowed.
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1983 (8) TMI 63 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Revision of Appellate order justified, if it was not based on reasons but was passed in a cavalier fashion - Strictures against the Appellate Collector
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1983 (8) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
Writ jurisdiction - Words and phrases - `Production' - Interpretation of ... ... ... ... ..... to direct the original authority to investigate the claim of the petitioner. 15. On the above discussion, it follows that the application made by the petitioner for incentive rebate has been illegally rejected by the authorities and the same requires to be accepted by this Court, however, reserving them liberty to adjust the amount for any of the amounts that are outstanding to the Central Government under the Act, from the petitioner. 16. In the light of my above discussion, I make the following orders and directions (i) I quash the impugned orders (ii) I direct respondent No. 2 to allow the application made by the petitioner for incentive rebate for the month of May, 1973 for a sum of Rs. 4,14,600/- with liberty reserved to him to adjust the same for any of the amounts outstanding to Central Government under the Act from the petitioner. 17. Writ petition is disposed of in the above terms. But, in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1983 (8) TMI 61 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
Exemption notification treating manufacturers as non-manufacturers and vice versa invalid - Footwear
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1983 (8) TMI 60 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Writ jurisdiction - Quasi-judicial proceedings - Evidence of co-accused - Evidentiary value ... ... ... ... ..... criticised as statements of the co-accused, they are of sufficient evidentiary value for the purpose of coming to a conclusion against the petitioner in departmental proceedings. The belated retraction does not, in my view, affect the value of those statements. The department having discharged their initial burden of setting up a prima facie case against the petitioner, the burden, as stated by the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 859, shifted to the petitioner to establish and explain the relevant facts, especially in regard to matters falling within his special or peculiar knowledge. Even assuming that the respondents were not justified in reaching a conclusion solely on the statements of the six persons, the conclusion is unassailable, particularly because the statements of these persons must be seen in the context of Ext. P. 1. For all those reasons the conclusion reached in the impugned orders is perfectly valid. The Original Petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1983 (8) TMI 59 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
`Manufacture' - Connotation of - Words and phrases "Copra consumed" - `Excise duty' - Interpretation of - Direct and indirect taxes - Distinction between
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1983 (8) TMI 58 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Personal Hearing — Natural justice - Exemption ... ... ... ... ..... on ground that the 1st respondent did not hear the petitioner orally before rendering Ext. P7 order. On that short ground, I hold that Ext. P7 order is illegal. It is violative of the principles of natural justice. It is quashed. The 1st respondent is directed to hear the petitioner and dispose of the matter in accordance with law. The petitioner is at liberty to bring to the notice of the 1st respondent any material he has got in order to substantiate the contention he had taken against Ext. P5 notice. 9. The O.P. is disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs. 10. The Counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice that as per orders of this court dated 24-3-1982 in C.M.P. No. 6366 of 1982 he has furnished bank guarantee for amounts due as per Ext. P7. This order was extended by order dated 13-4-1982 in C.M.P. No. 7974 of 1982. In view of the fact that Ext. P7 order is annulled, the bank guarantee that is furnished by the petitioner will also stand discharged.
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1983 (8) TMI 57 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
Search — Words and phrases — Writ jurisdiction — Searches and seizures — Interference by Courts
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1983 (8) TMI 56 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Customs valuation - Natural justice - Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... justified. In my judgment, there is no merit whatsoever in the petition and the same deserves to be dismissed. 12. Before parting with the matter, it is required to be stated that the Revisional authority was too kind to the petitioners in setting aside the penalty imposed in respect of the first two consignments. The Revisional authority, after recording the conclusion that the basis of the value given by the petitioners in respect of the two consignments was wholly under-valued was not justified in setting aside the penalty imposed on the ground that it was not done deliberately. The entire conduct of the petitioners leaves no manner of doubt that their action in declaring the value of the imported goods at under-value rate was deliberate and was done with a view to evade the duty. The petitioners should thank themselves for securing an order in their favour in respect of the first two consignments. 13. Accordingly, the petition fails and the rule is discharged with costs.
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