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Case Laws
Showing 181 to 200 of 219 Records
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1990 (6) TMI 39 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... e Appellate Tribunal was in error in deleting the addition of Rs. 9,26,448 representing ex gratia payment in excess of the statutory limit of 20 per cent. bonus. We answer the question referred to us in the negative, but at the same time, direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to restore the appeal to Me and re-evaluate the entire matter in the light of the Bench decision in CIT v. P. Alikunju, M. A. Nazir, Cashew Industries 1987 166 ITR 611 and the subsequent decisions in CIT v. Kumar Industries 1990 183 ITR 156 and CIT v. Kerala Agro Industries Corporation 1990 183 ITR 197, If the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal considers that it will be just and proper in the circumstances of the case that the matter is re-evaluated by the assessing authority, the Tribunal will be free to remit the matter to the assessing authority. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (6) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Deduction, Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... letter dated November 10, 1986, have either been complied with or will be complied with and, thereafter, the case may be considered on merits. For the foregoing reasons, the reliefs as prayed for are not available to the petitioners. This court does not find any merit in the contention of the writ petitioner. Accordingly, the writ petition is rejected. There will be no order as to costs. It is, however, made clear that this order will not prevent the petitioner from asking the specified authority to consider the case of the petitioner again on merits by complying with the formalities as required under the law and by production of all the documents and information as called for by the specified authority in accordance with law. Interim order, if any, is vacated, Since this court has observed that the rejection of the petitioner s prayer is premature and permitted the Department to consider it upon the application of the petitioner, there is nothing to be stayed as prayed for.
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1990 (6) TMI 37 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Power To Give Direction ... ... ... ... ..... ase pertaining to A. The same principles seem to apply when the question is whether the income under enquiry is taxable in the assessment year under consideration or any other assessment year. As regards the expression direction in section 153(3)(ii) of the Act, it is now well settled that it must be an express direction necessary for the disposal of the case before the authority or court. It must also be a direction which the authority or court is empowered to give while deciding the case before it. The expressions finding and direction in section 153(3)(ii) of the Act must be accordingly confined. For the foregoing reasons our answer to the aforesaid question of law is in favour of the assessee and against the Department as follows On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the direction given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was wholly unwarranted and redundant. We make no order as to costs of this reference.
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1990 (6) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... itioner s sons are entitled to have a share by birth. That being the position, the observation of the Commissioner extracted above is not correct and, therefore, while sustaining the order of remand, we set aside that portion of the observation of the Commissioner including the observation that the Agricultural Income-tax Officer must proceed to assess the petitioner under section 17 of the Act. In the result, we direct the Agricultural Income-tax Officer to give reasonable opportunity to the petitioner/assessee to substantiate his stand that the two holdings are distinct and different and he is entitled to have separate assessments on the two holdings under section 65 of the Act and dispose of the matter in accordance with law. While disposing of the matter afresh, the Agricultural Income-tax Officer may also bear in mind the ratio laid down by this court in Mariyam Aysha v. Commr. of Agri. I. T. 1976 104 ITR 381. The tax revision cases are disposed of accordingly no costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 35 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... issioner to dislodge the burden placed upon him. On the other hand, in the penalty proceedings, no materials were brought in by the Department to show that the assessee concealed or furnished inaccurate particulars. In fact, in the quantum appeal, the Tribunal accepted the explanation offered by the assessee and deleted a portion of the unexplained cash credit. It is under these circumstances and after taking note of all these facts that the Tribunal pointed out that even though the explanation is applicable for determining the exact quantum of concealed income, it has to be shown that the credit did represent an income receipt which was concealed. In such circumstances, therefore, we consider that the Tribunal was correct in holding that Rs. 29,000 cannot be termed as concealed income. In that view of the matter, we answer both the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department. The assessee is entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500.
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1990 (6) TMI 34 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... y the Appellate Tribunal dated December 18, 1978. Our reasoning and conclusion in 1. T. R. No. 107 of 1987 (M. D. Joseph v. CIT 1990 187 ITR 112) squarely applies to this case as well. In the light of our decision in 1. T. R. No. 107 of 1987 (M. D. Joseph v. CIT 1990 187 ITR 112) we hold that the Appellate Tribunal was justified in finding that the unregistered written agreement dated January 26, 1973, is a sale itself. We answer this aspect of the question in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. We decline to answer the other limbs of the question. Our decision in 1. T. R. No. 107 of 1987 (M. D. Joseph v. CIT 1990 187 ITR 112) will apply with equal force herein also regarding those aspects. We make this position clear. The reference is answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (6) TMI 33 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Coffee Plantation ... ... ... ... ..... sideration. So, the only part of the question that is relevant at this stage and which we are called upon to answer is whether, by the written deed dated January 26, 1973, there was a transfer of the asset. In our opinion, a reading of the written agreement dated January 26, 1973 as a whole, particularly, clauses 2 and 3 thereof, decisively points to the conclusion that the deed dated January 26, 1973, is not an agreement to sell but a sale deed itself. We concur, with the Appellate Tribunal in that view. We answer the first limb of the question referred to us in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. The Income-tax Officer will give effect to the order of the Appellate Tribunal dated December 18, 1978, in the light of the answer given by us hereinabove. The reference is answered accordingly. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (6) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Debt Due, Deduction, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... remained as an outstanding for a period of more than one year. Tax under section 140A is payable not because of an order passed by the authorities concerned, but by virtue of the statutory obligation contained in the taxing statute. Therefore, the contentions put forward by the assessee that even though the self-assessment tax payable under section 140A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, remained as an outstanding for more than one year, since there was no order passed demanding the same, the bar contemplated under section 2(m)(iii) will not be applicable, cannot be accepted in view of the abovesaid legal position on this point. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the order passed by the Tribunal in confirming the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on this point is in order. Thus, we answer the question referred to us in the negative and against the assessee. The Department is entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500 (one set).
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1990 (6) TMI 31 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Firm Registration, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... d, therefore, the Tribunal was right in refusing to make a reference. The question was whether the assessee was entitled to claim continuation of registration of the firm even after the date of minor, Tarun Kumar, attaining the age of majority on July 21, 1971, and the effect of Tarun Kumar s failure to sign the declaration in the requisite forms. In the light of the proviso to sub-section (5) and the provisions of sub-section (7) of section 30 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and those of section 185(3) of the Act, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the assessee was entitled to the continuation of registration of the firm. This conclusion was not challenged. What was sought to be challenged by the proposed question was, as pointed out by the Tribunal, the finding of facts. The application for reference was, therefore, rightly rejected. For the foregoing reasons, this application under section 256(2) of the Act fails and it is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 30 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Goodwill ... ... ... ... ..... ion 7 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, so as to be included in the principal value of his estate passing on his death ? It is agreed as between the learned advocates appearing for both sides that the question referred to us is covered by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CED v. Mrudula Nareshchandra 1986 160 ITR 342. Accordingly, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. No order to costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 29 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Bonus, Business Expenditure, Remuneration ... ... ... ... ..... ng other decisions ITO v. Murlidhar Bhagwan Das 1964 52 ITR 335 (SC) P. J. Udani v. CIT 1967 63 ITR 766 (AP) and Bakshish Singh v. ITO 1974 93 ITR 178 (Cal). In this connection, it should be remembered that the Tribunal was disposing of the appeal filed by the Revenue before it for the year 1980-81, and not an appeal filed by the assessee. And there is no material or even whisper to show that an alternate plea or approach was mooted by the assessee for the claim made by it when the Tribunal adjudicated the appeal, namely, that the amount is claimable for the subsequent year 1981-82 and that the alternate plea necessitated the observations made, in which case, the ratio of the decision in Motilal Bawalal v. CIT 1963 50 ITR 249 (Bom) may call for application. Such is not the case here. The reference is answered as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (6) TMI 28 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Lease On Land, Property Tax ... ... ... ... ..... f section 112 of the Act and, therefore, the primary liability to pay the property tax on the building in question is upon the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that, if it were to be held that the primary liability to pay the property tax on the building in question is on the appellant as he was receiving only a smaller amount of rent that the actual rent which the sub-lessee is receiving from those to whom he has further sub-let the premises, the appellant would be entitled to reimbursement as provided under sub-section (6) of section 112 of the Act. We do not express any opinion on the said question. That is a separate right which the appellant, according to him, is entitled to exercise, under sub- section (6) of section 112 of the Act in separate proceedings. In the result, we make the following order The appeals are dismissed without expressing any opinion on the right of the appellant to reimbursement under sub-section (6) of section 112 of the Act.
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1990 (6) TMI 27 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... . After examining the income and expenditure statement for the past 25 years and the report of the governing body of the sabha, the Tribunal, on facts, came to the conclusion that the Sabha was running at a loss all these years. Therefore, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that even assuming that there was an activity on the part of the assessee in letting out the hall, it was not an activity for profit within the meaning of section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Thus, considering the facts appearing on this aspect, in the light of the decisions cited supra, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was correct in holding that the assessee is entitled to the exemption under section 11 read with section 2(15) of the Act in respect of the rental income derived from letting out the Vani Mahal. In that view of the matter, we answer the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the Revenue. The assessee is entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500.
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1990 (6) TMI 26 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Deduction For New Industrial Undertaking, New Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... face of the records of the assessment orders, the rectification orders do not disclose that the alleged defect was cured by calling upon the assessee to disclose the requisite details for purposes of section 80J(4) of the Act in rectification proceedings under section 154 of the Act. On the contrary, the rectification orders showed that the Income-tax Officer proceeded to make the rectification orders on the assumption that all the conditions laid down under section 80J(4) were fulfilled by the assessee. For all these reasons, we are of the view that the aforesaid question of law deserves to be answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, Accordingly, we answer the question as follows The Income-tax Officer was not right in law in granting relief to the assessee under section 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in the rectification proceedings taken under section 154 of the Act. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to the costs of this reference.
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1990 (6) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Burden Of Proof, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... e the end of the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year under consideration. Further, in a case of legislative ambiguity, the assessee should be entitled to the benefit of doubt particularly in a provision which attempts to penalise the assessee (See CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd. 1973 88 ITR 192 (SC)). We have already pointed out in this case that there is no finding given by the Income-tax Officer to the effect that the original estimate of the advance tax furnished by the assessee was untrue to the knowledge or reasonable belief of the assessee. On a careful consideration of all these aspects, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal Was correct in upholding the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the penalty proceedings under section 273(a) of the Act. In that view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department. The assessee is entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500.
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1990 (6) TMI 24 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... epartment. Further, in the present case, the Department failed to establish that the loan taken by the deceased represented the amounts gifted by him to his son. Therefore, it is not liable to abatement under section 46(2) of the Estate Duty Act. Unless the Department establishes that the deceased made the gift to his son only with a view to facilitate the giving of the loan to the deceased, section 46(1) cannot be made applicable to the debts and hence the sum of Rs. 47,077 cannot be taken as property passing on the death of the deceased under section 46(2) of the Act. Thus, considering the facts appearing on this aspect in the light of the judicial pronouncements cited supra, we are of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal on this point. In that view of the matter, we answer both the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department. The accountable person is entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500.
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1990 (6) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Donation By Trust, Questioning Assessee's Running Of His Business, Void, Voidable Transactions
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1990 (6) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assessment, Information, Reassessment, Trustee, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... unal s order on the ground that although he had information as to law in the form of a higher authority s order in his possession, he waited for its confirmation by the Tribunal before acting on it. Section 17(1)(b) is not attracted in such a situation. In our view, therefore, it was not open to the Wealth-tax Officer to reopen the assessments for the years 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62. In the premises, the questions referred to us are answered as follows Question No. 1 in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 2 does not arise in view of our answer to question No. 1. Question No. 3 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 4 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. For the assessment year 1958-59, however, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner s order of June 24, 1959, constitutes fresh information. Question No. 5 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 21 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assessment, Trusts, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... r. At the instance of the Department, the Tribunal has referred to this court the following question of law for opinion Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it was open to the Wealth-tax Officer to assess the trust, notwithstanding the fact that assessments in the individual hands of the beneficiaries had already been made ? Shri Jetley, learned counsel for the Department, has fairly stated that the issue involved herein is covered by this court s judgment in the case of Trustees of Putlibai R. F. Mulla Trust v. CWT 1967 66 ITR 653. However, the issue, he stated, was pending before the Supreme Court. Shri Dastur, learned counsel for the respondent, stated that the Bombay High Court s decision 1967 66 ITR 653 has been approved by the Supreme court in the case of CWT v. Trustees of H. E. H. Nizam s Family (Remainder Wealth) Trust 1977 108 ITR 555, 599. Accordingly, we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1990 (6) TMI 20 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Deduction, Estate Duty, Probate Court Fee ... ... ... ... ..... tified in holding that relief under section 50 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, has to be allowed if court fees are paid in respect of the property which is exempt from payment of estate duty under section 33 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ? (3) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in law in allowing relief under section 50 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, in respect of certain items of property which were not charged to estate duty under the provisions of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ? Counsel are agreed that the facts and rival contentions in this case and in Estate Duty Reference No. 18 of 1976 CED v. M. Charitakis and Dr. G. B. Ramasarma 1990 186 ITR 490 (Bom) which we have heard and disposed of today are identical. Following our decision in that case, we answer the first question in the affirmative and in favour of the accountable person. The second and third questions are not answered as it is not necessary to do so. No order as to costs.
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